Just seeing how people think. No pressure, no biggie.

What is color?

Who is the one being unreasonable? — Metaphysician Undercover

Ooh, that's a toughie. You. Your fake conversation between us misrepresents what I'd say. Straight away, I wouldn't even say, "That rock has a measurement". I would say something along the lines of what I have been saying throughout the discussion, not what you've been so desperately trying to get me to say, or what you've simply been imagining me to say. I would say that the rock is of a certain length, and that that length could be 10cm, but that without measuring it, we won't know whether it's 10cm, even if it is.

There's nothing unreasonable about that. There's nothing unreasonable about such an unknown truth. You either don't see this or you just can't bear to accept it.

Correct, but "length" is a measurement, and a thing only has a measurement if it's been measured. To say that it has a measurement without having been measured is contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not correct. A thing has length if it is measurable, it is measurable if it has length. It need not be measured to have length, In fact it must have length (i.e. be measurable) in order to be measured.

This is not correct. A thing has length if it is measurable, it is measurable if it has length. It need not be measured to have length. In fact it must have length (i.e. be measurable) in order to be measured. — Janus

Thank God. Perhaps hearing it from someone else will help.

Thank God. Perhaps hearing it from someone else will help. — S

I wouldn't hold my breath when it comes to MU. :grin:

What is color? — Mww

Colour is visible light. Different colours are different ranges of wavelengths.

I feel like I must be a little mad to keep this up for so long. Maybe for even trying to begin with, knowing what it would be like.

Oh well. Fuck it. Some of it has been hilarious, like missing the point about missing the point. That's still cracking me up now. :lol:

Do you agree that this specific rock would exist at some times after all the people are dead, and at other times after all the people are dead, it would not exist? So, after all the people are dead, if it is to be either true or false that the specific rock exists "an hour" after all the people are dead, then some one must interpret, "an hour", and measure "an hour" after all the people are dead. Therefore it is a nonsensical question, because the rock exists at sometimes and other times it does not exist, and there is no one to interpret "an hour", and to measure "an hour", to see how this relates to the existence of the rock. The rock may or may not exist "an hour" after all the people are dead, and it is meaningless nonsense to ask such a question. To presuppose that the question may be answered is to presuppose something impossible, something contradictory, that "an hour" can be interpreted and measured when there is no one to interpret and measure. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is insane. It serves only as an example of very bad logic: a test for someone to analyse, identify the errors, and write up an explanation. Besides that, it is of no value.

Thanks for all of these tests, I suppose. I remain as sharp as ever.

So would a realist say some EMR has the property of 450nm, along with the property of 630THz, and the property “blue”?

Ooh, that's a toughie. You. Your fake conversation between us misrepresents what I'd say. Straight away, I wouldn't even say, "That rock has a measurement". I would say something along the lines of what I have been saying throughout the discussion, not what you've been so desperately trying to get me to say, or what you've simply been imagining me to say. I would say that the rock is of a certain length, and that that length could be 10cm, but that without measuring it, we won't know whether it's 10cm, even if it is. — S

The rock is not "of a certain length" until the length has been ascertained. To say that it is, is contradiction plain and simple. If you really believe that it is "of a certain length", then tell me who is certain of the length? If there is no one who is certain of the length, then clearly the rock cannot be a certain length. What are you supposing here, that the rock is certain of its own length? If not, how is the length of the rock certain?

This is not correct. A thing has length if it is measurable, it is measurable if it has length. It need not be measured to have length, In fact it must have length (i.e. be measurable) in order to be measured. — Janus

No, the length is the measurement. The object is measured, and the measurement is the length, 10cm, or whatever. Whether or not an object is measurable is irrelevant to its actual length. What is relevant to its length is actual measurement. You are simply making stuff up. Welcome to the S group, fabricators of fictitious fantasies.

This is insane. It serves only as an example of very bad logic: a test for someone to analyse, identify the errors, and write up an explanation. Besides that, it is of no value.

