I don’t think a theory of spontaneous causality is indeterministic. Freedom doesn’t determine anything, it is the condition by which the will is enabled to determine.

Still, it does presuppose an ontological dualism which empirical determinists don’t embrace.

The thing is that whatever theory of the mind you want, dualist or idealist, does not necessarily make libertarian free will more plausible.

What will make or break libertarian free will is the mechanics behind causation that rules over that immaterial mind.

A theory predicated on spontaneity isn’t going to have any mechanics behind it’s causality. The mechanics follow from it, re: will, maxims, imperatives, volitions, and so on.

Ehhhhh.....it’s just a theory.

Right. But, re your opinion, so you just don't feel that that issue is worth bothering with? — Terrapin Station

I think the issue is very interesting, but the specific questions asked are impossible to answer. First of all it's not possible to know the configuration of objective reality and secondly it's not clear to me how either ontological determinism or indeterminism answers the question.

Let's say the entire universe is a dream of me, and my will is actually the only thing that changes it. How can I change my decisions without also changing myself?

How would you explain your awareness of other minds without using causation? — Harry Hindu

That, my friend, is the million dollar question. We can't answer that question but that doesn't mean free will is impossible does it?

I've been thinking about explaining free will within a causal framework but I'm unable to do it. The problem with causation is there's always something that precedes everything in a cause-effect sense.

How about this for possibility of free will: Our brains and thus our minds are isolated, sealed off, from the rest of the causal web. I mean, yes, we are effects of the great chain of causation that extends back to the Big Bang but once we're born our minds are put inside a cranium that prevents any external influences and thus the choices we make are ours alone. Of course our proclivities are decided beforehand by our genes which connect back to the Big Bang itself but we can and do make decisions that we don't like, which is an ability to override our constitution. Free will?

We are part of the causal chain but the human mind is different than an inanimate object. Causality has influence over our thoughts but the mind has the power to cause things itself. Agent causation takes a massive amount of effort and will so most of the time we don't bother with it, but there are times when people do actually exercise true free will.

Remember using causation to explain things is really just invidious selection to provide an explanation, this is not the same thing as 'the cause'.

We are part of the causal chain but the human mind is different than an inanimate object. Causality has influence over our thoughts but the mind has the power to cause things itself. Agent causation takes a massive amount of effort and will so most of the time we don't bother with it, but there are times when people do actually exercise true free will. — Jamesk

And what are the required circumstances for that to happen?

And what are the required circumstances for that to happen? — Echarmion

It can happen at anytime to anyone however it is usually brought out in extreme situations where the agent is 'out of their depth' and can no-longer rely on their experienced based knowledge.

When we act in character we are following deterministic influences, when we act out of character or make acts of true greatness I believe we are acting from freewill.

First of all it's not possible to know the configuration of objective reality — Echarmion

Hmm, why would you believe that?

Let's say the entire universe is a dream of me, and my will is actually the only thing that changes it. How can I change my decisions without also changing myself? — Echarmion

That depends on whether you're thinking of your decisions as constitutive of yourself. In other words, if you on a complete whim choose rye bread over whole wheat, does that mean you've changed yourself merely because of that fact?

Hmm, why would you believe that? — Terrapin Station

The standard arguments on how we do not have any way to establish the objectivity of our experience.

That depends on whether you're thinking of your decisions as constitutive of yourself. In other words, if you on a complete whim choose rye bread over whole wheat, does that mean you've changed yourself merely because of that fact? — Terrapin Station

But the choice of bread is either based on reasons, or it random. If it's based on reason, those reasons cannot change without something about the person having those reasons changing with them. If it's random it's not attributable to the person making the (apparent) decisions, so it doesn't serve as an example of their will.

The standard arguments on how we do not have any way to establish the objectivity of our experience. — Echarmion

I don't believe that any of those work. I'm a direct/naive realist. Which ones do you find convincing?

