Unconventional, perhaps against rules that someone has agreed to play by (if they have) — Terrapin Station

Fair enough. I'd just say it's not a correct move, but maybe I'm more careless in my speech than I should be.

Mores can differ markedly between cultures, but I tend to see those more in terms of different forms of etiquette than of central moral differences — Janus

I’m ok with that. Mores being a form of social etiquette, or an unwritten code of public conduct, as opposed to, say, taboos. The consequence of violation of a civil code of conduct is usually pre-determined as part and parcel of that code. The consequence of violation of social mores is usually something like being ostracized to some degree, or something like it, and isn’t usually pre-determined in form or degree. It’s like mores are an informal code, civil law is a formal code, both having to do with public conduct.

It is very much more the case that an outsider will find the mores of an extant community sufficient reason to join it, rather than the unambiguous, etched-in-stone civil code. Though I suppose it is possible a guy will come to a state where the penalty for bank robbery, e.g., is substantially less than some other state. Nevertheless, it seems rather significant that one’s sense of good conduct has precedence over one’s sense of right conduct.
———————-

The "relativism of (your) moral dispositon itself" I would see as a combination of enculturation and freely exercised rationality. — Janus

Again, I concur, if I’m already in a social environment, but if I’m freely changing environments because of some arbitrary unhappiness with either myself or the community, to wit: my enculturation is insufficient, or even detrimental somehow, then my freely exercised rationality becomes the means by which I know what’s good for myself, and in turn justifies me packin’ up the kids and BBQ and hittin’ the road.

If it be true my moral relativism enables me to be well-adapted to a community, and my moral relativism enables me to be unhappy with a community, enculturation because of community can’t be the ground of my moral relativism. Cultural predicates can only serve as the means of exposing my freely excersiced rationality. In other words, I myself am common to both situations, therefore whatever the distinctions are, and however they manifest, absolutely must have their origin in me.
————————

Morality is relative, but it is relative to what is good for community, not what is good for the individual. There is obviously an objective 'what is the case' when it comes to what is good for community, and this is all the more obvious when it comes to extreme acts
— Janus — Mww

All my above is in relation to your assertion here. I voted it true, because I agree with that assertion in itself. I bring it up to exemplify the difference between your “morality is relative” with respect to the good of a community, and my “the relativism of morality” which I assert has nothing to do with community.

Is there any common ground?

I think it's important that we avoid suggesting that anyone should be doing anything just because it's what everyone else is doing.

I think it's important that we avoid suggesting that anyone should be doing anything just because it's what everyone else is doing. — Terrapin Station

I completely agree. It's what is most fundamental to me about this discussion. What I'm trying to do is to demonstrate that this continues to be true even if one accepts the terminology of "correct" = accords with the rules the masses make.

The masses do not, in fact, agree on 'the rules' like they do in chess, or maths, and if any community were to devise some 'rules' with the objective of bringing about social harmony, it is my view that they would be well advised to proscribe something which acknowledged individual autonomy, diversity and innovation. Something very different from that which moral objectivists tend to think of as 'morality'.

In other words, I got bored of banging my head against a wall on meta-ethics and started talking about normative morality instead.

What’s a moral statement? From the agent’s perspective, is it a declaration of an interest (hunger is detrimental to good health), or, is it the representation of an interest in the form of an action (I go to the gospel mission every Tuesday to feed the hungry)?
— Mww

Will any interest do or does it require a specific kind of interest in order for it to qualify as being a moral one, as compared/contrasted to one that is not. I've all kinds of interests, from people watching to inventing, to rendering, to poetry, to non-fiction, etc. — creativesoul

Excellent question, and well-thought. There are two kinds of interests. An interest which is the object of desire is an interest of empirical reason and is subjectively pathological; an interest which is the object of will is an interest of morality and is purely subjectively practical. It is here that it becomes clear objective examples, re: external to the moral agent, of moral conditions are not sufficient for moral judgements.

