This subject to correction by anyone who can correct it (me).

What I am getting out of this so far is that everyone non-critically accepts that some moral propositions are relative; that given such a moral proposition, P, some folks hold for P, some for not-P, and because of moral relativity, both are right, neither is wrong.

Relativists believe this category includes all moral propositions.

Persons not relativists argue there are moral propositions that are not relative in the sense described above. That for a (broad) class of moral propositions P', of P' and not-P' both cannot be correct.

Correct so far?

It seems to me the relativist position lives at all times on the edge of annihilation, there being needed but a single P' that is right, while not-P' is wrong, that blows them up. And there are actually innumerable P's, but that relativists preserve themselves from them by denying reason.

Question: is there any P anyone can think of, that is not actually in the class of propositions P', that is, a P that is not actually a P'?

Same question another way: is there any moral proposition that is impervious to reason in the sense that reason cannot determine which view of the proposition is right/better/correct?

It seems to me the argument of relative morality vs objective morality is not being argued on the merits of one vs the other.

Your source argument is certainly the best argument against objective morality - but the argument is based a proposition that can not be shown to be true.

At its core, i think the entire argument for relative morality rests on one core proposition, that is not true.

The core of the relative moral arguments is -

P1 - there is no God
P2 - since there is no God - the source of morality is human

There is no support that P1 is true or false

So this is the core belief that leads to rather interesting points.

Things like truth is relative, murder is relative, Slavery is relative, etc etc

It seems to me the argument of relative morality vs objective morality is not being argued on the merits of one vs the other. — Rank Amateur

In my view it has absolutely nothing to do with what the merits of one versus the other would be. It has to do with which one is the way the world really is.

Look at it this way: let's say that we make the argument over whether Jack is a multimillionaire versus being homeless and having to depend on handouts about the relative merits of one versus the other. Obviously "multimillionaire" is going to win out there (well, at least for most people). The problem is that it's not true that Jack is a multimillionaire. Jack is homeless. So why would we pretend that he's really a multimillionaire?

That's the way I look at this issue.

Your source argument is certainly the best argument against objective morality - but the argument is based a proposition that can not be shown to be true. — Rank Amateur

Do you mean that in the sense of "It can't be proved"? No empirical claim can be proved, period. That includes proving that Jack is homeless.

There's plenty of evidence that it's true, though, and no evidence that it's false.

I think it's a mistake to see this as being about God. But maybe that's the only way that you could imagine moral objectivism being the case.

However, if God does exist, isn't God's morality just one more set of mental preferences? Or is God's morality supposed to be something different than "things that God thinks"?

I've brought this up before, including in this thread, but a problem with value objectivism (so not just moral, but aesthetic, etc.) is this: let's say that somehow, maybe because God prefers it, maybe because it's embedded into the nonmental universe in some way, etc., it's an objective fact that Brahms was a better composer than Frank Zappa. That would have no impact on the fact that I prefer Frank Zappa as a composer, that I have lots of reasons that I prefer Frank Zappa as a composer, that I'll try to persuade other people to see the merits of Frank Zappa as a composer, etc.--in other words, there's no reason to believe that it would change anything about anyone's preferences, about the way that anyone behaves and interacts with others, etc.

That's because it being a fact that God, or the world itself, etc. has a preference for A over B is practically no different than it being a fact that any random person has a preference for A over B, where that might be different than your own preference. So if you're not going to conform to your parents', or your music teachers', or your political leaders', etc. preference to Brahms over Frank Zappa just because they have a different preference than you do, why would you conform to God's, or the world's preference to Brahms over Frank Zappa just because those things have a different preference than you do?

Morality isn't anything other than what's it's good for. — Janus

Exactly. Morality never was a “thing”, but always the condition of a thing, and, therefore, what morality is good for, is defining itself as a condition of the human thing, from its pragmatic, albeit a priori, ground of relating that self-defined condition to a corresponding practical welfare.

Morality never was a “thing”, but always the condition of a thing — Mww

Why wouldn't conditions be "things"?

In my view it has absolutely nothing to do with what the merits of one versus the other would be. It has to do with which one is the way the world really is. — Terrapin Station

Actually no you don't, you believe it has to do with the way you think the world really is. Maybe, just maybe, your view of how the world really is, is not correct.

Do you mean that in the sense of "It can't be proved"? No empirical claim can be proved, period. That includes proving that Jack is homeless. — Terrapin Station

The argument you gave me originally is the source argument, it is, as you said, what could be the source of an objective morality? I say the core assumption under that argument continues to be,

there is no god, therefore the source is human, and since it is human it is contingent in one way or another.

