So first, we're going to assume that it doesn't "magically change" when there are no people around.

If it doesn't magically change, and meaning exists independently of people once it's created, then once people are absent, there should still be meaning. So, the question becomes this: in a world with no people, how exactly does a dictionary, for example, amount to meaning, when all we're talking about is a set of ink marks on some paper? — Terrapin Station

Well, you still seem to have your physicalist cap on. I am not a physicalist like you, so I don't share the same set of beliefs which you do. You might well be talking about a set of ink marks and nothing else. I, however, am talking about a set of ink marks which are also pages and pages of definitions written in the English language. The ink marks would say things like, "planet - a celestial body moving in an elliptical orbit round a star". Why wouldn't that be what the word meant in English, as per the definition? I've asked this question so many times, but I never get back a properly justified answer, because it always goes back to some fundamental unjustified premise or way of speaking.

Again, this is what it was before, and it doesn't magically change, and there is no alternative for concluding such a change which has been properly justified.

If your argument goes something like, "Given physicalism...", or, "Given subjective meaning...", then it won't work on me. You would first need to convince me of that before going any further.

No one here should be talking about language being necessary for a rule to be expressed. — S

....unless they are of the mind that such expression contains the rule, the expression *is* the rule. Anything beforehand is nothing but synthetic a priori relations.

The alternative is contradictory, insofar as, if the rule is thought to be antecedent to its expression, hence antecedent to the language that expresses it, it can only be presented as such by speaking about it by means of the language it was supposed to be antecedent to. Whatever it was that was supposed to be a rule can’t be said to be a rule unless it is expressed as being one. If such were not the case, it would be impossible to distinguish rule from accident.

On the other hand, there are rules theoretically employed in the human thought system that are not generally expressed, hence are language independent, but still must be explicated and understood before being presented in a formal elucidation of how they are used. Analytic or synthetic propositions are such because of a rule to which they adhere but the rule is not contained in the proposition itself. In the same way, concepts relate to phenomena according to rules, such that we do not confuse the objects of our perceptions, but there is nothing in a concept or a perception that illuminates the rule.

As far as the OP is concerned, the ontology of meaning in language is contained in the language used in tandem with the rationality using it. Whether we create a new word or learn an extant word, all we’re doing is relating it to a concept in our heads. Nothing more, nothing less.

Idealist logic reigns supreme. Again. YEA!!!!!!

the expression *is* the rule — Mww

The mashed is the potato? :brow:

You mash a potato. You express a...?

A rule!

There's the potato.

And there's the mashing of it.

There's the rule.

And there's the expression of it.

A potato is a potato, and mashed potato is mashed potato. A potato is not mashed potato. When I say that I'm going to mash this potato, I'm not saying that I'm going to mash this mashed potato.

A rule is a rule, and an expressed rule is an expressed rule. A rule is not an expressed rule. When I say that I'm going to express this rule, I'm not saying that I'm going to express this expressed rule.

Admit it, your language is completely whack, as this logical demonstration shows.

The ink marks would say things like, "planet - a celestial body moving in an elliptical orbit round a star". Why wouldn't that be what the word meant in English, as per the definition? — S

I'm not saying it can't be what the word means in English. I'm querying how that works. It works in some nonphysical way in your view?

We write down "planet . . . " and then that causes some nonphysical thing to happen?

I'm not saying it can't be what the word means in English. I'm querying how that works. It works in some nonphysical way in your view? — Terrapin Station

No, I'm more sceptical than that. If it is physical, then I am not in possession of an explanation in that regard of which I'm convinced. It could be nonphysical, as far as my knowledge goes. I also still haven't even ruled out the physical-nonphysical being a category error.

It works if the logic works, it seems to me. You go by your unnecessary phychologism logic which creates problems for you. I only go by what is necessary and cut out the extra with Ockham's razor.

We write down "planet . . . " and then that causes some nonphysical thing to happen? — Terrapin Station

It's logic, whatever that counts as. And we don't even need to write it down. You just need to provide a justified basis for the logic to suddenly stop applying.

I'm more confused than ever. What would it have to do with logic?

I'm more confused than ever. What would it have to do with logic? — Terrapin Station

Remember this?

