To me, it doesn't make sense to say, "There is really no such thing as 'what Wittgenstein is saying.' I think it's plainly contradictory, at least in terms of how we normally use the word say. — Sam26

If a group of people like us cannot agree on an interpretation, and the author of the material intentionally ensured such disagreement through the use of ambiguity, then it is correct to say that there is no such thing as what the author is saying.

Consider his example, "stand roughly here". What does "roughly" add to the statement "stand here", other than ambiguity? If he says "stand here", you know exactly where he wants you to stand, where he's pointing. If he says "stand roughly here", you do not know exactly where he wants you to stand, because he is saying that there are many possibilities of places where you might stand in that area. The author implies that there is a place where you are wanted to stand, yet adds "roughly" to say that there is really no such place. What "roughly" does, is pass the choice of where to stand to the hearer, so that there is no such thing as the exact place where Wittgenstein wants you to stand. This is what the intentional use of ambiguity does, it gives to the reader a choice in interpretation, so there is no such thing as what the author says because the author is giving you a choice of what is said. You decide what the author said, and different people can decide on different things, because there is no such thing as what the author really said, as the author plays a game of possibilities. Likewise, when the speaker says "stand roughly here", there is no such thing as the place where the speaker wants you to stand, there are many possibilities, and the speaker has used ambiguity to allow you to choose the place where you ought to stand.

The use of that example by Wittgenstein, to demonstrate the use of ambiguity indicates that he is intentionally using ambiguity. If a word is recognized as having a family of meanings, and interpretation of that word will depend on one's background (the language-games which one is familiar with), and the author proceeds to use that word in a way which "fits" with a multitude of different language-games, without indicating a specific language-game as intended, then ambiguity is intended.

§121

This one's pretty straightforward on the surface but I just want to quickly relate it to the passages around it, because it can seem to come a bit out of left-field (as it did for me). I'm admittedly cribbing a bit from Hacker and Baker, but §121 needs to be read in light of the distinction established previously between theory/explanation and description (§109).

To deny that there can or ought to be 'second-order philosophy' is to deny that there can be a 'theory of philosophy': any account of philosophy would or can only remain at the level of description. We can only describe this or that (actual) philosophy as it stands, not provide a theory of philosophy (a metaphilosophy) that would account for what philosophy 'is'. Or rather: philosophy is as philosophy does.

§122, §123

A lot of ink has been spilt on Witty's understanding of the 'survayability of grammar' (@Fooloso4 linked to a nice article on it here), but I want to try my hand at reading it on my own terms.

In particular, I want to link the idea of survayability with Witty's comments on explanations and boundaries, in the sections around §70-§90 or so (the comments on 'staying roughly here' and on defining names). Recall that in those sections, Witty argued that boundaries and explanations were always adequate to the degree that they fulfilled their purpose. To say 'stay roughly here' would fulfil it's purpose, for example, were I to go away and come back and were able to find you again (you didn't wonder off while I was away). That the exact borders of 'here' were not exhaustively defined is irrelevant (§87: "The signpost is in order - if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose".)

Now, another way to put this is that all explanation is local. The grammar of 'staying roughly here' only needs to be as 'deep' as it needs to be to facilitate the activity of me being able to find you again later on. It doesn't ramify any further, so that, say, I can pick out the ring of atoms that 'here' 'ultimately constitutes' or whatever. Explanation doesn't go 'all the way down' - it is not global. Now, to say then, that "we don't have an overview of the use of our words" is to say that you can't 'zoom out' to a global level and see how the grammar of our words is every laid out in some a priori fashion; grammar is 'purpose relative' and our purposes are always 'local', beyond which they change (if I'm doing a scientific experiment, I may indeed need to know where the 'exact', 'atom-level' boundary of 'here' is).

In this regard, to create a 'surveyable representation' is to create a kind of 'local map of grammar': it is to understand how the/a grammar of use relates to the particular activities (forms-of-life?) in which that grammar finds its purpose. Importantly, it is also to recognise that that grammar does not extend beyond that purpose: there is no grammar that would encompass all instances of use: there is only ever this or that use, in this or that language-game. This is what is means to say that "our grammar is deficient in surveyability": there is no Archimedean point from which one could survey (all?) grammar from without (no ideal) - one must only ever work with actual (local) grammars.