I am happy to give up this line of reason - if you can come up with another argument against objective morality that is not the source argument. But I will not accept as convincing any argument that rests on a core proposition that has no real truth value.

Maybe, just maybe, your view of how the world really is, is not correct. — Rank Amateur

Sure. That's always the case (that it's possible for my view to be incorrect). It follows from the fact that we can't prove any empirical claim. So how do we proceed when someone is claiming that my view is incorrect? Well, I require the other person to provide evidence that something incompatible with my view is correct instead. If the other person won't provide evidence to the contrary, there's no reason for me to change my belief (which is always based on some evidence or other besides mere possibility).

(And of course, the mere fact that they consider something to be evidence isn't sufficient. The person the evidence is presented to has to assess it, has to agree that it's good evidence, that it supports the claim in question, etc.)

here is no god, therefore the source is human, — Rank Amateur

That's not actually my argument. As I pointed out earlier, there are plenty of objectivists who are atheists. Heck, there's even a very famous one that gets mentioned here sometimes--Ayn Rand.

I'm not going to make any assumptions about what the objective source might be. I'll leave that up to the objectivists at hand. It's their position. I don't want to put any limits on what their view might be. It's up to them to present whatever alternate view, and maybe they'll come up with something I could have never imagined. But they need to provide evidence of some objective source if they're going to make that claim (and they expect me to think the claim has any merit).

if you can come up with another argument against objective morality that is not the source argument. — Rank Amateur

I'm not saying that's not what this is about. The issue is solely one of "where do moral stances occur?" So that's a source argument.

where do moral stances occur? — Terrapin Station

Understand - but all thought is not true, all thought is not correct, and we do not really know the source of all thought. I still say if you continue to peel the onion away - even this line of logic lead back to - there is no God, therefor it is human.

Not making a theist argument - just saying whether you realize it or not - that is the core proposition relative morality rests on.

Now - I am happy to get off that point and get to some more pragmatic approach. Happy to go down some road that says something along the lines of human nature, a shared consciences on many issues, or some such road. But here is where i can't get.

some people at some time, and for some reason believe slavery was moral
other people at some time, and for some reason believe slavery was immoral

Both times the people were correct, and the morality of slavery changed.

All this says is whatever one thinks is infallibly morally correct for you - that is nonsense.

Simplest: conditions themselves are merely states of affairs;
Technical Point: conditions themselves are non-entities;
Technically Finer point: condition in itself cannot be intuited:
Technically Finest point: understanding cannot assign a concept to condition itself.

here is what I think the bottom line is.

At its core objective vs some form of relative moral view is, a theist/atheist argument - you can point to an exception here or there maybe, but it does not change this core reality.

And since this is the core, there is no correct answer to what is the right moral view.

All we can hope for is understanding each other, not agreement

some people at some time, and for some reason believe slavery was moral
other people at some time, and for some reason believe slavery was immoral

Both times the people were correct, and the morality of slavery changed.

All this says is whatever one thinks is infallibly morally correct for you - that is nonsense. — Rank Amateur

It's just important to realize that a moral relativist is never going to say that any moral stance is "infallibly morally correct." That's pretty much the opposite of moral relativism.

Simplest: conditions themselves are merely states of affairs; — Mww

But states of affairs are some way that things are. Some arrangement of things.

Technical Point: conditions themselves are non-entities; — Mww

I don't know if "entity" is any clearer.

The other two points don't make much sense to me. I don't know why we'd be talking about if they can be "intuited," and "nderstanding cannot assign a concept to condition itself" just reads like gobbledygook/word salad to me.

And since this is the core, there is no correct answer to what is the right moral view. — Rank Amateur

Of course, I don't think there's any doubt that there is no God, so I'd say there's a correct answer there, but I realize you don't agree with that.

agree - and neither can prove the other false.

Maybe someday when we leave this broke down palace we will know, or not.

agree - and neither can prove the other false. — Rank Amateur

Right, as no empirical claim is provable, period. That includes claims like "There is a refrigerator in my kitchen."

If the rest is word salad then “some way things are” is good enough.

Ok, different question.

I want to own slaves, because owning slaves will make me a bunch of money. And I really like money.

I think about it a sec, and then I decide, my moral view is slavery is morally permissible.

In your view or moral relativity, relative to myself, am I correct, slavery is morally permissible ?

