By consulting with a know-it-all on reddit, I can officially say that Wittgenstein was talking about how the logical structure of language and the logical structure of the world are the same.

How do we know this, though? The statement implies a transcendental vantage point. Or maybe Wittgenstein was an anti-realist. — frank

The know-it-all you consulted appears to have had W's Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus in mind. (Cool story about that book - apparently W began writing it in the trenches in WW1. I just saw that Peter Jackson documentary about the war - hard to imagine someone in those circumstances doing that. Though... it might make sense in another way. There's something protective, bubble-like about the book. I say that because-->) you're right that TLP implies a transcendental vantage point. To the point where it might also imply solipsism. Which is troubling. And Wittgenstein was duly troubled. Enough to change his whole approach entirely.

He wrote Philosophical Investigations in large part as an ultra-self-conscious repudiation of the TLP. Which is why your post seems misplaced 36 pages into a reading group thread of PI. If you'd read up to this point, you'd have registered the multiple places he chastises his earlier self and ideas, quite explicitly.

He changed his mind, and owned that his brash, fuck-you-everyone treatise (the one the reddit know-it-all seems to have been referencing) was wrong. Pretty admirable, even if he repudiated it with another brash, fuck-you-everyone treatise.

113 & 114: we feel it must be like this, but we are only looking at the frame.

and the resolution: 115: A picture held us captive. — Banno

The frame - if proper - outlines the language use. The resolution is the complexity of use. Pictures built upon descriptions of that which exists prior to the description are prone to be wrong. The frame is broken, but the resolution is immaculate.

Flies and bottles.

I think you captured most of 109: look without theorising. — Banno

Was he really so unreasonable as to deny that there's the meaning, and then there's the expressing of it? — S

He disregarded meaning in favour of use.

I don't see how this might be compatible with a segregation of expression and meaning. And it's a long way from the topic here.

apparently W began writing it in the trenches in WW1 — csalisbury

He regularly volunteered to observe enemy movements from one of these:



I guess writing the Tractatus kept him occupied.

He disregarded meaning in favour of use.

I don't see how this might be compatible with a segregation of expression and meaning. And it's a long way from the topic here. — Banno

Then don't bring it up here, genius. Is this not a topic for discussing the text of the PI? One obvious way of doing that is by contrasting it with the text of the TLP, and by discussing your own examples. I think that you're just letting your feelings get in the way of good sense, so you try to shut out anything of relevance I might have to say. You expect me to remain silent. Yet, of course, you still continue to use what I'm saying as an example.

That meaning is use, is, by my interpretation, compatible with what I'm saying. Or, if the wording is problematic, then the phrase can be suitably qualified. I'm not setting out to make the views of the later Wittgenstein contradict the views of the early Wittgenstein, which doesn't seem like a productive approach at all. I'm seeking to get the best of both worlds, a sort of compatibilism.

You might add that I should decide if your OP is a simile or an analogy. In either case, it's use here is to show how such thinking can lead one down a false trail.

You might add that I should decide if your OP is a simile or an analogy. In either case, it's use here is to show how such thinking can lead one down a false trail. — Banno

And it doesn't show that, because I came back with a challenge which you've decided to ignore. It only shows that you're not really bothered.

§116 in preference to grasping essences of abstract, philosophical concepts, look to their use in ordinary language.

A challenge? How butch!

No, I'm not bothered. It was the place of your OP as an example that interested me, not the resulting walk up a garden path.

§116 in preference to grasping essences of abstract, philosophical concepts, look to their use in ordinary language. — Banno

That's great on a practical level, in a sense of what we mean by this or that. But it doesn't help resolve the problem that I was getting at in my discussion, and which the early Wittgenstein recognised as a problem, and which he and I share a logical resolution to. But if you want to misapply his later method in inappropriate contexts which lead to irresolvable logical problems, then be my guest.

Note that he doesn't deny the abstract there. On the contrary, he tacitly acknowledges it. He doesn't deny, at least in that quote, that there is a concept of meaning as a separate and logically distinct entity.

You're the one leading me down the garden path! You seem to confuse your own interpretation for something greater than that. Step one would be to show more of a recognition of the fallible nature of your own ability to interpret Wittgenstein - or me for that matter!

Not every post has you as it's focus. But welcome to the discussion.