In the former it is the object itself that is good because it satisfies a desire, in the latter it is the willful determination of a volition in order to attain to an object that is good because it satisfies a moral disposition.
———————

On my view, the law is nothing more and nothing less than legitimized morality(legitimized moral belief). — creativesoul

Absolutely. As long as we agree it is a moral law, not a law in general. And it must have the form of law, because laws are the only possible manifestations of universality and necessity, with respect to human rationality. And it must be those in order to be non-contradictory. And it must be non-contradictory in order for the moral agent to know with certainty what his moral dispositions are. He cannot go through life constantly asking himself what the right thing to do is, or, more importantly, what the good thing to do is. Here is where the intrinsic circularity of human rationality arises, insofar as he must reason to a law, which must then be used to reason to his lawful actions. Enter.......yeah....that’s right......moral subjective relativism. Proof positive moral relativism has no place in the world. An agent needs to determine his laws relative to his sense of good. THAT is the name of the moral game.

Even so, given the necessary conditions of law, it still must be determined how a moral law is possible.

FYI, of purely general interest.

This struck me most:

“....a survey of 73 professors with a PhD in philosophy and primary area of specialization in ethics revealed that 37% endorse deontological principles, 27% endorse utilitarian principles, 22% endorse virtue ethics, and 14% endorse none of the above....”
(reported in Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012)

http://home.uchicago.edu/bartels/papers/BartelsEtAl-MoralJDM-2015.pdf

Nice analysis. :ok:

The main reason why I'm keen to support relativism is not because of its ontological truth (as I've said before, "truth" is not such a big deal for me) it's because I think objectivism is harmful, and I care about avoiding harms (at least to those people I choose to care about). — Isaac

Interesting take on it. I'm very much with Terrapin in that it's first of all a disinterested approach about what's the case regarding morality, ontologically. But in addition to that, for me, it then becomes pragmatic in the sense of which interpretation is most useful or least problematic philosophically, and I argue that that's subjective moral relativism, in spite of the clear prejudice and misconceptions some people have about it.

If I didn't take that pragmatic approach, I would've stopped at error theory. I think we can actually order meta-ethical positions in terms of how sophisticated they are. I would roughly place dogmatic moral objectivism at the bottom, with error theory somewhere in the middle, and my pragmatic subjective moral relativism at the top.

I would place emotivism and error theory below my position, because the former is problematic in terms of moral truth-aptness, and the latter in terms of moral truth.

It is in this context I find the argument about near universality to be more fruitful to oppose than the one about absolute universality which would be required to prove objectivism (and which those on that side of the argument have so spectacularly failed to provide). — Isaac

It was clear to me from the start that Janus would put forward a position with more going for it than that of Tim, creativesoul, or Rank Amateur. I think that's likely true in general, whatever the topic.

My recent quarrel with him hasn't changed my assessment in that regard. The truth is, we aren't all intellectual equals.

Riddle me this. Throughout this thread I've represented that some things are absolutely wrong, with reference to Kantian ethics to try to give some meaning to "absolute." And basically - if I've understood correctly - you and yours have beat that notion with a stick at every opportunity and then some. As if to say it just absolutely ain't so, but that moral propositions are simply expressions of personal preference - absolutely. I haven't seen where you actually wrote that it was all absolutely relative, but I'm comfortable affirming that "absolute" as at the apparent core of your relativity.

But it does seem to me a fatal contradiction. Maybe a relativist like you can get through the day without resolving the contradiction, but while that may have utility, it's not very honest.

So. Contradiction? Yes? No? If so, resolve it? Or is it personal preference all the way down, even into the deep abyss of self-contradiction? And if this latter, on what basis other then mere personal preference do you object to anyone else's beliefs? There's an answer to that, too, but it's unkind. But it's up to you to show that it's unwarranted.

