The problem of appearance/reality as applied to ethics --

So this is why I think that acts like changing one's mind, repentance, forgiveness, and redemption are strong indicators for moral intuitionism. Sure, we can be wrong. In fact in the face of our own evil we often acknowledge our error and try to make amends. In a similar way in the face of our own falsity we often acknowledge our error and try to amend our beliefs. If we can be wrong then there is something we can be wrong about, unlike our preference for ice cream of which it is silly to say you can be wrong about.

But this set up is the sort of set up which denies our ability to tell someone else what is right or wrong, because it depends on intuition. And then depending on how much tolerance we are allowing the argument from a difference in ethical beliefs either does or does not get off the ground.

A bit of an afterthought -- I first wrote on this, but then thought it better just to mention instead -- If anyone can tell others what is right or wrong, it would be the ubermensch: breaker of tablets, master of the self, inspirer of slaves to write future tablets. But the ubermensch is not an ideal, nor is it something we even could aspire to -- she cannot even help but to be an ubermensch.

A bit of an afterthought -- I first wrote on this, but then thought it better just to mention instead -- If anyone can tell others what is right or wrong, it would be the ubermensch: breaker of tablets, master of the self, inspirer of slaves to write future tablets. But the ubermensch is not an ideal, nor is it something we even could aspire to -- she cannot even help but to be an ubermensch. — Moliere

Tangetial, but definitely related (I think.) Its interesting that when Wittgenstein is introduced in a conversation, its rarely to reference a formal argument of his. He's almost always brought in to try to communicate a superior mode of philosophical valuation. An idiosyncratic - but powerful - way of selecting which philosophical problems are worth posing, and which aren't.

Its funny how the good, the true, and the beautiful run together here. It seems almost a law that things work like this. A new time, a new figure (or group of figures) and then a lot of working out implications. and filling in gaps. Ethical progress definitely seems to follow this pattern too.

So this is why I think that acts like changing one's mind, repentance, forgiveness, and redemption are strong indicators for moral intuitionism. Sure, we can be wrong. In fact in the face of our own evil we often acknowledge our error and try to make amends. In a similar way in the face of our own falsity we often acknowledge our error and try to amend our beliefs. If we can be wrong then there is something we can be wrong about, unlike our preference for ice cream of which it is silly to say you can be wrong about. — Moliere

People say that they were wrong about their previous music tastes all the time. Do you believe that there are really factually correct/incorrect assessments of music?

Factually? No. There is a difference between facts and values.

But I'll use an example. I grew up watching Star Wars. I love watching Star Wars. I have good memories of it and a soft spot for the fantasy world that inspired me as a kid.

But as I grew older and developed a taste for film I could come back to Star Wars and see its flaws.

Now, knowing its flaws, I still love Star Wars. But I would not argue that Star Wars is a good film.


To go with music -- preferences can change over time. But there are still ways of evaluating music that do not reduce down to mere preference. Beethoven, regardless of your preference, is a good composer. You may not have a taste for classical music, or prefer to listen to electronic dance music, or some such. But in spite of your or my preference he is still a good composer.

To take a page out of the Critique of Judgment -- we treat objects of art as if our matters of taste were in some respect "objective". For Kant this had to do with purposiveness and the effects that some work of art had on our faculties. But there are other aesthetic theories out there -- and with them we can say why this or that work of art is good or not good. We can articulate an argument about our judgments, rather than simply saying "Hurrah, Beethoven!" or "Boo, Beethoven!"

But I'll use an example. I grew up watching Star Wars. I love watching Star Wars. I have good memories of it and a soft spot for the fantasy world that inspired me as a kid.

But as I grew older and developed a taste for film I could come back to Star Wars and see its flaws. — Moliere

Start with this. Do you believe that what you're referring to are flaws factually? Or are you just saying that they're flaws in your later opinion, given how your preferences have changed?

Start with this. Do you believe that what you're referring to are flaws factually? Or are you just saying that they're flaws in your later opinion, given how your preferences have changed? — Terrapin Station

Neither. Values differ from facts, so they are not factual. But it is not just an opinion or preference either.

Don't you think things like forgiveness, redemption and repentance are applicable to particular actions that would be entirely ignored by other religions, cultures or relationships? Is the wrongness of those actions really innate if this were the case?

I have been thinking about this topic a lot since I looked at this thread. I think that impetus for morality comes from within, it is biological and interpretation always leads back to the source eventually. Still, that impetus can be directed... how much can you twist and bend something until what it's based on changes? Very peculiar question. I still need to think about it.

Don't you think things like forgiveness, redemption and repentance are applicable to particular actions that would be entirely ignored by other religions, cultures or relationships? — Judaka

Yes. I think there is a relative element to values. I also think there is a relative element to facts -- as in, other religions, cultures, or relationships ignore certain facts.