Not every post has you as it's focus. — Banno

And what do you intend to do to go about redressing this?

But welcome to the discussion. — Banno

Thanks. Thanks for dragging me into it in such an infuriating manner. :lol:

§117 "This is here". Interesting. Compare to Moore's hands, and OC.

And what do you intend to do to go about redressing this? — S

Nothing.

Nothing. — Banno

Well, you had better reconsider. Or else... I'll... write a formal letter of complaint!

§118 Smashing stuff.

§119 Philosophers get bumped on the head by running up against the limits of language. Ubiquitous quote.

He changed his mind, — csalisbury

Ok. So he wasn't saying that we project our logic on the world. I wonder what he was saying, then.

There is definitely a method which is being described here. That's what learning is, a method for restricting doubt, and this is what Wittgenstein is focused on, that method. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, Wittgenstein's "method" for "restricting doubt" is...learning? And that's Wittgenstein's method? Hmm.

He started off the book with simple descriptions of ostensive definition, and showed how these description were deficient. — Metaphysician Undercover

Deficient in what respect?

Now he has progressed to the point of addressing doubt in the same context, the context of learning. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not obvious to me that his remarks to this point, on (e.g.) language games, family resemblance, meaning is use, simples/complexes, sharp/blurred boundaries, all share "the context of learning". Does W state somewhere that the purpose of the book (thus far) is learning?

If we learn rules, the rules are like sign-posts, and we must learn how to restrict the doubt we have in relation to what the sign-post is telling us, to have confidence in understanding, in order to proceed. — Metaphysician Undercover

As far as I can tell, so far W has made only a few remarks on doubt from §84-§87. You are placing a lot of emphasis on these few sections.

That's what I'm talking about, removing the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's funny, because you appear to talk about doubt and certainty in ideal terms. Would you be satisfied if Wittgenstein told you the reason for his direction "stand roughly there" (e.g. so that he can take your photograph)? Would that be enough to remove your doubts in this case? If not, what would remove your doubts?

119 Philosophers get bumped on the head by running up against the limits of language. Ubiquitous quote. — Banno

He referenced this in a comment about Heidegger. So maybe their views were similar in regard to a separation between the realm of language, which slices and dices experience, dismantling the cuckoo clock, and the realm of action, in which there is no subject/object divide.

He referenced this in a comment about Heidegger. — frank

Where?

Deficient in what respect? — Luke

I've described that so many times now, in so many different ways, at least three, so if you still don't understand, then I guess that's the way it will stay.

As far as I can tell, so far W has made only a few remarks on doubt from §84-§87. You are placing a lot of emphasis on these few sections. — Luke

That's right, because the section has made me doubt. When I understand what he is doing, and everything appears consistent, I can breeze through the section without discussing it, confident that I understand. But in this section, he brought up the possibility of misunderstanding, and doubt, along with the apparent need for explanation, along with the notion of removing doubt. He seems to be rejecting explanation as the means by which we remove doubt as to what the sign-post is telling us, because explanation is not grounded, it would produce infinite regress (87). He is replacing explanation with the observation that the sign-post fulfils its purpose. When we observe that the sign-post fulfils its purpose, doubt is remove. However, I see this as insufficient because doubt is prior to the action, while observation is posterior.

This problem makes me wonder why he is even concerned about removing doubt. I think that "On Certainty" is a good example of when being obsessed by an ideal obscures one's perception of reality.

That's funny, because you appear to talk about doubt and certainty in ideal terms. — Luke

Doubt is clearly not an ideal. Certainty, in the sense of "leave no room for doubt", is an ideal. That is why I am arguing that it is inconsistent for Wittgenstein to be seeking certainty, in "On Certainty", when he is telling us here, that there is something wrong with this approach of seeking the ideal, it clouds our perception of reality. This attitude, the one which seeks "the ideal" explanation, which removes the possibility of misunderstanding and doubt, distorts the way we see things. It's like looking through glasses (103). We need to take off the glasses and describe the way that we really perceive things, as they are, instead of trying to explaining things through the lens of the ideal (what we want).

In the context of Wittgenstein, you might be correct in your arguments about “eliminating the possibility of doubt” being untenable. I have not read him so I don’t know.

