It's all personal thought/belief being expressed here anyway. What matters most is whether or not it is true. What matters second most is whether or not it is well-grounded. Given that the topic is morality, and we all adopt our own initial worldview, we're all on equal grounds to that - being adopted - extent.

Moralities vary according to particular circumstances. Not all are on equal footing however. Some allow exceptions to the rules. Some do not. Some are based upon true claims, some are not. There are many aspects to consider when one is considering morality.

History shows us that our moral thought/belief changes. What we once thought/believed was good is no longer thought of as being such. Slavery is a prima facie example, although it has morphed more than being abolished. That's another topic altogether though. The point is that humans are the ones that make the rules for human behaviour, and those rules have changes dramatically over the last few centuries, right alongside the evolution of our thought/belief.

Morality has been called a necessary human condition. I think that that sort of thinking highlights one very important aspect of morality. We are all interdependent social creatures by physical and mental necessity. Our cooperation with one another has been instrumental in the survival of the human race. This is true of all long lasting communities.

With an ever-shrinking world filled by an ever-expanding power of personal expression, we're beginning to see more and more of not only our differences, but our similarities as well. The shrinking is due to computer technology. Easier access to information is not good in and of itself. The quality matters most. As a result of being able to access whatever one wants to by virtue of a couple of keyboard clicks, confirmation bias has never been so easy unless one already agrees with everyone around him/her.

Difference is irrevocably crucial for improvement.

The need for critical reasoning skills has never been more prevalent.

That's very true, however, when it comes to topics such as morality, I don't believe that you can tell someone what is moral when the topic of morality is so heavily based on opinion. When someone criticizes you on the use of phrases such as "I think" and "I believe" it kind of defeats the purpose of a forum such as this.

That was extremely well thought out and well worded, to summarize would you say that c

The point is that humans are the ones that make the rules for human behaviour, and those rules have changes dramatically over the last few centuries, right alongside the evolution of our thought/belief. — creativesoul

?

That's very true, however, when it comes to topics such as morality, I don't believe that you can tell someone what is moral when the topic of morality is so heavily based on opinion. When someone criticizes you on the use of phrases such as "I think" and "I believe" it kind of defeats the purpose of a forum such as this. — nsmith

Such criticism is usually based upon an ill-conceived notion of thought/belief itself. Everything ever spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered consists of thought/belief.

Morality is tough because of the differences. Who is the standard bearer, so to speak. Who determines what is moral/immoral? Who determines what is acceptable/unacceptable? These are common questions...

We do, and thankfully more and more people across the world are coming to the agreement that blatant, willful, and underserved disrespect for another's person is unacceptable. Racism is dwindling. However, it is but one manifestation of the same fallacy. Gross overgeneralization. Unfortunately, it still underwrites soooo much 'Western' pop culture, not to mention the institutionalized racism still prevalent in American government at every level, federal, state, and local. However, that is also evolving moe and more into socio-economic prejudice/injustice as compared/contrasted to racial. There are some token pieces of diversity roaming about, and they are well-paid to do what they're asked.

Is it morally acceptable to literally pave a legitimate way for a foreign country, citizen, or group to have and freely express a much more powerful freedom of speech than the average American? I think not. However, that has actually already been done at the Supreme Court level. All of these directly involve morality.

There are things that can be said; things that are true of everyone regardless of one's individual circumstances. These things help to frame our thinking and understanding about how we ought act. Our behaviour has an effect/affect on other's. Keeping that in mind is crucial for determining which action to take.

The point is that humans are the ones that make the rules for human behaviour, and those rules have changed dramatically over the last few centuries, right alongside the evolution of our thought/belief. The changes in human morality are part of that evolution of thought/belief, alongside all the other changes.

Everyone dislikes being murdered, raped, stolen from, deceived and so on, and that is an objective fact about human nature. — Janus

But this is not a moral stance. Loads of people dislike broccoli, yet still eat it because they want to be healthy. Dislikes and behavioural proscriptions are not the same thing. I may dislike being stolen from, but dislike being unable to steal much more and therefore prefer a society where we all steal from each other. In many tribal cultures it is considered OK to just take someone else's possessions if you want them, so your concept of what everyone likes and dislikes just reveals your Western values, not anything about human nature.

it ignores the actual functionality or dysfunctionality of the community. — Janus

OK, let's follow your line of thinking and see where it goes. The actual functionality of a community is an objective fact, and that certain behaviours lead to or avoid such functionality is also an objective fact (or, I believe in your use of 'objective' something can be so on the grounds of being widely agreed on, so we'll go with your definition here).