If it's random it's not attributable to the person making the (apparent) decisions, — Echarmion

Sure it is. It's not someone else making the random decision. That would be like saying, if we were talking about a random number generator, that it's not the random number generator producing the random numbers. I don't know how that would make sense. What would you think is producing the random numbers in that case (and could we then say that it's that thing that's producing the random numbers, or would we have to say that something else is)?

(None of which is to argue whether anything is "really random," by the way, but if we're characterizing things that way . . .)

How would you explain your awareness of other minds without using causation? — Harry Hindu

That, my friend, is the million dollar question. We can't answer that question but that doesn't mean free will is impossible does it? — TheMadFool

Of course we can answer it. The answer is, "You can't - at least not without redefining what "awareness", and "other" mean."

I've been thinking about explaining free will within a causal framework but I'm unable to do it. The problem with causation is there's always something that precedes everything in a cause-effect sense. — TheMadFool

As usual with many philosophical debates, the terms that we are discussing are often obscure and incoherent in light of other knowledge that we have. Integrating our knowledge shines a light on these inconsistencies in our definitions. What do you mean by "free will"? What is the "will" and what makes it "free"?

How about this for possibility of free will: Our brains and thus our minds are isolated, sealed off, from the rest of the causal web. I mean, yes, we are effects of the great chain of causation that extends back to the Big Bang but once we're born our minds are put inside a cranium that prevents any external influences and thus the choices we make are ours alone. Of course our proclivities are decided beforehand by our genes which connect back to the Big Bang itself but we can and do make decisions that we don't like, which is an ability to override our constitution. Free will? — TheMadFool

We are part of the causal chain but the human mind is different than an inanimate object. Causality has influence over our thoughts but the mind has the power to cause things itself. Agent causation takes a massive amount of effort and will so most of the time we don't bother with it, but there are times when people do actually exercise true free will. — Jamesk

You seem to be claiming that we are both causes and effects, which plants us firmly within the causal chain - as part of it - not external to it.

Think about it. Do other people's decisions have an effect on you? Do your decisions have an effect on other minds? Maybe not all of them, or maybe in degrees depending on what the choice was about, but there is still a causal chain where it takes time to make decisions, execute them, and then observe the consequences to know if you made the correct decision.

Your reasons are the causes of your decisions. Your goals (ideas about the future in the present - like being content) are the causes of your decisions. Being content, or suffering, are the effects of your decision, which can then lead to other kinds of decisions being made, and so on.

Remember using causation to explain things is really just invidious selection to provide an explanation, this is not the same thing as 'the cause'. — Jamesk

So the difference between a pine cone falling on your head from a tree limb and a person throwing a pine cone at your head is just the explanation for why a pine cone hit you in the head?

Free will needs a clearer definition? I could define it as having the power to do choose uninfluenced by anything one didn't choose in the first place. That's a very restrictive definition I believe and makes free will impossible. Afterall who has ever chosen what one likes/dislikes.
Nevertheless, we can analyze, in terms of rationality, our preferences and then pick from them what is reasonable and discard what isn't. The fact that we can do that points to free will of some kind doesn't it?

Of course not all our preferences can be so dealt with. There are some things about our personality beyond our control. Whether this is significant or not is debatable. If you ask me, I think our ability to change/add/delete our preferences indicates free will. That there are unchangeable parts to the code that makes us who we are is irrelevant because we've already proved that we can alter our personality.

And no these alterations to who we are aren't necessarily coded beforehand because we can make choices against our preferences.

As for causality and free will I propose a gedanken experiment. Imagine a pool table. There are balls on the table subject to causality. At the center of the table is a box with some balls inside it. The box has an opening with a valve that only allows balls to exit the box and not enter it. Now, despite balls moving, hitting in all possible combinations on the table they can't cause anything for the balls inside the box due to the walls of the box. However, the balls inside the box have access to the balls outside through the opening in it (remember there's a valve that allows exit but no entry). Our minds could be like that - protected from causality from without by the skull and other mental barriers but capable of initiating a causal chain both within and without. Free will?

