You have an unassailable argument.

You define all things we think as subjective
Moral judgments are things we think
Moral judgments are subjective

Understand the logic, disagree that all mental process are subjective

My definition of subjective morality is a moral judgment that has no inherent truth value. That the truth value of the statement, or the mental phenomena , is dependent on or subject to something else. It is not always true, it is only true if (fill in the blank)

As I've said a number of times, I don't think the terms are important. I'm fine with dropping the terms "objective" and "subjective." I've suggested dropping them a number of times, including earlier in this thread.

So I'm just saying that moral judgments are things we think.

Do you agree with that?

And on my view, I don't believe that moral judgments (or whatever else we might want to call them--moral whatevers) occur, as moral judgments (whatevers) other than as things we think.

And then what matters are the upshots of the fact that moral judgments are things we think.

My definition of subjective morality is a moral judgment that has no inherent truth value. That the truth value of the statement, or the mental phenomena , is dependent on or subject to something else. It is not always true, it is only true if (fill in the blank) — Rank Amateur

Trying to avoid getting too much into truth theory, because my views on that are a big can of worms that require getting into a bunch of "technical" analytic philosophy stuff, we can just ask what it would amount to for something that exists only as a mental phenomenon to be "true"

↪Rank Amateur

As I've said a number of times, I don't think the terms are important. I'm fine with dropping the terms "objective" and "subjective." I've suggested dropping them a number of times, including earlier in this thread.

So I'm just saying that moral judgments are things we think.

Do you agree with that?

And on my view, I don't believe that moral judgments (or whatever else we might want to call them--moral whatevers) occur, as moral judgments (whatevers) other than as things we think.

And then what matters are the upshots of the fact that moral judgments are things we think. — Terrapin Station

There is nothing there to disagree with. But it just does not say anything of value about the utility of moral judgments

My definition of subjective morality is a moral judgment that has no inherent truth value. That the truth value of the statement, or the mental phenomena , is dependent on or subject to something else. It is not always true, it is only true if (fill in the blank) — Rank Amateur

That is most certainly an idiosyncratic way of viewing subjectivity, but it doesnt matter, just drop the term then.

There is nothing there to disagree with. But it just does not say anything of value about the utility of moral judgments — Rank Amateur

Well, so for value, I'd also say that that is only something we think.

Re utility, I'm not sure what you'd be looking for. My approach would typically be descriptive, but that may not do anything for you.

Re the upshots of something only being something we think, one of the important issues is whether we can get such a thing correct or not. If we say we can get something that's only mental correct, then we need to be able to say just how that would be the case.

“Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv’d from reason....”
-Mww
— creativesoul

This presupposes that nothing (...) that has/ (...) an influence on actions and affections can be derived using reason. — creativesoul

Yes, the keyword being affections, which Hume specifically names as “...perceptions of the mind...”. Thus, if reason cannot tell us of affections, it cannot tell us of the mind, which is, as Kant called it, “a wretched subterfuge”, strictly due to Hume’s rabid anti-rationalism. (CpR 1.3.45., 1788)
————————-

Hume's mistake is conflating simple, rudimentary, and/or basic thought/belief with the linguistically informed/ladened — creativesoul

Might this hold some relevance to your thought/belief characterization? I’m still working on it, how I might find something comparable in my own mind. (I still need to separate them; it’s my cognitive bias at work....sorry)

“....Certain statements have strong existential implications; we might say that they are 'ontologically loaded." There is a tendency to equate the making of these statements with the making of an ontological commitment. But to do so would be a mistake, one that has prompted Quine to devise a formula to help keep our tendency in check. Quine draws a distinction between linguistic facts and ontological attitudes. The fact is, as Russell and Quine have pointed out, that statements can be meaningful without referring to anything. A person can play with linguistic objects to his or her heart's content without embracing any ontology that might be said to be "included" or "inherent" in the objects. We can tell stories about Pegasus without committing ourselves to its existence. Of course, with certain linguistic entities, the ontological implication can be strong, and the game can be dangerous. These days, we have quite happily accepted the Russell-Quine doctrine, and do not see ontological commitments in statements employing certain linguistic entities. We now accept that we only commit ourselves when we specifically give the variable a value....”
(A. T. Nuyen, 1985)

Why wouldn't not wanting to be murdered be sufficient? Additionally most people don't want people to murder other people in general. — Terrapin Station

The question is not about who would or would not object. As S. so perspicaciously noted, that question is daft. It's about the wrong or right of it, and the grounds of the determination. My question to so-called relativists here is not about whether they would object, but the grounds for their objection.