This is where I disagree with you (and I have a feeling disagreeing with you is going to be a lot more fruitful than disagreeing with my previous interlocutors). I think it is an erroneous appeal to the masses, not a fallacious one. I don't think it is fallacious to appeal to the masses (or any other authority) as to what is "correct" in certain circumstances. It is "correct" to move the Bishop diagonally in chess, and this is entirely because the consensus of chess players think that. It is incorrect to say 2+2=5, and this is entirely because the consensus of mathematicians define the terms that way.

What I think the appeal to the masses is here is erroneous. It is a mistake (given what the proponents claim to want) to use the opinion of the masses as a normative force to guide behaviour in that way. Diversity is good, innovation is good (I also trust instinct quite a lot too). Reversion to the mean stifles these things and so is a mistake. It ends up back with something I think you and I spoke about right at the beginning. People imposing their own cultural values as if they were objectively right. — Isaac

I consider it a very minor difference, if it is even a real difference at all, whether we say erroneous appeal to the masses or fallacious appeal to the masses. I agree that not every such appeal is erroneous or fallacious. When it is a consensus-based thing, it is more of an appeal to authority. I don't think that his claim would be a valid appeal to authority, because he's not actually appealing to an authority. They are an authority on herd-morality, not on morality. If you want to know about herd-morality, obviously it makes sense to consult the herd.

I agree entirely with your successful refutation. Where I'm at odds is that if he had come back and said "in a racist society, racidm is morally" right" because that's what "right" means" - then, I think he would have had a reasonable position. We're free to define words that way and I'm not sure it would be too far from the way a lot of people use the term. They are just wrong about the behaviour of the they consequently advise. — Isaac

Yes, I agree that that would have been a considerably better response: bite the bullet, stick to your guns. That's better than handwaving and ignoring at least. But I think that that just doesn't feel right. And I prioritise what your gut is telling you here. It seems pretty damn wrong and crazy to appear to be siding against your own moral judgement with the racists and the slavery supporters by affirming that they're morally right in these scenarios. To me, that indicates a problem, even if only semantic. It's really weird not to give your own moral judgement priority, and say that they're wrong. I think he's like pretty much everyone else when faced with this thought experiment: he instinctively wants to say that they're wrong. But he can't do that without seriously undermining his broader position.

Riddle me this. Throughout this thread I've represented that some things are absolutely wrong, with reference to Kantian ethics to try to give some meaning to "absolute." And basically - if I've understood correctly - you and yours have beat that notion with a stick at every opportunity and then some. As if to say it just absolutely ain't so, but that moral propositions are simply expressions of personal preference - absolutely. I haven't seen where you actually wrote that it was all absolutely relative, but I'm comfortable affirming that "absolute" as at the apparent core of your relativity.

But it does seem to me a fatal contradiction. Maybe a relativist like you can get through the day without resolving the contradiction, but while that may have utility, it's not very honest.

So. Contradiction? Yes? No? If so, resolve it? Or is it personal preference all the way down, even into the deep abyss of self-contradiction? And if this latter, on what basis other then mere personal preference do you object to anyone else's beliefs? There's an answer to that, too, but it's unkind. But it's up to you to show that it's unwarranted. — tim wood

This objection is a slight variation in wording from your earlier objection, and it has been dealt with. But I will generously remind you of the answer.

As you know, I am a moral relativist. That means that I consider normative moral statements, like "Murder is wrong", to be true in a relative sense.

As you should know, I haven't committed to relativism more broadly. I actually just consider meta-ethical statements about morality to be either true or false in the normal way we treat such statements. There's no contradiction there at all. These are two distinct positions about two distinct types of statement.

This has been explained to you multiple times, by myself and by others. The real question is, why do you persist with this stuff? Is it that you just don't get it, or that you deliberately disregard the explanations? Either way, it makes you look bad.

