I don't think you are addressing the same issue as I was. Imagine you wanted to create a new private language; how would you specify what the words of your new language refer to? Perhaps with common nouns you could draw pictures, but what about verbs, definite and indefinite articles, pronouns, adjectives, adverbs and so on? And to make it even more difficult, you would need to have new words for each of those linguistic categories as well!

I think if you already knew a language, say English, then you would simply translate all your terms into English, which would mean that your new language, insofar as it was intelligible to you, would also potentially be intelligible to other English speakers, and hence not truly "private" in the strong sense I am guessing @Banno is concerned with.

On the Nietzsche side of your question, following rules "only understood by oneself" relates to the differing opinions about his notion of the personal as a result of "perspective."

Some have objected to his use of the term perspective because his critique of the objective should not permit him to relate different points of view in a shared space. Others emphasize that the drives competing for dominance exist and Nietzsche was trying to be an accurate reporter of what those things are.

Being a philologist, Nietzsche's use of terms was not personal but fraught with double and triple meanings. He constantly demanded that his readers know as much as he did. His audacity to say what was most important to the philosophers he praised and criticized is a testimony to a non private language.

There are remarks made by Nietzsche that point out that rules are often used to justify decisions after they are made. That is a lot like observations made by La Rochefoucauld regarding a person always needing to appear righteous to oneself and others.

Maybe Nietzsche is not just one thing.

We choose, and choose agin and again. If that choice follows a pattern, it follows a rule. But then,if the choice follows a rule, is it free? — Banno

This is not a case of that person following a rule though, it is a case of the person's choices following a rule. So you cannot proceed from this premise, that the person's choices follow a rule, to make any conclusion about whether or not that person is free. That is why it is necessary to determine what it means for a person to follow a rule, before we can make any conclusions about the person's freedom. The person might have freely chosen to follow a rule in making those choices.

A rule that no one else could understand, or merely a rule that no one else does understand because they have not been told about it. — Janus

A rule that cannot be stated. I really have no idea how such a thing could be made coherent. SO I guess we can leave that aside.

A rule that might be stated, but hasn't been.

Suppose I decide that I will tailgate any car such that the numbers on its plate add to a prime.

TO someone observing, it might seem that I am tailgating vehicles at random; and hence not following any rule.

But if they were to look closer, it might turn out that those drivers I tailgated just happened to have Slavic ancestry.

So was the rule I followed that their number plates added to a prime, or that their ancestry was Slav?

OK. But is "what feels right" a rule?

A rule that might be stated, but hasn't been. — Banno

That's not what the private language argument is about though. It's about a language that can't be translated.

And though it be articulatable we can have no behavioristic criteria for determining if an act is moral, though we can check if it follows the rule. — Moliere

So an act's being moral is hidden, private - and hence irrelevant. Between you and your maker, I suppose.

The private rule is that one ought act with moral intent. But could you even know if you had done so? Perhaps your memory is mistaken, and you did not intend to act morally, at the time, even though it now appears to you that your intent was moral.

This happens. We justify our actions post hoc.

And if this were so, we could never know if our actions were moral.

So was the rule I followed that their number plates added to a prime, or that their ancestry was Slav? — Banno

You can only follow a rule that involves criteria of which you were aware at the time of applying the rule I would say. If you knew that the numbers on the plate added to a prime, and you acted accordingly then that was the rule you were following. You didn't formulate a rule with Slav ancestry as criterion, and you didn't know the drivers were of Slav ancestry, so.....it could not have been the rule you were following.

OK, so suppose I did know they were Slav.
Which rule was I following?

I don’t understand the connection between Nietzsche’s morality and Wittgenstein’s private language. Seems like some strange equivocation.

Always get rid of the idea of the private object in this way: assume that it constantly changes but you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you

PI p.207e


So how can morality be a private object?

When did Nietzsche describe his morality as being “private” (as Wittgenstein meant by the term)? As I understand him he just talked about the Übermensch deciding for himself what to value and how to behave, as opposed to adopting “herd” morality. But this personal morality isn’t anything like a private language, hence my charge of equivocation.