But once they're established, I simply ask: wherefore art thou, necessary dependency?

I go by the realist logic, which seems very reasonable to me, that if x means y, then x means y.

I don't go by any logic which I think Russell would call psychologism. That is, something like: x means y if x means y & if and only if x is understood by S & y is understood by S &... — S

So, beforehand, x means y. And, absent any contradiction, afterwards, x still means y. You create your own contradiction because of your additional premises. But I don't have that problem. Neither do you, internally, but then you have logical consequences I find weird and implausible. For you, x just wouldn't mean y anymore. But that is not at all convincing to me.

What are rules themselves existentially dependent upon?

What do the rules themselves consist in/of?

Are these two answers the same?
— creativesoul

These are interesting questions quite apart from any specific definition of the term "rule". — Echarmion

Thank you. I thought them necessary given the OP and the direction of the thread at the time.

The rules would have to depend on some kind of communication. Otherwise they cannot be shared.

This presupposes that all rules governing language use are existentially dependent upon being shared. I don't think that's right. Some. Not all.

The rules then consist of a bunch of connections of symbols (in any form) to observations, and connections of symbols to other connections and other symbols.

Rough and incomplete... but sure. Some. Not all.



Doesn't a rule exist prior to it's being shared?

Jumping in here, considering whether ontology is the way to go, I think meaning is being overthought, or given to much credit. Considering words as behavior, meaning becomes: the use of words that are acceptable to others (including oneself in an internal conversation). and knowing how to respond to words acceptably. Words are learned through emotional commitment to the situation in which the are learned, and continue to be used base on that emotional commitment. For example, a child learns to behave the word ball acceptably because the parent gives bright smiles when he does. So, for those smiles, the child behaves the word ball in an acceptable manner. He has not learned a word, he has learned a behavior driven by the emotional result. I think all words carry that emotional commitment, and are behavior that does not refer, or point, but interacts. Thus the definition of meaning given above.

I'm asking what kind of thing a set of rules is, fundamentally. What kind of thing is a set, fundamentally? — S

"Set" is a name used to pick out a group of different particular things. All these particulars have something in common. The commonality is what makes them part of the set.

A set of rules is a group of rules. A more interesting and probing question remains...

Are the things in the set existentially dependent upon our taking account of them?

What kind of a thing is a rule, fundamentally?

That's debatable... obviously.

Is the rule existentially dependent upon being taken account of?

Perhaps a better question is this...

Does everything that governs the behaviour of thing count as being a rule, even when and if we have not yet taken it into account?

Gravity(space-time) governs behaviour. The Second Law of Thermodynamics governs behaviour. Shrodinger's Equation describes/predicts it. F=ma describes/predicts it. Does that difference between governing and describing matter here?

I would think it mattered to what counts as a rule, if all rules govern.

Another thing...

Some rules can be broken. Others cannot. Both govern behaviour. Not sure if talking about rules lends itself to substantive philosophical thought about the ontology of linguistic meaning.

What kind of thing is language?

Shared meaning being used to influence the world and/or ourselves. The use is important here, as a result of the fact that two creatures can share meaning and no know that one another exist. Shared meaning... alone... is necessary but insufficient for language. All language is existentially dependent upon shared meaning, but not the other way around.

What kind of thing is meaning?

Meaning is existentially dependent upon a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. The drawing of the correlation is the attribution of meaning. Convention has it that there are two basic kinds of theories of meaning. Both presuppose symbolism. So... all meaning is existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of making a connection between the two... drawing a correlation.

There are no examples to the contrary.

Linguistic meaning has this same 'core', so to speak.

What do they consist of, on a fundamental level? Physical? Mental? Abstract? Concrete? Objective? Subjective? Location? No location? Is location a category error? How does interaction work?...

I find that none of those notions can take proper account of meaning.

I think meaning is being overthought — forswanked

I've nothing much to argue with in that post, except for the above...

What you're calling "overthought", I would call not thought about in the right sorts of ways... closer to underthought.

How does it all tie together to result in language use?

It begins simply and grows in it's complexity. By the time one gets to where you are... asking these sorts of questions... one's understanding is steeped in complexity.