I think that that just doesn't feel right. And I prioritise what your gut is telling you here. It seems pretty damn wrong and crazy to appear to be siding against your own moral judgement with the racists and the slavery supporters by affirming that they're morally right in these scenarios. To me, that indicates a problem, even if only semantic. It's really weird not to give your own moral judgement priority, and say that they're wrong. — S

Yes, me too. Again, this is kind of the point I'm trying to make here. If (not an if I would agree with) one were to say "morality" just is the rules set by the masses, and if one somehow took the edge off the 'mob rule' that would allow by claiming some notion of humanity as the universal belief, even then, one would have little by way of answers because the 'rules' thereby created would barely answer a single real question. Questions you and I could answer in an instant by consulting our gut.

Yes, me too. Again, this is kind of the point I'm trying to make here. If (not an if I would agree with) one were to say "morality" just is the rules set by the masses, and if one somehow took the edge off the 'mob rule' that would allow by claiming some notion of humanity as the universal belief, even then, one would have little by way of answers because the 'rules' thereby created would barely answer a single real question. Questions you and I could answer in an instant by consulting our gut. — Isaac

:100:

I’m ok with that. Mores being a form of social etiquette, or an unwritten code of public conduct, as opposed to, say, taboos. — Mww

I'm not sure about your distinction here. There are more or less serious taboos, just as there are more or less serious mores. Taboos are the kinds of mores that tell us what not to do and there is another class of positive mores which tell us what to do. I don't believe it is terribly important for the health, harmony and stability of societies that their members adhere to the less serious mores, although it might be so in very tradition oriented societies.

Modern societies thrive on difference, so it might be worse for such societies, societies that are based on change and growth, if everyone obediently adheres to less serious mores. If everyone began practicing incest on the other hand, I think that would certainly be deleterious to modern societies, but perhaps not to societies in which the practice had somehow become sanctified. Although it seems that there have been very few, if any societies which did not proscribe incest.

If it be true my moral relativism enables me to be well-adapted to a community, and my moral relativism enables me to be unhappy with a community, enculturation because of community can’t be the ground of my moral relativism. — Mww

OK, but I was referring to your enculturation as a child being the foundation of your moral attitudes. Of course you can think about and modify those attitudes however you want to, or are capable of, by freely thinking about them. One aspect of the kind of moral relativism that says it's all about the individual is right; the individual is certainly in principle free to change his or her mind about any moral prescription or proscription whatsoever. The individual can do whatever they want to within the limits of what their enculturation, and of course the law, will allow.

My position is just that acts which foster flourishing, peace and harmony for individuals and for their (whole) communities are morally right, and acts which bring about decline, conflict and disharmony within individuals and their communities are morally wrong. Different mores may suit different communities, but as I have repeated many times, I believe that when it comes to the big central moral issues there is little variation within and across communities. I also believe that if egregious acts like murder, rape and so on were widely approved it would be fatal to the community in which it was approved. So there is plenty of room for diversity when it comes to the less serious mores, but not when it comes to the serious ones.

I am curious about one thing; which is that, although you apparently consider yourself a moral relativist, you seem to be in favor of Kant's categorical imperative. That would seem to be a difficult if not impossible reconciliation.

I’m ok with that. Mores being a form of social etiquette, or an unwritten code of public conduct, as opposed to, say, taboos.
— Mww

I'm not sure about your distinction here. — Janus

You know...the human complement system: Yes, no; left, right; front, back; up,down.....mores, taboos.
But you think of a taboo more as a negative more? That’s fine. I can do that, if it ever comes up again.
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OK, but I was referring to your enculturation as a child being the foundation of your moral attitudes. — Janus

So you use enculturation that way, from a child-rearing perspective. I was attributing more to it than that, looks like. It relates because I treat morality from the perspective of a fully developed rational system. As such, I don’t think morality is given to me by parents or society or environment. I figure if I’m responsible for my actions, I get to say what they’re going to be.

