That fact that you're alive is located wherever you are, as (long as) you continue to breathe, metabolize, undergo cell division, etc. How in the world would you think that fact is located nowhere or everywhere or whatever you think? — Terrapin Station

It's the third option in your question, as I previously made clear to you. I do not think that it's located everywhere, nor do I think that it's located nowhere, I think that it's a category error.

I reject your position because, firstly, it seems completely inappropriate to assume that there must be a location from the outset, which is to put the cart before the horse. And secondly, this leads to absurdity in innumerable cases. And by absurdity, I don't mean the strict logical sense, but rather that it forces you to come up with terrible and unconvincing explanations, whereas I don't have that massive problem. I think that my position has greater intuitive appeal, and makes more sense. Your position is counterintuitive, makes no sense, and severely lacks evidence, because all of the evidence that I'm alive is not evidence that there is a fact located nearby me at all times whilst I'm alive. You don't seem to have any evidence for that at all. It's just a bizarre, unsubstantiated belief. But you seem committed to it because of your broader commitments.

nor do I think that it's located nowhere, I think that it's a category error. — S

If you think that it doesn't have a location, then you think that it's located nowhere. The only way to think that it's not located nowhere is to think that it has a location. "It's located nowhere" is another way of saying "It doesn't have a location."

I reject your position because, firstly, it seems completely inappropriate to assume that there must be a location from the outset — S

The idea of extant things with no location is incoherent.

a fact located nearby me at all times whilst I'm alive. — S

Why are you saying "a fact located nearby me"?

The fact is located at you. It's the fact that you're breathing and metabolizing etc. You have a location. Your breathing has a location. Your metabolism and cell division etc. have a location.

Facts are states of affairs. Ways that the world is. There's a state of affairs that you exist, that you're breathing, etc. Those states of affairs have a location.

Are you thinking of "fact" linguistically? In other words, some people call true propositions "facts." I don't use "fact" that way (a la analytic philosophy, stemming from Russell, Wittgenstein, etc.) If you're asking me about "true propositions," my ontology of that is very different than what I'm saying about facts.

So, for myself, it seems to me that if meaning is a property of language, and we are competent language speakers, then we should all be able to tell -- perhaps only in a rough and proximate sense, but still truthfully -- what the meaning of moral statements are.

I think I'd describe my beliefs about meaning in analogue with intuitionists on moral matters or mathematics, minus some tendencies in intuitionism to believe in stability -- since clearly words do change their meaning with time and usage.

And if that were true then it would follow that we'd all be able to pinpoint the meaning of words, moral or otherwise.

Where I think I agree with you, @andrewk, is in looking at usage to determine meaning -- I'd just say that meaning exists, and it is not identical to usage. Looking at usage in context is the method for determining meaning. And there are shades of meaning, too, in most phrases -- so you might focus on how the meaning of a moral phrase is meant to influence others, and someone else might focus on another aspect like how a moral phrase expresses one's sentiments about some action or another, and I'd just insist that some moral phrases are also -- not opposed to either of these previous theories but in addition to them -- truth-apt, because of the way some moral phrases are said are said in a descriptive sense.

If you think that it doesn't have a location, then you think that it's located nowhere. — Terrapin Station

What sophism! Do please pay close attention to my wording of the following: I don't think that it has a location, and I don't think that it doesn't have a location, because I think that it's a category error. There's no contradiction in that. It's not the kind of thing which does or doesn't have a location.

The idea of extant things with no location is incoherent. — Terrapin Station

Bare assertion.

Why are you saying "a fact located nearby me"?

The fact is located at you. — Terrapin Station

Fine, whatever, it's still a whacky and implausible theory.

You have a location. Your breathing has a location. Your metabolism and cell division etc. have a location. — Terrapin Station

I accept that. That's an irrelevant point which doesn't lead to your conclusion without some illogical tinkering which I have good reason to reject.

Facts are states of affairs. Ways that the world is. There's a state of affairs that you exist, that you're breathing, etc. Those states of affairs have a location. — Terrapin Station

Facts are what's the case. If you are going to claim that what's the case has a location, then you have a burden of proof for that. Nothing you've said so far has convinced me in the slightest.

Are you thinking of "fact" linguistically? In other words, some people call true propositions "facts." I don't use "fact" that way (a la analytic philosophy, stemming from Russell, Wittgenstein, etc.) If you're asking me about "true propositions," my ontology of that is very different than what I'm saying about facts. — Terrapin Station

No, facts are simply what's the case. True propositions just correspond with facts. But it still makes no sense to ask where they're located, rather than, in at least some cases, where what they're about is located. If we take a fact about me, then I can give you my location, but that does nothing whatsoever for your crackpot theory about facts having a location.