Thanks for all of these tests, I suppose. I remain as sharp as ever. — S

It's interesting, and very telling how you can go on and on about how such and such is bad logic, but you can never point out what is wrong with the logic. I'll tell you what's wrong with the logic. You do not like the conclusion therefore it must be bad logic. Things which you do not like are "bad".

No, the length is the measurement. The object is measured, and the measurement is the length, 10cm, or whatever. Whether or not an object is measurable is irrelevant to its actual length. What is relevant to its length is actual measurement. You are simply making stuff up. Welcome to the S group, fabricators of fictitious fantasies. — Metaphysician Undercover

If what you claim were true, then we could not be wrong in any of our measurements. The fact that multiple measurements can be taken completely independently and without any knowledge of prior measurements, and yet will unfailingly be found to agree with one another with a very small margin of error (given that all the measurements are correct, of course!) proves the point.

It is not @S or me who is "fabricating fantasies"; in fact that's one of the most egregious examples of projection I have come across. Leaves me wondering if this is wilful intellectual dishonesty or rank stupidity. Be ashamed, be very ashamed!

So would a realist say some EMR has the property of 450nm, along with the property of 630THz, and the property “blue”? — Mww

I wouldn't say that last part. That it has the property of being 450nm and 630THz means that it's blue.

The rock is not "of a certain length" until the length has been ascertained. To say that it is, is contradiction plain and simple. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nope, not by my logic, plain and simple. By your logic, plain and simple. Your logic is bad logic which I reject. This is one of your fundamental errors: confusing your logic for mine. And it should be obvious to anyone with even a very basic understanding of logic what you're doing wrong here, yet, let me guess: you want me to explain the problem to you? That first sentence of yours in the quote above: do you know what we call that when it is part of an argument? That's right: a premise! And whose premise is it? Is it yours? Is it mine? Is it a premise that we both agree on? Bearing this in mind, whose logic leads to contradiction? Does my logic internally lead to contradiction? Yes or no?

Let me know if you've figured it out.

If you really believe that it is "of a certain length", then tell me who is certain of the length? — Metaphysician Undercover

Very funny. I'm guessing that you don't see why that's a funny question to ask me, and you'll expect me to explain it to you, like you expect me to explain everything, no matter how simple or obvious it is to anyone with half a brain. Nah. I don't think so. Try to figure it out for yourself. It is not good that you need to be spoon fed everything, like a little baby.

What are you supposing here, that the rock is certain of its own length? — Metaphysician Undercover

Wow. Just... wow. This is astounding.

Ok. So if some properties are measured, some meaning follows necessarily from those measurements, but the meaning itself is not a measurement. If that is true, then how can we tell whether the meaning belongs to the measurement or to the EMR? Just like if we measure the sides of a four-sided geometric figure and the measurements provide the same units means the figure is a square, does “square” reside in the figure or the equal measures?

Ok. So if some properties are measured, some meaning follows necessarily from those measurements, but the meaning itself is not a measurement. If that is true, then how can we tell whether the meaning belongs to the measurement or to the EMR? Just like if we measure the sides of a four-sided geometric figure and the measurements provide the same units means the figure is a square, does “square” reside in the figure or the equal measures? — Mww

What? A square is a shape that has four equal sides and four equal angles. So if there's a shape that has four equal sides and four equal angles, then it's a square. It's the shape that has those properties. Regarding the meaning, that's covered by the aforementioned. The first sentence empresses the meaning. Why would measurement even come into this? That seems irrelevant to me. The first two sentences are sufficient for determining whether or not there's a square, which would be a relevant line of inquiry. If a relevant line of inquiry was something like, "How can we know what length the sides of the square are?", then measurement would be relevant.

If what you claim were true, then we could not be wrong in any of our measurements. The fact that multiple measurements can be taken completely independently and without any knowledge of prior measurements, and yet will unfailingly be found to agree with one another with a very small margin of error (given that all the measurements are correct, of course!) proves the point. — Janus

I don't see how that proves your point. It just indicates that the numerous people measuring the same object use the same standards, and therefore come up with the same measurement of that object. Are you familiar with length contraction in relativity theory. Length is dependent on the frame of reference. If relativity theory is true, it proves my point, length is a product of the measurement.