All the rest of your comment.....all good.
—————————-

although you apparently consider yourself a moral relativist, you seem to be in favor of Kant's categorical imperative. That would seem to be a difficult if not impossible reconciliation. — Janus

Moral relativism is only recently prominent, sorta like when science divorced itself from philosophy, so too did relativism divorce itself from anthropology, and has since sliced and diced itself up into so many separate denominations....it’s ridiculous. If morality is a study of personal conduct, then there are only two sources of what would stand as a guide for it. Either the code is external, as religious, tribal or administrative doctrine, and is called descriptive ethics, or it is internal, called normative ethics, as a function of personal character, called virtue ethics, or as a function of will, called deontological ethics. That’s it...ain’t no mo’.

I am a relativist in the common sense only insofar as my moral interests are certainly not going to be identical to everybody else’s, I’m a subjectivist simply by nature, and I’m a deontologist because the idea of moral law appeals to me.

The C.I. is the formula for a moral law, it says act strictly in accordance with a principle and whatever that principle is, which I am free to choose, treat it as if it were a law on which everybody else acted the same way. Although this is not a realistic “ought”, it is a very substantial guide to private conduct, to being morally disposed. And that’s all it was ever supposed to be. Murder is a moral interest of mine, because from it I can hold with a principle (murder is contrary to the purpose of life), therefore I ought to act (never commit murder) as if it is indeed a fact murder is contrary to the purpose of life.

As an aside, this formulation also solves the “is-ought” problem. Turns out, it ain’t all that difficult to reason from an “is” (murder is contrary to the purpose of life), to an “ought” (don’t do it, man).

Kant's CI is the best standard to use as a guiding principle of our behaviour if we already care about others. However, it is neither magic, nor flawless. It is not perfect by any reasonable standard of perfection, nor need it be; for perfection - while being fine as an aim to strive for - is an impossible criterion to meet. We're much more reasonable than that. A moral code need not be perfect to be the best one readily available as a means for immediate, long-lasting improvement.

It's not flawless...

Someone who does not care about others could use the CI as a rule of thumb and arrive at unwanted, unexpected, and harmful consequences regardless. Someone could use the CI, in some logically possible scenario, as a means to intentionally harm others(steal and wish that everybody else would as well). Isaac argued something quite similar earlier. It could be used as a means to an end. Goodness is an end in itself. A method is only as successful as it's implementation.

How much does this logically possible situation actually matter though? Not much if we also recognize that all such guiding principles of behaviour are prone to the exact same thing.

We do what is good for the sake of doing good.

Kant's CI is a fantastic starting point for helping all youth develop a greater sense of the actual part we play in our own lives including the actual influence that our thought, belief, and/or behaviour has upon the world. It couldn't be more realistic and practical. It also gives it's user the best possible chance to discover, release, and/or further perpetuate goodness. Kant's CI is quite easily taught despite Kant's unnecessarily complex taxonomy/linguistic framework.

Certainly the best moral belief can be taught to everyone first acquiring language, regardless of individual particulars.

"What if everyone acted like that?"

Easy to understand. Easy to further develop.

With simple reasonable follow-up focusing upon the obvious negative consequences, it helps to further develop critical thinking skills and it begins and/or continues to promote active conscious deliberation regarding how our actions affect/effect others. <---------That is the very heart of all that is morally relevant.

Bring it to the forefront of the child's thought at the appropriate time, and it can leave quite the good impression. Teaching children how to come to such terms promotes goodness for it helps nurture a worldview built upon how important it is to consider others as well as considering the efficacy of their own thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

It fosters goodwill.

It teaches a well-grounded sense of responsibility based upon considering how one's own behaviour effects/affects the world. It is easily understood with simple terms at first. It is also easily amenable to further nuance. After it is introduced as a way to come to terms with everyday situations and is being actively employed by someone, it can be used as the sole means for helping them to finally determine what they ought do in any actual situation that they find themselves in. It will not eliminate the possibility of being mistaken.

Not everyone likes being treated the same way. Everyone likes being respected, accepted, and valued. Thinking about everyone in such terms promotes goodness. Our honourable use of Kant's CI can help pave the way.

