§132

The distinction drawn here between 'an' order and 'the' order ('in our knowledge of the use of language'), maps, I like to think, onto the distinction I previously drew between 'surveying' grammar (§122) either locally and globally. In those terms, one can put the point like this: because there is, and therefore can be, no globally applicable grammar to cover all uses of language, the only comparisons we can make are between distinct local grammars. In other words, there can only be local-to-local comparisons, and not local-to-global comparisons.

This is one reason why the accent here is placed on 'distinctions' (and not similarities; compare §130: "the language-games stand there as objects of comparison which, through similarities and dissimilarities"). "Our ordinary forms of language ... make us overlook" these distinctions, because we tend to take language to have a global grammar that is applicable everywhere - philosophy, in particular, is prone to this mistake.

Now, what lends every 'local' grammar it's flavour, is, of course, the use to which it is put (building something, naming something, giving directions, etc). Each of these 'practical' forms-of-life will employ a different kind of grammar, corresponding to the language-games appropriate to them. 'Language in idle' is what happens when we abstract language-games from those forms-of-life, and treat grammar as being globally consistent across all of language.

PI 132
"We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language:..."

Think of order in terms of an arrangement or method, not the order or the method, as if there is one way of seeing or looking at a word's use, but "...one out of many possible orders or methods. Why? Because of the complexity of language-games, and the logic of use behind each language-game. In order to see this clearly one compares language-games (similarities and dissimilarities). Think of comparing the use of the word time in one language-game (e.g. science), as opposed to the use of the word time as a poet might use it (compare and make note). As we do this we accumulate "...knowledge in the use of language," and we begin to see the distinctions within each of these language-games that are easily overlooked.

Clarity is also not a kind of generalized clarity, but a clarity that comes from understanding various uses of words within a particular language-game. It's not the clarity Wittgenstein was seeking in the TLP. Clarity for Wittgenstein in the PI is piecemeal, and each case is a reminder used for a particular purpose.

The question that arises is, "Are all philosophical problems solved using Wittgensteinian methods?" The answer, has to be an unequivocal, no! Wittgenstein's methods don't clear up everything. However, they do clear up many philosophical puzzles. In fact, as I've stated before, many, or probably most of the philosophical problems in these forums are simply misunderstandings of the sort that Wittgenstein is dealing with. Moreover, understanding Wittgenstein's methods will help you not to go down roads that lead nowhere.

Understanding Wittgenstein is not enough, one must be practiced at using his methods.

§133

§133 can be read as a conclusion to the whole section that began around §88 or so, and it does so by bringing out the stakes of much of the discussion so far. I want to approach this in light of what I said previously about comparisons only being available at a local level: it's in this respect that I understand the comment that: "A method is now demonstrated by examples, and the series of examples can be broken off". This is because a local-to-local comparison of grammar does not generalise: local-to-local comparisons - which must always involve examples of language-in-use - shed mutual light on each other (ie. with respect to the specificity of the language-games involved, along with their grammar, and according to the forms-of-life which grant them relevancy), but they don’t ever (can’t ever, according to Witty) amount to (or lead to) a ‘theory of language’ as a whole.

The comparisons between language-games shed light on those language-games, but not, as it were, language in general. This is why ‘the series of examples can be broken off’: the comparison of examples can only go so far, before you literally start running out of material: forms-of-life and the grammar appropriate to them only extend so far, and no further. This is in contrast to the philosophical impulse to generalise (in the blue books, Witty famously laments philosophy’s “craving for generality”) and take examples as merely standing for tokens of universilizablity; to make a philosophical problem ‘disappear’, in this sense, is to make note of the local specificity of a language-game; to note where it can, and cannot be applicable, and where and when it starts to stray too far from the form-of-life which gives it it’s sense.

This is why one can “break off philosophising” when one wants to: insofar as ‘philosophical problems’ are always those of an inappropriate generalization, merely noting that inappropriateness simply 'returns words to their everyday use’ (§116), from which philosophy is always a deviation. And having done this, one no longer, as it were, needs to philosophise: the philosophical problems ‘completely disappear’. All this also accounts for why Witty here insists on the plurality of problems (“problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem"): insofar as problems are always local, they are also always specific: there are no ‘eternal’ philosophical problems, just philosophical problems brought about by the inappropriate extension or extrapolation of a language-game beyond its bounds of applicability. And this is always a case-by-case issue.

—

Woo! Glad we got through this section. It’s easily my least favourite of the PI, and from here on out for the next few sections, Witty will be addressing what he calls the ‘general form of the proposition’, introduced in §65 but taken up here in an explicit manner. It continues his self-critique of the TLP, in which such a ‘general form’ was one of Witty’s most important concepts (TLP 5.471: "The general propositional form is the essence of a proposition”). It will be useful to keep this in mind while reading the next few sections.

This is because a local-to-local comparison of grammar does not generalise: local-to-local comparisons - which must always involve examples of language-in-use - shed mutual light on each other (ie. with respect to the specificity of the language-games involved, along with their grammar, and according to the forms-of-life which grant them relevancy), but they don’t ever (can’t ever, according to Witty) amount to (or lead to) a ‘theory of language’ as a whole. — StreetlightX

If language consists of distinct objects, separate language-games, and there can be no such thing as a theory of language as a whole, then it appears like the Philosophical Investigations' whole enterprise, which was to describe "language" (remember #7 ... I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the "language-game"), seems to be self-refuting. There is no such thing as "language".