One of the reasons I'm employing these cartographic terms (map making terms) like 'local' and 'global' is that it helps account for §123, which talks about how philosophical problems consist in 'not knowing one's way about'. It is to be 'lost', to not have a 'map', to not understand the local grammar, and how that grammar relates to the purpose and activity from which it gains its life. A few things I've left out in this exposition ('Weltanschauung', 'intermediate links', 'seeing connections'), but will leave off here for space's sake.

In this regard, to create a 'surveyable representation' is to create a kind of 'local map of grammar': it is to understand how the/a grammar of use relates to the particular activities (forms-of-life?) in which that grammar finds its purpose. — StreetlightX

In my translation we are talking about a "perspicuous representation". The perspicuous representation is said to be "of fundamental significance for us", and it is implied at 123 that we are lost (have a philosophical problem) without it. So philosophy, if we can say "what philosophy is", is the way that we understand the use of words. We often say that a person has "a philosophy", and this for Wittgenstein means a way of understanding the use of words. Hence the oddness of understanding the use of the word "philosophy". But this, one's understanding of the use of the word "philosophy", is incorporated within, as part of one's philosophy.

The overall picture which Wittgenstein is putting forward is exactly as the perspicuous representation StreetlightX has provided. Ways of using words are developed, evolve from particular instances of use (the local). From this comes distinct language-games, and distinct meanings for the same words (thus a family of meanings). This is exactly opposed to, or an inversion of the Platonic ontology of meaning which positions eternal Forms (universals) as prior to particular instances, imparting reality (real meaning) to the particular instance of use through participation in the universal. In the Wittgensteinian ontology of meaning there is no need for an overriding universal concept to give any instance of use meaning, but this creates a gap between particular instances of use and the well-defined language-games (complete with rules), because the particular instance which evolves into the game, is prior to the game. The gap needs to be filled to support a proper understanding because existing within the gap would be like being lost (present us with philosophical problems). Therefore we have a need for "intermediate cases".

The intermediate cases are like the commonly quoted "missing links" in evolutionary theory, which would provide the connections, the relations required to fill the gap between one species and another, or one language-game and another. Logic dictates that the properties or features of the intermediate cases, the missing links, must be attributed to the individual instances, because there is no species, or "universal" there (Platonism denied), to attribute them to. .

A lot of ink has been spilt on Witty's understanding of the 'survayability of grammar' (@Fooloso4 linked to a nice article on it here), but I want to try my hand at reading it on my own terms. — StreetlightX

It was Luke who provided the link.

In this regard, to create a 'surveyable representation' is to create a kind of 'local map of grammar': it is to understand how the/a grammar of use relates to the particular activities (forms-of-life?) in which that grammar finds its purpose. Importantly, it is also to recognise that that grammar does not extend beyond that purpose: there is no grammar that would encompass all instances of use: there is only ever this or that use, in this or that language-game. This is what is means to say that "our grammar is deficient in surveyability": there is no Archimedean point from which one could survey (all?) grammar from without (no ideal) - one must only ever work with actual (local) grammars. — StreetlightX

I agree with the distinction between local and global. In terms of language games it is the distinction between a surveyable representation of a language game and a surveyable representation of all language games. As I read it the former is not only possible, it is "of fundamental significance for us", and is what Wittgenstein is attempting to provide. The latter, however, is not. When he says that our grammar is deficient in surveyability I take this to mean the grammar of the language game being played rather than the grammar of language games in general or in toto. This deficiency is not a necessary condition, but one that can be rectified.

One of the reasons I'm employing these cartographic terms (map making terms) like 'local' and 'global' is that it helps account for §123, which talks about how philosophical problems consist in 'not knowing one's way about'. — StreetlightX

A couple of examples I cited earlier of what might be called the "surveyor's language" :

I am showing my pupils details of an immense landscape which they cannot possibly know their way around.
— Culture and Value 7

Our language can be regarded as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with extensions from various periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses. — PI 18

§124

§124 comes in something like two parts, with the first part acting as somewhat of a recapitulation of a lot of what has been said so far, and the second part linking what has been said with mathematics.