I want to own slaves, because owning slaves will make me a bunch of money. And I really like money.

I think about it a sec, and then I decide, my moral view is slavery is morally permissible.

In your view or moral relativity, relative to myself, am I correct, slavery is morally permissible ? — Rank Amateur

I wouldn't say that you're correct relative to you. Correct/incorrect is a category error for this stuff. So you're neither correct nor incorrect. It's like asking if "slavery is morally permissible" is green or orange.

I would say that relative to your views, slavery is morally permissible, that it's morally acceptable, etc.

I would say that relative to your views, slavery is morally permissible, that it's morally acceptable, etc — Terrapin Station

thanks - just to be clear - the "correct" was asking you if my understanding was correct.

Okay re "correct."

So how do you think we'd argue that relative to the person in question's views, slavery isn't morally permissible? Isn't that simply a statement of fact about what their views are? Even if you think that objectively, they're wrong, it's still the case that relative to their views, slavery is morally permissible.

ok - but what if my conscience is really saying “slavery is bad you idiot “. But I like money so much, I just say “I think slavery is moral”

Did I just turn moral relativism from what I think into what i say ?

ok - but what if my conscience is really saying “slavery is bad you idiot “. But I like money so much, I just say “I think slavery is moral” — Rank Amateur

In that case, you'd simply not be honestly reporting your moral stance. You're saying something different than your actual stance for some other motive.

But if your morality were based only on your personal preferences, and you were satisfied with that then nothing anyone raises could be a problem for you, then no argument could be against your position and hence would not be worth arguing against. It would be like arguing that your preference for beef over lamb was somehow mistaken. — Janus

Oh god, not another bad analogy relating to foodstuffs. It's not impossible that I can be convinced otherwise. My morality isn't absolutely rigid, it can change. And one technique of convincing me otherwise about something would be to appeal to my moral feelings. Maybe I initially feel that I'm in the right, but you get me to change how I feel about it. That's not unheard of. It happens. And my meta-ethical relativism has no bearing on that. It would be exactly the same if I had almost any other meta-ethical position. It is a fallacy of the moral objectivist to think that an objective morality would make it easier to convince me otherwise. And this fallacy has already been noted by others in this discussion.

And besides, even preferences about food can change, in part due to emphasising the perceived merits or demerits.

To discuss anything is to seek normative agreement, For anything to be worth arguing over is for it to be potentially subject to normative agreement, but that is impossible in the case of moral relativism. — Janus

No, that isn't impossible, that's just the same gross misunderstanding.

So to answer what might be considered to be the meta-ethical question "What do moral judgements consist in?" with something like "They are nothing more than personal preferences", is to ignore the reality of cultural and normative influences on the individual. — Janus

Oh dear. Mistake after mistake. You're not on top form today, Janus! I've explicitly acknowledged external influences, and rightly dismissed them as having much less of a primary role in determining my morality than other more fundamental factors.

And further to that if they were nothing more than personal preferences based on feeling (and I am not denying that they are that, only that they are not nothing more than that) then they are not properly moral at all, since they would then have no moral significance. In other words you would just be acting, not morally, but as your feelings dictate, just as animals do. (This is not to deny that the instinctive behavior of animals towards their own kind is not normative and cannot be seen as a kind of quasi-morality). — Janus

Well, if you intend to say something relevant about my position rather than someone's else's, then you should note that I talk about moral feelings. Other animals don't have moral feelings, or at least that's controversial to suggest. We are moral agents with moral feelings which are the foundation of our moral judgements. You can't rightly say that about chickens or budgies, or at least not without much controversy.

What "other (moral) priorities" could one who wishes to live in society have? The whole idea of morality consists in thinking of others. — Janus

That's a load of rubbish. Morality is not necessarily social or altruistic. They are merely positions in ethics. They contrast with individualism and egoism, which are equally positions in ethics. You are once again confusing your personal moral values for morality itself.

So if you had. for example, an "other priority" that consisted in exploiting others without consideration for their feelings or welfare, then that would amount to thinking only about yourself and your own feelings, and hence would not count as moral at all, but rather amoral. — Janus

The same comment I made above applies here also.

If someone acts against their own moral principles, then they are acting immorally. — Janus

The antecedent suggests an unwarranted assumption. I wouldn't be acting against my own moral principles. So why are you talking about that?

If someone has no moral principles, which would be the case if someone were to kill people without remorse, then they would be acting amorally. — Janus

Again, why are you talking about this? This says more about your own unwarranted assumptions than anything that I've said.