It appears to me like he has proposed two completely different ways to describe language, which are distinctly incompatible with each other. One description is as a bunch of distinct objects, language-games, and the other, the various actions which comprise language as a whole. At this point in the text, he is clearly rejecting the latter in favour of the distinct language-games. But now we have no principle whereby we might unify distinct language-games to say that there is such a thing as "language".

I will stress that going forward from this point we must reject the inclination to think that there is such a thing as "language", because it is firmly denied. And to follow Wittgenstein's intention we must adhere to this principle that there is no such thing as "language". The description is of distinct language-games without a unifying principle.

I think Wittgenstein makes an illegal move by trying to on the one hand dissolve the basis for rules like math (equating it to the diagonal moves of a bishop in chess, let's say) but then shrug off any responsibility to employ empirical avenues such as evolutionary psychology which can inform the math/language system itself. Evolutionary psychological reasons for the capability of logical inferencing, for example, would negate the major thesis that all is just social convention and language-games. More over, if patterns of nature necessitate creatures with logical inferencing for survival, that is an even harder blow.

I think the following from Zettel speaks to this:

Do I want to say, then, that certain facts are favorable to the formation of certain concepts; or again unfavorable? And does experience teach us this? It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to them becomes unimportant, and vice versa. (It is discovered e.g. that what formerly counted as a difference in kind, is really only a difference in degree. (352)

Three points: First, does your post have anything to do with the passages we're currently reading? If so, which passages? If not, why are you posting here? Second, what is the 'basis for rules of math' that Wittgenstein supposedly 'dissolves'? You've said nothing about it, so I don't know what you're referring to. Third, one of Witty's 'major theses', as you put it, is precisely that language-games take their relevance from the forms-of-life from which they arise, so I don't see why you think the concept of language-games (to say nothing of 'social convention' - a phrase that appears not a single time in the PI, despite you naming it as a 'major thesis') might be in some way disabling of an evolutionary reading of language. Your post simply makes the assumption that they are incompatible, but I don't see any argument to that effect. So there's some implict understanding of Wittgenstein at work in your post, but you've not spelled it out, and so it cannot be engaged.

First, does your post have anything to do with the passages we're currently reading? — StreetlightX

You said:

Insofar as problems are always local, they are also always specific: there are no ‘eternal’ philosophical problems, just philosophical problems brought about by the inappropriate extension or extrapolation of a language-game beyond its bounds of applicability. And this is always a case-by-case issue. — StreetlightX

Witt's theory of the foundations of math are similar to that of language, in that he thinks it dissolves once it is shown to be a game of sorts. This is related to no "eternal" philosophical problems, like that of the foundations of math.

Second, what is the 'basis of math' that Wittgenstein supposedly 'dissolves'? You've said nothing about it, so I have no idea what you're referring to. — StreetlightX

The basis would be ones that see math as something "objective" and "Platonic". Instead, he thinks it is convention that gets played out in language-games.

Third, one of Witty's 'major theses', as you put it, is precisely that language-games take their relavence from the forms-of-life from which they arise, so I don't see why you think the concept of language-games (to say nothing of 'social convention' - a phrase that appears not a single time in the PI, despite you naming it as a 'major thesis') might be in some way disabling of an evolutionary reading of language. Your post simply makes the assumption that they are incompatible, but I don't see any argument to that effect. So there's some implict understanding of Wittgenstein at work in your post, but you've not spelled it out, and so it cannot be engaged. — StreetlightX

Fine, I will play this language-game and conflate "social convention" (my sense of it at least), with your use of "forms of life" (how Wittgenstein of us). Essentially, forms of life are human perspectives of a community- how people act, behave, cultural indicators, wrapped up with how the language is used. Forms of life have a relativistic sense to them- each community has its own form of life, and none are particularly hierarchical.

However, there are language/mathematical/logical communities that DO special things. For example, the conventional math-languages used in the sciences and engineering DO solve problems of a much more complex nature than the problems that other language games solve. It creates predictive models for which other language games do not have the ability to predict. How can this language game be so useful compared with others, in mining complexity in natural phenomena and in secondarily creating synthetic technologies from those original mined complexities?

And here we can say there is perhaps a realism to the complexities of these special language-games. Perhaps a realism that is above and beyond mere forms of life only. Contingency would imply caprice- that the efficacy would work as well as any other convention.

Perhaps these complexities, or what I call "patterns", are part of a bigger picture of explanation. Language-games may be true (pace Wittgenstein), but some language-games are based in a realism of necessary pattern-recognition that is necessary by way of evolutionary necessity. Animals that do not recognize patterns, would not survive. Thus there is a realism underlying the conventionalism or nominalism of Wttgenstein's project.

However, there are language/mathematical/logical communities that DO special things. For example, the conventional math-languages used in the sciences and engineering DO solve problems of a much more complex nature than the problems that other language games solve. It creates predictive models for which other language games do not have the ability to predict. How can this language game be so useful compared with others, in mining complexity in natural phenomena and in secondarily creating synthetic technologies from those original mined complexities? — schopenhauer1

Wittgenstein's methods of dissolving philosophical problems in the PI is meant to solve particular kinds of philosophical conundrums. This does not mean that every philosophical problem is solvable using these methods. If I understand you correctly, you seem to think that all philosophical problems can be solved using the language-game model. Wittgenstein is showing us how a certain kind of thinking is a misuse of language, and when it is such, then Wittgenstein's methods can be employed, otherwise never-mind.