So: The first part underscores, again, the distinction between facts and understanding that has been operative all throughout these sections, along with affirming that philosophy only ever works at the level of the understanding - that is to say, at the level of idealisations about what language should be, or ought to be. Given then, that Witty has argued all along that all such idealisations should be expelled, and that philosophy only ought to describe language, it follows that philosophy ‘leaves everything as it is’. It does not 'contribute’ in any way to language as it is actually used. Language is, or would be, indifferent to anything philosophy has to say about it.

--

Just before going on, it’s perhaps worth pausing to do a quick comparison to some of Witty’s views on philosophy in the Tractatus. For, despite the heavy critique of the Tractatus here (re: idealisation and so on), Witty’s understanding of philosophy remains strikingly similar. For, recall that in the Tractuatus that "Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences” (TLP 4.111: i.e. does not deal with facts, or the empirical); and that famously, one who has ‘climbed the ladder’ of the TLP ought to throw it away; In the PI, philosophy has a similar role, but unlike the TLP, it cannot be done away with so definitively: philosophy in the PI is always something of a standing threat (§109: "a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language”), against which one must remain, in some sense, ever vigilant.

Where philosophy in the TLP ought to self-immolate once and for all, in the PI, philosophy is both cure and disease, and one always needs philosophy in order to ‘cure’ oneself of philosophy, indefinitely. If the illusions in the TLP were Cartesian, in the sense that, like the illusions of Descartes’ evil demon, they could be overcome once and for all, the illusions of the PI are Kantian, in the sense that they are always looming. Philosophy in the PI is a pharmakon, to use one of Derrida's terms if anyone is familiar with it.

—

The second half of §124 extends Witty’s point about philosophy and language to mathematics. Just as philosophy does not ‘interfere’ with the actual use of language, so too does philosophy not ‘interfere’ with the workings of mathematics. Witty doesn’t really explain himself much here - the bulk of the good stuff is to be found in the Remarks, Lectures, and Philosophical Grammar - but there is one important point that I think is worth noting. If the reason that philosophy leaves everything in language ‘as is’ because it only deals with the understanding and not facts, this cannot be the same reason it leaves everything in mathematics ‘as is’: this is because mathematics, for Wittgenstein, is also not empirical: that is, math also does not deal with facts, or at least, facts in the empirical mode.

This isn’t something that Witty insists upon here in the PI - at least, not that I can recall - but he makes the point almost everywhere that he explicitly deals with math. All of this is simply to say that despite the fact that Witty says that philosophy does not ‘interfere’ with either language or math, this lack of interference does not happen for the same reason in both cases. Something is slightly different about math. This gets brought out somewhat in the next passage, but all I want to do here is mark or take note of this not-so-obvious asymmetry between language and math.

It was Luke who provided the link. — Fooloso4

My bad! It was quite a few posts back. And yeah, the conception of language as a maze of different (kinds of!) streets is a very nice one and well worth invoking in the reading of §122-123.

For, despite the heavy critique of the Tractatus here (re: idealisation and so on), Witty’s understanding of philosophy remains strikingly similar. — StreetlightX

I agree, and I find this to be very odd. The TLP is extremely naïve in its simplistic representation of philosophy. In the PI Wittgenstein appears to recognize this naivety, and the fact that philosophy is much more complex than he originally thought. But for some undisclosed reason, he refuses to recognize, in his writing, the implications of these complexities. The glaring deficiency is that philosophy really does deal with morality, and how human beings ought to be behave, and language use is described by Wittgenstein as a form of human behaviour. So the fact that philosophy deals with how people ought to use language cannot be avoided.

Now he has created a real dilemma for himself. If he is to accurately describe what philosophy is, it is required that he include moral philosophy which prescribes what people ought to do. And if he excludes moral philosophy from his description, saying that philosophy ought not include this, then he is practising that very form of philosophy which he is saying ought not be done.

and that philosophy only ought to describe language — StreetlightX

Here is a fine example of the hypocrisy which Wittgenstein has forced himself into by refusing to bring his criticism of the TLP down to the root of the problem, its representationalism. Instead of beginning at the true base of language use, what he himself has exemplified as "orders", instances of telling someone what to do, he still wants to begin with representation, description. He now jumps the ought/is gap, to maintain his mistaken starting point of representation. But that jump is an act of hypocrisy.

is also not empirical: that is, math also does not deal with facts, or at least, facts in the empirical mode. — StreetlightX

I know this is definitely an exegetical thread, but I wanted to chime in because of how wrong this conception is.

