The interpretation is the way it sounds when he hears it, the way it moves his tongue as he articulates, the reaction of his doting parent, the way he feels when he sees his parents reaction. — emancipate

So what you are calling an interpretation is not more words that say the same thing - see @Judaka.

What you are calling an interpretation is the results of the use of language.

. It is later that he learns to associate words with things, but the initial experience is full of interpretation. — emancipate

Not all words are names.

How do you experience reality, but through a filter that allows you to make meaning (interpret) of it all? Meaning is not just linguistic. — emancipate

I don't argue that meaning is just linguistic, but you're essentially using "meaning" as a catch-all term for every form of processing, which seems unnecessarily broad and confusing. This thread is about the meaning of moral statements, after all, not the basic epistemology of human experience.

You experience the car horn which startles you and then you retrospectively apply analysis to the situation. Meaning has flowed through sense (sound), emotion (fear) and intellect (analysis). — emancipate

But my initial reaction is a completely different mental process from the later analysis. My fear doesn't "lead to" analysis.

Really it is much more than this, the situation (initial experience) is complete morass of meaning. But in retrospective analysis meaning has been reduced by the intellect to a speck of what it was during experience. — emancipate

You need to define your terms a bit before I can make much sense of this.

I do think that Emancipate has a point.

My definition is incomplete and while interpretation can work the way I described it doesn't have to.

As an example. we might think about psychological things like empathy, fairness, fear, anger, jealousy and such, which are far more ancient than words but serve as expressions of interpretations.

Interpretation goes far deeper than language, I knew this but gave a half-assed definition and got called out on it.

And moral language is no different from any other sort of language. It doesn't deserve to be put in a class by itself as some super-special language with its own set of interpretive rules. It, like any statement, means what it means -- and can be put to many uses, from admonishment, expression, description, and so forth. — Moliere

One difference that might be worth noting is the direction of fit of different sentences. In "The door is closed", the sentence is perhaps used to set out what it the case - the words are made to fit the world.

But in "Shut the door!", the sentence is perhaps used command something to become the case - the world is made to fit the words.

Interpretation goes far deeper than language, — Judaka

You drew attention to the worthwhile use of interpretation as interpreting one set of word in terms of another set of words.

It's that which is inadequate to explain language learning.

You do not distinguish between what is required for understanding and objective meaning, you call them the same thing unless I am missing something. — Judaka

You're certainly missing something. A key difference between what's required for there to be understanding and what's required for there to be meaning is that the former requires there to be a subject and the latter does not, and obviously you can see here that I'm not calling them the same thing.

When I asserted this you have replied "Yes, and? — Judaka

No, that's clearly not what you asserted before. Go back and see for yourself. You didn't even use the word "understanding". You just seemed to put to me a rephrased version of my own point about a rule based independent meaning, which I obviously agreed with and questioned what your point was.

Where based on an established criterion, a particular judgement is necessarily reached., objective validity is achieved. Which says if premises this means conclusion. When the premises are subjective so is the conclusion. Morality is always going to have subjective premises and so is the same with language.

The dictionary I write is not for a "made up language" it's for English. There are already many dictionaries for English and they don't all say exactly the same things.

Talking about language just seems like a tangent from the perspective of validity, the problem with English is that the rules don't achieve objective validity and the existence of rules doesn't necessitate certain interpretations. I haven't argued that the differences in our interpretations might not be trivial or non-existent, perhaps we have different rules for calling something "objective".

That's part and parcel with language, we will have different understandings for words and the concepts they refer to. — Judaka

Sorry, but what are you talking about? You've lost me. If you think that you can refute my argument, then go ahead and try, but you can't just say some tosh about it being subjective without properly explaining how that's allegedly the case. Understanding requires a subject, whereas meaning as I've described it does not. In this sense, the latter is objective. Can you explain why there would need to be subjects subsequent to the language rules being set for there to be meaning, as opposed to understanding? (Setting aside some degree of ambiguity, which would only be a problem for my position if I had implied complete meaning, which I haven't). Over to you.

The dictionary I write is not for a "made up language" it's for English. There are already many dictionaries for English and they don't all say exactly the same things. — Judaka

My point was about a made up language, not English. You seem to be missing my point and quoting me out of context. I'm not sure why you've done that.

