No, you're misunderstanding the definition. The article is even clearer in its opening paragraph:

"The object is something that presumably exists independent of the subject’s perception of it. In other words, the object would be there, as it is, even if no subject perceived it."

How much clearer does it need to be? A thing is objective iff it exists even if it's not being seen.

What are you quoting there. You have a quote with no attribution. Sorry I just saw your opening remark. (I don't know if you just added that.)

The IEP article I've quoted and linked to several times now; the one we're discussing.

Okay, that's not a necessary property though. I explained why.

Can you address my explanation? Or are you not capable of that?

Okay, that's not a necessary property though. I explained why. — Terrapin Station

But it is the definition that the IEP uses.

Can you address my explanation? Or are you not capable of that?

Again, it's not relevant, as I'm only explaining how the IEP defines the term. You're more than welcome to take issue with their definition, but that's a separate issue, and not one that I'm currently addressing.

So in your opinion if the IEP says, "The object is something that presumably exists independent of the subject’s perception of it. In other words, the object would be there, as it is, even if no subject perceived it," then it's saying that that's a necessary property of something being objective, and if something were to pop out of existence independently of observers, it necessarily wouldn't be objective? Also, what would it be if it's not objective? It wouldn't be subjective, would it? Because it's not something that's mental or dependent on observers in any way. What word would you use for that category?

Would you say that the IEP says that necessarily, people having subjective states are objective?

and if something were to pop out of existence independently of observers, it necessarily wouldn't be objective? Also, what would it be if it's not objective? — Terrapin Station

I guess some ideas are just too ridiculous to entertain, but yes, if you claim that objects objectively pop in and out of existence "independently of observers", then you are making an objective claim about reality.

But I'm not sure that is what you mean.

I don't think that any ideas are too ridiculous to entertain in a philosophical context. And thought experiments aren't typically very "realistic" in terms of what we expect to be likely metaphysically. That's not the point of them.

Re "independently of observers," yes, that's exactly what I mean--I specified that as plainly as I could.

Again, it's not that "continues to exist when we're not looking at it" isn't what realists or objectivists on x typically believe to be the case with x. It's just that "continues to exist when we're not looking at it" isn't a necessary property of x for it to qualify as real or objective. The only necessary property is that x obtains independently of us, that it's not a mental phenomenon, but a phenomenon that obtains "outside" of minds (with "outside" being a literal locational term in my view as an identity theory physicalist).

Re "independently of observers," yes, that's exactly what I mean--I specified that as plainly as I could. — Terrapin Station

If the popping in and out of existence is independent of observation, then why don't we see it?

In the logically possible scenario I presented, it coincidentally occurred when observation stopped. There was nothing causal about it--as I stipulated that there was no causal connection, it was just a coincidence on that occasion.

Well, that can be ruled out as it conflicts with our knowledge of reality. Plus, your "coincidental" popping in and out of reality is non-explanatory, so can't qualify as a theory of reality.

Also, it can't be a metaphysical theory, because it is a theory of how reality behaves.

Well, that can be ruled out as it conflicts with our knowledge of reality. — tom

It's a thought experiment about something that's logically possible. Logical possibility is different than metaphysical possibility, if you want to argue that it's not metaphysically possible. Of course, metaphysical possibilty is also different than "consistent with our knowledge of reality."

I wasn't presenting any sort of theory. It's a thought experiment that clarifies a conceptual cleavage.

I highly doubt that intrapersona is claiming that "[existence] is only ever an inference at best". Rather it seems that he's saying "[the existence of things not being seen or thought about] is only ever an inference at best". This would be consistent with the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy's definition of "objective reality" as "anything that exists as it is independent of any conscious awareness of it (via perception, thought, etc.)." — Michael

If there isn't an objective reality then there isn't any conscious awareness of it. That has been my point the whole time. When you declare that there isn't any objective reality then there cannot be any awareness of it. If you still make the claim that there is an awareness - then what is it aware of? Awareness is about things - like an objective world. If there is no awareness - then there is no aboutness - and that isn't how it seems to me.

You didn't seem to have an argument against you being text on a screen. Are you acknowledging that you aren't a mind - but are simply text on a screen? Because there isn't anything more to you than being text on a screen - then I know you completely (there is nothing I don't know about you) - as all you are is text on a screen.