That's reasonably intuitive from the perspective of pure math or logic (though still debatable), but it's very wrong for applied math/physics and statistics.

If you drop an object from distance $h$ to the ground, ignore air resistance, you get that the time $t$ of impact on the ground is $t=(2h/g)^2$ where $g$ is the acceleration due to gravity. If you want to find $t$ you take the square root. But you ignore the solution for negative time because it's not 'physical'. Here you have the interpretation of nature interfacing with math to constrain the adequate solutions to a law of motion.

Similar things can happen in experimental design. If you apply 1 of 3 fertilisers to different plots in a field, in amounts 0, 0.5 and 1g per square inch, the standard algebra for analysing this experiment will not tell you that you actually only have 5 possible treatments applied to the plots, you have to intuit that applying no fertiliser is the same thing if you apply none of A or none of B. And the inference from the experiment depends on recognising this extra-mathematical fact to constrain the calculation.

In both cases 'mathematical thinking' and 'facts of nature' interact inextricably, and to do the analysis correctly in each case is to understand the subject matter of the equations.

I would have to agree with Fdrake, i.e., that whether we are talking about the propositions of mathematics or otherwise, both can have an empirical side. I'm not that up on Wittgenstein's mathematical views, I'm just giving my take on the language of both mathematics and other linguistic propositions. Either way we're using symbols to describe reality, at least in part.

§126-128. Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy appears to be different from the prevailing view. Whereas philosophy has traditionally been (and continues to be) viewed as a study, or as a branch of knowledge (e.g. in which one can undertake research), Wittgenstein presents the alternative view that "Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. — Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain" (§126). For Wittgenstein, it seems, there is nothing to study, research, or discover in philosophy: "The name “philosophy” might also be given to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions" (§126). Wittgenstein reduces the work of the philosopher to "marshalling recollections for a particular purpose" (§127). Furthermore, there should be no disagreements over the propositions of philosophy: "If someone were to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them" (§128).

I see a move of inconsistency in this section. Prior to 127, he describes philosophy as just laying things out, "to make it possible to get clear view" -125. That would be the goal of philosophy, to lay things out for viewing, analysis, whatever. But then at 127 he says that this is done for a "particular purpose", so he introduces the notion that the philosopher is actually laying things out for a further end. "To get a clear view" is something general, and we might describe the philosopher as doing this. But now he moves toward what is the particular purpose of an individual philosopher, in doing this (laying things out), and this is something beyond "to get a clear view".

There is always intention behind the "laying things out", which influences the way things are laid out by the philosopher. So at 132 it is not "the order", but one of the many possible orders, which describes how the philosopher lays things out. So even in the philosopher's act of laying things out to get a clear view, there is a particular view (intended by that philosopher) which is behind the philosopher's particular way of laying things out.

Notice that from 130 he proceeds to talk about a comparison of distinct language-games, with the end goal (purpose) of producing a prominent order, "an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible" -132. So that when we obtain complete clarity there will be no more need, or urge to philosophize -133. Now he has moved to his particular goal, complete clarity, no need to philosophize, and he is no longer talking about the general goal of just laying things out.

The precise inconsistency is found at 132 where he introduces his particular purpose. If the goal of the philosopher were simply to lay out all the different language-games for analysis, this would be consistent with what is said about philosophy prior to 127. However, at 132 he starts to talk about a particular way (his way) of comparing language games, and this is inconsistent with simply laying things out "to make it possible to get a clear view". He has now stated that we lay things out for a further purpose, but that purpose is his, not ours.

I see a move of inconsistency in this section. Prior to 127, he describes philosophy as just laying things out, "to make it possible to get clear view" -125. That would be the goal of philosophy, to lay things out for viewing, analysis, whatever. — Metaphysician Undercover

This seems to be the basis for your claim of inconsistency, but where does he describe philosophy as "just laying things out"? Where does he say that this is the goal of philosophy?

