Yes. — Terrapin Station
Classifying as an argumentum ad populum the claim that that appeal to a broad level of intersubjectivity is evidential re morality by playing with the word 'prevalent' and turning it into 'popular', which has different implications, misses the mark. For example, that pain is generally felt as a bad thing is evidential of the general truth of the moral precept 'We ought not to inflict unnecessary pain', and that can't be effectively challenged by claiming we're only appealing to what people popularly believe concerning the feeling of pain (as if there was some kind of free choice involved). No. Pain in itself, its nature, its prevalence, and its effects, not popular notions concerning it, is what's morally salient here and moving away from that is misleading. At the very best, inapt. Which was the specific charge made, and that I'm supporting. — Baden
Classifying as an argumentum ad populum the claim that that appeal to a broad level of intersubjectivity is evidential re morality by playing with the word 'prevalent' and turning it into 'popular', which has different implications, misses the mark. For example, that pain is generally felt as a bad thing is evidential of the general truth of the moral precept 'We ought not to inflict unnecessary pain', and that can't be effectively challenged by claiming we're only appealing to what people popularly believe concerning the feeling of pain (as if there was some kind of free choice involved). No. Pain in itself, its nature, its prevalence, and its effects, not popular notions concerning it, is what's morally salient here and moving away from that is misleading. At the very best, inapt. Which was the specific charge made, and that I'm supporting. — Baden
Re shared meaning, for example, is your view that people are literally given meanings from others, kind of like you might hand a football to them, say, so that you share that same football with them? — Terrapin Station
No, I don’t think meaning is a thing. It’s a relation between the associated mental thought and the referent given how a word or symbol is used (I think). — Noah Te Stroete
To me that seems like you're positing something additional to what I posit. Because on my view the relation in question is a property of the "associated" mental event. So I have the mental event, the referent, and the behavior (how the word or symbol is used). And you have all of those things plus a relation that's apparently something more than those three whatever-you-want-to-call-thems (I'd say "things" but people often seem to use "thing" in a technical way) — Terrapin Station
My sole remaining vice. And the only one of all, I’d recommend, it’s only requisites being sufficient funds and proximity to a bathroom. — Mww
Morality is not taught, it is self-determined. What is taught is the actionable requirements of individual members consistent with a given social structure. Morality is the personal justification as to whether or not to so act, the ground from which *ought* statements arise, under certain necessary conditions. — Mww
Humans *desire* socialization, they do not *need* it, as witnessed by homesteaders or “mountain men” in 1800’s American western frontier, “ronin” of feudal Japan, and any kind of social outcast. — Mww
All moral predicates are cognized, hence cannot be derived from feelings. — Mww
The only rational method for negating a feeling is with a principle, and a principle sufficient to negate a feeling absolutely must be undeniable, otherwise we can never justify our own morality. — Mww
Morality, one of two fundamental human conditions, the other being reason, can never be given from examples, which merely demonstrate what morality may or may not do, but not what it is. — Mww
Yeah, I guess I would agree my sense of morality has.....er, evolved.....since the 60’s. The “ought” becomes clearer when “fun” becomes “stupid”. — Mww
You should have a problem stating it that way, unless you're okay with being wrong. My morality need not involve any "complex interaction" with "religious institutions". It need not be about "collective preference". I have no intention of "recognising" your flawed view of what morality is. — S
1) relativism itself is subject to its own radical critique. Relativism itself, then, is relative. Which can only mean that not everything is relative. — tim wood
A simple example: a chair. A chair is absolutely a chair. — tim wood
Although you copied my quote directly, you misquoted me in what you wrote. I said "It involves a complex interaction of societal, governmental, religious, and cultural institutions." Do you really think you created your morality out of nothing but your own self? Your parents had nothing to do with it? Do you really believe you created your mind and heart without being influenced by the society and culture around you. To me, that shows a profound lack of self-awareness.
I do think, although I didn't mention it, that a lot of our morality does come from "human nature" whatever that means, I guess it means some sort of genetic predisposition, to behave in a way that makes it easier for us to live together. As I've said many times, we are social animals. We are born to like each other. — T Clark
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