If there isn't an objective reality then there isn't any conscious awareness of it. That has been my point the whole time. When you declare that there isn't any objective reality then there cannot be any awareness of it. If you still make the claim that there is an awareness - then what is it aware of? Awareness is about things - like an objective world. If there is no awareness - then there is no aboutness - and that isn't how it seems to me. — Harry Hindu

Of course there wouldn't be an awareness of an objective reality. There'd just be an awareness of a subjective reality. The things I'm aware of are things that only exist whilst I'm aware of them rather than things that exist even when I'm not aware of them. Objectivity is not required for intentionality.

You didn't seem to have an argument against you being text on a screen. Are you acknowledging that you aren't a mind - but are simply text on a screen? Because there isn't anything more to you than being text on a screen - then I know you completely (there is nothing I don't know about you) - as all you are is text on a screen.

I don't understand the relevance of this.

, you seem to only use objective (and "real" in other instances) as referring to something existing when it's not being observed (rather than noting that in your view, that's a necessary upshot of objective things, that they also continue to exist when they're not being observed).

So let's take for a moment a mind-brain physicalist/identity theory view where one believes that the mental is simply identical to specific brain states of specific individuals (and where one also believes that there are bodies, containing brains, situated in a world that contains a lot of other things, too). Under that view, there are things like toasters that can be observed, where the toaster isn't itself a brain in someone's body "acting" in a mental way.

However, if you use "objective" (and "real") to only refer to something existing when it's not being observed, then in a scenario where someone is observing a toaster, where the toaster isn't a brain "acting" in a mental way, then the toaster isn't objective or real until one stops observing it and it continues to exist.

If we want to make a distinction between (1) the toaster as something that exists in a different location than the persons brain "acting" in a mental way, and (2) the toaster-perception as it is in the brain "acting" in a mental way, what terms would you use for that distinction?

Michael, you seem to only use objective (and "real" in other instances) as referring to something existing when it's not being observed (rather than noting that in your view, that's a necessary upshot of ojective things, that they also continue to exist when they're not being observed). — Terrapin Station

I'm not using it in that way.

Of course there wouldn't be an awareness of an objective reality. There'd just be an awareness of a subjective reality. The things I'm aware of are things that only exist whilst I'm aware of them rather than things that exist even when I'm not aware of them. Objectivity is not logically necessary. — Michael

But that's not what awareness seems to me. Awareness seems to be the entire reality. Why say that "what exists in subjective reality I'm aware of"? If to say that what I'm aware of and what exists is the same thing is to redefine awareness as reality, and then there is no awareness - just a reality. What is the meaning of "I" in "I am aware"? Where and what is the "I"? Is it also the same as the awareness/reality? If so, then I guess we can just dispense with both terms, "awareness" and "I" and just use "reality". Do you see where I'm going with this? Idealism ends up redefining words out of existence, or into meaninglessness.

You didn't seem to have an argument against you being text on a screen. Are you acknowledging that you aren't a mind - but are simply text on a screen? Because there isn't anything more to you than being text on a screen - then I know you completely (there is nothing I don't know about you) - as all you are is text on a screen. — Harry Hindu

I don't understand the relevance of this. — Michael

How do you reconcile the fact that you have a mind yet this isn't a fact from my perspective. Your mind doesn't exist from my perspective - only text on a screen. Your mind exists independently of my subjective experience of it, or you don't have a mind and are simply text on a screen.

I'm not using it in that way. — Michael

It just seemed like it to me because you keep stressing that and only that.

So is something objective to you under the view I gave by virtue of it being located outside of a brain-acting-in-a-mental way?

Why say that "what exists in subjective reality I'm aware of"? If to say that what I'm aware of and what exists is the same thing is to redefine awareness as reality, and then there is no awareness - just a reality. — Harry Hindu

I've already gone over this. It doesn't redefine awareness as reality. It simply restricts reality to awareness. That's not the same thing. If I restrict "intelligent species" to humanity (i.e. claim that humanity is the only intelligent species) I'm not redefining "humanity" as "intelligent species".

And besides, if awareness is defined as reality and if there is a reality then ipso facto there is awareness, and so what you say above is a contradiction. Just as if I defined a bachelor as an unmarried man and if there is an unmarried man then there is a bachelor.

How do you reconcile the fact that you have a mind yet this isn't a fact from my perspective. Your mind doesn't exist from my perspective - only text on a screen. Your mind exists independently of my subjective experience of it, or you don't have a mind and are simply text on a screen. — Harry Hindu

Firstly, I'm not arguing for or against solipsism, hence why I don't think this relevant. What I'm arguing is that idealism doesn't define subjectivity out of existence, as you claim.

Furthermore, the very question is confused. If I were arguing for solipsism then I wouldn't consider your perspective at all. I'd only consider my perspective. And from my perspective I'm not just words on a screen. You, however, would just be words on a screen to me.