It is not S or me who is "fabricating fantasies"; in fact that's one of the most egregious examples of projection I have come across. Leaves me wondering if this is wilful intellectual dishonesty or rank stupidity. Be ashamed, be very ashamed! — Janus

This is what you said:

A thing has length if it is measurable, it is measurable if it has length. — Janus

That's clearly a fabrication. One cannot equate length with measurability. That's complete nonsense. You just made that up, and spouted it out, rudely interrupting our discussion, as if you were interjecting with a fact. Shame on you!

Nope, not by my logic, plain and simple. By your logic, plain and simple. Your logic is bad logic which I reject. — S

You've demonstrated your logic. You reject conventional definitions, fabricate definitions, and even change them, as required, to support your metaphysics. And, you reject my logic as "bad" because it produces conclusion which are inconsistent with your metaphysics.

This is one of your fundamental errors: confusing your logic for mine. — S

Producing your own type of logic is called "rationalizing", and this is actually a form of being unreasonable.

That's right: a premise! And whose premise is it? Is it yours? Is it mine? Is it a premise that we both agree on? Bearing this in mind, whose logic leads to contradiction? Does my logic internally lead to contradiction? Yes or no? — S

Right, you do not agree with my premises because they are based in conventional definitions. You reject conventional definitions, (such as the one quoted, that for something to be certain it must be ascertained), and fabricate your own definitions, as you go, because this is the only way you can support your incorrect metaphysics. Conventional definitions do not support your incorrect metaphysics, and that's why your metaphysics is incorrect.

Let me know if you've figured it out. — S

I've got it figured out now. You have a particular metaphysical perspective. Normal, conventional usage of words does not support your metaphysical perspective. Conventional definitions produce premises which prove your metaphysics to be incorrect. So you've created your own way of using words, what you call your own "context", which is not the normal, conventional way of using words, it's your newly fabricated way, which supports your incorrect metaphysics. And someone like me, who adheres to conventional definitions to prove your metaphysics wrong, you say is a "sophist".

Very funny. I'm guessing that you don't see why that's a funny question to ask me, and you'll expect me to explain it to you, like you expect me to explain everything, no matter how simple or obvious it is to anyone with half a brain. Nah. I don't think so. Try to figure it out for yourself. It is not good that you need to be spoon fed everything, like a little baby. — S

When someone uses a word, in a new, unconventional way, I ask for an explanation, because I want to understand what is "meant" by that word, the purpose for using that word in the context that it was used. In a situation like this discussion, where you are trying to support a metaphysical position, if you fail to explain to me why you are using that word, in that unconventional way, I will simply conclude that you've changed the definition of that word for the purpose of supporting your metaphysical position. If you must deviate from accepted definitions, and fabricate new definitions as we proceed in discussion, to support your metaphysics, then I conclude your metaphysics is an untenable fabrication of your own imagination, and therefore incorrect.

Before science there were humans that perceived blue things. Before geometry there were humans that perceived equi-sided formations. Even if we can say truthfully the scientific or geometric properties resided in the objects before we knew of them, we can truthfully only say so after The discovery of it. Blue things were blue long before wavelengths and frequencies were determinable, or even practically necessary. Square things were square long before geometers determined what it means to be square.

Because these things were perceived beforehand, the specific properties for these things are not required for them to be understood. That is the same as saying the real parts of these things are not required for the understanding of them, for the knowing of them for what they are merely by means of their appearance. A gal who wants a shade of blue for the nursery doesn’t give a crap about the frequency of it, and the guy setting tile in the hallway doesn’t give a crap about the fact of four equal angles, but both of them know what they want from each of those things, have an expectation from these things because of their appearance and NOT from their respective properties.