Nevertheless, we can analyze, in terms of rationality, our preferences and then pick from them what is reasonable and discard what isn't. The fact that we can do that points to free will of some kind doesn't it? — TheMadFool

Doesn't that require ontological freedom in the first place? If there's no ontological freedom, you can't actually pick one thing and discard another. You're predetermined to pick one thing and discard another. Then it would just be a matter of whether the predetermination happens to coincide with "what you think you want," so that you don't notice that you really don't have any choice.

That's a problem with the Dennettian approach to free will in general.

I don't believe that any of those work. I'm a direct/naive realist. Which ones do you find convincing? — Terrapin Station

Isn't it sufficient to observe (heh) that we have no criterion to judge the objectivity of an experience? Any such criterion would run into the problem of an infinite regress (the objectivity of the criterion itself, and so forth).

Sure it is. It's not someone else making the random decision. That would be like saying, if we were talking about a random number generator, that it's not the random number generator producing the random numbers. I don't know how that would make sense. What would you think is producing the random numbers in that case (and could we then say that it's that thing that's producing the random numbers, or would we have to say that something else is)? — Terrapin Station

It's not someone else making a decision, there just isn't a decision. It's not a case of asking "which entity did this result originate from". That question does not allow us to differentiate between results of a free will and results of e.g. an algorithm. What you call a "random decision" might phenomenally originate from me, but it's not indicative of my will. It doesn't get us any closer to explaining how indeterminism leads to a meaningful concept of free will.

Nevertheless, we can analyze, in terms of rationality, our preferences and then pick from them what is reasonable and discard what isn't. The fact that we can do that points to free will of some kind doesn't it? — TheMadFool

In saying that it is rational, are you not saying that it was deterministic as well? Can you give an example of something that is non-deterministic AND rational, or something that is deterministic AND irrational?

If you ask me, I think our ability to change/add/delete our preferences indicates free will. — TheMadFool

But why would we ever change/add/delete our preferences? There must be a reason (cause), no? And in pointing to that cause, are you not explaining the rationality of your decision?

As for causality and free will I propose a gedanken experiment. Imagine a pool table. There are balls on the table subject to causality. At the center of the table is a box with some balls inside it. The box has an opening with a valve that only allows balls to exit the box and not enter it. Now, despite balls moving, hitting in all possible combinations on the table they can't cause anything for the balls inside the box due to the walls of the box. However, the balls inside the box have access to the balls outside through the opening in it (remember there's a valve that allows exit but no entry). Our minds could be like that - protected from causality from without by the skull and other mental barriers but capable of initiating a causal chain both within and without. Free will? — TheMadFool

The walls of the box are part of the causal chain. The balls outside of the box react differently than if the box wasn't there in the first place, and the balls inside increase the density of the box which has an effect on how much the box moves when external balls hit it. In other words, you cannot escape causation unless you completely remove yourself from the world. The world, in essence, is a causal event.

If there's no ontological freedom, you can't actually pick one thing and discard another. You're predetermined to pick one thing and discard another. — Terrapin Station

I wonder: What would the phenomenal difference be between being free to pick one thing and discarding another and being predetermined to pick one thing and discard another?

It seems that in both cases one is aware of multiple options but chooses only one while discarding the others. What determines whether or not the choice was predetermined or not? What does it mean for a choice to be predetermined?

Isn't it sufficient to observe (heh) that we have no criterion to judge the objectivity of an experience? — Echarmion

I don't even really understand the idea of that. Why would you need a criterion to judge the objectivity of an experience? That sounds like we're starting from an assumption of idealism.

That question does not allow us to differentiate between results of a free will and results of e.g. an algorithm. — Echarmion

It's a will phenomenon--we're talking about a conscious phenomenon, and it's free because we're not forced to go with one thing or the other.

