You must admit that it’s kinda funny that you applied experimental results from critter studies to human morality.

I haven't got the patience to be dealing with uncharitable nonsense about worms, dogs and critters as though it bears any relevance whatsoever to what I was getting at... — S

Special pleading, ad hom, gratuitous assertion, and moving goalposts is much better philosophy. Keep doing that.

At least you got in the ring.

You must admit that it’s kinda funny that you applied experimental results from critter studies to human morality. — praxis

No, it's not that much of a stretch, actually. Emotions have an obvious role in morality, and those experimental results are of significance in relation to how our brains function in relation to emotion. Funnily enough, we do have some things in common with "critters", as you call them, but that doesn't mean that we have everything in common with them, and I certainly wasn't suggesting the silly things that you and the malfunctioning android, Repetitron2000, seemed to have in mind.

Special pleading, ad hom, gratuitous assertion, and moving goalposts — creativesoul

I see you can name some logical fallacies. That's nice. But there's a bit more to it than that.

I see you can name some logical fallacies. That's nice. But there's a bit more to it than that. — S

You can’t expect him to list all of your shortcomings.

I really miss the Mr. Green emoticon...

You can’t expect him to list all of your shortcomings. — praxis

There isn't much that can be expected of him until he's repaired. Well, except repeating his usual jibber-jabber.

So why would that be any less the source of morality, per the way that you're using the term "source," than any other cause you're suggesting, where the cause isn't itself morality? — Terrapin Station

If you regard the big bang as the source of everything, then it is correct to consider it a necessary factor when explaining the source of anything. Yet, although it is a necessary factor in such explanation, as it stands, it is detrimentally inadequate for explaining the source of morals, just like the neurobiological explanation. Both astrophysical and neurobiological explanations of the source of morals may open up the possibility of an ethical reality, but they stop short and leave much more to be desired.

What makes a cause adequate or not?

What makes a cause adequate or not? — Terrapin Station

I'm not sure what makes a cause adequate or not. What would an adequate cause look like?

I do know, however, that which makes an explanation adequate is coherence, consequence, and maybe a little authority.

I'm not sure what makes a cause adequate or not. What would an adequate cause look like? — Merkwurdichliebe

Why are you asking me? It was your idea. Don't you know what you meant when you wrote "although it is a necessary factor in such explanation, as it stands, it is detrimentally inadequate for explaining the source of morals"? What makes something adequate or not?

I do know, however, that which makes an explanation adequate is coherence, consequence, and maybe a little authority. — Merkwurdichliebe

So "the big bang" isn't coherent, has no consequence or authority? I must not know what those words refer to very well.

So "the big bang" isn't coherent, has no consequence or authority? I must not know what those words refer to very well. — Terrapin Station

The big bang is a cosmological event. How are you using it to explain the source of morality? Explain yourself.

If your explanation is sufficiently coherent, and provides a reasonable degree of consequence, you might actually say something valuable regarding the source of morality. Otherwise it is just a bunch of confused rhetorical blabbing.

The big bang is a cosmological event. How are you using it to explain the source of morality? Explain yourself. — Merkwurdichliebe

The point is that it's exactly the same thing as you're doing by talking about social stuff. The social things mentioned aren't identical to morality by any means. They were given as causes, as necessary conditions for morality to arise. Well, the big bang is just as much a cause, a necessary condition for morality to arise. How in the world is the social stuff supposed to explain morality in a way that the big bang doesn't? Neither is morality itself. They're just preconditions for it.

Absolutely. We need a multi-varied analysis.

Should we list all of the causes/preconditions? Wouldn't that be encyclopedia-length?

Should we list all of the causes/preconditions? Wouldn't that be encyclopedia-length? — Terrapin Station

We should include all the preconditions and limitations for any explanation we set forth. If we did it exhaustively, it would be an immense amount of material, but philosophy is, indeed, a vast field of discovery and creativity.

Shouldn't we focus at least as much on a phenomenon as the phenomenon rather than just talking about preconditions for it?

