I've long subscribed to the notion that the source of human suffering is desire. — Wallows

Also the source of pleasure, no?

@schopenhauer1

Well I created a whole long argumentative response, but then decided I had better be sure I put some effort into understanding your position. After re-reading a couple posts, I think I have come to a bit of understanding. Is anti-natalism heavily attached to the Philosophy of "do no harm"? Like utilitarianism but where suffering takes heavy priority over happiness?That helps me to understand, but then I would still have a problem with the absolute nature of the argument (and for that no amount of our discussing is likely to bridge our gap).

Also the source of pleasure, no? — Janus

Always my first thought :smile:

"I thought most utilitarian ethical formulas were consequential not primarily intent-driven?"

What would be the meaning of exhorting people to place the consequence of alleviation of suffering or the greatest happiness as the aim of a moral system unless one assumed that not everyone does consider such goals as their ethical aim? To assume that one person values alleviation of suffering more than another person when weighed in the balance against an alternative aim is intent-driven thinking, as is your assumption that some put agenda X over the suffering of someone. To get beyond this intent-driven thinking is to inquire into why it is that the other person construes agenda x and the nature and circumstances of an other's suffering in such a way that they end up concluding that they are not in fact choosing that agenda over avoidance of another's suffering.

In other words, when they put the alternatives at two ends of a moral scale(for instance, agenda x vs suffering avoidance), the intent-driven moralist assumes that the moral dispute is a result of the fact that both parties see the same quantities being weighted, as well as which way the scale is being tipped and by how much. Then the intent-driven moralist concludes that one party gives less moral importance to the quantity at one end of the scale than the other party does. Then the intent-driven moralist finds it necessary to somehow convince the other party to value the other's suffering more than the moralist assumes that party apparently does.

IF we abandon intent-driven moralism in favor of a sense-making ethics, we no longer assume that two parties agree on what quantities are being weighed, and we thus no longer assume they agree which direction the scale is being tipped and by how much. Does the homophobic moralist value the freedom of choice of the gay person less than a non-homophobic moralist? Do they appreciate the gay person's suffering less than the non-homophobe? Or do they lack a bio-sociological undestanding of the gay person's behavior as non-dysfunctional?

IF we abandon intent-driven moralism in favor of a sense-making ethics, we no longer assume that two parties agree on what quantities are being weighed, and we thus no longer assume they agree which direction the scale is being tipped and by how much. Does the homophobic moralist value the freedom of choice of the gay person less than a non-homophobic moralist? Do they appreciate the gay person's suffering less than the non-homophobe? Or do they lack a bio-sociological undestanding of the gay person's behavior as non-dysfunctional? — Joshs

I think you are assuming that I think people who don't agree with antinatalism have bad intent. I don't necessarily think that. Rather, as you are sort of saying, I think they haven't seen it from the view that I am taking. They will say the same of me. However, at the end of the day, if my view is carried out, no procreated person will actually suffer, where in there's, someone always will. Those are just facts, whether it is weighted one way or the other how much suffering should be considered. Anyways, I don't see the other person as the enemy or bad. Part of my antinatalism stems from a rebellion of sorts manifested in an ethics about "being born". It is part and parcel of the larger view of our human predicament. Antinatalism in that regard is like existential therapy for one's already being born in to the human predicament.

I'm looking at the OP and thinking to myself "which suffering"? There are so many ways to suffer, and I can't imagine many ways to suffer to which desire is related. Also, some of the ways we suffer, and to which desire is related, are self-inflicted. Can self-inflicted suffering, or for that matter suffering that is requested or demanded from other people, actually be considered suffering if suffering is the desired outcome? It seems there are far more ways a person can suffer at the hands of other people than by his own hand. Much of suffering is beyond a person's control. Much of suffering is beyond anyone's control. I guess I would say that any suffering that is within a person's capacity to avoid is related to desire, while any suffering that is not is unrelated to desire. I'm not sure what Buddhism says or how it's connected, but Buddhism is religion and therefore philosophically limited to the confines of its principles of piety.

If I wrote a book and anyone made the mistake of reading it, it would soon after find itself in a trash bin. No truer words have ever been spoken. Amen.

On the other hand, if I studied philosophy, my brain would soon after find itself in a trash bin.