So... Simply list those things. List all the behaviours which objectively (by your definition) lead to the dysfunctioning of a community. Or just a few, if there are too many to list. I ask because I'm struggling to think of any without further questions which make any central agreement pointless. I'll start you of with those issues I'm having trouble with.

Murder of innocents - who exactly is innocent, an adulterer (already carries a reduced burden of guilt in some countries), a slave (entire cultures considered this acceptable in the past) who is truly innocent in war, are we really at war (see Northern Ireland), what about the trolley problem, saving several lives by killing one innocent, how many lives make the killing of one innocent one OK, how far into the future do these saved lives have to be, how certain do you have to be about innocence...etc?

Rape - how has the MeToo movement evolved if everyone agrees (and always has) on the boundaries of what rape is?

Torture - Guantanamo Bay?

Stealing - I've just given examples of cultures where taking other people's possessions is considered OK. What about revolution, Marxism radical anarchism, all have very different ideas about what property is and who it belongs to.

Hurting innocent children - smacking?


So, you say our agreement on these matters is the objective fact, and our disagreements are of less importance, but all I see from an objective viewpoint is disagreement. So perhaps you could help me out with a quick list of some things you think we all agree on.

In many tribal cultures it is considered OK to just take someone else's possessions if you want them, — Isaac

Show me. Many native American tribes had no concept of personal property. There is no such thing as stealing someone's possessions in a community where all property is gladly and happily considered communal to begin with.

Guys, I've just come up with a brilliant new argument. Are you ready for this?

If you don't agree with my opinion, then we have nothing to talk about. If you don't share my opinion, then you're a stupid head. If you disagree, then I choose to close my eyes to any support you've provided. If you disagree, then you're a pervert. (Which makes you a pervert sociopath stupid head!).

And say something I'll agree with, or else I'll ignore you.

When I have all the facts, I'll make that leap to telling, but until then, it's nothing more than personal judgement. It's essential that those on a philosophy forum understand when they have all the facts and when they don't and until they have all the facts, they have no right to be telling anybody anything. — nsmith

Wow. That's astoundingly humble. @tim wood, @creativesoul, @Janus... did you hear that?

That's very true, however, when it comes to topics such as morality, I don't believe that you can tell someone what is moral when the topic of morality is so heavily based on opinion. When someone criticizes you on the use of phrases such as "I think" and "I believe" it kind of defeats the purpose of a forum such as this. — nsmith

Okay, that's an interesting spin on what you said. Is that an indirect refernce to me? Reasonable criticism is encouraged in philosophy. It doesn't defeat the purpose of a forum such as this. On the contrary, it is very much in line with the purpose of a forum such as this. What's not in line with it, would be to indirectly refer to my criticism in such a manner without properly addressing it. I think that it's generally fine to use such qualifiers. I believe that there's generally nothing wrong with that. My specific criticism was only applicable in a certain context, namely with regard to moral statements, and when intended as an argument against subjective moral relativism. They support subjectivity by their subjective nature, so it would be self-defeating.

Wait, how would acquiring a list of irrelevancies help? Surely, all it would really say is things like, "I judge murder to be wrong!". Forget the list, we should all collectively be seeking a reasonable demonstration, or a proper response to criticism of attempted demonstrations! And no, not that murder is wrong, as we're supposed to be doing meta-ethics, not normative ethics, and especially not normative ethics over things we all basically already agree on.

It's called Demand Sharing. It was first identified by Les Hiatt among the Arnhemland Aborigines, but it's since been recognised quite widely among hunter-gatherers.

What I'm hoping to show by this is that there are no objective facts of the matter even by Janus' definition of objective. I'm not particularly precious about my personal definitions, but I am precious about people confusing cultural superiority complex with objective fact.