As to the right/wrong of it, it is, most simply, answered by the thing itself. That is, not as a matter of preference, desire, or inclination, nor even on mere abstract reasoning. It rests on the thing itself, properly understood. If you know what murder is, then you know it must be wrong. Else you implicitly authorize murder. Can that be right?

Nor can it be enough to say, if my neighbor wishes to murder his neighbor, that is no concern of mine, because soon enough the wheel turns, and it will be ok for you to be murdered. That's the box you're in. Closing your eyes and pretending there is no box does not make the box go away, although it is an incidental comment on the quality of your thinking.

Not only the ownership, or possession of it, but included is the principle of its preservation. If we have a truth the negation of which is impossible, we have a law. If we have a law, we have the ground of a moral philosophy. Because the law is a priori, it is neither relative nor objective. It is, instead, a good place to start. — Mww

I accept this. It forces a substantial refinement in my understanding of "ground" and "law" by making me think about it. A good thing and never a bad thing.

The right or wrong of something like "Murder is bad" or "One should not murder" is a moral right/wrong, and it's identical to the preferences "Murder is bad" or "One should not murder." The grounds of determination is someone having those preferences.

Moral stances are preferences of interpersonal behavior, not just with respect to oneself. "No one should murder anyone" is a preference that many people have.

And I steadfastly refuse to address what the Kantian in the background has said if he hasn't the decency to even speak to me. He who has the nerve to suggest that I lack philosophical maturity. I think they call that projection. — S

I'm thinking that's me, although I'm flattered at being called a Kantian. All right, you lack philosophical maturity. You're like someone who can operate a motor vehicle but does not know how to drive, nor understands the two are different things.

And it certainly can be projection. but not in this case.

The right or wrong of something like "Murder is bad" or "One should not murder" is a moral right/wrong, and it's identical to the preferences "Murder is bad" or "One should not murder." — Terrapin Station

Then it's clear. According to the philosophy of Terrapin, et al, the 20th century murders by Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, and a host of imitators are nothing whatsoever wrong in themselves. Apparently that's even a nonsensical idea. The truth is that those persons thought their actions were acceptable/justifiable/necessary/good, take your pick. Evidence and proof? It's right there just above:

The grounds of determination is someone having those preferences. — Terrapin Station

According to the philosophy of Terrapin, et al, the 20th century murders by Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, and a host of imitators are nothing whatsoever wrong in themselves. Apparently that's even a nonsensical idea. — tim wood

The problem I have is that I have no idea how anything qualifies as 'wrong in itself' (i.e. wrong even if no one believed it was wrong)?

the 20th century murders by Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, and a host of imitators are nothing whatsoever wrong in themselves. Apparently that's even a nonsensical idea. — tim wood

Correct.

The truth is that those persons thought their actions were acceptable/justifiable/necessary/good, take your pick — tim wood

Sure, they may have.

At least you're getting it now. :grin:

I'm confused then, I suppose. Did you not quote me and charge the excerpt with ignoring and/or neglect?

Yes, that actually happened.

Three charges of neglect. None true.

When I wrote "non-sequitur" I was drawing your attention to the situation at hand. None of those charges follow from my position. You quoted me, and then aimlessly opened fire. "Non sequitur" was not about your argument, it was about the fallaciousness of your inquiry.
— creativesoul

"Non sequitur" refers to something being stated in the context of an argument as if it follows--that is, as if it is valid, but it actually does not follow, it is not valid.

All you're saying really is that you disagree with me that "Morality is codified rules of behaviour. Code is language" "amounts to ignoring a significant portion of the phenomena that people typically characterize as morality, moral stances, etc"--well, we should hope you disagree with that, otherwise you'd be forwarding stances more or less dishonestly, because you'd think that you're ignoring something but you'd not care.