Witt's theory of the foundations of math are similar to that of language, in that he thinks it dissolves once it is shown to be a game of sorts. This is related to no "eternal" philosophical problems, like that of the foundations of math. — schopenhauer1

Oh come on this is the longest of long stretches to stretch. At least be honest and say that you just wondered in here from your own recent concerns and you have zero interest in where the reading group is at.

How can this language game be so useful compared with others, in mining complexity in natural phenomena and in secondarily creating synthetic technologies from those original mined complexities? — schopenhauer1

What is it about language-games that makes you think they are somehow incompatible with this 'usefulness'? Especially since for Witty, all language-games are useful for particular purposes (that's just what language-games are). You mention caprice - but what makes you think language-games are (merely?) capricious or arbitrary? That they are not, that they are keyed at every point to purposes, is maybe the biggest lesson of the PI: language is use in a language-game.

You mention a 'realism to the complexities of these special language-games' - but what makes you think that not every language-game already involves just such a realism which not merely underwrites them, but makes of them language-games at all? That not every language-game is 'special' precisely to the degree that it is as it is for a (necessary (set of)) reason(s)? Witty's whole concern is to show when precisely such a realism is lost, we no longer even have language-games, and with their loss, can no longer mean anything at all.

And I'm ignoring entirely the idea that mathematical Platonism somehow counts as the default 'basis of math': as if it wasn't just one measly contender in a crowded, unstable field.

Some relevant passages from Stanley Cavell Claim of Reason, which I've been quoting incessantly, which might be useful here:

On necessity:

"It is not necessary that human beings should have come to engage in anything we would call calculation (inferring, etc.). But if their natural history has brought them to this crossroads, then only certain procedures will count as calculating (inferring, etc.) and only certain forms will allow those activities to proceed. It is not necessary that the members of a group should ever have found pleasure and edification in gathering together to hear the stories of their early history related; but if they do, then only certain kinds of stories, in certain structures, will provide (what we can comprehend as) that pleasure and edification. "There must be agreement not only in definitions but also . . . in judgements. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so."

In particular, I take it: It is not necessary that we should recognize anything as "logical inference"; but if we do, then only certain procedures will count as drawing such inferences, ones (say) which achieve the universality of agreement, the teachability, and the individual conviction, of the forms of inference we accept as logic. There is no logical explanation of the fact that we (in general, on the whole) will agree that a conclusion has been drawn, a rule applied, an instance to be a member of a class, one line to be a repetition of another (even though it is written lower down, or in another hand or color); but the fact is, those who understand (i.e., can talk logic together) do agree. And the fact is that they agree the way they agree; I mean, the ways they have of agreeing at each point, each step.

... Wittgenstein's view of necessity is, as one would expect, internal to his view of what philosophy is. His philosophy provides, one might say, an anthropological, or even anthropomorphic, view of necessity; and that can be disappointing; as if it is not really necessity which he has given an anthropological view of. As though if the a priori has a history it cannot really be the a priori in question. - "But something can be necessary whatever we happen to take as, or believe to be, necessary." - But that only says that we have a (the) concept of necessity - for it is part of the meaning of that concept that the thing called necessary is beyond our control.

If the wish were not mere father but creator of the deed, we would have no such concept. If upon doing a calculation I could wish, and my wish bring it about, that the figures from which I "started" become altered, if necessary, in order that the result of my calculation prove correct; and if I could wish, and my wish bring it about, that the world alter where necessary so that the altered figures are still of what they are supposed to be; then the sense of necessity (standing over myself, at any rate) is not likely to be very strong in me. What we take to be necessary in a given period may alter. It is not logically impossible that painters should now paint in ways which outwardly resemble paintings of the Renaissance, nor logically necessary that they now paint in the ways they do. What is necessary is that, in order for us to have the form of experience we count as an experience of a painting, we accept something as a painting. And we do not know a priori what we will accept as such a thing. But only someone outside such an enterprise could think of it as a manipulation or exploration of mere conventions"

On Convention:

"The conventions we appeal to may be said to be "fixed", "adopted", "accepted", etc. by us; but this does not now mean that what we have fixed or adopted are (merely) the (conventional) names of things. The conventions which control the application of grammatical criteria are fixed not by customs or some particular concord or agreement which might, without disrupting the texture of our lives, be changed where convenience suggests a change. (Convenience is one aspect of convention, or an aspect of one kind or level of convention.)

They are, rather, fixed by the nature of human life itself, the human fix itself, by those "very general facts of nature" which are "unnoticed only because so obvious", and, I take it, in particular, very general facts of human nature - such, for example, as the fact that the realization of intention requires action, that action requires movement, that movement involves consequences we had not intended, that our knowledge (and ignorance) of ourselves and of others depends upon the way our minds are expressed (and distorted) in word and deed and passion; that actions and passions have histories.

... That human beings on the whole do not respond in these ways is, therefore, seriously referred to as conventional; but now we are thinking of convention not as the arrangements a particular culture has found convenient, in terms of its history and geography, for effecting the necessities of human existence, but as those forms of life which are normal to any group of creatures we call human, any group about which we will say, for example, that they have a past to which they respond, or a geographical environment which they manipulate or exploit in certain ways for certain humanly comprehensible motives.