There is no suspicion in claiming to be a realist, the negation of which is absurd, but the denial of idealism which necessarily accompanies it, is highly suspicious. As long as an otherwise normally functioning human thinks, he is an idealist of some kind. Simply knowing something about blue and squares and all the rest, that cannot be derived, nor does not need to be derived, from its physical properties presupposes a source of knowledge having nothing to do with the empirical realism, that being merely the occassion.

Before science there were humans that perceived blue things. Before geometry there were humans that perceived equi-sided formations. — Mww

Agree.

Even if we can say truthfully the scientific or geometric properties resided in the objects before we knew of them, we can truthfully only say so after the discovery of it. — Mww

No, because that erroneously rules out speaking unconfirmed truths. If I knew enough to make a prediction or a guess about the properties of blue objects or geometric shapes, then I could speak unconfirmed truths about them. For example, if I knew that the colour blue consists in visible light from within a certain range of wavelength, and I knew that we could measure wavelengths in nanometres, then I could make a complete guess and say that the colour blue has a range of between 450 and 495 nanometres, and if I said that, then I would be speaking a truth prior to the discovery of that fact.

But if I didn't know enough to make a prediction or guess of that sort, then yes, I wouldn't be able to truthfully say stuff like that. But so what? How is that supposedly relevant?

Unconfirmed truths are important in this context, because that, in combination with other things, enables me to reasonably say that there would exist a rock if we all died, and, in my argument with you-know-who, that it could be the case that there's a rock that's 10cm in length, despite it not having been measured.

So you've fallen prey to his kind of illogic, have you? I thought that you were better than that.

Blue things were blue long before wavelengths and frequencies were determinable, or even practically necessary. Square things were square long before geometers determined what it means to be square. — Mww

This is a misuse of "determine", another error which Metaphysician Undercover has made prior to you making it. If you want to say it right, then you should use "discover" instead. The properties of a thing are what determines what it is. If a segment of visible light has the properties required for being blue, then it's blue. If a shape has the properties required for being a square, then it's a square. That's what determines. If I don't know that, then I haven't discovered it. And if I want to discover it, and I think I know how, then that's what I'll have to do in order to find out.

Because these things were perceived beforehand, the specific properties for these things are not required for them to be understood. — Mww

To what extent?! Obviously lacking knowledge of subsequent discoveries means that they didn't understand them to the extent that we do.

That is the same as saying the real parts of these things are not required for the understanding of them, for the knowing of them for what they are merely by means of their appearance. — Mww

That's a load of rubbish. If I only knew of the appearance of the colour blue, then I would only have an incomplete understanding. I wouldn't understand that the colour blue is visible light within a certain range of wavelength.

A gal who wants a shade of blue for the nursery doesn’t give a crap about the frequency of it, and the guy setting tile in the hallway doesn’t give a crap about the fact of four equal angles, but both of them know what they want from each of those things, have an expectation from these things because of their appearance and NOT from their respective properties. — Mww

But I don't give a crap about knowledge for limited practical purposes in this context. I've explained the irrelevance of this before, yet here you are bringing it up again, as though it were otherwise. This discussion is about knowledge and truth. It is not confined to your agenda of what's practical! If you want to talk about what's practical, then create a separate discussion! This isn't something that's going to change over time for no apparent reason, so please try to remember the appropriate context.

There is no suspicion in claiming to be a realist, the negation of which is absurd, but the denial of idealism which necessarily accompanies it, is highly suspicious. As long as an otherwise normally functioning human thinks, he is an idealist of some kind. Simply knowing something about blue and squares and all the rest, that cannot be derived, nor does not need to be derived, from its physical properties presupposes a source of knowledge having nothing to do with the empirical realism, that being merely the occassion. — Mww

What? That's a load of nonsense. I'm not an idealist. And knowing something about things like the colour blue, like how it appears, without knowing the science, is completely irrelevant. Okay, people can know some stuff about some stuff without knowing everything about that stuff. Okay, people can know enough for practical purposes. I never denied that, but I certainly deny the relevance of you bringing that up in this context.