Nevertheless, what you stated amounts to ignoring a significant portion of the phenomena that people typically characterize as morality, moral stances, etc. — Terrapin Station

p1.Morality is the codified rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.
p2.Codes consist of common language.
C1.Morality consists of common language.
p3.Common language is existentially dependent upon shared meaning.
C2.Morality is existentially dependent upon shared meaning.

Agree or disagree?

I disagree, starting with the first premise, for the reasons I gave in the post of mine that this tangent is stemming from.

Cool. From real world observation to the a priori reduction to a principle, hence the possibility of a law, is only good for something else, just as in logic, with just as much power. Can’t just stop there, though; gotta use that undeniability to build on, like the ownership of one’s life and what we can induce from that. Even so, anything new to think about can’t hurt.

It seems to me, when Hume said....

“Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions”

.....he should have realized his own words suggest morals are antecedent to passions. And when combined with......

“a passion must be accompany’d with some false judgment, in order to its being unreasonable; and even then ’tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment”

.....suggests an undefined chronology between an unreasonable passion and the false judgement that goes with it. Is the passion unreasonable because of the false judgement or is there a false judgement because the passion is unreasonable? — Mww

Yes. Hume worked from an utterly inadequate framework, including a sore lack of understanding existential dependency. Again. He was/is not alone.

The first premiss is both true and verifiable. How do you reconcile ignoring truth and/or holding a position that does not square with the way things are?

Obviously I don't agree that it's true. In what way would you say that it's verifiable? In other words, explain how we'd verify it.

your belief is not necessary

The problem I have is that I have no idea how anything qualifies as 'wrong in itself' (i.e. wrong even if no one believed it was wrong)? — ChrisH

Reason, following Kant's dynamic in his categorical imperative. That is, the claim rebounds on itself and destroys its own sense. No one, even Terrapin notwithstanding his post just above, understanding what murder is, can condone it, without implicitly condoning his own murder.

As to belief, what exactly do you mean by "belief"? Or don't mean, if that's easier. Belief qua belief, at least in my book, stands protected from question, unless it claims more for itself than belief itself warrants

If no reason (at all), then we're in the world of animals - and they don't murder. If the question is about murder, then maybe think some more about what murder is?

So the verification is "That's how Bernard Gert defines it"?

(And even if you're going by that, you don't seem to be acknowledging the "or accepted by an individual for her own behavior" part for example)

The verification of what we're talking about when we are talking about morality is provided by how current and past convention used the term...

If you want to talk about something other than the rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, then I suggest that you quit using the term "morality" as a means for doing so. No one will know what you're on about.

Intellectual honesty starts with the ability to admit it when we're wrong.

The verification of what we're talking about when we are talking about morality is provided by how current and past convention used the term... — creativesoul

But I disagree with you that your definition covers the conventional usages of the term. That was just the point I made. It's exactly why I wrote, "(1) that would amount to ignoring a significant portion of the phenomena that people typically characterize as morality, moral stances, etc.,"

So how do we verify who is right there?

The problem I have is that I have no idea how anything qualifies as 'wrong in itself' (i.e. wrong even if no one believed it was wrong)?
— ChrisH

Reason, following Kant's dynamic in his categorical imperative... — tim wood

Sorry, but nothing in your response appears, to me, to address my concern.

Read the link...

From the SEP...

There does not seem to be much reason to think that a single definition of morality will be applicable to all moral discussions. One reason for this is that “morality” seems to be used in two distinct broad senses: a descriptive sense and a normative sense. More particularly, the term “morality” can be used either descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior, or normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons.

Two ways to use "morality". Both refer to codes of conduct.

Gert doesn't even define morality as narrowly as you defined it. I've already pointed that out.

Anyway, if he did, it would simply be a case of me not agreeing with Gert's definition, either.

A verification that some widespread, common phenomenon is exhaustively defined by x wouldn't be that some arbitrary person who has an academic background in the phenomenon has defined it as x.

I swear, sometimes I get the impression here that I'm talking with basement dwellers who think that reading a single web page--like an SEP page on something--makes them an expert in something they never experienced, even though they also quickly reveal that they aren't even really grokking the page about the stuff they otherwise have zero real world experience with.