Is the wrongness of those actions really innate if this were the case? — Judaka

Well, it could be. If the cat stands up and walks off the mat, the cat is no longer on the mat -- and "the cat is on the mat" is false. Facts change, and for all that we do not say that our preference dictates what is true or false.

how much can you twist and bend something until what it's based on changes? — Judaka

A bit of a different question, but still a good one.

Neither. Values differ from facts, so they are not factual. But it is not just an opinion or preference either. — Moliere

What would you say it is that's different from facts or opinions/preferences?

What would you say it is that's different from facts or opinions/preferences? — Terrapin Station

Wouldn't there be many things that are different from those?

Let's take knowledge. Under a simple theory of knowledge it involves belief and justification as well as facts. And it isn't right to say that knowledge is merely opinion.

Wouldn't there be many things that are different from those? — Moliere

The question is about the status of flaws in a film--wasn't that what I was asking you about? It's not a fact that there are flaws in a film, and it's not simply a result of preferences/opinions, but it's what?

The question is about the status of flaws in a film--wasn't that what I was asking you about? It's not a fact that there are flaws in a film, and it's not simply a result of preferences/opinions, but it's what? — Terrapin Station

It's a value.

It's a value. — Moliere

Sure. And what are values?

Seems to me that they operate on their own. That is, after all, my position -- that they are not reducible to something else.

Do they occur external to our thinking? If so, why wouldn't we be talking about a fact?

I don't think you'll find my response very satisfactory. :D

But, from my perspective at least, determining whether a phenomena is external or internal to our thinking isn't a productive question. It's a metaphysical set up that gets in the way of looking or "going back to the things themselves", as Husserl put it.

Whether you determine that values are strictly internal to thought or external to thought, regardless of how you interpret the phenomena -- values are distinct from facts, and they are not just preferences.

Let's try this, then: how do we discover values?

There is no method. I'll put that out there. And the same holds true for factual matters.

But there are stories I can give you. With Star Wars I'd say that I discovered it was not good by watching more movies, reading more scripts, taking classes on acting and script writing, engaging with the history of storytelling and further developing my knowledge of the movie artform. In comparing Star Wars to other movies I could see how Star Wars was primarily plot-driven, that the characters were two-dimensional, and the dialogue came out because of the storyteller had a plot they wanted to tell and it drove that plot.

In general -- engaging with the history of an artform, in its production and as audience, is how you discover aesthetic values.

Star Wars was primarily plot-driven, that the characters were two-dimensional, and the dialogue came out because of the storyteller had a plot they wanted to tell and it drove that plot.

In general -- engaging with the history of an artform, in its production and as audience, is how you discover aesthetic values. — Moliere

So something shouldn't be primarily plot-driven, dialogue shouldn't just be there to drive the plot, characters shouldn't be "two-dimensional" because . . . I don't know. You're saying that whether they should be that way or not doesn't have anything to do with anyone's opinion, right? So maybe they shouldn't be that way because other films you watched/studied weren't that way? Because most films are not that way? Or . . . ? (It can't be something like "because most films considered 'good' by cinephiles, film professors, etc. don't have those features, because that has to do with those folks opinions)

The general method is one of engagement with the medium as creator and audience, knowledge of its history, as well as the elements and principles which make up a medium. It is not one of reduction to something else. This is something that stands on its own. As such there is no deeper "because", though it is always possible to ask why.

Let's take an extreme example.

Have you ever watched The Room?

Now compare that to Guardians of the Galaxy.

Which would you say is a better movie?

I've seen many thousands of films, but unfortunately I haven't seen either of those two yet. I'm familiar with both to some extent. I just haven't gotten around to watching them yet.

We could pick other examples, but the one I'm going to say is the better movie is the one that I like better overall, due to a combination of my tastes in plots, scripts, acting, cinematography, editing, scoring, production design, etc.--all of the elements that make up a film.

Then you have the capability of choosing which is better. To me that is enough. Of course you have a preference for this or that. Preferences play a role in evaluating what is better or worse. But it's also not quite right to say that they are the same as mere opinion either -- we have elements of an art and principles by which said art is made, a history to draw from, and -- importantly -- reasons we can provide to others as to why this is better or worse than something.

With matters of preference there isn't anything more to judging something other than whether or not it pleases you. But with matters of aesthetics there is -- we provide reasons for others to consider in making their own judgment about whether such and such is good or bad.

Which is why I was trying to drive the point home with Star Wars. There is a difference between my saying "I like Star Wars" and my saying "Star Wars is a good movie" -- and I'd say that the primary difference is in whether we can reason about something. It wouldn't make sense to debate whether I like something. But it does make sense to debate whether this movie is better than that one -- we have this, that, and the other reason.

That our preferences influence our judgments doesn't matter and is obvious. What matters is that these two things are not the same sort of judgment.