At least you seem to have moved on from much of your illogic to focus on trivial semantics. That's progress of a sort, I suppose. Let's just agree to disagree, as I don't really care about your opinion on the semantics here, and it doesn't seem worth arguing over. If your semantics is anything like your illogic, then it will leave much to be desired.

”Translation:

“I can’t define it.” “— Michael Ossipoff
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I went over this. Your reply is nonresponsive and doesn't progress the discussion. Whether I can or can't, defining it isn't necessary if we understand the meaning…

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???!!! :D
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Yes, defining our terms is necessary. Without that, philosophy becomes meaningless, muddled gibberish.
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If you can’t define it, then you don’t know its meaning, and that supports my claim that it doesn’t have one.
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, which we do.

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No, you don’t. If you knew its meaning, you’d be able to state it.
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”1. You point to a cabinet whose contents are unknown, and say “Is a rock there?” “ — Michael Ossipoff
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And you're going to pretend that you don't understand what is being asked there?

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It’s obvious, clear, and well-defined what’s being asked there.
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”2. Or you say “Is there the rock that I referred to, after everyone dies?”. (“Exists that rock?”)” — Michael Ossipoff

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And you're going to pretend that you don't understand what is being asked there?
[/quote]
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No. I’m not going to pretend that.
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But, though I don’t pretend it, I’m truthfully saying it.
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I don’t understand what’s being said there, and neither do you. You don’t know what you mean. That’s why you can’t say what you mean.
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”Those are two entirely different kinds of question, and “There is…” is being used entirely differently, with a different meaning. (..an unknown or absent meaning, in #2)” — Michael Ossipoff
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The part about existence is no different in either. They're just two different scenarios, two different contexts,

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They’re two entirely different questions:
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In #1, you’re asking if there’s a rock in the place that you’re pointing to. Either the cabinet contains a rock or it doesn’t, and we all know what that means.
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In #2, you’re asking if a certain particular rock still exists (…objectively (no context specified), whatever that’s supposed to mean.)
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…and you understand what's being asked in both cases

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No, I don’t, and neither do you. …in the case of question #2.
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”As you meant it when you asked if there still is that rock after everyone has died, “There is” means “Exists”.
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“Exists that rock, after everyone has died?” accurately translates your question.
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It’s a matter of whether or not you can define “Exist”. “ — Michael Ossipoff
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It doesn't make a difference if you use "is" or "exists", as they have the same meaning per my usage here.

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Yes, in your OP question, “There is” means “Exists”.
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And nope, it's just a matter of whether what I'm saying is understandable…

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What you’re saying (what you’re asking in your OP question) is meaningless.
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…and, not having a meaning, it also doesn’t have an understandable meaning.
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Michael Ossipoff
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9 M

I don't see how that proves your point. It just indicates that the numerous people measuring the same object use the same standards, and therefore come up with the same measurement of that object. Are you familiar with length contraction in relativity theory. Length is dependent on the frame of reference. If relativity theory is true, it proves my point, length is a product of the measurement. — Metaphysician Undercover

You continue to conflate length with measurement. Is an anaconda longer than a maggot? Of course it is, and you don't need to measure them to see that.

Does the "length contraction" that accords with Relativity theory occur regardless of whether it is measured? If it didn't then how would it ever be discovered?

Yes, defining our terms is necessary. Without that, philosophy becomes meaningless, muddled gibberish.

If you can’t define it, then you don’t know its meaning, and that supports my claim that it doesn’t have one. — Michael Ossipoff

So until I define every term in this sentence, you have no idea what I'm saying. I might as well just be banging my head on the keyboard.

Ghjnnbvcgjkk vggjj ghnnmmnfvb

Yeah, that's real convincing.

What you’re saying (what you’re asking in your OP question) is meaningless.

…and, not having a meaning, it also doesn’t have an understandable meaning. — Michael Ossipoff

Yet almost everyone else understood it. How peculiar.

You have GOT to be the WORST epistemological realist EVER!!!