Imagine a family of ducks...

Newborn ducklings will quickly learn to avoid getting too close to the drakes, for they often observe an other ending up dead from being grabbed up by the head and violently shaken. The drakes exhibit other aggressive behaviours in such situations as well. The young-uns quickly learn to avoid the drakes and be on guard when they witness these aggressive behaviours.

During feeding times, sometimes the dominant ducks will behave in such a way as to acquire the most food for themselves(and the ducklings if we're talking about a mama).

Are these behaviours rightly called "rules"?

They certain govern/influence the behaviour of others. Are the dominant ones 'laying down the rules', so to speak? They certainly have/hold expectations involving these behaviours, perhaps as a result of them. They behave aggressively and then expect the other to retreat.

It's funny at times when the adolescents start fighting back! They can become quite surprised.

How does a convention or something merely understood but not explicit govern conduct? You don't have to follow any convention. There's no punitive action for not doing so. What sort of government is it if there's no punitive action for not following any of its rules? Under that government, I can do absolutely anything I like. Other folks may not like it, and they might bitch and moan, but so what? I can do whatever I want, including murder, rape, etc. I'd not be controlled in any way. I'm only controlled if there is specific punitive action for breaking rules. Otherwise I'm not really governed, am I? — Terrapin Station

I can certainly see the above as an interpretation of "govern". But I don't think it is the only thing "govern" can mean.

definition of govern: conduct the policy, actions, and affairs of (a state, organization, or people).

That wasn't enough for me so...

definition of conduct (the "conduct" used in definition of "govern" not the conduct used in definition of "rule") : the action or manner of managing an activity or organization.

So in relation to "rule" (one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct within a particular activity or sphere.)

So it seems like we can clarify the definition of rule in relation to the word govern:

so a rule is: one set of explicit or understood regulations or principles managing conduct in a particular activity or sphere.

So if we replace "govern" with "manage" (based on all applicable definitions that show govern has very little to do with government in this case) does that leave us a bit more room?

In your mind I am guessing the phrases "general rule" or "rule of thumb" (I apologize for sexist undertones in that second one) mean "not a rule"? Because both of those expressions refer to basic guidelines, not "do it or else."

A set of rules, ontologically, requires meaning assignments, and that only happens via people thinking about the utterances, the text, etc. in specific ways--which is their brain functioning in particular ways. — Terrapin Station

Does gravity require assigning meaning? Does spacetime not govern the behaviour of all mass?

Are there no rules involved?

This presupposes that all rules governing language use are existentially dependent upon being shared. I don't think that's right. Some. Not all. — creativesoul

I was thinking in terms of how language rules could be established, and for that communication seems necessary. One can of course make up new rules in their heads. I thought up the tern "Quixpel" just now. It has a definition, so it's a kind of rule concerning language. But is it a rule governing language use?

What I am getting at here is that I can certainly make up new rules without communicating them. I can make up an entire language. But in order for these thoughts to become rules governing language use, they kinda need to be used, no? You can repeat the term "Quixpel" to me, but that's not talking about a Quixpel unless we somehow communicate the definition between us. And what language is "Quixpel" even part of before it's shared? It's in my head, but I speak two languages, and know some vocabulary from a couple more. Do I have a personal language including all the languages and vocabulary I know?

Rough and incomplete... but sure. Some. Not all. — creativesoul

Certainly rough and incomplete. I have no idea if what I wrote can account for grammar, for example. But since @S has specifically criticized that part, I think there is no way around language referencing observations. I just cannot think of any other way I know what things are other than to reference things I have seen, heard, felt etc.

"Set" is a name used to pick out a group of different particular things. — creativesoul

No, that talks about a word. My question was about a thing. De re, not de dicto.

A set of rules is a group of rules. — creativesoul

I'm not looking for the kind of answers you're giving. I could have given these kind of answers myself. You're doing it wrong.

I'm asking what kind of thing is a group, fundamentally.

That's debatable... obviously. — creativesoul

Yes, I'm not looking for obvious and unhelpful comments like that.

Perhaps a better question is this... — creativesoul

Please stop doing that. I'm asking the questions here. It's my discussion, not yours. I'm the chairperson, not you.