Does the Übermensch follow rules?

What I was addressing was whether a private language is possible or not (and per the manner in which the "private language argument" is usually construed). The way the argument is usually construed, the claim is that a private language isn't possible. I'm challenging that, under some of the common assumptions (under some uncommon views, such as my views about language, meaning, etc., we might say that all language is private in some regards).

Always get rid of the idea of the private object in this way: assume that it constantly changes but you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you


PI p.207e


So how can morality be a private object? — Banno

The same goes for assuming it's public. Assume the object constantly changes, but everyone's memory constantly deceives them.

Both criticisms are of course making the additional, curious, assumption that languages can't obtain if what they refer to constantly changes, where the users of the language aren't aware of this.

So was the rule I followed that their number plates added to a prime, or that their ancestry was Slav? — Banno

Are we pretending to be behaviorists for some reason? (So that we're pretending that the person didn't have something in mind?)

So an act's being moral is hidden, private - and hence irrelevant. Between you and your maker, I suppose. — Banno

I don't think I'd go so far as to say that its being hidden makes intent irrelevant. Though between you and your maker I believe is the inspiration behind such thinking, there is also an aspect to this which makes one question themselves and ask what it is they are really acting from. Did I do this out of love for someone, or did I do it out of respect for some rule, or did I do it because I thought it might benefit me? These aren't all necessarily exclusive of one another, but the intent behind an act is important to deciding if I'm coming from the right place or not -- and thus whether or not I should continue acting in such-and-such a manner (if I happen to believe that such-and-such is subject to moral deliberation, at least)

The private rule is that one ought act with moral intent. But could you even know if you had done so? Perhaps your memory is mistaken, and you did not intend to act morally, at the time, even though it now appears to you that your intent was moral.

This happens. We justify our actions post hoc.

And if this were so, we could never know if our actions were moral.

This line of thinking made me think in three different directions.

In one direction I would say that self-knowledge is in some respect different from knowledge of the world. I am not an object in the world, after all, and though I can certainly be wrong about myself -- and I agree with you that we do come up with post hoc justifications all the time -- the same sort of scenario can be brought up with respect to knowledge of the world. Perhaps we can have self-knowledge, but just as with knowledge of the world, that knowledge lacks certainty or has certainty coming in degrees or in different respects.

In the other direction my thought is that sometimes we do know others very well -- sometimes so well that we know others, at least in certain respects, better than they know themselves. Think of the knowledge a parent has of a child. The relationship is so intimate and long-term that the parent comes to know the child's intents. They can, of course, be wrong about this. And I'd say that the way they come to know these things differs from the way we come to know about ourselves. But the upshot here is that this sort of knowledge is not a knowledge of rules, but of intents and desires.

And, lastly, another line of thought was that perhaps we do not know our actions are moral after all -- at least in a theoretical sense. In a practical sense we can know, and this sort of knowledge is the knowledge of doing. But it's not the same as both being righteous and knowing one is righteous -- so it may actually be appropriate to say we never know that our actions are moral, though we do ponder it, interrogate ourselves, think about our intents, and do the best we can.



I recognize that all three of these thoughts are not necessarily compatible. I just shared them all because I couldn't really decide which course of thought was best.

Sometimes it's just fun to see how ideas do or do not mesh -- even if said ideas may differ a little from how various people interpret them in an exegetical sense.

The problem of a language that is private is that it cannot convey meaning. There must be some logic or grammar for the usage of words. Language is a shared, public activity. It would be as if we were to play a game but only I knew the rules of the game. How could we play? It is possible, however, for me to make up a game that only I play with rules that only I know, but if I wanted anyone else to play then the rules cannot remain private.

It is possible for Nietzsche’s public conduct to be guided by private rules, but I think that the error has already been made if one thinks that for Nietzsche what is at issue is rules of conduct. What we should focus on instead is values, and this in terms of self-overcoming, the will to power, and the creation of creators.

It is possible for Nietzsche’s public conduct to be guided by private rules — Fooloso4

The issue is that these "private" rules aren't private in the sense that Wittgenstein meant by the word. A private language for Wittgenstein is a language that nobody else can understand, whereas anyone can learn what it is the Übermensch values and check for consistency in his behaviour.