Here the array of "conventions" are not patterns of life which differentiate human beings from one another, but those exigencies of conduct and feeling which all humans share. Wittgenstein's discovery, or rediscovery, is of the depth of convention in human life; a discovery which insists not only on the conventionality of human society but, we could say, on the conventionality of human nature itself, on what Pascal meant when he said "Custom is our nature" (Pensees, §89)".

§134

Thus begin's Witty's explicit attack on the 'general form of the propositon', identified in the TLP as 'This is how things are'. The first thing he points out is that 'this is how things are' doesn't actaully say anything about the world, as it were; instead, it points to, or rather 'stands for some statement or other' which does say something about the world (e.g. "the cat is on the mat").

In other words, while "the cat is on the mat" might 'agree' (or not) with reality, 'This is how things are' can do neither because on its own, it's simply an incomplete sentence. One has to supply the 'content' of 'this' for it to do so; in the absence of that content, it is simply a placeholder, and a placeholder can neither agree (or disagree) with reality. This is why it is what Witty calls a 'propositional schema'. One has to supply the 'content' of 'this' for it to do so, otherwise it's agreement or not with reality is 'obvious nonsense'.

Perhaps these complexities, or what I call "patterns", are part of a bigger picture of explanation. Language-games may be true (pace Wittgenstein), but some language-games are based in a realism of necessary pattern-recognition that is necessary by way of evolutionary necessity. Animals that do not recognize patterns, would not survive. Thus there is a realism underlying the conventionalism or nominalism of Wttgenstein's project — schopenhauer1

Necessary, in the sense of required for the purpose of (in this case survival), is associated with usefulness. And usefulness is the supporting principle of pragmatist metaphysics. I see no way to make any form of pragmatism consistent with any form of realism, due to the gap between them, commonly cited as the is/ought gap. You are clearly jumping this gap, when you claim that the existence of things which exist for various purposes (language-games), support some sort of realism. Until the purpose itself is shown to have real existence, the things which exist for that purpose cannot be said to have real existence.

Therefore, in Wittgenstein's thought exercise of understanding language-games as objects to be compared, we are not dealing with real objects according to any form of realism. Language-games are activities, so Wittgenstein has taken a "process" premise, and he hasn't given any principles whereby objects have real existence.

What is it about language-games that makes you think they are somehow incompatible with this 'usefulness'? Especially since for Witty, all language-games are useful for particular purposes (that's just what language-games are). You mention caprice - but what makes you think language-games are (merely?) capricious or arbitrary? That they are not, that they are keyed at every point to purposes, is maybe the biggest lesson of the PI: language is use in a language-game. — StreetlightX

Ok, I must clarify here- I'm not anti-Witty to be anti-Witty. I came out swinging hard. His language-games idea, I find enormously useful insofar as describing the internal agreement and history of a community and its conventions and how that historical use dictates further use, because it is useful etc.. So I am not refuting Witty's idea of language-games tout court. It adds some useful thought-tools for understanding universal anthropological tendencies (to use particular conventions), and I'm on board with that. In fact, I think that "logic" and "math" the way it is used today is indeed partly a language-game started mainly by the Greeks, continuing with figures like Leibnitz on through the 19th and 20th century logicists which essentially invented a convention/game/framework that analytic philosophers and mathematicians can use to talk with each other in an internally meaningful way. Also "cool" about Wittgenstein is how he points out that this conventionalized mathematical community starts making its own "problems" by making errors of meaning/use in their own invented game. They missapply their own game and then make problems which the game itself has to fix by integrating the problem as useful in the game again or changing the game accordingly. Bravo, I like it.

However, I was trying to map his picture of human reality with other metaphysical and epistemological conceptions- namely realism, contingency, and necessity. One can construe Witt's metaphysics of these language-games to be be in purely nominalist or conventionalist terms. However, there may be some inherent, universal aspects to them which can characterize them to be necessary. It is necessary that humans inference, for example. It can be argued that general inferencing (this story/this phenomena/this observation is a specific or general case of X... This general case of X can be applied to specific cases of Y) may be a necessary human capability, dictated by evolutionary forces. In other words, in theory, any mode of survival is possible, in reality, evolution only allows certain modes of survival to actually continue. One such mode of survival, is inferencing. Since humans have no other recourse in terms of built-in instincts beyond very basic reflexes- our general processing minds, must recognize the very patterns of nature (through inferencing, and ratcheted with trial-and-error problem-solving, and cultural accumulated knowledge) which other animals exploit via instinctual models and lower-order learning behaviors/problem-solving skills.

In particular, I take it: It is not necessary that we should recognize anything as "logical inference"; but if we do, then only certain procedures will count as drawing such inferences, ones (say) which achieve the universality of agreement, the teachability, and the individual conviction, of the forms of inference we accept as logic. There is no logical explanation of the fact that we (in general, on the whole) will agree that a conclusion has been drawn, a rule applied, an instance to be a member of a class, one line to be a repetition of another (even though it is written lower down, or in another hand or color); but the fact is, those who understand (i.e., can talk logic together) do agree. And the fact is that they agree the way they agree; I mean, the ways they have of agreeing at each point, each step. — StreetlightX

This quote here, which I take to be a sort tie-in to my last post, seems to overextend its point. He is moving from primitive inferencing- something that is universal and even tribal cultures utilize, to Logic (capital "L") as conventionalized by Greek/Western contingent historical circumstances. Inferencing + cultural contingencies of the Greek city-states + further contingencies of history led to our current conventions of logic. So it is a mix of taking an already universal trait and then exposing it to the contingencies of civilizations that mined it thoroughly and saw use for it.