There is a difference between my saying "I like Star Wars" and my saying "Star Wars is a good movie" - — Moliere

I couldn't more strongly disagree with this, though.

The sort of reasons one gives are things like "it's primarily plot-driven." It's not good or bad for something to be primarily plot-driven. You can like or dislike (or be neutral towards) something primarily plot-driven, but there's no right answer regarding whether something should be primarily plot-driven or not.

It's no different than saying, "I like Casablanca more than Star Wars because Star Wars is primarily plot-driven, and I don't like things that are primarily plot-driven as much as things that are primarily character/relationship driven."

There are plenty of facts about films, facts that are not at all opinions. For example, "Star Wars is set on other planets than the Earth." None of those non-opinion facts are at all indicative of anything being good or bad, better or worse than anything else.

Values ARE just ways that people feel about things.

And re the other comment we didn't get to yet, the only way that Beethoven is a better composer than anyone else--Chuck Berry, say, is to a particular individual, if that individual likes Beethoven's writing more.They can give reasons why they like his writing more. Anyone should be able to do this if they've introspected just what it is they like and dislike in any detail. But none of that translates to anything other than their likes/dislikes. It's just telling us what specifically they like/dislike.

I suppose that seems false to me because of the two reasons I've tried to convey.

There are extreme cases. So Chuck Berry and Beethoven -- that's a hard case to judge. They are good in their own ways, and which we prefer listening to is likely a matter of preference. But Beethoven compared to the garage band next door? They are just beginning. They haven't learned much about music. They are mostly playing covers, and they aren't able to play together in unison - they are often playing different beats and aren't listening to one another.

Just to keep the analogy cleaner -- comparing them to the New York Philharmonic to the garage band next door, the New York Philharmonic is better.

And then there are middling cases for which it makes sense to differentiate between what I like and what is good. In one case I know I just like it. In another I can provide reasons why you should like it too. Kant makes a similar distinction when talking about aesthetic judgment -- that though there is no fact to the matter we hold aesthetic judgments as if others should conform to our judgment.

It's the reasoning part that differentiates matters of aesthetics from mere liking -- for you can reason to the ends of the earth and I will like or dislike something just because I like or dislike something. There is no reason to it. But something is good because of such and such reasons which have to do with comparison between artworks, context, history, the elements of art, and the principles of art.

There is a difference between my saying "I like Star Wars" and my saying "Star Wars is a good movie" — Moliere

I agree, and think the fundamental principle translates to moral issues, such as abortion. No one likes abortion. It doesn't 'feel' good and we have the intuitive sense is that it's bad. Nevertheless we can have good reasons for being pro-choice.

Values ARE just ways that people feel about things. — Terrapin Station

We can value abstract principles, however, which can override our intuitions.

There are extreme cases. — Moliere

The only thing "extreme" about cases like that are whether an opinion would be popular or unusual. Some people tend to be swayed popularity of opinion, especially when we're talking about a popular opinion among specialists. But that's an example of the argumentum ad populum fallacy. It's not correct in any way, shape or form that Beethoven is a better composer than a 2-year-old who just started banging on some pots and pans five minutes ago. It's simply a matter of what someone likes versus dislikes, where most people can give some details about their likes and dislikes.

But something is good because of such and such reasons which have to do with comparison between artworks, context, history, the elements of art, and the principles of art. — Moliere

You can compare etc. all day long and it doesn't amount to anything re good/bad aside from people liking whatever they do. No comparison, no context, nothing about history, nothing about "principles" has any bearing whatsoever on whether anything is good or bad, better or worse than anything else outside of people liking whatever they do.

We can value abstract principles, however, which can override our intuitions. — praxis

The only way to know if you value an abstract principle is via your intuition.

Re the earlier comment, it's the same rudimentary misunderstanding people make all the time when discussing this stuff. It's not that you necessarily value every aspect of something equally. You often assign different values to different aspects and weight each differently.

Heh. I made no such assertion about popularity.

And I do not expect you to agree with me. This is, after all, philosophy. However I think we can both see that we're at the point where we basically believe or do not believe a proposition, and we're kind of at the part where we're just asserting our belief -- we have tried to show the other what we mean, but failed.

We can value abstract principles, however, which can override our intuitions.
— praxis

The only way to know if you value an abstract principle is via your intuition. — Terrapin Station

With enough conditioning an abstract principle can become intuitive, I'm sure, but initially they are learned or reasoned out and may have no personal value at all. People can adopt principles on faith.

With enough conditioning an abstract principle can become intuitive, I'm sure, but initially they are learned or reasoned out and may have no personal value at all. People can adopt principles on faith. — praxis

You said that we can value an abstract principle. I was saying something about that--about valuing abstract principles. I wasn't saying aside from that about abstract principles. Just about valuing them, since that's what you had mentioned.