It's a decision because we're picking one of two or more options.

I wonder: What would the phenomenal difference be between being free to pick one thing and discarding another and being predetermined to pick one thing and discard another?

It seems that in both cases one is aware of multiple options but chooses only one while discarding the others. What determines whether or not the choice was predetermined or not? What does it mean for a choice to be predetermined? — Harry Hindu

Phenomenally, there may be no difference. Hence, the issue is whether what it seems like is what it really is. What it means for a choice to be predetermined is that only one option was ever possible, even if appearances suggest otherwise. If it's not predetermined, at least two choices were possible (again, even if appearances suggest otherwise).

If not pre-determined, then are the only choices that are possible are the ones we are aware of?

Doesn't that require ontological freedom in the first place? If there's no ontological freedom, you can't actually pick one thing and discard another. You're predetermined to pick one thing and discard another. Then it would just be a matter of whether the predetermination happens to coincide with "what you think you want," so that you don't notice that you really don't have any choice.

That's a problem with the Dennettian approach to free will in general. — Terrapin Station

This would've made sense but what about the choices you made before engaging reason. The pre-reason choices sometimes don't match the post-reason ones do they? If all our preferences were determined from before we wouldn't be able to change our minds. People regulalry do after some reflection don't they?

In saying that it is rational, are you not saying that it was deterministic as well? Can you give an example of something that is non-deterministic AND rational, or something that is deterministic AND irrational? — Harry Hindu

Suppose determinism is true. What about irrational people e.g. the insane? Aren't they part of the causal web? So, deterministic and irrational.

As for non-deterministic and rational that's what I'm trying to prove.

Yes, rationality can be construed to be a cause but we have control over it. We can always opt out of it and choose to be irrational but then we would lose touch with reality.

Suppose determinism is true. What about irrational people e.g. the insane? Aren't they part of the causal web? So, deterministic and irrational. — TheMadFool

Yes, good example. Their irrationality is caused by a neurological anomaly.

As for non-deterministic and rational that's what I'm trying to prove.

Yes, rationality can be construed to be a cause but we have control over it. We can always opt out of it and choose to be irrational but then we would lose touch with reality. — TheMadFool

When we say that someone is irrational, what we're really saying is that the person isn't behaving as if they have common sense or knowledge. From the irrational person's perspective they are acting on their knowledge which is skewed, or limited for some reason. It's not that they are acting randomly. They are acting on their knowledge or perception of the world, just like you and I are doing. It's just that that perception is actually a delusion, or the cause of some kind of amnesia or lack of information that the person labeling the other as "irrational" has. If you know something that someone else doesn't know and you see that that lack of knowledge causes changes in their behavior, those changes would appear to be irrational from your perspective.

So it's not that the irrational person is just behaving in a way that has no cause. It's just that they're acting on an inaccurate or limited information.

I don't even really understand the idea of that. Why would you need a criterion to judge the objectivity of an experience? That sounds like we're starting from an assumption of idealism. — Terrapin Station

For a statement to have a truth value, there needs to be a criterion to determine truth from falsehood, correct? It follows that we can only make true statements about objective reality if we have a criterion that gives different answers for statements that refer to objective reality vs statements that do not.

Since statements can refer to subjective realities, objectivity must be one of the things this criterion establishes.

It's a will phenomenon--we're talking about a conscious phenomenon, and it's free because we're not forced to go with one thing or the other.

It's a decision because we're picking one of two or more options. — Terrapin Station

You have smuggled a subject into these statements. In the first sentence you're talking about us, the two people who write in a forum.

In your following sentence, you're now introducing a subject "we" that is picking options and is or is not forced. But in order to have a subject that is doing these things, you need to be able to attribute them to that subject. You need an immanent connection between the subject and the process that results in a phenomenal decision. What could provide that immanent connection?