How in the world is the social stuff supposed to explain morality in a way that the big bang doesn't? — Terrapin Station

The essential difference is that we can influence 'the social stuff' and we can't influence the Big Bang. We tend to identify causes that we can influence, because we have goals and such.

Anyway, as I mentioned early on in the topic, differences in moral frameworks can be explained by examining the culture they develop in. These differences can't be explained by investigating the Big Bang.

Shouldn't we focus at least as much on a phenomenon as the phenomenon rather than just talking about preconditions for it? — Terrapin Station

We could, say, restrict the entire conversation on the source of morality to ethical terms. But that would rule out all reference to the authority of other disciplines (e.g. science or history), and drastically diminish our ability to explain it.

But I don't think such a thing is necessary. I think a multi-varied analysis from the perspective of many disciplines can reveal a lot about any topic. We just need to refrain from committing the reductionist error of equating the explanation with the thing we are trying to explain.

Right, and some preconditions are more relevant than others. The Big Bang is irrelevant, or at most trivially relevant, to understanding morality because it is the precondition for absolutely everything, at least if you accept the truth of it, and if you don't accept it is even more irrelevant.

Moral feelings are obviously highly relevant. And social conditions, and most especially moral teachings and injunctions that are a kind of social currency that flows through communities and becomes internalized by their members are also highly relevant.

And let's not forget that in theocratic communities, which include probably most hunter-gatherer communities, as well as most pre-modern agricultural and mercantile communities, moral injunctions are enforced by threat of punishment for transgression.

What is the most dependable method of approach to this topic? I mean, ought we not put good reason to good use here - sound - if at all possible. There's no disagreement concerning whether or not we have morals. There's no disagreement concerning how we come to adopt our first morals(original language acquisition). I assume that we all agree that morals must begin simply and grow in complexity along with our understandings/worldviews. I assume that none of us are going to argue that a zygote has morals. In general, human thought/belief about morals has grown in complexity along with our knowledge regarding the history of morals/morality throughout the world. A robust account/theory of the origen of morals ought be able to take proper sensible account of all of these considerations and more.

Methodology seems to be the contentious issue.

Like some of you, I also agree that the approach needs to be multi-faceted. Empiricism looks towards physical observation. Morals aren't just physical. Thoughts aren't just physical. Beliefs aren't just physical. Rationalism looks towards pure(a priori) reason alone. There is no such thing. Methodological naturalism requires quantification. Does existential quantification count? There's some sense of verifiability/falsifiability possible if we're careful how we frame our line of thinking/vein of thought. Conceptual scheme(linguistic framework) is paramount here.

I disagree with Witt on this matter. The ladder cannot be kicked out from beneath us - unless it is utterly inadequate for justificatory support to begin with. Not all metaphysics shares the inadequacies of metaphysics based upon historical dichotomies unless it is also based upon them.

Even then, we're not kicking it out by virtue of taking it into logical notation - contrary to Quine. Taking inadequate common language use into proper logical account transmits the inadequate explanatory power of the common language use.

Subject/object. Internal/External. Mental/physical. Material/immaterial.

None of the above dichotomies are capable of taking proper account of that which consists of both, and is thus... neither.

All thought/belief is one example of a plurality of different things that consist of both, and are thus neither. The presupposition of truth(as correspondence) inherent to all thought/belief somewhere along the line is another. All attribution of meaning is yet one more.

Connections. Associations. Correlations.

Thought/belief is formed when a creature draws a mental correlation between different things. All thought/belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content regardless of subsequent further qualification.

All meaning consists entirely of drawing mental correlations, associations, and/or connections between that which becomes sign/symbol and that which becomes significant/symbolized. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content, regardless of further subsequent qualification as 'real', 'imagined', and/or otherwise.

Rather, we're systematically replacing the faulty rungs, until - in the end - they're all based upon, agree with, and/or effectively supplant parts of the current knowledge base.

Paradigm shift.

You ought be glad I like you.

Can we take proper account of the origen of morals without taking proper account of the origen of thought/belief?