I may have been pointed out, but it is not compelling; it just doesn't stand up to scrutiny. If moral relativism consists in saying that it is OK to believe whatever is in accordance with your feelings about how to act towards others, then that just is an amoral, morally nihilistic, anarchic view. In that sense the very idea of moral relativism is a contradiction in terms. — Janus

Obviously it won't be compelling to anyone who is stuck in their own misunderstandings about it.

I don't believe that individuals are morally independent in any significant sense. — Janus

Well, good for you, but they demonstrably are.

I made this point before to Terrapin; an artist is not isolated from influence, but they may be creatively independent in the sense that they can produce an original synthesis. — Janus

Their work is unique, and so is my morality, because it is uniquely mine, and founded on that which is unique to me, like my thoughts and feelings. An artist and an individual moral agent have this in common. Thanks for giving me a good analogy.

This is not the case with moral stances; there are no original stances when it comes to questions about the rightness of murder, rape, theft, deception and so on. There is really very little variation on those generic question other than for or against, and actually there is even less variation than that since almost everyone is against murder, rape, theft and deception. — Janus

Doesn't matter. Just because I have things in common with others, that obviously doesn't mean that I'm not unique, and uniqueness makes my point rather than your point about originality. I don't really care about your point about originality, and I needn't. That's the good thing about individualism. I forge my own path. I do not require your approval. Your judgement has no authority over me.

It is not merely that they are "equal in kind", but that they are equal insofar as on the presumption of moral relativism there is no rational reason to prefer one over the other. — Janus

It's not a matter of being rational. Feelings aren't rational.

The fact that moral relativists do prefer one over the other does not indicate that there are any rational justifications for any of those preferences, because they are preferences based only on self-interest or feeling. — Janus

If that's supposed to be a criticism, it is ineffectual. It is a category error to seek rational justification in something that isn't a matter of rationality.

There is no need for rational justification if you are a moral relativist, because you are simply following your feelings. — Janus

There can be rational justification on a level, but not at the core. It would be naive to seek one from the core.

If those feelings happen to be kind, then good, but that does not make them moral. — Janus

You have no authority to make that announcement. But if you're just expressing your own personal opinion, then that's fine.

Animals have kind feelings towards their own; does that make them moral beings? — Janus

Other animals aren't moral agents.

Something more is needed, and that something more consists in thinking that it is important to care about your fellows, even if you don't naturally feel that way. — Janus

Yes, something more is needed: moral agency. The rest is just more personal opinion stemming from personal values, but stated as though it is something more than that.

Isn't what? Isn't — Janus

What isn't isn't what? Isn't it? Or is it?

Wait, what?

...if you are a consistent moral relativist you won't expect anyone to be interested in your reasons for your moral judgements since they are merely based on your feelings and not on any normative considerations. — Janus

I'm just going to dismiss this. At this stage, I'm tired of trying to get sense out of it, when there probably isn't any sense to be found anyway.

In fact it isn't possible for you, as a consistent moral relativist, to 'explain the truth in (your) claim that (your) moral judgement is better than someone else's" because any such explanation will necessarily appeal to normative values that you have no business appealing to. All you could consistently say is "I feel my moral judgement is better than yours, so there!" to which the other will likely retort "So what?". — Janus

This is where psychology is handy, I think. Neitzche recognised the importance of psychology in relation to morality. It is handy as a tool, because although you're talking, I think that what you're actually doing and your reasons for doing it matter more. Your talking is actually kind of meaningless. It isn't about consistency at all, it is about you making a judgement about me on the basis that I am a moral relativist. You do not judge that I am deserving of "the right" to make moral evaluations, just because I am a moral relativist, and you disapprove of moral relativists for whatever reason. It doesn't have to be logical, and it probably isn't. You've basically already admitted to a guilt by association fallacy. Yours is a prejudiced and authoritarian judgement. Note the language: "You have no business!". The great irony is that you seem to think that you're being more rational than emotive, when in reality it is the opposite. "Boo moral relativism!".

No, I don't treat it like that at all. As I said a few times moral philosophy is more an art than a science, and similarly as with aesthetics there are qualities which determine the value of works that are more than merely a matter of personal preference, even though, since art has no strict utility, it is even harder than it is with ethics to say precisely what those qualities are. — Janus

Art isn't best made sense of by taking a rationalist approach either.