You're certainly missing something. A key difference between what's required for there to be understanding and what's required for there to be meaning is that the former requires there to be a subject and the latter does not, and obviously you can see here that I'm not calling them the same thing. — S

I see.

No, that's clearly not what you asserted before. Go back and see for yourself. You didn't even use the word "understanding". You just seemed to put to me a rephrased version of my own point about a rule based independent meaning, which I obviously agreed with and questioned what your point was. — S

You're right, my apologies.

Sorry, but what are you talking about? You've lost me. If you think that you can refute my argument, then go ahead and try, but you can't just say some tosh about it being subjective without properly explaining how that's allegedly the case. Understanding requires a subject, whereas meaning as I've described it does not. In this sense, it is objective. Over to you. — S

So what you actually said "Yes, and?" to was this.

You are trying to argue that rules which have been created for the sake of making a language functional have created objective meaning because they are independently coherent and established. — Judaka

As such I will take this as your argument for objective meaning which doesn't require interpretation in language.

I have two questions.

1. Where would you advise one to find the established rules for English?

The example of me writing my own dictionary is pointing to this problem. Dictionaries are different from each other, let alone something I might write. Language evolves over time and I think if your argument is that there IS established rules for English, you should be able to point me to some source of where to find them. My follow up question if needed will be why you choose that over something else.

2. Why isn't the lack of objective validity in English a problem for your position?

Objective validity means the premises necessarily lead to the conclusion. This is the bare minimum requires for an argument of meaning not requiring interpretation. If the premises don't necessarily lead to a conclusion then how do you know which conclusion is correct? Someone needs to make a choice.

English is filled with words that describe values, concepts, ideas, feelings and so much more without the required specificity to know exactly what is being talked about. "Justice" could just as easily be killing people as it is saving people, why isn't interpretation needed here? What do the established rules tell us about what is being talked about when people use the word "justice"?

Context matters in English too, if I say "I really need to go", you could understand what I mean differently based on the context. Do I mean to the toilet? Or do I have some kind of appointment? What did I mean when I said I really need to go? Why do I need to go?

The words "I need to go" may have communicated those things but I don't know how the rules of English allow for this.

I would say "I need to go" is a fairly trivial statement but let's find an even more trivial statement like "I am a man".

What does that mean? Why am I saying that? What am I referring to? The lack of objective validity is a problem as far as I can see, this is at least one problem for the idea language carries objective meaning.

I am classifying perception as a mental association -- that is, the sort of thing that has meaning. I am not saying the world makes associations. — Moliere

Okay. Normally "perception" is reserved for (the notion of (ideally) accurately) processing external information.

1. Where would you advise one to find the established rules for English?

The example of me writing my own dictionary is pointing to this problem. Dictionaries are different from each other, let alone something I might write. Language evolves over time and I think if your argument is that there IS established rules for English, you should be able to point me to some source of where to find them. My follow up question if needed will be why you choose that over something else. — Judaka

Very odd question. I would advise them to learn the language in the usual ways, and use the usual resources, such as a dictionary or a language learning app. We've all learnt a language as children through to adulthood, and that entails learning language rules. A great deal of it is automatic for us, of course. We learnt the rules long ago. You understand what I'm saying without any need to learn the rules.

2. Why isn't the lack of objective validity in English a problem for your position?

Objective validity means the premises necessarily lead to the conclusion. This is the bare minimum requires for an argument of meaning not requiring interpretation. If the premises don't necessarily lead to a conclusion then how do you know which conclusion is correct? Someone needs to make a choice.

English is filled with words that describe values, concepts, ideas, feelings and so much more without the required specificity to know exactly what is being talked about. "Justice" could just as easily be killing people as it is saving people, why isn't interpretation needed here? What do the established rules tell us about what is being talked about when people use the word "justice"?

Context matters in English too, if I say "I really need to go", you could understand what I mean differently based on the context. Do I mean to the toilet? Or do I have some kind of appointment? What did I mean when I said I really need to go? Why do I need to go?

The words "I need to go" may have communicated those things but I don't know how the rules of English allow for this.

