yes, that is my entire point - there is no meaningful value judgement that can be made about competing moral views if you hold to subjectivity - they can only be different - there is no meaningful subjectively better or worse. — Rank Amateur
It muddies the waters because it is a false, or at least weak, analogy. We don't tend to care much what others like to eat, provided it doesn't smell too bad. When it comes to morals almost everyone agrees about the basic principles, and those principles are based on what makes for a harmonious community.
Kant was basically right: there would be a contradiction in saying that you want to live harmoniously with others, but that you think it is OK to lie, cheat. steal, exploit, rape and murder. If you are honest and say that you don't really care about living harmoniously with others, but that it suits you to remain in society because you don't like being alone, you wouldn't be able to survive alone, you need others to exploit and torture lest you be bored, and so on; then there would be no contradiction. But would such a person be moral, immoral or amoral?
(What I don't like about Kant's CI is the notion of duty). — Janus
This is true if you are holding to a notion of individual subjectivity. If you hold to a notion of collective subjectivity or inter-subjectivity, then not so much — Janus
I would steal from a rich corporation if I could get away with it, whether we assume that that's immoral or otherwise. — S
None of this seems relevant in terms of the debate that's going on. — S
Yes, that is my entire point - there is no meaningful value judgement that can be made about competing moral views if you hold to subjectivity - they can only be different - there is no meaningful subjectively better or worse. — Rank Amateur
Then please show me how it is possible, before you invoke the fallacy - show it applies please. — Rank Amateur
And they are welcome to their view, but it has no real meaning to anyone else. — Rank Amateur
there still is no better or worse, you can have more or less widely agreed - inside or outside the predominate view, even the overwhelming predominate view - but if you hold to subjectivity - still can't get to better or worse. You can add comparative terms, but you still can't add qualitative terms and hold to subjectivity. — Rank Amateur
I know what your conclusion is. I was questioning this supposed argument you referenced. — S
But I think that you need to go back and reconsider the explanations already given, not that I need to repeat them. — S
That's not true, because people become moral subjectivists. They're not born that way. I became one myself, because I found it convincing enough. But yes, obviously if you're not convinced by it, and that can't be changed, then it is meaningless in a sense. That's not unique to moral relativism, it is true in general. How do you suppose we see your position? — S
I can't see why you would say that. If the vast majority of people agree, that is feel the same way, about the broader moral issues: theft, deception, murder, rape, pedophilia, and so on, then there is a shared cultural set of morals. To say that you wish to live harmoniously with your fellows and yet hold contrary views about those issues, would be to contradict yourself. You would be a liar or a fool in that case. — Janus
tell me any meaningful difference between what you propose as subjective, and those beliefs are to a high degree objectively immoral. Just some coincidence that the vast majority of subjective moralist all view them the same way ? — Rank Amateur
This is true if you are holding to a notion of individual subjectivity. If you hold to a notion of collective subjectivity or inter-subjectivity, then not so much. — Janus
Those beliefs are objectively immoral if you count universal inter-subjective agreement as being objective. But I would see that agreement as being socially evolved, not as given from on high. — Janus
Here's what I conclude:
1. You have no argument, or at least no valid argument.
2. You aren't willing to help yourself out of your own incredulity. Rather, you want us to repeat our earlier attempts ad neaseam, even though there is little evidence that you'll get it this time instead of repeating the same problems.
3. You don't realise that your criticism of moral relativism as meaningless is not uniquely a criticism of moral relativism, but applies in general and can easily be turned back on you. — S
You of course realize that relative to my point of view all of equally applies to you. Ironic — Rank Amateur
And again, what's the supposed significance of that, given the strict confines of the topic? — S
So this was what you were getting at. Well no, I don't, because it isn't. It's not universal for starters, and it isn't objective. It is subjective. — S
That should be obvious; I am talking about the context of inter-subjectively shared values being the overarching context within which, perhaps even against which, individuals define their own sets of moral values. How do you think it is not significant? — Janus
On the broader issues it is, for all intents and purposes, universal. — Janus
The fact that there might be some deviants who think that what most people consider to be heinous acts are actually good is what is morally and subjectively irrelevant. — Janus
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