Yes, we all agree with the very nebulous concept that "murder is wrong" and so by Janus' (rather idiosyncratic) definition of 'objective', such a concept could be considered an objective fact ('wrong' would also have to be quite weirdly defined as a class of behaviour, but as I said, I'm not precious about definitions).

My point is that this does not provide any useful insight because the concept is too nebulous to be of any normative utility. Hence he can safely leave the thing behind when investigating the meta-ethical issues.

I know it's a long way round, but the direct route didn't seem to be working.

What I'm hoping to show by this is that there are no objective facts of the matter even by Janus' definition of objective. I'm not particularly precious about my personal definitions, but I am precious about people confusing cultural superiority complex with objective fact.

Yes, we all agree with the very nebulous concept that "murder is wrong" and so by Janus' (rather idiosyncratic) definition of 'objective', such a concept could be considered an objective fact ('wrong' would also have to be quite weirdly defined as a class of behaviour, but as I said, I'm not precious about definitions).

My point is that this does not provide any useful insight because the concept is too nebulous to be of any normative utility. Hence he can safely leave the thing behind when investigating the meta-ethical issues.

I know it's a long way round, but the direct route didn't seem to be working. — Isaac

Yeah, if everyone feels that murder is wrong then surely it's a fact that everyone feels that murder is wrong and that fact implies . . . exactly nothing else. It certainly doesn't imply that any individual should feel that murder is wrong (if some odd individual happens to show up at any point and not feel the same as the rest of us), or that anyone has things incorrect if they don't feel that murder is wrong, or anything like that.

If you don't judge health and functionality to be good and ill-health and dysfunctionality to be bad, then we have nothing to talk about. If you don't believe that the most fundamental aim of community is to live harmoniously together, then I will agree that of course you are entitled to that stupid opinion. But I see nothing to support such an opinion except "that is what I choose to believe"; it would be a perverse, and not a reasonable, opinion. — Janus

So presumably you believe that it's a non-opinion-oriented fact that "health and functionality are good" is reasonable, and you believe in general that "x is reasonable" can be a fact that in no way hinges on individual mental predispositions, habits, etc., right?

How would you attempt to support that?

if everyone feels that murder is wrong then surely it's a fact that everyone feels that murder is wrong and that fact implies . . . exactly nothing else. — Terrapin Station

Yes, absolutely. But then what is to stop someone from saying that a collection of such things (things everyone thinks is wrong) is what we call "wrong" when it comes to moral-apt behaviour? "wrong" is just a word, words quite frequently mean different things in different contexts (and to different people). It's quite reasonable that "wrong" when we're talking about morality means {those behaviours which most people dislike}, whereas "wrong" when talking about the statement "the sky is made of jam" means {does not correspond with reality}. After all, we say 2+2=5 is "wrong" all the time, and by that we don't mean {does not correspond with reality}, we mean {does not correspond with the rules of maths}.

So, if "wrong" in the context of morality means {does not correspond with the rules of morality} that would be a completly normal use of "wrong", and if the rules of morality happen to be decided by consensus, then so be it. I don't complain that the rules of chess are derived without my input, nor do I cry foul when someone uses those rules to claim that I was objectively "wrong" to move the bishop perpendicularly.

What is not implied (which is where I agree with you) is that one then should behave a certain way. All those statements above can reasonably be correct uses of the word "wrong" but none mean that I should not murder, presume 2+2=5, or move a bishop perpendicularly.

The reason I bring this up is that I think there's a difference between the ultra-rationalist view that some moral behaviour is rationally right, and what seems to be Janus's view that some behaviour is right because that's what we use the word "right for in this context.

I disagree with both, but I disagree with them for different reasons because they are different propositions, and that's what I was trying to draw out.

Yes, absolutely. But then what is to stop someone from saying that a collection of such things (things everyone thinks is wrong) is what we call "wrong" when it comes to moral-apt behaviour? "wrong" is just a word, words quite frequently mean different things in different contexts (and to different people). It's quite reasonable that "wrong" when we're talking about morality means {those behaviours which most people dislike}, whereas "wrong" when talking about the statement "the sky is made of jam" means {does not correspond with reality}. After all, we say 2+2=5 is "wrong" all the time, and by that we don't mean {does not correspond with reality}, we mean {does not correspond with the rules of maths}. — Isaac

Sure, but there would be no way to support that using "right"/"wrong" in a particular way is the correct way to use it aside from just descriptively noting that it's the conventional or common way to use it. But that's not all that the other side here wants to say. They don't want to just say that such and such is the common moral view, or that such and such is the common way to use a term. If that's all that they wanted to say there would be no argument with us--or if there were, we could just settle any disagreement by doing a survey of beliefs, of word usage, etc.