309. What is your aim in philosophy? — To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.

This seems to be the basis for your claim of inconsistency, but where does he describe philosophy as "just laying things out"? — Luke

"125. It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved.
...
126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither
explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view
there is nothing to explain."

Then, at 127 he shifts, to talk about "assembling reminders for a particular purpose". So here has already gone beyond simply putting everything before us, to talk about assembling things for a particular purpose. Assembling things for a particular purpose is completely distinct from putting everything before us.

Now, 132 presents the biggest problem because of some ambiguity. We want to establish a particular order, not the order, but one order out of many possible particular orders. To do this we give prominence to certain language-games which are not necessarily ordinary or common usage. This appears to be a task of reforming language. "Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible.

However, it appears like he might be dismissing such an effort altogether, by saying near the end of 132 "these are not the cases that we have to do with." And then he presents a metaphor, of an engine idling, implying that the cases we are looking for is cases when language is doing nothing. But this doesn't really make sense, because it's hard to imagine a case when language is being used to do absolutely nothing. And then at 133 he seems to go back to the earlier part of 132 again, looking for a particular order which will prevent misunderstanding, "complete clarity", as if this is the particular goal which when obtained, will solve all philosophical problems.

Then, at 127 he shifts, — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no "shift" if you understand Wittgenstein's philosophy to be therapeutic. Hence the quote of §309 in my previous post. Rather than being the goal of philosophy [your unsupported assertion], getting a "clear view" is a means to an end; it is used to resolve a philosophical problem, which has the form: "I don't know my way about" (§123). Since "assembling reminders for a particular purpose" also has a therapeutic purpose, and since these reminders are most likely to be of a "clear view" of a particular philosophical problem, then there is no "shift".

255. The philosopher treats a question; like an illness.

I'm not going to reply to your comments on 132-133 at this stage. There's too much to untangle in your misrepresentation of the text.

Rather than being the goal of philosophy [your unsupported assertion], getting a "clear view" is a means to an end; — Luke

No, it is succinctly stated at 133 that clarity is the end of philosophy. "For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear."

255. The philosopher treats a question; like an illness.

Does that imply quietism?

No, it is succinctly stated at 133 that clarity is the end of philosophy. "For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear." — Metaphysician Undercover

The disappearance/resolution of philosophical problems is the goal. The complete clarity is the means to achieve that goal. The statement you have quoted does not say otherwise.

Does that imply quietism? — Wallows

I believe so.

When someone says we are aiming at something, as is the case in 133, "the clarity we are aiming at", then that thing is a goal.

Whether this clarity aimed at is a means to a further end is irrelevant to the inconsistency which I am pointing out. The inconsistency is that prior to 127 Wittgenstein is describing philosophy as simply putting things in front of us, not explaining anything, but after 127 he switches to say that the philosopher will arrange things into a particular order, for a particular purpose. He then proceeds to identify that particular purpose as clarity at 133.

To arrange things into a particular order, for the sake of clarity is an act of explanation. To "explain" is to make clear, and this is obviously inconsistent with 126.

"126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain."

The point being that there is a radical difference between laying everything out in front of us for the sake of observation, and arranging things in an order for the sake of clarity. The latter being a form of explanation.

When someone says we are aiming at something, as is the case in 133, "the clarity we are aiming at", then that thing is a goal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Complete clarity is the goal, for that is when the philosophical problems completely disappear. You originally said that the goal of philosophy for Wittgenstein was "just laying things out...to get a clear view". However, the process of getting a clear view is not the goal, for it is not the end of that process. The goal is the final achievement of that clear view: complete clarity.

The inconsistency is that prior to 127 Wittgenstein is describing philosophy as simply putting things in front of us, not explaining anything, but after 127 he switches to say that the philosopher will arrange things into a particular order, for a particular purpose. He then proceeds to identify that particular purpose as clarity at 133. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no "switching" or inconsistency. Arranging things into a particular order for a particular purpose is the process of getting a clear view.