However, that's not all. ONCE these contingently ratchted inferencing techniques were applied to natural phenomena, we found not only that the conventions worked internally in its own language-game, but that it did something more than mere usefulness to human survival/language-game-following. It actually mapped out predictions and concepts in the world that worked. New techniques now harnessed natural forces and patterns to technological use, far beyond what came before. Math-based empirical knowledge "found" something "about the world" that was cashed out in technology and accurate predictive models. This is then something else- not just conventionalized language games. This particular language-game did something different than other language games.

My own conclusions from this is that the inferencing pattern-seeking we employ as a species, to survive more-or-less tribally and at the least communally, by way of contingency, hit upon real metaphysical patterns of nature. Thus my statement in another thread that while other animals follow patterns of nature, humans primarily recognize patterns of nature in order to survive.

@Metaphysician Undercover @Sam26 You may be interested as well.

One can construe Witt's metaphysics of these language-games to be be in purely nominalist or conventionalist terms. — schopenhauer1

No, one can't, that's my point: that it's a total, utter misreading to think this. One might put the point this way: the PI stands as one of the most rigorous meditations on the force of necessity in language ever written, and to think that this force is somehow missing in the construal of language-games is to misunderstand them entirely. Forget this shallow focus on 'culture' and 'convention', again words that barely appear in the PI. Langauge-games only exist to the degree that they lay down roots in the world; they do not exist as a thin film pulled over it.

This particular language-game did something different than other language games. — schopenhauer1

But this is false, an untruth - at least in the terms proposed in your post. Witty's entire point is that our use of language, to the degree that one can mean anything at all with it, is saturated with nothing other than 'predictions and concepts in the world that work'; we 'technologized' and 'predicted' long before we had math at hand, and were we to lose every work of math and every mathematician to a fire tomorrow, we would go on predicting, inventing, and putting language to work regardless. Nothing in language would work - or would do work for us, would mean anything - unless at every point it 'hit upon real metaphysical patterns of nature'. Witty's complaint against philosophy is precisely that it doesn't register such 'hits', although Witty would not call them 'metaphysical', but simply, everyday.

I would also make note of your continual conflation between math and logic, which ought to alone disqualify everything you write, but I doubt you care. Here's an idea - follow along and contribute to the reading group, rather than waltzing in with your preconceived ideas and prior, unrelated concerns.

No, one can't, that's my point: that it's a total, utter misreading to think this. — StreetlightX

Before I answer anything further.. I'd just like to make a plea in this forum to stop vitriolic hyperbole that. it's unnecessary rhetorical vitriol and only stirs up emotion, not makes a point. It's rhetoric for rhetoric. I will read further though.

I couldn't care less, you're wasting my time.

you're wasting my time. — StreetlightX

It's either gnashing of the teeth, or meant to piss off..either way, its emotional unnecessary flourish.. and I think you are clearly a well-read poster, I just think this style doesn't befit your knowledge.

continual conflation between math and logic, which ought to alone disqualify everything you write, but I doubt you care. — StreetlightX

I deem math and more specifically, mathematical logic as a set of logical frameworks for proofs, axioms, and such that try to lay the foundations of mathematical operations of quantity, functions, variables, spacial analysis, geometric analysis, probabilities, etc.. I deem this to be a specific variety of a larger logical framework (language-game) that has essentially been going on since the Greeks. The history of both are intertwined so much, that there is much borrowing of each, though they started out in different avenues, closely related. The early analytic philosophers blurred the lines as many were both mathematicians and general logicians and tried to use symbolic logic to found arithmetic in a larger logical framework, though this approach was obviously questionable. Logic in general, extends to more than just quantity, numbers, space, and probabilities- but also used to analyze the basis of ordinary language and concepts.

Witty's complaint against philosophy is precisely that it doesn't register such 'hits', although Witty would not call them 'metaphysical', but simply, everyday. — StreetlightX

Right, but all is language-games, implies a relativism in how each language-game corresponds to what is the case. He precisely criticizes the idea that we can even get at what is the case. How is it that the language-game of science "hit upon" the technological complexities it has? Well, if all is merely language-games, why are some language-games useful for creating greater complexities out of natural phenomena than others? Clearly, there is something going on with certain language-games over other language-games. Perhaps this leads the way to a realism of the world that the this particular language-game is hitting at, that other language-games are not. Other civilizations (maybe contingent world-histories) can get along without the discoveries of the science language-game, but then that is missing the point of all the technology and predictions the science language-game does compared to other language-games.

How is it that the language-game of science "hit upon" the technological complexities it has? — schopenhauer1

The same way the language-games of literally anything else 'hits upon' the 'realities' they are adequate to. It's as if someone were to ask: 'how is it that 'block!' 'hits upon' this block here such that the builder will pass it to me? What a mystery!'; a mystery, sure, to anyone who does not understand what a language-game is. One lesson here is: no language-game is 'mere', is sufficient unto itself: every language-game is constrained and made possible by the realities out of which it is born and is addressed to. This is as true of one asking to pass the salt as it is of one asking to measure the velocity of light.