What counts as a moral statement?

Are we limiting the scope to moral judgments? "X is moral/immoral"? "X is good/bad"? "One ought do/not do X"?

It seems to me that moral judgments not only assert that something is immoral/moral, but also that they are universally applicable. If X is morally wrong, then no one ought do X.

I like the direction of fit notion that Banno invoked. It involves the meaning of the statement but not solely in terms of moral judgments.

Promises come to mind.

Without expressing my approval/disapproval, but rather just acknowledging what the making of a promise is...

When one promises to do X, then X ought be done.

Whether or not I approve of X is irrelevant to what it means.

One ought not do X...

If that is a command, and commands are not truth-apt, then neither is that utterance of ought.

Facts are what's the case. If you are going to claim that what's the case has a location, — S

Just saw this response now.

"What's the case" is ambiguous to me, because people often use it to refer to, for example, stating propositions. Otherwise, what's the difference between "what's the case" and "state of affairs" a la there being some dynamic physical things in particular relations to other dynamic physical things?

When one promises to do X, then X ought be done.

Whether or not I approve of X is irrelevant to what it means. — creativesoul

If someone were to say, "When one promises to do X, then X ought not to be done"--so they were to claim that that's the "meaning" of a promise, what would we appeal to if we want to claim that they're (objectively) incorrect?

Do you not know what counts as a moral statement? I'm hesitant to put necessary and sufficient conditions to the notion. It seems to me that it's not hard to discriminate between moralizing and statements of preference.

Some aspects seem to include claims to universality across all responsible moral actors, the notion that one's belief does not change whether something is good or evil, and that the subject matter is of particular import to living life.

I find the private-language argument to be pretty convincing. While I grant that we all have our own subjective realities that we do not share in the same way as we share, say, money or chairs I don't think that language is a part of that reality. In fact I'd say that language forms the bridge between our own interiors to one another -- and its public nature is what allows us to do that.

Further, while I grant subjectivity, I also think there's also similarity in our subjectivity. How do I know? Because when someone relates to me their experience I can feel that experience based upon what I've felt before -- I can feel someone else's pain, I can relate my life to another's. They are not identical, but similar. This relating happens a great deal of the time, too -- so while it is important to recognize we are different, I think it's also important to recognize our similarities too.

It's in this way that we might be able to argue that morality is a factual, if not empirical, matter. But the more I think of it the more I think that we would be abandoning naturalism in so saying -- which may be just too much for some to go along with.

If someone were to say, "When one promises to do X, then X ought not to be done"--so they were to claim that that's the "meaning" of a promise, what would we appeal to if we want to claim that they're (objectively) incorrect? — Terrapin Station

Misunderstanding accompanied by a dichotomy that is inherently incapable of taking proper account of morality.

Do you not know what counts as a moral statement? — Moliere

I think that I know. However, what I think I know does not always match up to conventional understanding/notions. I asked not to be intentionally obtuse, but rather to perhaps seque into reasoning that leads us to scrutinize the conventional notion of moral statement.

I'm hesitant to put necessary and sufficient conditions to the notion. It seems to me that it's not hard to discriminate between moralizing and statements of preference. — Moliere

See, right there is something queer to me. I mean, don't get me wrong. I totally agree with what you said above. I would readily concur.

However...

Moralizing is thinking about one's own thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is prior to thinking about it. On my view, not all thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is moral thought/belief, but all moral thought/belief is thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Moral statements have the same conditions/criterion as moral thought/belief.

Here, of course, I'm not using the term "moral" to denote value, or approval. Rather, it is a kind of thought/belief and statements thereof.

Some aspects seem to include claims to universality across all responsible moral actors, the notion that one's belief does not change whether something is good or evil, and that the subject matter is of particular import to living life.

I don't understand the bit about unchanging belief...

Misunderstanding accompanied by a dichotomy that is inherently incapable of taking proper account of morality — creativesoul

Misunderstanding of what and a proper account of morality per what?

I think that I know. However, what I think I know does not always match up to conventional understanding/notions. I asked not to be intentionally obtuse, but rather to perhaps seque into reasoning that leads us to scrutinize the conventional notion of moral statement. — creativesoul

I'd invite you to present some reasoning, if you wish. If it sparks a comment or thought in me then I'll share. But I'm failing to see where you're going with this.

I don't understand the bit about unchanging belief... — creativesoul

I just mean that the following conditional is false:

If I believe that "kicking puppies is wrong" is true then "kicking puppies is wrong" is true

"Kicking puppies is wrong" may be true, but my belief, or lack thereof, in said statement does not change its truth-value.