Also, not all idealists are solipsists. One can claim that nothing exists that isn't being aware of without claiming that nothing exists that I'm not aware of. So other minds exist, but not other things.

But that's not what awareness seems to me. Awareness seems to be the entire reality. Why say that "what exists in subjective reality I'm aware of"? If to say that what I'm aware of and what exists is the same thing is to redefine awareness as reality, and then there is no awareness - just a reality. What is the meaning of "I" in "I am aware"? Where and what is the "I"? Is it also the same as the awareness/reality? If so, then I guess we can just dispense with both terms, "awareness" and "I" and just use "reality". Do you see where I'm going with this? Idealism ends up redefining words out of existence, or into meaninglessness. — Harry Hindu

It seems like you're getting at something that I argue, but I instead stress that representationalist-oriented idealism can't get at a support for itself. That is, it can't get at saying that something like the phenomenal data of a toaster is a mental event in the first place. In order to make that claim, it has to assume realism somewhere in the argument--it needs to assume realism to make a mental vs other stuff cleavage in the first place. Otherwise it's just the phenomenon of a toaster, without any further ontological categorization attached. There would be nothing to make it distinctly mental versus other possibilities.

Another way of saying this is simply that the only way that the ideal/mental category makes any sense in the first place is if we have something to distinguish it from. But under idealism, there's nothing to distinguish it from, since we can't (at least epistemically, or by acquaintance) know anything but the ideal.

Another way of saying this is simply that the only way that the ideal/mental category makes any sense in the first place is if we have something to distinguish it from. But under idealism, there's nothing to distinguish it from, since we can't (at least epistemically, or by acquaintance) know anything but the ideal. — Terrapin Station

There can be a conceptual distinction even if the concept is of a thing that isn't real. We can conceptually distinguish between the physical and the magical even though the magical isn't real. And so we can conceptually distinguish between the subjective and the objective even if the objective isn't real.

I'm skeptical that you could make any sense of an objective/real category if you're positing that we can only know (either epistemically or by acquaintance) the ideal. Although maybe I should stick to noting that it can't be supported without assuming realism somewhere.

But for example as a physicalist, I believe that the very idea of nonphysical existents is incoherent. No one is able to demonstrate that they can make any conceptual sense of it. It seems like that should be the case for (at least a) representationalist-oriented idealist, too, with respect to objective/real things.

I'm trying to imagine myself as an idealist for a moment:

I believe that the occurrence of a toaster is just a mental phenomenon (assuming that makes sense for a moment), and that that's all that one can know (again either epistemically or via acquaintaince).

To conceptualize objective/real things, I have to try to imagine a view like the one I outlined earlier (a la physicalists beiieving things about brains in bodies and so on). But I believe that we couldn't know such a thing either epistemically or via acquaintance. I believe that "brains in bodies situated in the world" etc. can only be a mental phenomenon. So how could I make sense out of the idea of it NOT being a mental phenomenon somehow? It seems like I'd have to be able to at least imagine what it would be like via acquaintance, but I don't believe that we can know such a thing.

However, if we can't make sense of the idea of knowing objective or real things, then the phenomenon of a toaster is just the phenomenon of a toaster. It's different than the phenomenon of something like thinking "I'm seeing a toaster" or imagining a toaster, etc., and then it's unclear just what I'm saying about it when I say that the phenomenon of a toaster is mental (which dissolves my earlier assumption that it makes sense to say that under my imagined idealism).

But for example as a physicalist, I believe that the very idea of nonphysical existents is incoherent. — Terrapin Station

Yet the idea of physical existents is coherent?

So it seems to me that you're being inconsistent here. If "the only way that the ideal/mental category makes any sense in the first place is if we have something to distinguish it from" then the only way that the physical category makes any sense in the first place is if we have something to distinguish it from.

If you want to argue that everything that exists is physical and that nonphysical existence is incoherent then how can you make the above argument against someone who wants to argue that everything that exists is mental and that nonmental existence is incoherent (or just never applicable)? Seems hypocritical.

The difference is that my physicalism only arises because people claim dualism etc., where they're relying on a putative distinction that's incoherent.

You could say that one's idealism only arises because people claim objectivism/realism, etc., where they're relying on a putative distinction that the idealist believes is incoherent, but then that would undermine the idea of being able to make sense of the distinction in the first place.

The difference is that my physicalism only arises because people claim dualism etc., where they're relying on a putative distinction that's incoherent.