So this insistance - made with no argument and substantiated by the most flimsy of suppositions - that the language-games of science (now further illigitimately assimilated for no apparent reason into math and logic, out of nowhere) do something other than any other langauge-games simply rings hollow and false. It falsifies not only the concept of language-games, but also the operations of math, logic, and now, apparently, science. As if we did not make predictions until the advent of math. As if we could not invent before the formalizations of logic. Rubbish.

It falsifies not only the concept of language-games, but also the operations of math, logic, and now, apparently, science. As if we did not make predictions until the advent of math. As if we could not invent before the formalizations of logic. Rubbish. — StreetlightX

No, that is now taking me out of context, ignoring what I said earlier. I said that all humans, even tribal ones, have a basic inferencing capability, and it is a universal capability of all humans in all types of cultures. In fact, I said almost the complete opposite of this quoted statement above. I even posited that inferencing is perhaps a necessity of humans due to evolutionary explanations of pattern-recognition

What I did say, and you misrepresented, was that this initial inferencing ability was refined (what you called "formalized") by originally the Greeks (with synthesis from other cultures), and further updated and appended down the generations in mainly Western culture(s). These formalizations/refinements were mainly due to contingent circumstances of historical development (e.g. I mentioned perhaps the culture surrounding the Greek city-state as one possible originating contributor out of a wide-array). This formalized form of logic, however, provided insights to predicitions about the natural world that were accurate, and technology that was vastly more complex than what came before.

Yes, it is not just logic or math that produced these results (which indeed would be a formalized language-game(s)) but it was/is this formalized math along with formalized empirical observations of the natural world that created these results. These results have been cashed out in the predictive power and technology that was/is generated as a result of these insights.

Thus my further conclusion that through evolutionary means, humans have an extremely high capacity for inferencing, which was necessary for survival. I further stated, that most other animals are following patterns of instincts that conform with survival, while humans survive by having the capacity to recognize patterns using inferencing, enhanced by problem-solving and accumulated cultural knowledge. That is not to say other animals don't recognize patterns (as I get that being some objection), but this pattern recognition is usually by instinct and lower-learning capabilities, and not by the immensely ratcheted up capacities that language, accumulated cultural knowledge, and all the rest bring with the human mind which allow it to primarily survive in this form of life rather than via instinctual modules (as is the case for most other animals). So, the "real" here is that there are patterns of nature, and some of our language-games have recognized them, to such an extent that the resultant technology harnesses them.

One lesson here is: no language-game is 'mere', is sufficient unto itself: every language-game is constrained and made possible by the realities out of which it is born and is addressed to. This is as true of one asking to pass the salt as it is of one asking to measure the velocity of light. — StreetlightX

Where yes, every language-game may be sufficient for its use in that form of life/community, there is something different regarding the measure of velocity versus the language-game surrounding how to pass the salt. One is seeing the patterns of nature via a formalized version of our basic inferencing abilities (mathematically-derived empirical science), and one is a contingent convention. We also cannot misconstrue that the historical development, though contingent on how the language-game played, nonetheless produced something that sees "real" patterns of nature that have produced highly accurate predictive models and technology that other language-games cannot and do not do.

Edit: Oh and then I'm guessing you or someone else will probably bring up how sciences have "revolutions" of conventions and relativity and QM replacing Newtonian physics, etc. etc. So, ""HA! realism schealism! You are wrong!" No, it is just that this language-game allows for corrections of its own conventions, built into the game itself. Besides the usual resistance to change, and hurt feelings people get from strongly held beliefs, the actual game of science itself allows for corrective changes in principle, based on where the evidence takes you.

This formalized form of logic, however, provided insights to predicitions about the natural world that were accurate, and technology that was vastly more complex than what came before. — schopenhauer1

'More complex'; ' immensely ratcheted up capacities'; 'something different': these are all so many ways of saying nothing at all: what complexity? What kind of capacity? What 'something different'? Merely insisting on some kind of Very Important Difference - and that is all you've done - is to insist on nothing. You've given no conceptual substance to any of these apparent 'differences', other than beg the question and insist that language-games 'cannot capture real patterns of nature'. And this despite the fact that such 'capturing' is just the sine qua non of language-games as such. As if passing the salt is something unreal.

Wittgenstein reduces logical necessity to a form of "needed for a particular purpose". This is the pragmatist standard, conception is based in purpose. The problem is that Wittgenstein does take this position happily, or even willingly, it's a philosophical problem which worries him. He seems to have an underlying disposition to reject this pragmatism as deficient. So he attempts to get to the bottom of it, and find something real which supports it. From the days of the Tractatus, to now in the Investigations, he seeks a way out of the pragmatist mess. He seems to believe that there must be some underlying reality, which would give a necessity to logic, a necessity other than purpose. In the Tractattus he considered fundamental elements (materialism), and in this book he considers fundamental Ideas (Platonic realism), but neither of these is acceptable. So he is stuck in this pragmatist base where "logically necessary" simply means necessary for the purpose of this particular logic.

At this point there is nothing here to indicate that he is nominalist. He has found no basis for the assumption that social conventions are based in anything "real". They are part of the language-games. The only thing we might assume as a basis for convention is a commonality of purpose but we haven't gotten an indication of this yet.

