There is no reaching you. You are incapable of rational discourse.

When a Christian or a person of another theistic religion says that their God exists, the truth is that they are saying this because they believe that God(s) exists. Regardless of how sure they claim to be or what "evidence" they give, the fact is that is simply what they believe, because no one knows if any God(s) exist, which is the exact reason why no evidence has been provided for the existence of any God(s). I personally do not have an opinion either way regarding God(s) or their presence, so I guess you could call me agnostic, but I am simply pointing out that no one knows if God(s) exists. If Christians actually knew that their God exists, then they could easily provide irrefutable evidence and there would not constantly be disputes by atheists asking for said evidence. I'm not arguing for atheists or theists, I'm simply saying that theists don't actually know if God does or does not exist, and therefore they should not claim to know this or try to give atheists reasons why God(s) does exists as opposed to simply accepting that they don't know if God exists. — Maureen

It isn't as simple as that, because the debate isn't purely an epistemic dispute over the possibility of theological knowledge. Rather, the debate between atheists and Christians is to a large extent a debate over the very meaning of evidence, god, and their interrelation.

There will be theists, the immanentists, who will say that one's immediate experience is all the proof one needs of gods existence, effectively eliminating the concept of evidence by identifying experience itself with divine presence. And on the other extreme there will be atheists who insist that the evidence for god is zero in every possible world, effectively eliminating the relevance of experience to the concept of god, leaving the idea of god empty. Both of these positions constitute 100% certainty in their respective beliefs.

The key is to recognize that their definitions of god are incompatible and that they are talking past each other in incommensurable dialects.

I suggest that to understand what a person means by "god", you must ask them to describe the experiences they are prepared to accept as constituting "god's" existence. After hearing the person's answers, is there anything more to discuss?

Argument from incredulity.

Perhaps you find this arguement compelling.
— Noah Te Stroete

No, I don't find fallacious arguments compelling. — S

My understanding of the Divine Fallacy is that “supernatural” explanations are given to phenomena that one cannot imagine to be explained as natural. My argument is that a “divine” consciousness is a natural explanation abductively inferred as a better inference than that of a spontaneous and accidental explanation. I will repeat: it is an abductive inference. I use the term “divine” not in the ordinary sense, but as a descriptor for which there is a lack of a better word for the guiding consciousness that led conscious life to form. This, too, would be a natural phenomena, as I believe that everything that exists is natural.

It has not been established, nor I highly doubt that it ever could be, that there is an accidental and spontaneous mechanism that causes inanimate matter to form into conscious life. And, no, evolution does NOT explain it. In order for my argument to be characterized as an instance of the Divine Fallacy, it would have to be a supernatural explanation for which there is a natural explanation. It is not this at all for the reasons I just showed.

What did I say that was irrational?

This is the part that I, not necessarily object to, but which I mean muddies the waters for those who aren't knowledgable in philosophy. They use "knowledge isn't different than belief" as proof that belief has the same position of truth as claims rooted in rational reasoning, evidence and so on. Maybe a new terminology of knowledge based on supporting information with high scrutiny of skepticism should be named in order not to be confused with "belief", as just by looking at this forum, many get confused by. — Christoffer

Atheists who aren't philosophically-educated are just as troublesome in this regard, though, because they wind up saying silly things like "I don't have beliefs," "I don't believe that there is a refrigerator in my kitchen; I know there is," etc.

All you need to do with theists is to explain that knowledge isn't belief simpliciter. It's a qualified species of belief.

I really don't understand when people use "likely" that way. Likely based on what? It seems like it's just shorthand for "based on my intuitive preconceptions . . . " — Terrapin Station

It’s an abductive inference. Abduction necessarily deals with likelihood.

It’s an abductive inference. — Noah Te Stroete

An abductive inference based on what?

An abductive inference based on what? — Terrapin Station

What do you mean? Let me ask you this: how do you infer that other people are conscious other than that it is a better explanation than that solipsism is true?

Or that materialism is a better explanation than idealism? As you seem to.

What do you mean? — Noah Te Stroete

Someone says, " It seems highly likely to me that inanimate matter could spontaneously collect and organize itself into conscious beings all on its own without some kind of guidance."

What makes the supportive/justificational difference between the sentence above and the alternate sentence that you typed? We ask the person above what they're basing their sentence on and they say: "It’s an abductive inference. Abduction necessarily deals with likelihood. " Is that good enough? If so, why don't you believe their sentence over your alternate sentence?

how do you infer that other people are conscious other than that it is a better explanation than that solipsism is true?

Behavior in conjunction with one's first-person knowledge of how one's similar behavior is correlated with mental activity.

Behavior in conjunction with one's first-person knowledge of how one's similar behavior is correlated with mental activity. — Terrapin Station

Sure. I also infer inductively by analogy, but it is not something that ALSO doesn’t rely on an abductive inference that everything you experience is really happening. How do you know that you’re not hallucinating and are delusional all the time?