You could say that one's idealism only arises because people claim objectivism/realism, etc., where they're relying on a putative distinction that the idealist believes is incoherent, but then that would undermine the idea of being able to make sense of the distinction in the first place. — Terrapin Station

I fail to see why "but then that would undermine the idea of being able to make sense of the distinction in the first place" applies to the idealist but not to the physicalist.

If the physicalist can claim that all is X and that not-X is incoherent then the idealist can claim that all is Y and that not-Y is incoherent (or, if they allow for the coherency of not-Y, just that nothing is actually not-Y).

I fail to see why "but then that would undermine the idea of being able to make sense of the distinction in the first place" applies to the idealist but not to the physicalist. — Michael

But I specified that I can't make sense of the distinction of physical/nonphysical. That's because the very notion of "nonphysical" is incoherent.

If the physicalist can claim that all is X and that not-X is incoherent then the idealist can claim that all is Y and that not-Y is incoherent — Michael

I just said this, and thus it undermines the idea of being able to make a coherent distinction.

if they allow for the coherency of not-Y — Michael

Which I challenged the idea of above.

Why say that "what exists in subjective reality I'm aware of"? If to say that what I'm aware of and what exists is the same thing is to redefine awareness as reality, and then there is no awareness - just a reality. — Harry Hindu


I've already gone over this. It doesn't redefine awareness as reality. It simply restricts reality to awareness. That's not the same thing. If I restrict "intelligent species" to humanity (i.e. claim that humanity is the only intelligent species) I'm not redefining "humanity" as "intelligent species".

And besides, if awareness is defined as reality and if there is a reality then ipso facto there is awareness, and so what you say above is a contradiction. Just as if I defined a bachelor as an unmarried man and if there is an unmarried man then there is a bachelor. — Michael

Of course it's the same thing. If humans were the only intelligent species, then by using the term, "intelligent species" I'm automatically referring to humans because they are the only species that is intelligent. They would be the same thing. You don't seem to understand the concept of redundancy.

How do you reconcile the fact that you have a mind yet this isn't a fact from my perspective. Your mind doesn't exist from my perspective - only text on a screen. Your mind exists independently of my subjective experience of it, or you don't have a mind and are simply text on a screen. — Harry Hindu

Firstly, I'm not arguing for or against solipsism, hence why I don't think this relevant. What I'm arguing is that idealism doesn't define subjectivity out of existence, as you claim.

Furthermore, the very question is confused. If I were arguing for solipsism then I wouldn't consider your perspective at all. I'd only consider my perspective. And from my perspective I'm not just words on a screen. You, however, would just be words on a screen to me.

Also, not all idealists are solipsists. One can claim that nothing exists that isn't being aware of without claiming that nothing exists that I'm not aware of. So other minds exist, but not other things. — Michael

Well, that is my point. Idealism logically devolves into solipsism. Once you question the external aspect of your experience as the cause of your internal experience, then you question the existence of all external, un-experienced things, which included other minds. Once you take that step of questioning the existence of just one external thing, you end up questioning all of it, or else you have to come up with a really good explanation as to how you know other minds exist but you know that apples and tables and cars don't exist outside of your experience of them. So you are arguing for solipsism the moment you question the external reality of anything.

If solipsism, then you are actually arguing with yourself.

Of course it's the same thing. If humans were the only intelligent species, then by using the term, "intelligent species" I'm automatically referring to humans because they are the only species that is intelligent. They would be the same thing. You don't seem to understand the concept of redundancy. — Harry Hindu

That they refer to the same thing is not that they mean the same thing. And that "intelligent species" refers only to humans doesn't mean that there are no humans. So to say that idealism redefines awareness as reality or that if "reality" refers to awareness then there is no awareness is simply false.

Well, that is my point. Idealism logically devolves into solipsism.

You can't go from "only mental phenomena exists" to "only my mental phenomena exists". It simply doesn't follow.

Once you question the external aspect of your experience as the cause of your internal experience, then you question the existence of all external, un-experienced things, which included other minds. Once you take that step of questioning the existence of just one external thing, you end up questioning all of it, or else you have to come up with a really good explanation as to how you know other minds exist but you know that apples and tables and cars don't exist outside of your experience of them.

Sure, but non-solipsist idealists will argue that there are good reasons to believe that other minds exist but not non-mental things. As above, the non-existence of non-mental things does not entail the non-existence of other minds, and so such reasons are not necessarily ruled out.

So you are arguing for solipsism the moment you question the external reality of anything.

Again, that's simply false. "I question the existence of non-mental things" doesn't mean "only my mind exists", and neither does the latter follow from the former.