There are some unconfirmed truths; but these are necessary truths, the contradictions of which are impossible. To say

....knew enough to make a prediction or a guess about the properties of blue objects or geometric shapes, then I could speak unconfirmed truths about them. — S

.....has no greater power than mere conjecture, a contingent possibility, because no conditions are given to sustain any prediction. Because of the technical difficulty intrinsic to color, simply observing one of them enables no predictions whatsoever about their physical properties. You couldn’t even ascertain the fact color is EMR, much less predict anything about the behavior of it from the observation of rainbows. Even saying if you knew enough is catastrophically inept, because it raises the question....how much is enough. If you knew x and y and from those predicted z, z remains no more than reasonable expectation until some other condition is satisfied, as in, experiment or accident. A caveman sees green grass and predicts it is fresh, but only because he has seen brown grass that deer never eat. Just because he knows the grass is green at night, does not allow him to predict the sun is partly responsible for fresh grass. Faraday might have the unconfirmed hypothetical for electric lines, but without the rational appeal to a very specific experiment, he would have had no reason to suppose them. And even then, he got it wrong by requiring a medium.

if I knew that the colour blue consists in visible light from within a certain range of wavelength, and I knew that we could measure wavelengths in nanometres, then I could make a complete guess and say that the colour blue has a range of between 450 and 495 nanometres, and if I said that, then I would be speaking a truth prior to the discovery of that fact. — S

Yeah, so what? That’s what every theoretical physicist says, but I betcha a Benjamin he never calls it a “truth” before it is proven to be one. After the fact he can say such and such is true, thus beforehand it was an unconfirmed truth, which is exactly the opposite of what you say.

Unconfirmed truth is a contradiction in terms. No truth is unconfirmed and that which is either rationally or empirically unconfirmed cannot be a truth. That which is true now and will be under congruent circumstance is a necessary truth empirically, or a logical truth rationally. Substantiated hypotheticals can lead to reasonable predictions, but truths absolutely must meet the criteria of knowledge.
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I didn’t say “determine”; I said determinable. Under certain conditions there are things completely undeterminable, and those conditions have to do with human inability.
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This discussion was about realism and possible counter-arguments with respect to it. Knowledge and truth may enter into it but they are qualifiers for what they are. You brought truth here, apparently without understanding what it is.
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A worthy epistemological realist would be quick to realize the limited practical purpose is the sole paradigm from which he can work. The total of practical exercise is indeed very far larger than the arena available to a human, but the totality is quite irrelevant. Hell, we haven’t even got ourselves off this planet yet. But the deeper you go into realism the more you need some kind of idealism, because you’re bound by reason itself to reduce to conditions not met with realism alone.

This thread is called a THOUGHT experiment for a reason.

At least you seem to have moved on from much of your illogic to focus on trivial semantics. That's progress of a sort, I suppose. Let's just agree to disagree, as I don't really care about your opinion on the semantics here, and it doesn't seem worth arguing over. If your semantics is anything like your illogic, then it will leave much to be desired. — S

What? You just now realized that my objection to your thought experiment is based in semantics? Right from the beginning, I objected to your use of "an hour", saying that it was meaningless nonsense in that context. How could it take you this long to see that?

You continue to conflate length with measurement. — Janus

Length is a type of measurement, just like width, height, temperature, etc.. In the case of this op, the measurement referred to is "an hour". I said such a measurement would be impossible with no people. S tried to justify the use of "an hour" by claiming that it was not a measurement, but a unit of measurement. I said that a unit of measurement is useless without someone to apply it. S claimed that the unit of measurement "would apply" regardless of whether there are people to apply it, (as if it would apply itself, and measure and hour by itself, or something like that).

Is an anaconda longer than a maggot? Of course it is, and you don't need to measure them to see that. — Janus

That one thing is longer than another is an act of comparison which doesn't tell you the length of either one. Therefore this example is not relevant. It is not the correct type of measurement required to give you the length, and because it is not such, it doesn't provide the length of anything.