Can we take proper account of the basic adopted morals without taking proper account of thought/belief?

Can we take proper account of the "principles" that some say help to govern our behavior without taking proper account of thought/belief?

Can we take proper account of the rules of behaviour without taking proper account of thought/belief?

Can we take proper account of certain habits of behaviour without taking proper account of thought/belief?

Can we take proper account of certain habits of thought/belief if we do not take proper account of all thought/belief itself?

The only answer to all these questions is "no".

Morals consist entirely of thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. They are one kind of thought/belief. All thought/belief share a common basic core. They all have the same basic elemental constituency, so to speak. As a result of having knowledge of the basic minimalist criterion of all thought/belief, there is ground to talk of the origen of one particular kind. Some would agree that there is no stronger justificatory ground than a conceptual scheme following from and/or built upon uncontentious true premisses.

An adequate conception(a basic outline) of all human thought/belief is needed here.

That is a bit of the ground.

Morals consist entirely of thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. They are one kind of thought/belief. All thought/belief share a common basic core. They all have the same basic elemental constituency, so to speak. As a result of having knowledge of the basic minimalist criterion of all thought/belief, there is ground to talk of the origen of one particular kind. Some would agree that there is no stronger justificatory ground than a conceptual scheme following from and/or built upon uncontentious true premisses that has no actual nor conceivable/imaginable examples to the contrary. — creativesoul

I would agree. This would represent the bedrock upon which all manner of conceptual edifice could be constructed. But it seems a bit idealistic. I don't know if this actually exists (other than as a hypothesis); and, if it does exist, it seems as though it would be practically impossible to validate. It is as though we would have to become identical to each other, in the strictest sense, to establish such an apodictic ground of certainty. I would even be willing to suggest that the notion of an epistemological bedrock is a cleverly veiled a priori category.

Nevertheless, I'm willing to try to find it.

I can agree with the utility of assuming everything up to this point, all those factors that lead up to and produce thought/belief - here we can mark a point of origin. But this is only the origin of the source of morals, we must go further. So I suppose, I can say: I hold an open mind in regard to existential quantification.

Btw, great job reframing the issue! :up: :up:

What can you agree to?

I can agree with the utility of assuming everything up to this point... — Merkwurdichliebe

I cannot.

In the creativesoul sense, I might argue that socio-cultural factors stand as the primary ethical influences on the thinking/believing individual. In effect, ethics are primarily apprehended from an external source, yet it appears as though the ethical only becomes existentially charged in the thinking/believing individual. I feel that it is somewhere in the internalization of morality tha the source of morals lies. (At this point, we are far removed from any cosmological or neurological explanation, as they have previously been synthesized into the notion of thought/belief, of which morality represents one type.)

But, maybe I'm jumping the gun. — Merkwurdichliebe

A bit regarding a couple of key points.

Morals consist entirely of thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. They are one kind of thought/belief. All thought/belief share a common basic core. They all have the same basic elemental constituency, so to speak. As a result of having knowledge of the basic minimalist criterion of all thought/belief, there is ground to talk of the origen of one particular kind. Some would agree that there is no stronger justificatory ground than a conceptual scheme following from and/or built upon uncontentious true premisses that has no actual nor conceivable/imaginable examples to the contrary.
— creativesoul

I would agree. This would represent the bedrock upon which all manner of conceptual edifice could be constructed. But it seems a bit idealistic. — Merkwurdichliebe

Interesting. If there are no actual examples to the contrary, that's falsifiable/verifiable.

In the creativesoul sense, I might argue that socio-cultural factors stand as the primary ethical influences on the thinking/believing individual. In effect, ethics are primarily apprehended from an external source, yet it appears as though the ethical only becomes existentially charged in the thinking/believing individual. I feel that it is somewhere in the internalization of morality tha the source of morals lies. (At this point, we are far removed from any cosmological or neurological explanation, as they have previously been synthesized into the notion of thought/belief, of which morality represents one type.)

But, maybe I'm jumping the gun.

Is that Spock logic: "Once you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the truth" ?