If not pre-determined, then are the only choices that are possible are the ones we are aware of? — Harry Hindu

No, of course not.

Say that it's not predetermined that Joe chooses rye bread instead of whole wheat when he orders his sandwich. Well, pumpernickel could be available, too, but Joe might not be aware of this--he didn't look at the menu very carefully, maybe he's never even heard of pumpernickel, etc.

If choices are predetermined, however, then presumably choices you're not aware of are never the predetermined choices, since no one seems to have the experience of choosing pumpernickel when they've never heard of it before or when they weren't aware that it was available.

This would've made sense but what about the choices you made before engaging reason. The pre-reason choices sometimes don't match the post-reason ones do they? If all our preferences were determined from before we wouldn't be able to change our minds. People regulalry do after some reflection don't they? — TheMadFool

Just to be clear, I'm on the "there is ontological freedom/there is free will" side of this issue. I'm criticizing compatibilism a la Dennett, as I believe that he doesn't even really deal with the issue. He says, "Okay, I'm just going to call this 'freedom' instead," while ignoring the traditional issue, but the traditional issue is still present in the underlying assumptions being made. That was the gist of my comment that you had quoted.

And yeah, people do change their minds often.

No, of course not.

Say that it's not predetermined that Joe chooses rye bread instead of whole wheat when he orders his sandwich. Well, pumpernickel could be available, too, but Joe might not be aware of this--he didn't look at the menu very carefully, maybe he's never even heard of pumpernickel, etc.

If choices are predetermined, however, then presumably choices you're not aware of are never the predetermined choices, since no one seems to have the experience of choosing pumpernickel when they've never heard of it before or when they weren't aware that it was available. — Terrapin Station

I'm not sure that you are using "choice" consistently here.

Is pumpernickel a kind of choice, or a kind of bread? Don't choices only exist inside of minds? Isn't a choice the act of making a decision, or does everything have a characteristic of choice. Are you a choice?

Wouldn't your lack of knowledge be a pre-determined factor for your decision? If you are hindered from making other choices, or being aware of them, then doesn't that affect what decisions you can make?

Is pumpernickel a kind of choice, or a kind of bread? — Harry Hindu

What? It would be possible to choose pumpernickel if it's available, if one were to know about it, and if the choice ("choice" really) of some other type of bread isn't predetermined. You were asking me about possibility.

Wouldn't your lack of knowledge be a pre-determined factor for your decision? — Harry Hindu

No, as it's not predetermined.

If you're asking whether someone is going to choose something they're not aware of then no (and I noted that we don't experience that phenomenon in the latter part of the post). That doesn't mean that the other choices aren't possible. It's not impossible to know that pumpernickel is available, it's not predetermined that you don't know it's available, it's not impossible to choose it if you know about it, etc.

compatibilism — Terrapin Station

Can you elaborate on Dennett's version? If you have the time...

When we say that someone is irrational, what we're really saying is that the person isn't behaving as if they have common sense or knowledge. From the irrational person's perspective they are acting on their knowledge which is skewed, or limited for some reason. It's not that they are acting randomly. They are acting on their knowledge or perception of the world, just like you and I are doing. It's just that that perception is actually a delusion, or the cause of some kind of amnesia or lack of information that the person labeling the other as "irrational" has. If you know something that someone else doesn't know and you see that that lack of knowledge causes changes in their behavior, those changes would appear to be irrational from your perspective.

So it's not that the irrational person is just behaving in a way that has no cause. It's just that they're acting on an inaccurate or limited information. — Harry Hindu

Do you have a brain anomaly because there really is no one who hasn't ever been irrational?

I guess logic does have an influence on our beliefs but let's think why. Logic is a guarantee for truths and knowing truths, truths being facts of our world, keep us alive and well. However, that's the extent of logic's influence. By itself it doesn't cause us to believe/disbelieve stuff. It's a tool and tools aren't as important as the one who wields them in a causal sense. Right?