It provides a foundation upon which to discover, release, and/or further perpetuate goodness.

If someone already respects others it is a fantastic tool for honing the will. If someone does not already respect others, say someone has a long history of not giving a fuck what sort of harm she/he/they do to others, then Kant's CI is much less affective/effective. Certainly we all agree that that sort of behaviour is not the best.

The best possible results stem from early teaching and constant reminding. It fosters good habits of mind.

Thinking about the affects/effects that our own behaviour has upon others is the very best foundation. It is easily administered, taught, and/or otherwise initially implemented. It provides a baseline from which to judge. It supports the idea of doing what is good for it's own sake. It provides the best practical and realistic possibility for increasing happiness and livelihood while decreasing unnecessary suffering.

We're not seeking perfection. We're setting out which is the most likely to increase goodness while decrease unnecessary suffering. If everyone did this, there is no doubt that the world world be a much better place than if not. So, it also consistent.

What more could one ask for?

My vote is Kant's CI, and you've just read my off the cuff meandering.

I believe that when it comes to the big central moral issues there is little variation within and across communities. — Janus

You're talking like a religious zealot. You keep repeating this belief without any justification.

What are these big central moral issues about which there is little variation within and across communities? You haven't answered any challenge to a single one yet.

It's all very well ignoring anyone who opposes your position, but this is a philosophy discussion site, not a personal blog. It's not here for you to just declare what you believe to the Internet at large, its here for you to engage with the views of others who may think differently to you.

I do not see how Kant solves Hume's Guillotine.

If all utterances of ought are moral statements, then I know of at least one variety that is most certainly true and it follows from what is(what happened) without presupposing another ought. Arguments to the contrary are based upon the misattribution of meaning.

If person A promises to plant a rose garden on Sunday, then it follows that there ought be a rose garden the day after, not because one ought keep his/her promise, but rather because that is exactly what the promise means. It means nothing else.

The Speech Act theorists used the notion of 'direction of fit'. To make a promise is to voluntarily obligate oneself to make the world match one's words. That is what a promise means. That is all that it means. This is not about my approval. I'm not saying that someone should keep their promise.

Either not all utterances of ought are moral utterances, or Hume is wrong.

You're talking like a religious zealot. You keep repeating this belief without any justification.

What are these big central moral issues about which there is little variation within and across communities? You haven't answered any challenge to a single one yet.

It's all very well ignoring anyone who opposes your position, but this is a philosophy discussion site, not a personal blog. It's not here for you to just declare what you believe to the Internet at large, its here for you to engage with the views of others who may think differently to you. — Isaac

Yeah, it's gone down hill, unfortunately. I think this is actually far worse than when we were getting frustrated with people who were presenting criticism of a position based on misunderstandings of it. At least that was an attempt to engage.

I also don't think it helps that Janus is confused about what counts as relevant to the topic and what doesn't, given that he considers normative ethical points, like "a harmonious society is good" to be of relevance in meta-ethics, which is about morality itself. It is about statements like the aforementioned. You're not supposed to just be saying them.

Either not all utterances of ought are moral utterances, or Hume is wrong. — creativesoul

Here's an idea. Maybe it's you that's wrong. Has that possibility even crossed your mind?

Arguments to the contrary are based upon the misattribution of meaning. — creativesoul

No they're not.

If person A promises to plant a rose garden on Sunday, then it follows that there ought be a rose garden the day after, — creativesoul

No it doesn't.

that is exactly what the promise means. It means nothing else. — creativesoul

Wrong.

To make a promise is to voluntarily obligate oneself to make the world match one's words. — creativesoul

No it isn't.



Well isn't this fun and engaging philosophical debate! We all just state arguable positions as if they were absolutely true without any support whatsoever. I don't know why philosophy papers are so long, this is much easier.

