You don't seem to be reading what I'm writing. — Terrapin Station
What counts as being moral in kind
— creativesoul
It's an opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. — Terrapin Station
So, it would follow that all opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral in kind.
— creativesoul
Yes. Hence why I wrote that. — Terrapin Station
Earlier I responded to your first statement above by saying that promises are not true or false in a propositional sense, but that they may be true promises or false promises depending on whether the one promising sincerely intends to keep the promise. I said further that so-called false promises are not truly promises at all, they just appear to be promises.
Thinking about it further it occurred to me that promises can be understood to be true or false propositions in two ways:
First, if we think of promises as statements of intention, then promises will be true or false depending on whether they correspond or fail to correspond to the intention they state. If I promise to pay you for the work you carried out on my behalf, and I have no intention of paying you for the work, then the so-called promise, as a statement of intention to pay you, is false.
Second, if we think of promises as statements about what will be, then promises will be true or false depending on whether the states of affairs they claim will obtain do or do not obtain. If I promise to pay you for the work, and I do not pay you for the work, then the promise, understood as a statement about what will come to pass, is false. — Janus
Why in the world do we have to keep posting the same thing over and over? — Terrapin Station
Seriously, though, if this is that difficult for you, we need to concentrate on tackling stuff like the Cat in the Hat first. — Terrapin Station
Being moral relative to S is about S's judgment. — creativesoul
The thing you’re not agreeing with, and now asking me if I agree with, is derived from an improper understanding of what I said.
What I categorically, and hardly anybody else by my supposition, and you by admission, wouldn’t agree with, is your statement, rather than my comment. — Mww
Something here is troublesome to me... — creativesoul
Promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good. Just because promising is always morally good, it does not follow that which is promised must also be good, as measured by the relativism of the law chosen to ground it. — Mww
I said promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good.
The procedure is morally good, from a deontological point of view. — Mww
An insincere promise is a deceit, so I would say it isn’t following the lawful procedure. — Mww
is an instance of moral relativism. I should have said subjective moral relativism, because the good of a promise is always internal.Not all promise making is good. — creativesoul
Your “not all promises are good” is a judgement made on a morality not belonging to it, and is merely a continuation of an objection to a promise-making procedure, and is moral relativism proper. — Mww
Let's look again, shall we? — creativesoul
the ‘good’ of a promise is contingent upon integrity as always morally good, — Possibility
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