Nietzsche's view is just that the Übermensch can look at some "herd" morality like Christianity, disagree with their claim that "the meek shall inherit the Earth", and instead decide to value strength.

This "transvaluation of values" just doesn't seem to have anything to do with a private language, and so this discussion seems confused from the start. You might as well try to argue that, according to Wittgenstein, I can't have a private life. I can – and do; it's just that what "private" means in this context isn't what it means in a Wittgensteinian context.

:up:

Sure. I think we can all acknowledge that the thinkers are different.

But there is some resonance between these ideas too.

For one, freedom -- under a certain conception of freedom we do not follow rules. So by describing actions as being not-articulatable we could be saying that the ethical is that place in life where language can no longer operate -- that its in the showing, and not the saying, where our actions are free insofar that they do not follow a rule.

For two, one way of reading Wittgenstein is to focus on his interest in ethics -- compare his notion that ethics and aesthetics are one to Nietzsche, or that goodness is not found in the world to Nietzsche. You could almost say that Wittgenstein is struggling with the same problems of value that Nietzsche is, though they do go different ways with it of course.

And then there's rule-following as a traditional way of looking at ethics, of which Wittgenstein certainly has something to say and Nietzsche has something to say about rules.

They aren't talking about the exact same thing. But there's some interesting parallels to be drawn.

EDIT: It just occurred to me to mention this so it's in an edit -- but wasn't Wittgenstein also influenced by his readings of Schopenhauer?

Thanks for this articulation of the issues.

Maybe Nietzsche is not just one thing. — Valentinus

Behaving in a systematic, rule-guided way does not appear to be a characteristic he admired. Being admirable, was. Thanks for your contribution.

Nietzsche's view is just that the Übermensch can look at some "herd" morality like Christianity, disagree with their claim that "the meek shall inherit the Earth", and instead decide to value strength. — Michael

Just. Doesn't the Übermensch reject any rule-following in order to achieve greatness? And isn't the will to power more than mere strength? If the Übermensch decides that apple trees are important, and spends his life planting apple seeds with no regard to others, he expresses the will to power as well as any monarch.

The problem of a language that is private is that it cannot convey meaning. — Fooloso4

Isn't it more that is can't be useful?

whereas anyone can learn what it is the Übermensch values and check for consistency in his behaviour. — Michael

But any behaviour can be made to match any rule. Just play with the constraints.

Further, the Übermensch need not be consistent.

Doesn't the Übermensch reject any rule-following in order to achieve greatness? And isn't the will to power more than mere strength? If the Übermensch decides that apple trees are important, and spends his life planting apple seeds with no regard to others, he expresses the will to power as well as any monarch. — Banno

Which has nothing to do with Wittgenstein’s private language argument. Wittgenstein argues that there cannot be a language that only one person can understand and Nietzsche argues that we should decide for ourselves what to value and how to behave. There’s no connection and so no issue of incompatibility.

This seems to steer very close to a purely semantic discussion. Are purely private moral rules actually moral, or rules? Depends on your definitions. — Echarmion

That's philosophy.

Which has nothing to do with Wittgenstein’s private language argument. — Michael

Your world is too neat.

Isn't it more that is can't be useful? — Banno

Isn't the reason it would not be useful because it would not convey meaning?

The problem of a language that is private is that it cannot convey meaning.
— Fooloso4

Isn't it more that is can't be useful? — Banno

I think Witt's point was that the concept of a private language doesn't make any sense. So it wouldn't be useful because it can't exist.

I don't Nietzsche is your boy. He knew people who live by master morality become assholes who exploit others and fill the world with sorrow. Whatever the ubermensch is, it's not that. I think you probably want Trotsky.

Trotsky (may he rot in hell) was what you think Nietzsche advocated. He had no morality. He believed morality is for the little people. He was a big person who can intentionally start famines and then send the army into the countryside to kill peasants and take the little bit of food they hid away.

Do you think he had a private language?