What I am getting out of this so far is that everyone non-critically accepts that some moral propositions are relative; that given such a moral proposition, P, some folks hold for P, some for not-P, and because of moral relativity, both are right, neither is wrong. — tim wood

I don't agree with the last phrase. Right and wrong in this context are simply another way of saying whether someone holds moral position P or not-P. In other words, we have to be talking about moral right and wrong, and that's only a matter of someone thinking x is/should be morally permissible, y should be morally prohibited, etc. It's not the case that from any perspective, both P and not-P are right or wrong unequivocally.

But if your morality were based only on your personal preferences, and you were satisfied with that then nothing anyone raises could be a problem for you, then no argument could be against your position and hence would not be worth arguing against. It would be like arguing that your preference for beef over lamb was somehow mistaken. — Janus

Not that I expect anyone to read the whole thread, but I addressed this above:

"Basically, one needs to ferret out other stances that the person has, and then try to appeal to them via those stances. In other words, it's a matter of "trying to talk them into something" using things that they already accept/that they're already comfortable with, to try to lead them to a different conclusion. Or, this is similar to the traditional sense of what an ad hominem argument is--it's a matter of appealing to views the person already has, appealing to their biases, to push them to a different view. (But in this case, the ad hominem approach isn't a fallacy, because we're not even dealing with things that are true or false, correct or incorrect, though it is necessarily manipulative.)

"At that, it might not be possible to persuade the person to a different position. "Hitler didn't do anything morally wrong" might be foundational for them, for example, so that it doesn't rest on any other views they have. Or their stances might be so situation-specific that there's not a sufficient way to generalize that would lead them to different stances. "

"They are nothing more than personal preferences", is to ignore the reality of cultural and normative influences on the individual. — Janus

Well, or it's to note that the cultural and normative influences aren't themselves moral stances. In terms of literally, what they are on a physical level, they're sounds that other people make, motions they make, marks they make (writing), etc. They don't literally contain meaning, for example. As sounds, marks, motions, they're not identical to judgments/assessments.

I don't agree with the last phrase. Right and wrong in this context are simply another way of saying whether someone holds moral position P or not-P. In other words, — Terrapin Station

Fair enough. That's how your notion works. I get it. The question is if it's worth getting. Within your system, yes. But is there anything beyond or outside of your system? (Yes!)
As is said of knots, your argument is either all right or all wrong. If you allow reason, then it must be all wrong. In the face of reason to deny reason is a vicious Prucrusteanism.

If you allow reason, — tim wood

Speaking of reason, I didn't see you answer if you were claiming that reason exists independently of persons.

@Janus @tim wood

Just a question. If, in a future world, some evil genius had arranged things such that torturing an innocent child brought about a harmonious society, would that make torturing the child morally right? Because that's the way your argument sounds.

Basically I can only see two ways things that 'moral' could mean as a class of actions. Either it describes a feeling - actions which feel this way are those we're calling 'moral'. Or it describes a logical outcome - actions which bring about x are those we're calling 'moral'.

Being of a Wittgensteinian bent, I'm not of the opinion that one is right and the other wrong by virtue of their correspondence with the world. They're just words and they mean whatever we use them for. But...

This is the reason I asked the opening question. Would you really have no moral qualms at all about torturing an innocent child simply by virtue of someone having demonstrated to your satisfaction that doing so would bring about a harmonious society (ot whatever else we take x to be)? I ask, because I very much doubt either of you would. Which means that the term 'moral' is a term we apply to action which we feel a certain way about, not actions which bring about some end.

If you allow reason,
— tim wood

Speaking of reason, I didn't see you answer if you were claiming that reason exists independently of persons. — Terrapin Station

That's an interesting question. If you asked it before, I missed it, and am sorry I did.

My view is (I think) informed by Kant. No thing needs mind to exist. But existence as understood as conditioned by mind, needs mind to exist and does not exist without it.

Is reason a thing in this sense? Rabbit holes to the left, right, all around them!

But what does it matter? Because a mind realizes a matter of reason, does that make the so-ness of the matter less so? No doubt it takes a mind to put together that 2+2=4, but is it any less certain for needing a mind to express it? Apparently you would like to be equivocal, because of its parentage. But that's a bad step. A truth, such as it is, is simply a truth, never mind its age or provenance.

Perhaps you would have truth depend on the speaker, but that would be a shabby excuse for a truth if it depended on who uttered it.

sorry the delay and know you have moved on. But to finish

Than would you say moral relativism would require the individual moral judgements to be authentic and honest need to be in accord with one’s conscience

I can get very very close to that.