Moralizing is thinking about one's own thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. — creativesoul

This seems to cloistered in one's own thoughts, to me. When we moralize we are addressing others. When Ted moralizes on the evils of adultery, he is not talking about his beliefs, he is talking about adultery.

A point I use because we can often moralize about what I don't think is within the domain of morality. You can rationalize why adultery is wrong by making some notion about promises, but to me it just doesn't come on the same level as, say, ensuring the hungry are fed or preventing murder.

But even when we moralize about what I believe is not morally significant, we're talking about actions, dispositions, or character -- not our own beliefs.

If I believe that "kicking puppies is wrong" is true then "kicking puppies is wrong" is true

"Kicking puppies is wrong" may be true, but my belief, or lack thereof, in said statement does not change its truth-value. — Moliere

Gotcha. I would concur.

This seems to cloistered in one's own thoughts, to me. — Moliere

Drawing and maintaining the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief is imperative to understanding all sorts of things about us and the world we find ourselves within. It's crucial for the ability to discriminate between conceptions/notions, including but not limited to morality. Academia has failed here, and still does as far as I can tell. The relevance to moral philosophy and doscourse would include allowing one to be able to distinguish between moral thought/belief that is informed by language, and moral thought/belief that precedes language. Again, the term moral denotes a classification and/or kind of thought/belief.

I am of the very strong opinion that everyone is involved in the same process, in the same set of circumstances, regarding forming and/or having our initial worldview, which includes belief about what's good/bad, right/wrong, moral/immoral. By and in large one's, initial worldview is adopted via language acquisition and it's subsequent use.

We're all in the same boat in this way. Unpacking what that is existentially dependent upon gleans knowledge of morally relevant common denominators. Trusting the truthfulness of the teacher being an important one.

When we moralize we are addressing others.

And ourselves...

When Ted moralizes on the evils of adultery, he is not talking about his beliefs, he is talking about adultery.

I would concur that this is often the case. Ted is expressing and/or presenting his beliefs about adultery, via language use. That's an overly simplistic account though.

When we begin to explain our reasoning, our ground for our belief, or when we begin to compare/contrast... we are most certainly talking about our belief. Knowing the difference is crucial to understanding the world and/or ourselves.

A point I use because we can often moralize about what I don't think is within the domain of morality. You can rationalize why adultery is wrong by making some notion about promises, but to me it just doesn't come on the same level as, say, ensuring the hungry are fed or preventing murder.

But even when we moralize about what I believe is not morally significant, we're talking about actions, dispositions, or character -- not our own beliefs.

I get what you're saying here Moliere. It is interesting that you've chosen to invoke promises, giving one's word. I would sharply disagree regarding the moral significance of making a promise, but do not look to argue this point here, as the thread is about the meaning of moral statements/claims.

If someone were to say, "When one promises to do X, then X ought not to be done"--so they were to claim that that's the "meaning" of a promise, what would we appeal to if we want to claim that they're (objectively) incorrect?
— Terrapin Station

Misunderstanding accompanied by a dichotomy that is inherently incapable of taking proper account of morality. — creativesoul

Misunderstanding of what and a proper account of morality per what? — Terrapin Station

Misunderstanding of the role that meaning plays in making a promise, particularly regarding truth conditions setting that out. That's what I was discussing.

Proper account of morality cannot involve the objective/subjective dichotomy. I've already offered more than adequate argument against that idea. You've neglected those offerings and continue on unabated.

You've jumped to questions about how to discriminate between competing utterances of ought, regarding a previous promise.

If you know what making a promise means, then the utterance of ought in question simply confirms that. It is what one expects to happen, solely as a result of knowing what making a promise means and believing that the speaker is sincere.

I've explained this numerous times in the other thread we're both involved in. Care to address what I've asserted?

Misunderstanding of the role that meaning plays in making a promise, particularly regarding truth conditions setting that out. That's what I was discussing. — creativesoul

In other words, you'd be saying that they have the meaning wrong. But that's just what they're saying--that you have the meaning wrong. So when I ask you what we'd appeal to, I'm asking you what we can look at to figure out who is really right or wrong.

Proper account of morality cannot involve the objective/subjective dichotomy. — creativesoul

I said absolutely nothing about that in my reply to you that you're addressing. I asked you "proper account of morality per what?" You're supposed to tell me per what.

If you know what making a promise means, then the utterance of ought in question simply confirms that. It is what one expects to happen, solely as a result of knowing what making a promise means and believing that the speaker is sincere.