You haven't answered any challenge to a single one yet. — Isaac

Fuck, man, how many times? Murder, rape, torture, exploitation...basically anything which treats the other as means, and fails to recognize the inherent value of life. Name a culture where such acts committed by one citizen upon another has been approved or even condoned by the members of the community.

Here's an idea. Maybe it's you that's wrong. — Isaac

No, no, no. That's impossible. He's a genius. It is Hume and the rest of Western philosophy who is wrong. They have utterly and miserably failed to distinguish between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. That which is prior to thought/belief isn't existentially dependent on language.

Fuck, man, how many times? Murder, rape, torture, exploitation...basically anything which treats the other as means, and fails to recognize the inherent value of life. — Janus

That doesn't even begin to engage the challenge. Meta-ethics isn't about asserting normative judgements or the normative framework you use. And proper philosophical dialogue isn't about just asserting that your interlocutor fails to recognise something you ardently believe, but haven't proven capable of reasonably supporting.

Fuck, man.

Murder, rape, torture, exploitation...basically anything which treats the other as means, and fails to recognize the inherent value of life. — Janus

Yes, all of which I have raised a challenge to, all of which you have ignored.

People absolutely and evidently do not all agree that murder is wrong across all communities.

In Nazi Germany murder of Jews was commonplace and ordinary citizens were entirely complicit. Columbus murder hundreds of natives on arrival in America and that was considered perfectly acceptable. Murdering slaves for most of modern civilisation was seen as merely regrettable.

All wars are murder to those who don't agree with the justification for the war.

Rape was considered a legitimate 'spoil of war' for the best part of 200 years during both the viking and the Mongol expansions.

Torture is used today by one of the world's largest democracies.

The whole fucking third world is exploited to save a few pence on our commodities and no one gives a shit.

No, no, no. That's impossible. He's a genius. It is Hume and the rest of Western philosophy who is wrong. They have utterly and miserably failed to distinguish between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. That which is prior to thought/belief isn't existentially dependent on language. — S

Of course, my mistake. How foolish of me!

Dude, you don't even need to be getting into details like that, and I think that it's counterproductive. What that does is to play into his hand by shifting focus away from meta-ethics and towards normative ethics. The big problem here is that if we assume a shared normative judgement on the stuff you two are talking about, like murder, rape, and torture, then there's still the meta-ethical challenge of supporting his meta-ethical interpretation of these moral judgements. He hasn't reasonably met that challenge. Don't let him off the hook or allow him to lead you down the garden path.

I am not asserting normative judgements; I am saying that what is near universally valued and dis-valued reflects the reality of the human situation and is the only guide to working out what is generally right and wrong for human life. And of course our moral feelings accord with what is most generally valued and dis-valued; there is such a thing as human nature!

Of course in actual situations there are moral issues which are not so clear cut; the underlying principles are the same, but it is not always so easy to determine right and wrong, and there is thus, especially in our modern individualistic culture, some diversity of opinion. But I don't think the general diversity, even on these more nuanced issues is all that significant.

I gave the example of abortion before, Virtually no one questions the sanctity of the individual person's life, if not every person, then at least members of their own culture, so attitudes that are pro or anti-abortion turn on the definition of personhood.

On the central issues there is little or no variance across cultures. If you think there is then give an example. If you want to reply then directly address what I say here with some interesting or relevant comment. It doesn't have to agree with what I have said, but if you want to disagree then you should disagree with what I have actually said, and give good reasons why If you go off on a stupid rant. claiming that I am sounding like a "religious zealot, or some such shit, then I won't respond. If you genuinely want to discuss then you should be able to do so civilly without getting all defensive,casting aspersions and ranting and so on. I don't think you realize how boring that is.

In Nazi Germany murder of Jews was commonplace and ordinary citizens were entirely complicit. — Isaac

They had little choice but to be complicit, and it was not considered murder because the Jews were not accorded status as properly human by the Nazis; they were considered to be a disease to be eradicated.