The point being that there is a radical difference between laying everything out in front of us for the sake of observation, and arranging things in an order for the sake of clarity. The latter being a form of explanation. — Metaphysician Undercover

He never says "for the sake of observation". Also, you have omitted important context from your quote of §126, namely: "For whatever may be hidden is of no interest to us. The name “philosophy” might also be given to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein is signalling here that philosophy should not be treated like a science in which hidden aspects of nature can be discovered. Our language is not a mystery. That is, I believe he is referring to a scientific type of explanation at §126. Regardless, I have no interest in arguing over the word "explanation".

Complete clarity is the goal, for that is when the philosophical problems completely disappear. You originally said that the goal of philosophy for Wittgenstein was "just laying things out...to get a clear view". — Luke

Yes, do you see the inconsistency there? Complete clarity is what Wittgenstein says is the goal of philosophy after 127. Prior to 127 the goal of philosophy is just laying things out.

However, the process of getting a clear view is not the goal, for it is not the end of that process. The goal is the final achievement of that clear view: complete clarity. — Luke

The aim is complete clarity, as stated at 133. If you choose to ignore this that's your choice. If the complete clarity is for the purpose of something other than philosophy, then this further goal is irrelevant to this discussion of philosophy.

There is no "switching" or inconsistency. Arranging things into a particular order for a particular purpose is the process of getting a clear view. — Luke

Of course it's inconsistency, you seem to be in denial. At 126 it is stated that there is no need for "explanation". To "explain" is to make clear. Therefore to arrange things for the purpose of getting a clear view, is the very definition of "explain". To arrange things for the purpose of getting a clear view is completely opposed to what is stated prior to !27.
"126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain."

If you must, go right back to 98: "So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence.". By what principle is one order better than another order? If a philosopher is creating an order for the purpose of clarity, then that philosopher is explaining. But Wittgenstein has introduced no principle whereby explaining is what a philosopher ought to do. In fact, he has explicitly denied that there is any need for a philosopher to explain. Any order is a perfect order, even the vaguest of sentences, and there is no reason why any philosopher ought to arrange things in any specific order, for any specific purpose, because all orders are equally "perfect".

Therefore all this talk which occurs after 127, about arranging things for the purpose of clarity, is completely inconsistent with what was said prior to 127.

Regardless, I have no interest in arguing over the word "explanation". — Luke

I know, because rather than take a good look at how "explanation" is used, you'd rather simply deny the glaring inconsistency.

Prior to 127 the goal of philosophy is just laying things out. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is your unsupported assertion. He never states this is the goal of philosophy. But maybe if you say it enough times it will become true.

If the complete clarity is for the purpose of something other than philosophy, then this further goal is irrelevant to this discussion of philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

It appears you did not understand my distinction between the process of working to attain complete clarity and then actually attaining it. The former is not the goal of philosophy. The goal of philosophy is the resolution of philosophical problems, which is why he focuses on the source and resolution of philosophical problems from §119-133.

To arrange things for the purpose of getting a clear view is completely opposed to what is stated prior to !27. — Metaphysician Undercover

False.

If you must, go right back to 98: "So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence.". By what principle is one order better than another order? If a philosopher is creating an order for the purpose of clarity, then that philosopher is explaining. But Wittgenstein has introduced no principle whereby explaining is what a philosopher ought to do. In fact, he has explicitly denied that there is any need for a philosopher to explain. Any order is a perfect order, even the vaguest of sentences, and there is no reason why any philosopher ought to arrange things in any specific order, for any specific purpose, because all orders are equally "perfect". — Metaphysician Undercover

These are different uses/meanings of the word "order".

Does that imply quietism? — Wallows

I just came across this article which argues that Wittgenstein was not a quietist, so perhaps I was a little hasty to label him as one. I consider the distinction made in the article for why he is not a quietist to be somewhat subtle, although I do agree with it. The article also contains pertinent remarks on the current passages under discussion and on my recent discussion with Metaphysician Undercover. It is a little lengthy, but worth the read.

This is your unsupported assertion. He never states this is the goal of philosophy. But maybe if you say it enough times it will become true. — Luke

I quoted 126 at least twice and 125 at least once. I'm not here, to teach you how to read. I would expect that anyone partaking in this discussion would have already ascended to a basic level in that. Making it possible to get a clear view of things (which is "the business of philosophy" 125), and, arranging things for the purpose of clarity (after 127), are two distinct things. These two are mutually exclusive.