In the context of philosophical skepticism, the subject matter changes tremendously. Here’s one reference to this point:

Consider next the notion of doubt. Doubt is often considered the hallmark of skepticism. So how can it be that ancient skepticism is not about doubt (Corti 2010, Vogt 2014a)? Insofar as ‘to doubt’ means no more than ‘to call into question,’ the ancient skeptics might be described as doubting things. However, skeptical investigation as Sextus Empiricus describes it does not involve doubt (I shall focus here on Pyrrhonism; on Cicero’s use of dubitari, see Section 3.3). — SEP (Ancient Skepticism)

Pyrrhonism is arguably the most extreme form of non-Cartesian philosophical skepticism. And, as stated in the quote, it does not involve doubt. Rather, it upholds a fallible subjective certainty (i.e., a consciously entertained confidence) that its methods result in eudemonia. No non-Cartesian philosophical skeptic ever expressed holding the stance of global doubt. If you disagree, please provide a credible reference to the contrary if such exists.

As to your more detailed observations concerning my stance:

Going by common usage of the term, doubt is well defined as “to call into question”—as per the definition given in the quoted text —thereby being a cognitive activity, and not a mood or generalized attitude. You also want to pigeonhole the term “certainty” to in all cases signify “the property of being indubitable”—which is not how the term is commonly used: e.g., I’m very certain (rather than somewhat certain) that the term holds the synonyms of sureness and certitude. To the extent to which we disagree about the semantics of these terms—which currently seems significant—we then have no bearing for a proper argument concerning the terms’ referents.

you might be correct in your arguments about “eliminating the possibility of doubt” being untenable. I have not read him so I don’t know. — javra

Meta is the one who involved the word "possibility" in this discussion. Wittgenstein was content to remove the practicality of doubt. When doubt becomes irrational, Meta keeps doubting.

He seems to be rejecting explanation as the means by which we remove doubt as to what the sign-post is telling us, because explanation is not grounded, it would produce infinite regress (87). — Metaphysician Undercover

He is not rejecting explanation. He is only rejecting the philosophical misconception of a complete and final explanation.

He is replacing explanation with the observation that the sign-post fulfils its purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Signposts also require explanation or training in their use. What did you make of Fooloso4's example of the male/female bathroom signs?

Doubt is clearly not an ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your doubts appear to be ideal and endless. You appear to have an axiomatic rule that doubts can be restricted but not removed. You also appear reluctant to address any specific examples which may challenge this rule. You did not address Fooloso4's bathroom signs example, nor respond to my latest example offering a reason for Wittgenstein's direction to "stand roughly there" (to take a photograph), and my questioning of what would remove your doubts in that particular case.

Certainty, in the sense of "leave no room for doubt", is an ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, your ideal. This is not quite Wittgenstein's account of certainty.

That is why I am arguing that it is inconsistent for Wittgenstein to be seeking certainty... — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps he is being inconsistent with your idea of certainty, but he is not contradicting himself.

However, we should refrain from turning this into a discussion about On Certainty.

He is not rejecting explanation. He is only rejecting the philosophical misconception of a complete and final explanation. — Luke

I think that explanation in general, as the means by which we remove doubt, is being rejected, for the reason that explanation cannot remove doubt unless it is the final explanation. Consider the section we've moved up to now, at 109 he says "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place."

Signposts also require explanation or training in their use. What did you make of Fooloso4's example of the male/female bathroom signs? — Luke

There's two different approaches to how one might learn a rule, which Wittgenstein has been stressing almost from the beginning of the text. One is that the rule is told to us (explanation), and the other is that we might learn simply by observation. I think that this is first mentioned at 31, where he says one might learn the rules of a game just by watching. Explanation is not required to learn signposts, because we might learn simply by observation, and this is the case with bathroom signs. I don't think that anyone has every explained to me the meaning of bathroom signs.

I think it is important to note that Wittgenstein is trying to get to the bottom of language, the foundations. We can't simply assume that we learn rules through explanation because explanation requires language, and so the language by which we learn the fundamental rules, could have no rules at all. But how could there be such a language without rules? So he is pointing us toward the possibility that we might learn rules simply through observation, without any explanation required, as his effort to avoid this problem. I think that this would be like a basic form of inductive reasoning. Only females are observed to go through the door with this sign, and only males are observed to go through the door with that sign, so what is meant by the sign-posts, may be produced with inductive reasoning without any explanation.