Does the "length contraction" that accords with Relativity theory occur regardless of whether it is measured? If it didn't then how would it ever be discovered? — Janus

Your question doesn't make sense. Length contraction is a feature of measuring the same object from different frames of reference. It doesn't make sense to ask whether it occurs regardless of measurement, because it is a feature of measurement.

Unconfirmed truth is a contradiction in terms. No truth is unconfirmed and that which is either rationally or empirically unconfirmed cannot be a truth. That which is true now and will be under congruent circumstance is a necessary truth empirically, or a logical truth rationally. Substantiated hypotheticals can lead to reasonable predictions, but truths absolutely must meet the criteria of knowledge. — Mww

Using common meaning, wouldn't an unconfirmed truth just be any prediction that was "always" (relative to humans) true in the past. "The sun will rise tomorrow." It is possible that statement is "not true" but for the sake of everyone's sanity we can take the shortcut and just assume it will continue to be true. I get that science and philosophy regularly delve beyond the apparent, but "unconfirmed truth" will only seem a contradiction in terms to the types that like to over-analyze language (which I do sometimes).

To the layman, if I say "it is an unconfirmed truth that when I let go of this pencil it will fall to the floor" (I am holding my arm out to my side holding a pencil), most would say "true" as opposed to "false". Yes, I get it is far more complicated than just true or false, but that is only a problem for Philosophy (and occasionally science), it does not mean that language loses its common meaning.

And just to make the point for S, even if "unconfirmed truth" is a contradiction in terms, we all know what he meant, and calling it a contradiction of terms does not refute the more general point he was making.

After 10 pages, I am not sure I 100% agree with @S, but I don't think that I have any trouble understanding his points.

I would vie for the title of "worst epistemological realist" but I can't even figure out what the idealist position is; it seems to range from, "well there is more than just objective facts {mind has an influence}" to "without an observer, nothing exists". I view the former as certainly true, but as discussions move toward the latter option, I feel like we have left practicality behind along with reality and I lose interest.

Holy Jesus

"without an observer, nothing exists" — ZhouBoTong

To that I simply would say: "how do you know; you haven't been there"?

What? You just now realized that my objection to your thought experiment is based in semantics? — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh look, a non sequitur.

Yes, understood and agreed, in principle. Nonetheless, if we were herein engaged in common meanings, we would be writing newspaper articles instead of delving into metaphysical particulars.

The dropped pencil argument is straight out of Hume’s claim of epistemological knowledge given from mere habit or convention. The pencil will fall to the floor because it has always fallen to the floor, but that says nothing whatsoever about why such should be the case, and if sufficient reason should be given, that serves as argument the pencil will never do anything BUT fall to the floor. But sufficient reason is not proof, sufficient reason here being gravity, or the mass of the pencil, but that doesn’t say what gravity is or why it acts on objects the way it does.

Even the rabid subjective idealist grants the existence of real things, even if those things are said to be real in a categorically unsubstantiated way. No rational agent can deny the existence of real objects; if he does he cannot explain his own body as a spacetime object without immediately contradicting himself.

I think the antagonist approach in this multi-logue is, not so much that without observers nothing exists, but rather, the idea that because existence in general can only be examined, understood, cognized and known from a human perspective, without all that nothing can be said about it with the same certainty and logical consistency as the original expositions gave to it. So it isn’t so much about the negation of existence as it is about the negation of the observer with respect to existence. It’s the same error as defining a word and using the word being defined in the definition.

Oh look, a non sequitur. — S

Do you know what non-sequitur means, or do you just use any words in any random way that pleases you? A simple statement of observation cannot be a non-sequitur, because non-sequitur refers to a conclusion drawn from previous statements. If you think that my observation is false, then say so, and explain why. But why use fancy words which you don't even know the meaning of?

To that I simply would say: "how do you know; you haven't been there"? — Janus

It's demonstrated by logic. That's what logic is good for, telling us about things we haven't experienced. But people like S refuse the logic by finding a way to reject the premises. That way, is to reject conventional definitions of terms, and fabricate new definitions for the purpose of supporting faulty metaphysics.