These are different uses/meanings of the word "order". — Luke

Actually, the use of "order" in these two instances is very similar. At 98 he is talking about the ordering of words in a sentence. This order is given in the act of creating the sentence. At 130-133 he is talking about the ordering of language-games. This is an order given by the philosopher, who sets up the language-games as objects for comparison (the creative act known as platonic dialectics).

In each of these cases we choose from a vast selection of objects, arrange the selected ones in an order, and give them public existence for the purpose of saying something. In the first instance (98), he is talking about a selection of words which are given order as a "sentence". The person says something through the means of the sentence. In the second instance he is talking about the philosopher selecting language-games which are given order to create a "model" (131). The philosopher says something about "the facts of our language" (130) through the means of the model.

The problem is that at 98 he says that any order is "perfect", as if clarity is unimportant in the creation of sentences. And this is simply the way that language is, whatever order is necessary to serve the purpose is the perfect order. Clarity is not necessarily the aim, because language aims at efficiency (getting things done as unenelightened said), and clarity is not very efficient. Wittgenstein was stating in this earlier part of the book, that this is the way language is. That is his description. Yet at 130-133, when it comes to the philosophical act of modeling language-games for the purpose of demonstrating "the facts of our language", all of a sudden clarity is of the utmost importance to the philosopher.

If clarity is of the utmost importance to Wittgenstein the philosopher, then Wittgenstein is not adhering to the principles of description which he has himself laid down. He has described language as serving many possible purposes, and therefore being vague because of this, but when he moves to model language as a philosopher (stating that the philosopher ought to only describe), he appears to choose one purpose, one aim, the goal of clarity. If he has in fact chosen the goal of clarity, he is inconsistent. But, as I said in the earlier post there is still some ambiguity at 132 as to whether he has truly chosen clarity as his aim.

I quoted 126 at least twice and 125 at least once. I'm not here, to teach you how to read. — Metaphysician Undercover

You could at least quote the parts of §125 and §126 which support your claim that "just laying things out" is the goal of philosophy.

At 98 he is talking about the ordering of words in a sentence. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. When he speaks of "order" at §98, he is talking about the sense of a sentence. This is quite obvious from the context of §98 and §99.

You could at least quote the parts of §125 and §126 which support your claim that "just laying things out" is the goal of philosophy. — Luke

I did. If you cannot understand, then so be it.

When he speaks of "order" at §98, he is talking about the sense of a sentence. This is quite obvious from the context of §98 and §99. — Luke

He says "On the other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect order". This does not say that the sense is the order. It says that order is necessary (as determined by some sort of logic) for there to be sense. The order, which produces sense, is what I described above. At this point in the book (130-133), we have moved from "sense", to what underpins sense (as has been determined to be required for sense at 98), and that is "order".

I just came across this article which argues that Wittgenstein was not a quietist, so perhaps I was a little hasty to label him as one. I consider the distinction made in the article for why he is not a quietist to be somewhat subtle, although I do agree with it. The article also contains pertinent remarks on the current passages under discussion and on my recent discussion with Metaphysician Undercover. It is a little lengthy, but worth the read. — Luke

Thanks, I'll have a read. I've come recently to the conclusion that the later Wittgenstein was more of a neo-pragmatist in his adherence to forms of life, language games, and communal use of language to express thoughts and feelings. Would you perhaps, agree with this assessment?

I did. If you cannot understand, then so be it. — Metaphysician Undercover

He makes no mention of the "goal of philosophy" in either of those sections. If you want to pretend like you've already proven otherwise, then so be it.

He says "On the other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect order". This does not say that the sense is the order. It says that order is necessary (as determined by some sort of logic) for there to be sense. The order, which produces sense, is what I described above. At this point in the book (130-133), we have moved from "sense", to what underpins sense (as has been determined to be required for sense at 98), and that is "order". — Metaphysician Undercover

Your claim that "he is talking about the ordering of words in a sentence" at §98 is ridiculous.

Would you perhaps, agree with this assessment? — Wallows

I don't know. You're throwing a lot of -isms at me which I'm not completely familiar with, to be honest. And I didn't do very well the first time around, either. But I highly recommend reading the article.