Shared meaning being used to influence the world and/or ourselves. — creativesoul

If you include "being used" in your definition, then there will be no language when it's not being used. Are you okay with that? Because I'm not.

Meaning is existentially dependent upon a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. — creativesoul

Just to clarify, I'm exclusively talking about linguistic meaning in this discussion. I don't care about, "Oh gosh, that means a lot to me".

The setting of linguistic meaning seems dependent on that. Why would linguistic meaning be dependent on that?

There is only one creature in existence. A creature draws a correlation between this and that: "In this language, this means that". He writes it down. The creature dies a minute later. Why would the linguistic meaning he set die with him? Why wouldn't this mean that in the language? These are the questions that no one properly answers. Properly means giving a fully justified answer instead of just asserting a necessary dependence.

I find that none of those notions can take proper account of meaning. — creativesoul

Real helpful. It's ontology or nothing. If you refuse to do ontology, then you're just not cooperating. You must think on that level, and begin to categorise in that way.

But since S has specifically criticized that part, I think there is no way around language referencing observations. I just cannot think of any other way I know what things are other than to reference things I have seen, heard, felt etc. — Echarmion

So you've seen, heard, and felt rocks on Mars?

So you've seen, heard, and felt rocks on Mars? — S

No, but I have seen, felt and heard rocks. And I've seen pictures of Mars (and also of rocks on Mars, but we can ignore that). So I have things to reference when you talk about rocks on Mars.

No, but I have seen, felt and heard rocks. And I've seen pictures of Mars (and also of rocks on Mars, but we can ignore that). So I have things to reference when you talk about rocks on Mars. — Echarmion

That might seem okay. That might seem like it works. But then we all die, and the very moment the last person in existence dies, those rocks on Mars immediately cease to exist. And you find this logical consequence plausible?

In fact, it's worse than that. You've not been generalising. You've been talking about yourself. So it's solipsism, then?

That might seem okay. That might seem like it works. But then we all die, and those rocks on Mars immediately cease to exist. And you find this plausible? — S

You already know what my position is, I am not going to discuss this with you again.

I still don't know how I am supposed to know what words mean without referencing things I have experienced.

You already know what my position is, I am not going to discuss this with you again.

I still don't know how I am supposed to know what words mean without referencing things I have experienced. — Echarmion

Fine, no one is forcing you to do anything you don't want to. But the problems remain. And this is not meant as an insult, but I genuinely don't believe you when you say that you don't know this meaning. I think that you think that you have to say that in order to maintain your position. I think that it's like the photocopier guy from the video when he asks what a photocopier is. Did you watch the video I'm referring to?

Fine, no one is forcing you to do anything you don't want to. But the problems remain. And this is not meant as an insult, but I genuinely don't believe you when you say that you don't know this meaning. I think that you think that you have to say that in order to maintain your position. I think that it's like the photocopier guy from the video when he asks what a photocopier is. Did you watch the video I'm referring to? — S

I did watch parts of it. I am not sure how exactly it's relevant. I know what you mean, or what you want to establish. I just don't think it works that way.

If we go by ordinary language, the term "meaning" can be used as "I mean X" as well as "X means Y". So what is the proper, ordinary language use of meaning? I can make sense of "X means Y" as a short form of saying "When I (people) say X, I (they) mean (usually mean) Y". That seems like ordinary language use to me.

I did watch parts of it. I am not sure how exactly it's relevant. I know what you mean, or what you want to establish. I just don't think it works that way.

If we go by ordinary language, the term "meaning" can be used as "I mean X" as well as "X means Y". So what is the proper, ordinary language use of meaning? I can make sense of "X means Y" as a short form of saying "When I (people) say X, I (they) mean (usually mean) Y". That seems like ordinary language use to me. — Echarmion

It means: in this language, x means y. That's also ordinary language use, and it doesn't have the problems of idealism.

It means: in this language, x means y. That's also ordinary language use, and it doesn't have the problems of idealism. — S

And down the rabbit hole you go again. Sorry, as long as I have the impression that you're not honestly engaging with my posts, I won't continue putting effort into a discussion with you.

Remember this?