People want to instead say that there's normative weight to what's common or conventional (or we could say that they want to support the notion of normative weight, period), they want to say that certain things are correct versus incorrect, reasonable versus not reasonable, etc.

People want to instead say that there's normative weight to what's common or conventional (or we could say that they want to support the notion of normative weight, period), they want to say that certain things are correct versus incorrect, reasonable versus not reasonable, etc. — Terrapin Station

Yeah, that's what I wasn't quite sure about from Janus's latest posts. Tim and the ultra-rationalists definitely are trying to say that, but arguing against them is a pointless waste of time if they're never going to address the actual issues.

@Janus, I thought was saying something slightly different. That, in the case of morality, some collection of behaviours can be objectively called "right" just and only because that's what the word "right" means in this context, and any normative weight is derived entirely from the fact that we probably do want to live in a harmonious society (and so anyone who doesn't need not pay attention, ie the normative weight is not exhaustive).

This is a form of relativism (in that the few who do not have a desire to live in a harmonious society are excluded from the normative value), but it is still one with which I disagree, because I think widespread agreement is merely fabricated or presumed in order to give cultural preferences more weight than they rightly have under their own system.

Janus, I thought was saying something slightly different. That, in the case of morality, some collection of behaviours can be objectively called "right" just and only because that's what the word "right" means in this context, and any normative weight is derived entirely from the fact that we probably do want to live in a harmonious society (and so anyone who doesn't need not pay attention, ie the normative weight is not exhaustive). — Isaac

If that's all he's saying, though, what exactly is he disagreeing with me about?

Yeah, if everyone feels that murder is wrong then surely it's a fact that everyone feels that murder is wrong and that fact implies . . . exactly nothing else. — Terrapin Station

Bingo. It is odd to me how certain otherwise logical thinkers, who I shan't name, somehow end up at a different conclusion. We can add in a premise that if everyone feels that way, then it's objectively true that murder is wrong, but that is, as you rightly point out, a fallacious appeal to the masses, so that just won't work, and there should be more recognition from the other side of the debate that this just won't work.

It certainly doesn't imply that any individual should feel that murder is wrong (if some odd individual happens to show up at any point and not feel the same as the rest of us), or that anyone has things incorrect if they don't feel that murder is wrong, or anything like that. — Terrapin Station

Exactly. At best, it implies only a mere conditional, which is totally ineffectual if you don't subscribe to the antecedent in the conditional. At best, it implies something along the lines that, if this is your measure of judgement on right and wrong, than it will be right or wrong for you on that basis. That's totally consistent with subjective moral relativism, and no one has to accept that personal standard of judgement. One could simply go by a different standard of judgement. It's not as though there's a moral authority we can appeal to in order to settle this, or at least, this has not been successfully demonstrated, even after 60 pages worth of discussion.

Again, where is the recognition of this problem from the other side? Where are the attempted refutations? It seems we've reached a point where, for them, dogmatic bare assertions, handwaving, and flat out ignoring is the order of the day. What an abysmal state of affairs. This is a philosophy forum.

If that's all he's saying, though, what exactly is he disagreeing with me about? — Terrapin Station

Well, yes. As usual he'd be disagreeing with the usual straw man of relativism, that we all think murder is OK. Or a rather boring semantic argument about the use of the words "right" and "wrong" in this context. Or more likely just found himself on the wrong side of an argument with a little too much pride. I'm just trying to squeeze a little philosophical interest from this, and my previous tactic of pointing out the glaringly obvious ontological facts hasn't been doing it.

The main reason why I'm keen to support relativism is not because of its ontological truth (as I've said before, "truth" is not such a big deal for me) it's because I think objectivism is harmful, and I care about avoiding harms (at least to those people I choose to care about).