185. Let us return to our example (143). Now—judged by the
usual criteria—the pupil has mastered the series of natural numbers.
Next we teach him to write down other series of cardinal numbers and
get him to the point of writing down series of the form down the series of natural numbers. — Let us suppose we have done exercises and given him tests up to 1000.

Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say +2) beyond 1000 —
and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. We say to him: "Look what you've done!" — He doesn't understand.

We say: "You were meant to add tn>o\ look how you began the series!"
— He answers: "Yes, isn't it right? I thought that was how I was
meant to do it." —— Or suppose he pointed to the series and said:
"But I went on in the same way." — It would now be no use to say:
"But can't you see . . . . ?" — and repeat the old examples and explanations.
— In such a case we might say, perhaps: It comes natural to this
person to understand our order with our explanations as we should
understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000
and so on."

Such a case would present similarities with one in which a person
naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking
in the direction of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to
finger-tip. — Philosophical investigations

The point here being that in order to carry out the rule of the social convention, one must be able to understand that rule. To understand the rule requires that the person sees things (with the mind) in the same way as the others. This seeing things in the same way is instinctual, it's what "comes natural" to the person. So now we have this underlying instinct, or intuition, which is necessary for, and underpins the social conventions.

The point here being that in order to carry out the rule of the social convention, one must be able to understand that rule. To understand the rule requires that the person sees things (with the mind) in the same way as the others. This seeing things in the same way is instinctual, it's what "comes natural" to the person. So now we have this underlying instinct, or intuition, which is necessary for, and underpins the social conventions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, then I'd agree with Witt, that per evolutionary forces like theory of other minds, and social learning (something most other primates lack), humans have predispositions that start to work when exposed to social cues to understand the nuances of the language-games of their social environment. I used inferencing as an example of human capacity, but the predisposition for social learning is also an example of a human-centered ability shaped by evolutionary/survival forces. The language-games seem to have a base in these evolutionarily shaped tendencies.

My point was language-games have a base in "real" causes (patterns of evolutionary necessity) and in turn, lead to language-games like math-informed empirical investigation in general, which, though contingently constructed, has "hit upon" an understanding of the very patterns of nature, which has constructed the human (amongst other patterns of nature, ones harnessed for complex technologies and predictive accuracy of investigation into natural phenomena).

'More complex'; ' immensely ratcheted up capacities'; 'something different': these are all so many ways of saying nothing at all: what complexity? What kind of capacity? What 'something different'? Merely insisting on some kind of Very Important Difference - and that is all you've done - is to insist on nothing. You've given no conceptual substance to any of these apparent 'differences', other than beg the question and insist that language-games 'cannot capture real patterns of nature'. And this despite the fact that such 'capturing' is just the sine qua non of language-games as such. As if passing the salt is something unreal. — StreetlightX

Let me ask you this: What is the difference between technologies and explanatory powers before the Scientific Revolution/Enlightenment/Industrial Revolution, and after? Why might there be a difference? Simply just another language-game like passing the salt, or is there something different about this language-game?

Simply just another language-game like passing the salt, or is there something different about this language-game? — schopenhauer1

There is 'something different' about every language-game. Every language-game has a purpose or a point to which it is keyed, and there are as many language-games as they there are purposes to them, without which they would not be language-games. This is such an important point that Witty's emphasis on the varying kinds of language-games - the fact that they differ by kind, and not merely by degree - is placed right at the very start of the PI, and governs everything that follows in the book. That there might be such a difference in kind between the language-games that existed at some supposed break between the various revolutions you speak of (predictably lumped together like so many dead fish, as you lump math, logic and science together, utterly gutting any conceptual cogency each might have) is not an argument against the scope of language-games, but an elementality built right into their definition.

Every language-game has a purpose or a point to which it is keyed, and there are as many language-games as they there are purposes to them, — StreetlightX

Ok, I'm with you there.

That there might be such a difference in kind between the language-games that existed at some supposed break between the various revolutions you speak of (predictably lumped together like so many dead fish, as you lump math, logic and science together, utterly gutting any conceptual cogency each might have) is not an argument against the scope of language-games, but an elementality built right into their definition. — StreetlightX

Right, but we have to parse out the way I am using the idea of "different" or "break" here, as it is different than what you are construing it as. In a very Wittgensteinian way, we are talking passed each other in our language-game. I'm not arguing that each language game does not have its own nuances, complexities, and purposes that they are keyed to.

Rather, I am arguing that hitting upon a way to map the world that cashes out accurate predictions and increasingly complex technology, is a language-game that hits upon something different than other language games. Where we are missing each other, is that you think we don't agree, but I do agree with you that all language-games are useful in some way to that form of life. I am not debating that. Even survival-related language-games do not need to be related with science to foster surviving.

Rather, I am pointing out that there is something special about the way this language-game is able to so accurately predict and create powerful technologies out of the material world to a degree and kind far more than any other kind of language-game. To sum it up:

1) We agree language-games have various kinds for various purposes.
2) We agree that humans do not need the language-game of Western/formalized math-informed science as it has formed in the last 400 years to survive.
3) We have contention as to the significance of Western/formalized math-informed science as it has formed in the last 400 years.

What I think the significance can possibly be is pointing to a realism- a metaphysical indicator that there are structures to the world that are real, and can be mined with certain language-games that roughly map on to the structures enough to harness predictive explanatory power and technology.