Let's not bypass this part, it's what I want to know (also because there's a more fundamental issue here I'm tackling):

Someone says, " It seems highly likely to me that inanimate matter could spontaneously collect and organize itself into conscious beings all on its own without some kind of guidance."

What makes the supportive/justificational difference between the sentence above and the alternate sentence that you typed? We ask the person above what they're basing their sentence on and they say: "It’s an abductive inference. Abduction necessarily deals with likelihood. " Is that good enough? If so, why don't you believe their sentence over your alternate sentence?

What makes the supportive/justificational difference between the sentence above and the alternate sentence that you typed? We ask the person above what they're basing their sentence on and they say: "It’s an abductive inference. Abduction necessarily deals with likelihood. " Is that good enough? If so, why don't you believe their sentence over your alternate sentence? — Terrapin Station

It seems that there is no mechanistic explanatory model for how conscious life formed.

It seems that there is no mechanistic explanatory model for how conscious life formed. — Noah Te Stroete

Okay, so that's what you're basing it on? (If so, that's all I was asking.)

I suppose I am.

Would you say then that you're also essentially arguing that "If matter could spontaneously collect and organize itself into conscious beings all on its own without some kind of guidance, then it seems likely that there would be a mechanistic explanatory model for that by now"?

Would you say then that you're also essentially arguing that "If matter could spontaneously collect and organize itself into conscious beings all on its own without some kind of guidance, then it seems likely that there would be a mechanistic explanatory model for that by now"? — Terrapin Station

I would argue that even if such a model were given, it still couldn’t rule out some kind of guidance. I would still infer abductively that there is a “divine” consciousness.

I would argue that even if such a model were given, it still couldn’t rule out some kind of guidance. I would still infer abductively that there is a “divine” consciousness. — Noah Te Stroete

The other issue is how we'd support that there would be some sort of mechanistic explanatory model by now.

The other issue is how we'd support that there would be some sort of mechanistic explanatory model by now. — Terrapin Station

True. I have a preference for a “divine” consciousness, just as others have a preference for no “divine” consciousness. I gave my reasons for my belief. What are your reasons for yours?

Atheists who aren't philosophically-educated are just as troublesome in this regard, though, because they wind up saying silly things like "I don't have beliefs," "I don't believe that there is a refrigerator in my kitchen; I know there is," etc.

All you need to do with theists is to explain that knowledge isn't belief simpliciter. It's a qualified species of belief. — Terrapin Station

Completely agree. I mean, anti-vaccers doesn't have to be religious and theists to possess bullshit ideas. The important thing is to just disregard both theism and atheism as tribalist concepts and always aim for rational, reasonable arguments with evidence.

True. I have a preference for a “divine” consciousness, just as others have a preference for no “divine” consciousness. I gave my reasons for my belief. What are your reasons for yours? — Noah Te Stroete

I was more interested in talking about epistemology in general, and the idea of likelihood more specifically (although we never ended up getting into that).

Re my beliefs about the ontology of consciousness, all evidence points to it being a brain function, and there's zero evidence that consciousness occurs anywhere outside of brain functions.

Could an artificial brain be conscious? Also, I am not claiming I know the nature of this “divine” consciousness of which I speak. Could it also be somehow instantiated in something physical? I don’t know.

I was more interested in talking about epistemology in general, and the idea of likelihood more specifically (although we never ended up getting into that). — Terrapin Station

Sure. I also infer inductively by analogy, but it is not something that ALSO doesn’t rely on an abductive inference that everything you experience is really happening. How do you know that you’re not hallucinating and are delusional all the time? — Noah Te Stroete

My point was that it is more likely that the physical world exists, and that a conscious mind that is working properly is more likely to perceive it usually accurately. This is an abductive inference.

Weird. I didn't even mention the divine fallacy. I said that you'd commited the fallacy known as an argument from incredulity. And you're confusing where the burden of proof lies. I don't have to lift a finger. You have to justify your bare assertion about an "abductive inference". You must show your workings, and then we can assess them. Thus far, what you've presented has been fallacious.

I said that you'd commited the fallacy known as an argument from incredulity. — S

Can you define that for me?

Why not just google it?

My Google Home Hub gives the Divine Fallacy when I ask it that. Why not define it here for all of our amelioration?

Just Googled it with my iPhone. I’m not saying the alternative is necessarily false. I am saying that it is a better explanation that conscious life was guided into existence.

So you didn't read past the first sentence of the first link in the search results? Or click the second link, titled "Argument from incredulity"?

Why? Laziness?

I am saying that it is a better explanation that conscious life was guided into existence. — Noah Te Stroete

And I'm saying that bare assertions like that can be rightly dismissed.

Why? Laziness? — S

Yes. I was being lazy. I’m an extremely lazy person. God bless me.