I've explained this numerous times in the other thread we're both involved in. Care to address what I've asserted? — creativesoul

What did you get out of this thread?

I think I got a much better handle on what @Terrapin Station believes -- and I thought that we might start delving into mind and stuff so I didn't want to pollute the thread this spun from with all that speculation. And I think I understand where I disagree -- without some way of building from the relating of the mind to the frequent success of language I think I have to opt for some other theory, even if it is somewhat speculative and metaphysical.

I got to make clearer some of my thoughts on meaning.

And I think this grammar is interesting that you provided:

Having said that, there are some interesting aspects of the grammar of moral language that can be cleaned up. Moral statements have a direction of fit that distinguishes them from some other sorts of statements; they are unlike mere statements of preference, in that they set out what others should do, not just what the speaker should do; and they have their import in providing justification for what we do. — Banno

(switching topics here, thinking of @andrewk)Something about saying moral statements are meant to influence others doesn't quite sit right with me -- not that I'm unfamiliar with the phenomena. Of course people say these things to influence others. But it seems that we say things we believe are right or wrong not to influence others -- at least when thinking about what is the right thing to do -- but because it is the right thing to do.

I'm not sure how to put it, though, without sounding like I'm basically just running in a circle.

Thanks.

Turns out @Terrapin Station doesn't think mathematical statements have a truth value. I can't see how that could be made to work.

The direction of fit stuff is from Searle, and Anscombe; so it stretches across both Oxford and Cambridge. I think it very useful.

But it seems that we say things we believe are right or wrong not to influence others -- at least when thinking about what is the right thing to do -- but because it is the right thing to do. — Moliere

Unless - and this is a very different way to proceed - one's purpose is the will to power. Then, morality being subservient to will, all moral statements are ways of making things as you will.

That's true.

And there is something to be said for that approach too, I think. Something that's been niggling at the back of my mind in thinking through all this is that another approach that hasn't been mentioned is to say that debating the truth or falsity of this or that statement or theory misses the point entirely -- that we are the ones who have to make these decisions regardless of whether such and such is true or false.

And that seems to open the door to existential ethics.

Though, for myself at least, I don't think I am the sort of person who could fully commit to a will-to-power ethos. It's quite lonely, and seems to make some people masters while others are slaves (to morality, but thereby making them useful to the masters) -- and that just seems like a sad life to me. (not that all existential ethics are like the Will to Power -- heck, even Nietzsche doesn't always agree with himself here, I think.)

Yeah, someone could stipulate that they're only going to use the word "moral" when people have in mind something like a categorical imperative--and if that's the way they insist on using the term, there's probably little we could do to change their mind, but people think about what they call morality in a much broader way than that.

Turns out Terrapin Station doesn't think mathematical statements have a truth value. I can't see how that could be made to work. — Banno

I have a subjectivist theory of truth, anyway, so it's not going to amount to what you want it to amount to if I think a sentence has a truth value.

I actually would say that mathematical and other claims that are subjective do have a truth value if we're talking about someone who uses a relation other than correspondence for the truthmaker relation, and my theory allows for various relations, but I use correspondence and I didn't want to get into a big tangent on truth theory, so I simplified this.

And actually even the above is a simplification. Truth value could also work for these claims under a correspondence relation depending on how an individual interprets/assigns meaning to the proposition in question.

The problem for what you want, however, is that on my view, all of this stuff is subjective.

The direction of fit stuff is from Searle, and Anscombe; so it stretches across both Oxford and Cambridge. I think it very useful. — Banno

I've actually read some of that before re Searle etc. but I sure didn't remember it. I don't agree with some of aspects of it re what I'm reading now to review it (like the assumptions that are made about the criteria for a desire to be satisfied), but the distinction at least makes some sense. At that, a moral whatever-we-want-to-call-it per se can't be made to obtain "in the world." Only what we'd prefer could be made to obtain. In other words, the moral part of it can't be made external.

I'm afraid I'm uncertain where this is coming from. I mean, someone could, and people do think of morality in a broader way than that -- I agree. But I'm feeling dense at the moment.

Something about saying moral statements are meant to influence others doesn't quite sit right with me -- not that I'm unfamiliar with the phenomena. Of course people say these things to influence others. But it seems that we say things we believe are right or wrong not to influence others -- at least when thinking about what is the right thing to do -- but because it is the right thing to do. — Moliere

I should have quoted you above. I was basically agreeing with this comment.

Ah, ok. That makes sense now. I had a couple different thoughts so I wasn't quite sure which you were responding to.