You said "Naturalistic views of the world haven't had the world as a place with anything like Laplacean determinism for over 100 years now," and when I pointed out that's not true, you shifted to saying something like "Naturalistic views of the world shouldn't haven't had the world as a place with anything like Laplacean determinism for over 100 years now, based on the results from modern physics." — Arkady

If you claimed it's not true, you're wrong.

I wasn't making a claim about every single person and however they self-identify.

I didn't say anything even remotely resembling the second sentence you put into quotation marks.

So, you are taking a position on the question of determinism, and insisting that the results of science underwrite your views. — Arkady

That's false as well. I was making a claim about the widespread consensus in the sciences. Disagreeing with that would only reflect ignorance of what most scientists have been saying for over 100 years now.

As I just wrote and you seemed to ignore:"The point, by the way, isn't that one view or another is right or wrong."

So, Laplacean determinism isn't wrong? Or it's just not part of your increasingly elusive point?

So, Laplacean determinism isn't wrong? — Arkady

It is per the widespread consensus in the sciences for well over a century. Hence, it's ridiculous to wonder how someone could be a naturalist and reject determinism.

"Determinism is hardly a moribund view in philosophy" is actually false, too, by the way, but I didn't want to pick on everything.

It is per the widespread consensus in the sciences for well over a century. — Terrapin Station

So, the rightness or wrongness does seem to be rather salient, wouldn't you say?

Nope. Soft determinism re: free will is one such thesis.

So, the rightness or wrongness does seem to be rather salient, wouldn't you say? — Arkady

Not at all. What I was commenting on was that it's ridiculous to wonder how someone could be a naturalist and not a determinist. That shouldn't be a mystery to you unless you're completely unfamiliar with recent science. That you might think the consensus view is wrong is irrelevant to understanding how the two can coincide.

Nope. Soft determinism is one such thesis. — Arkady

Not many philosophers are determinists.

I'm not sure what this is based on. Most are compatibilists, which at least allows for determinism.

Look at it this way: In my opinion, beliefs in a "multiverse" are ridiculous.

But I'd never say that I can't understand how belief in a multiverse could be consistent with being a physicist. I very well understand how beliefs in a multiverse can and often do coincide with being a physicist. I just think that the beliefs are very misconceived.

I'm not sure what this is based on. Most are compatibilists, which at least allows for determinism. — Arkady

I don't know at all that "most are compatibilists" is true. What survey data are you basing that on?

At any rate, compatibilists aren't determinists. They're compatibilists.

You might as well say that compatibilists go with the freedom side of the freedom vs determinism debate.

But that wouldn't be right, either. They're compatibilists. Saying that they're determinists misses the whole point. (unless you're claiming that they don't really buy the freedom side . . . personally I don't think that compatibilism can be made coherent, but that's another discussion)

This survey data. https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl

I wouldn't say that "compatibilists go with the freedom side of the freedom vs determinism debate" because they don't see freedom as being opposed to determinism.

Yes, indeterminateness or randomness, as opposed to determinism.

I think it's worth bringing up, because we should know what we're even talking about if we're formulating positions featuring the term, no?

It's kind of hard to debate one side or the other with respect to a term like that if we don't even know what we're referring to. — Terrapin Station

Well, I know perfectly well what freedom of will is as a psychological fact. What I don't know is how to go from the experience of being a free actor to ontological freedom. I can make sense of the words "ontological indeterminateness", and I can see why it seems relevant to the question "is freedom of will an illusion". But I cannot see how, exactly, the connection between an ontologically indeterminate reality and the experience of a free will works.

I wouldn't say that "compatibilists go with the freedom side of the freedom vs determinism debate" because they don't see freedom as being opposed to determinism. — Arkady

So in your understanding of the debate, what are we debating? You're arguing that everyone is really a compatibilist and there is no debate?

No: my position remains, as it was when we started this exchange many posts ago, that determinism is not a moribund thesis in philosophy. You essentially said that modern science has somehow disproved determinism, and I'm saying that there are some who disagree with that interpretation of the science.

Basically the same question I asked above--what do you think the issue is, then, if we parse the "free" part of "free will" as simply the psychological phenomenon?

You essentially said that modern science has somehow disproved determinism, — Arkady

C'mon, man. Read what I said instead of putting words in my mouth. if you were to ask me if science proves anything, I'd emphatically say "No."

I like, by the way, in post after post you're simply ignoring that the point is that it's ridiculous for you to wonder how someone could be a naturalist and not buy determinism.

if you were to ask me if science proves anything, I'd emphatically say "No." — Terrapin Station

Fair enough, then.

Again, the point wasn't that one position or another is correct. It's that it's ridiculous to wonder how someone could be a naturalist (or a physicalist, etc.) and not buy determinism.

Basically the same question I asked above--what do you think the issue is, then, if we parse the "free" part of "free will" as simply the psychological phenomenon? — Terrapin Station

The issue is that making the question of the ontological reality of free will one of determinism vs. Indeterminism seems ill conceived to me. I am a compatibilist in the sense that I don't think indeterminism is a necessary basis for freedom of will.

I'm not asking your opinion. I'm asking what it is that you think that people are doing in the debate, from their perspective? (So an answer would attempt to accurately describe what they're doing from their perspective, it wouldn't be giving your approval or disapproval of what they're doing) No one is wondering whether there's the psychological phenomenon of making choices, decisions, etc.

This still really, really sounds like you are appealing to the results of modern science to underwrite one particular view of the world (i.e. indeterminism), though you insist otherwise.

This still really, really sounds like you are appealing to the results of modern science to underwrite one particular view of the world (i.e. indeterminism), though you insist otherwise. — Arkady

It's about understanding why someone would have the views they have.

I'm not asking your opinion. I'm asking what it is that you think that people are doing in the debate, from their perspective? No one is wondering whether there's the psychological phenomenon of making choices, decisions, etc. — Terrapin Station

I think they're trying to figure out whether freedom of will is an illusion, that really they could not have choosen any other option.

Confusion arises with such when we consider the eyes, and they have automatic processes that mirror our own input.

You'll look forward, and all the time you're looking forward your eyes are taking in what is in the foreground, automatically, and there is rapid eye movement, as what we experience is given to us rather than us taking it.

However, the observer is always taking experience from the mind, it is not solipsism.

Can anyone here present a theory of causation that allows for libertarian free will? — Walter Pound

Because the notion of free will is metaphysical, the derivation of its origin should be as well.

Enter the notion of freedom in the metaphysical sense.

If there is a casualty that spontaneously instantiates a series of events, therefore not under the constraints of time necessary for antecedent cause, then there exists the notion of an uncaused cause, which disinterests will from determinism. If it is conceivable that the natural constraints of time relative to cause and effect can be replaced with the concept of spontaneity, then it follows the sequence of willful volitions is possible without a determistic naturalism.

All that’s required is the recognition that humans actually do act without thinking, and without willing themselves to do so. If acting without thinking is acting spontaneously, then the notion of spontaneity as a uncaused cause is justified, and the assignment of the denomination “freedom” does nothing to contradict the notion itself.

From what you write, it sounds too close to indeterminacy. Can you explain what you mean again?

I think they're trying to figure out whether freedom of will is an illusion, that really they could not have choosen any other option. — Echarmion

Right. But, re your opinion, so you just don't feel that that issue is worth bothering with?