Perhaps he is being inconsistent with your idea of certainty, but he is not contradicting himself. — Luke

I am not claiming explicitly that he contradicts himself, only that there is some inconsistency evident, which may produce ambiguity, or confusion as to which way he is pointing with his words. At 85 he says the sign-post "sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not". I find this to be misleading because inductive reasoning, it has been argued, always leaves some room for doubt because it is based in probability. So Wittgenstein's description would be more accurate if he said that sometimes the probability of mistake appears to be so low, that we do not doubt. However, there is always room for doubt, in every instance of inductive reasoning, but sometimes we do not doubt, for reasons such as those described by unenlightened.



I see no reason to disagree with you. If, to proceed into an activity, confidence is required, and this confidence is by definition "certainty", and doubt is by definition an activity, then it follows logically that certainty is required for doubt.

You also want to pigeonhole the term “certainty” to in all cases signify “the property of being indubitable”—which is not how the term is commonly used: e.g., I’m very certain (rather than somewhat certain) that the term holds the synonyms of sureness and certitude. — javra

I am trying to deal with Wittgenstein's expression at 85, in which he implies that sometimes there is no room for doubt, which I find misleading. So I'm not trying to pigeonhole the term "certainty", but I find your definition (certainty as defined by confidence) insufficient to account for the situation described by Wittgenstein, when there is no room for doubt.

The problem specifically is that I often have the confidence required to proceed with an action, while I am actively doubting whether I will be successful in that procedure. This confidence I would not call certainty, because I am doubtful. So I am really calling into question your definition of certainty. If certainty is a type of confidence, as you claim, then it must be a type of confidence in which doubt is excluded, because it makes no sense to say that I proceed with certainty and with doubt concerning the same action. But as described, I can proceed with confidence and with doubt concerning the same action. Therefore I find your definition of "certainty" unacceptable. We must disassociate "certainty" from "confidence", to allow that I have confidence in relation to an action which I am doubtful about (this is courage), yet I do not have certainty concerning that action.

Not perfect, not indubitable, but quite a nice talk about Mr W, that might be of interest.

Would you agree that confidence is required for activity, and doubt being an activity therefore requires confidence, but certainty is a special type of confidence which is not required for doubt?

Meta is the one who involved the word "possibility" in this discussion. Wittgenstein was content to remove the practicality of doubt. — Banno

Got it.

The problem specifically is that I often have the confidence required to proceed with an action, while I am actively doubting whether I will be successful in that procedure. This confidence I would not call certainty, because I am doubtful. So I am really calling into question your definition of certainty. If certainty is a type of confidence, as you claim, then it must be a type of confidence in which doubt is excluded, [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I look upon it this way: all subjective certainties will entail respective states of confidence, but not all states of confidence will entail certainties. This to me gets into the complexities of human consciousness—which, imv, always entwines with our sub/unconscious mind, from where emotive states result. Hence, for one example, we can be emotively confident of an activity while consciously doubting ourselves in terms of this very activity. And yes, ditto to certainty being a type of confidence wherein the mental activity of doubt is absent—this for the timespan of the given certainty.

Debating definitions of certainty I think is deserving of its own thread, especially since folks here want to get on with their analysis of Wittgenstein. I’m hesitant to currently start one. Still, for accuracy’s sake, I personally define certainty so (this in the most general way possible): the state, or an instance, of givens that do not compete with alternative givens and thereby hold determinate presence. For example, an idea X which we consciously hold in manners devoid of alternative ideas that compete with idea X for what in fact is shall, then, be a held certainty concerning idea X—this for the timespan in which idea X holds a determinate cognitive presence within our minds; again, this on account of not competing with credible alternatives for what in fact is. As a more concrete example, Pyrrho held a certainty, thus defined, that his methods lead to eudemonia (rather than being uncertain or doubtful about this being so).

Let me know if you’d like me to start a thread dedicated to definitions of certainty, uncertainty, and doubt. I have an online chapter that addresses this very subject which I could link to, and which could do with some criticism. But I doubt I’ll partake in the thread as much as would be appropriate. I might start it next weekend if there is a call for it.

Would you agree that confidence is required for activity, and doubt being an activity therefore requires confidence, but certainty is a special type of confidence which is not required for doubt? — Metaphysician Undercover

yes

p.s. I should say "yes" with certain caveats, but these would amount to the same overall summary I'm thinking.