It is in this context I find the argument about near universality to be more fruitful to oppose than the one about absolute universality which would be required to prove objectivism (and which those on that side of the argument have so spectacularly failed to provide).

So presumably you believe that it's a non-opinion-oriented fact that "health and functionality are good" is reasonable, and you believe in general that "x is reasonable" can be a fact that in no way hinges on individual mental predispositions, habits, etc., right?

How would you attempt to support that? — Terrapin Station

Indeed, how would you support the claim that health and functionality are good in themselves, rather than conditionally so in accordance with our moral judgement?

It can't be done. Surely at this point we're justified in writing off such claims as unsupported.

We can add in a premise that if everyone feels that way, then it's objectively true that murder is wrong, but that is, as you rightly point out, a fallacious appeal to the masses, so that just won't work, and there should be more recognition from the other side of the debate that this just won't work. — S

This is where I disagree with you (and I have a feeling disagreeing with you is going to be a lot more fruitful than disagreeing with my previous interlocutors). I think it is an erroneous appeal to the masses, not a fallacious one. I don't think it is fallacious to appeal to the masses (or any other authority) as to what is "correct" in certain circumstances. It is "correct" to move the Bishop diagonally in chess, and this is entirely because the consensus of chess players think that. It is incorrect to say 2+2=5, and this is entirely because the consensus of mathematicians define the terms that way.

What I think the appeal to the masses is here is erroneous. It is a mistake (given what the proponents claim to want) to use the opinion of the masses as a normative force to guide behaviour in that way. Diversity is good, innovation is good (I also trust instinct quite a lot too). Reversion to the mean stifles these things and so is a mistake. It ends up back with something I think you and I spoke about right at the beginning. People imposing their own cultural values as if they were objectively right.

I disagree with you on that, too. It's fallacious. That something is common never makes that thing correct or right or anything like that. It's simply the argumentum ad populum fallacy.

You could say "Well, people consider it correct if it's the standard or the norm," which is true, but the fact that people consider things to be correct in that case suffers from the same fallacy. It's not correct just because people consider it to be.

The only thing that commonality makes correct is the fact that it's common.

But I've shown the problems with such usage. It fails to work or adequately explain any incongruity when the herd-morality doesn't accord with an individual's sense of right and wrong. I have shown this with examples about racism and slavery, and he has proven unable to reasonably counter. At first he dismissed the thought experiment as impossible or unrealistic when it was about racism, then he decided to completely ignore it the second time around when it was about slavery. These are the last resorts of someone who can't think up a way out of the problem.

So how do you treat the use of the term "correct" when applied to a move in chess? Is it a misuse of the word for you? Because the way i see it, the moment the majority of chess players change their mind about the rules, a previously incorrect move becomes correct. It seems entirely based on what the majority think.

So how do you treat the use of the term "correct" when applied to a move in chess? — Isaac

As a sloppy manner of speaking. Yes, it's a misuse of the word to me. If you want to play by the widespread conventions, you can play by them, and have people monitor that, etc.--that's fine. But it's important to not conflate that with the notion that there's something "wrong" with it if you want to play differently. Whatever exact terms we use. This isn't about the terms, it's about the ideas. You can simply play in conformity with the conventions or you can do something more unusual. There's no inherent value to doing either.

But I've shown the problems with such usage. It fails to work or adequately explain any incongruity when the herd-morality doesn't accord with an individual's sense of right and wrong. I have shown this with examples about racism and slavery, and he has proven unable to reasonably counter. At first he dismissed the thought experiment as impossible or unrealistic when it was about racism, then he decided to completely ignore it the second time around when it was about slavery. These are the last resorts of someone who can't think up a way out of the problem. — S

I agree entirely with your successful refutation. Where I'm at odds is that if he had come back and said "in a racist society, racidm is morally" right" because that's what "right" means" - then, I think he would have had a reasonable position. We're free to define words that way and I'm not sure it would be too far from the way a lot of people use the term. They are just wrong about the behaviour of the they consequently advise.

As a sloppy manner of speaking. Yes, it's a misuse of the word to me. — Terrapin Station

So a move which is against the rules of chess, whilst playing chess would be what? What term would be the one you'd prefer to hear? That move is...

Unconventional, perhaps against rules that someone has agreed to play by (if they have)