Where other language-games are conventionalized forms of life that more-or-less are pragmatic agreements by participants for the indirect and stated purposes of the game, math-informed science language-games are discovering something beyond conventional pragmatic discourse.

What I think the significance can possibly be is pointing to a realism- a metaphysical indicator that there are structures to the world that are real — schopenhauer1

And my point is that every language-game does this. I've said this multiple times now. I'll not say it again. You have a very shallow view of language-games as being nothing but 'conventions' or 'social pragmatic discourse' or whatever: terms which are not used by Witty, and which are often projected onto him by those who have not read his work. Language-games are 'real' through and through, and everytime you keep try and institute a dichotomy between 'mere' language-games and 'math-informed science' as turning upon 'hitting a reality' or whatever, you misunderstand language-games. Put 'conventions' in the trash bin of your mind; where they - and talk of 'social' and 'cultural' - belong. Also forget 'usefulness', language-games are not useful-for-x; language-games have uses is all; they are defined by their uses; whether those uses are themselves 'useful' for survival or not is irrelevant, and every time you speak in those terms you betray - again - your misunderstandings.

Start talking in terms of grammar and criteria, and then maybe you'll have something of relevance to say.

My point was language-games have a base in "real" causes (patterns of evolutionary necessity) and in turn, lead to language-games like math-informed empirical investigation in general, which, though contingently constructed, has "hit upon" an understanding of the very patterns of nature, which has constructed the human (amongst other patterns of nature, ones harnessed for complex technologies and predictive accuracy of investigation into natural phenomena). — schopenhauer1

The problem here being that, as I described in my other post, we have no principle whereby we can say that a language-game is a "real" object. Remember the question of 65 what is a language-game, and the following inability to say what exactly what a game is. Then we enter the paradox of trying to describe language with language. This is what is causing him the philosophical problems. In the Tractatus he found reality in representation, but he later noticed this was incorrect. Here he searches into concepts, ideas, but rejects Platonism and finds that language-games are based in human purpose.

Now language-games may be described in terms of learning social conventions, and the natural tendencies required to learn these conventions, but if we want to name "the real cause", we cannot get beyond purpose. Purpose is what holds the various features together into some kind of unity, which Wittgenstein calls a game. But here we reach the paradox I refer to earlier, with trying to describe language using language itself. To produce a true bounded object, a game with clear and consistent rules, we must specify the purpose. And as soon as we specify a particular purpose, we make an error in our description of language, because language is not bounded to be directed toward one particular purpose, it is unbounded so as to be adaptable to any purpose.

Language-games are 'real' through and through... — StreetlightX

I don't think we can say that a language-game is real. Remember the section starting at 65, where he asks what is a language-game, and consequently what is a game. We go into an unbounded, vague, conceptual realm where it would be impossible to separate one language game from another, to give one or another real separate existence, as they are dependent on a specific purpose, and purposes are general, vague and overlapping. And now, he has implied that there is no such thing as language as a whole, as a unity of all language-games in the language-game. So I really don't think we can say that a language-game is something real.

whether those uses are themselves 'useful' for survival or not is irrelevant, — StreetlightX

I mentioned survival, as you mentioned earlier that people went about surviving fine long before science, and I agreed with you.

Also forget 'usefulness', language-games are not useful-for-x — StreetlightX

I said "useful in some way for that form of life" which implies

language-games have uses is all — StreetlightX

Language-games are 'real' through and through, and everytime you keep try and institute a dichotomy between 'mere' language-games and 'math-informed science' as turning upon 'hitting a reality' or whatever, you misunderstand language-games. Put 'conventions' in the trash bin of your mind; where they - and talk of 'social' and 'cultural' - belong. — StreetlightX

I never disputed that language-games are not real in their own context and way of being. I only posited that the science language-game has a quality of cashing out certain outcomes, and this indicates patterns of nature are real.

I guess it is more to do with Witty's understanding of science itself. I know he was against scientisim, but so am I. Sceintism I take to be the idea that philosophy and logic can describe the world scientifically, finding some truth a priori, or by simply rigorous examination. This is just a form of language-game as well.

However, scientism isn't science, and I know he had respect for the outcomes that were chased out in scientific disciplines. Perhaps it is that I am against a certain interpretation of Wittgenstein, that can be taken out of his own context, by trying to conflate even scientific understanding as being "just another language-game". Mapping onto a way we go about interacting in or with the world, and mapping out how the world interacts, are two types of things. One is more malleable, and amenable to change. The language-game is fluid. The other is more rigid. The language itself can change, but the concepts informed mathematically are fixing on some phenomena that are showing some real patterns "out there" in the "great outdoors".

I know we've discussed Speculative Realism.. this would be more leaning in that direction I guess. That is to say, there is a way of speculating on the "real" or an ontology above and beyond never getting out of our epistemology. I also want to say, that this does not mean that I am in agreement with any particular speculative realism, but the openness to some ontological speculation is not out completely off the table. This also doesn't mean that I am not open to the idea of Witt's at the end of Tractatus, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". These are sometimes two tendencies of the modern philosopher world. The world presents itself to us, often in ways humans would not otherwise conceive, and is accessed via scientific results. But often it is hard to see how humans can get anywhere out of their predisposed epistemology.