But once they're established, I simply ask: wherefore art thou, necessary dependency?

I go by the realist logic, which seems very reasonable to me, that if x means y, then x means y.

I don't go by any logic which I think Russell would call psychologism. That is, something like: x means y if x means y & if and only if x is understood by S & y is understood by S &... — S


So, beforehand, x means y. And, absent any contradiction, afterwards, x still means y. You create your own contradiction because of your additional premises. But I don't have that problem. Neither do you, internally, but then you have logical consequences I find weird and implausible. For you, x just wouldn't mean y anymore. But that is not at all convincing to me. — S

So, "If 'flirt' means 'give someone a sharp blow' or 'sneer at,' then 'flirt' means 'give someone a sharp blow' or 'sneer at'"?

Wouldn't that also go for "If Herbert Hoover is president, then Herbert Hoover is president," "If the Azure Window is in Malta, then the Azure Window is in Malta," "If Hershey's makes Reese's Elvis Peanut Butter and Banana Creme Cups, then Hershey's makes Reese's Elvis Peanut Butter and Banana Creme Cups," and so on?

If the same wouldn't apply in those cases, why not?

Jumping in here, considering whether ontology is the way to go, I think meaning is being overthought, or given to much credit. Considering words as behavior, meaning becomes: the use of words that are acceptable to others (including oneself in an internal conversation). and knowing how to respond to words acceptably. Words are learned through emotional commitment to the situation in which the are learned, and continue to be used base on that emotional commitment. For example, a child learns to behave the word ball acceptably because the parent gives bright smiles when he does. So, for those smiles, the child behaves the word ball in an acceptable manner. He has not learned a word, he has learned a behavior driven by the emotional result. I think all words carry that emotional commitment, and are behavior that does not refer, or point, but interacts. Thus the definition of meaning given above. — forswanked

On S's view, your account can't be the case, because in his view meaning obtains just the same even when no people exist.

And down the rabbit hole you go again. Sorry, as long as I have the impression that you're not honestly engaging with my posts, I won't continue putting effort into a discussion with you. — Echarmion

Oh my god, what a joke. It's just a way of wording it which is relative or conditional, and yet maintains objectivity. Meaning is relative to the language rule. It's also a very common way of speaking: "What does 'chein' mean in English?", "It means 'dog' in English", "Sorry, I'm unfamiliar with that word in English, what does it mean?", "The word 'dog' in English means a furry creature with four legs and a tail which barks".

It would be very silly to expect me to involve a subject or subjectivity, like you do, so I hope that that wasn't what you were expecting from me. I consider language and meaning to be objective in the sense that I've been using throughout this discussion and the other one. In accordance with the language, x means y. How else can I even put that? That's about as fundamental as it gets.

In your mind I am guessing the phrases "general rule" or "rule of thumb" (I apologize for sexist undertones in that second one) mean "not a rule"? Because both of those expressions refer to basic guidelines, not "do it or else." — ZhouBoTong

I'd say that those expressions do not use the term "rule" literally. Not all language is literal. When we're doing philosophy, though, ideally we're trying to use terms as literally and precisely as we can.

Does gravity require assigning meaning? Does spacetime not govern the behaviour of all mass?

Are there no rules involved? — creativesoul

I'm not a realist on physical law, but we weren't talking about physical laws anyway. We were talking about rules that people construct, whether intentionally or not.

If there are physical laws, it's literally impossible to "disobey them" (at least in the possible world wherein the physical law obtains). That's not at all the case for rules as we're talking about them.

So, "If 'flirt' means 'give someone a sharp blow' or 'sneer at,' then 'flirt' means 'give someone a sharp blow' or 'sneer at'"? — Terrapin Station

That's a tautology, so it's obviously true.

Wouldn't that also go for "If Herbert Hoover is president, then Herbert Hoover is president," "If the Azure Window is in Malta, then the Azure Window is in Malta," "If Hershey's makes Reese's Elvis Peanut Butter and Banana Creme Cups, then Hershey's makes Reese's Elvis Peanut Butter and Banana Creme Cups," and so on? — Terrapin Station

Yes, these are more tautologies. It would be the epitome of unreasonableness to doubt them.