I would say "I need to go" is a fairly trivial statement but let's find an even more trivial statement like "I am a man".

What does that mean? Why am I saying that? What am I referring to? The lack of objective validity is a problem as far as I can see, this is at least one problem for the idea language carries objective meaning. — Judaka

I've already addressed this. Once again, some degree of ambiguity is not sufficient to refute my argument. In these cases, the speaker presumably knows what he meant to a higher degree of accuracy. The speaker would be the rule setter. So the rule would be that this particular word in the speakers statement has this particular meaning. Once the rule is set, the speaker is no longer required. Why would it be otherwise? This is what you must account for if you intend to argue against me. I'm still waiting for a proper response to this from you. Are you going to attempt to justify your idealist premise?

If the exact meaning cannot be understood from the statement itself, then so be it. That would merely mean that, without knowing the rule that the speaker set, then there would be an objective meaning which couldn't be understood. But we already know that in a scenario where there are no subjects, nothing can be known or understood, because knowing and understanding obviously require a subject. So, here we are once again, with the very problem that I pointed out from the start: this is to once again confuse understanding and meaning, epistemology and metaphysics. This is where your problems stem from. You keep reverting back to epistemology, when I'm making a point about metaphysics. You keep missing the point. Questions such as how the meaning could be known or understood are beside the point. It couldn't without a subject. But that doesn't mean a thing with respect to my argument for objective meaning. The meaning is there, irrespective of whether or not it can be understood. It has already been set.

I'd just say it's something of an outdated model to call the world external, and the mind internal. But I can go along with it. Isn't processing external information a mental activity, on your view?

I mean, even by your own notions of subjectivity, it's not like I can observe your perception.

And so, given that meaning happens in the brain, and perception happens in the brain, and meaning does not require language, it would seem -- at first blush, though I am open to being corrected by you in understanding your position -- that dog perception has meaning.

That's a good point. Though would we call commands moral? I suppose some commands are moral commands, so I can go with it.

Can such statements be true?

And, if true, do they or do they not have a fact? (Or is a fact just a true sentence?)

My premise for question 1 was that you agreed with that your position was that language has rules sufficient to create objective meaning but now you are saying I can understand you without rules. If there aren't rules for English then I don't understand your position any more.

Your counter-argument for question 2 is that you aren't arguing for complete objective meaning. You initially said that because I could understand you, you may have demonstrated either a paradox or a contradiction, now you say that there is no complete objective meaning just partial.

If you can understand the meaning of my words when they lack objective meaning, what's outlandish about you understanding the meaning of my words (at least enough so to allow language to function) if all of them lacked objective meaning?

I don't know what you mean when you use the word "objective" but I can't think of a definition that makes sense with what you're saying. I don't understand what your argument is and I don't understand what I need to prove/disprove to further my case against yours.

What I know is that without objective validity, objective meaning can't exist.

If we categorised all of the types, colours, sizes, shapes, textures and so on which exist under the umbrella term of "apple". In English, what is an apple? It's all of those things and none of those things. It could be any of the viable characterisations in any arrangement. The premise of "an apple" doesn't lead to a conclusion of what precisely is being talked about.

We could go around and take every word that I'm using and demonstrate further that the possibility for interpretation is rather extreme although potentially infrequently utilised by anyone. The end result would be a near non-existent set of rules, words which can have a variety of meanings and contexts, intentions and etc which can change the meaning of the words/phrase.

I said objective validity is the bare minimum for an argument in favour of objective meaning but it's not the ONLY requirement. There are further hurdles to contend with but I don't see the point in bringing them up.

You act like I've presented no evidence worth contending with and I feel like you basically have nothing left to talk about in your favour which may signal it is better to agree to disagree than continue arguing.

Not to just bombard you with questions @Banno I'll write what thoughts came to me after you brought up direction-of-fit:

So, we could say that the meaning of moral statements lies in their direction-of-fit, and in their truth-aptness. And, perhaps some notion of universality that includes all responsible moral actors, or something along those lines, if our notion of truth doesn't happen to include some requirement of aiming at what everyone should do in a specifically moral sense.

Then we might say something like -- "Though shall not kill" is true

And we might say that all true statements are facts -- redefining what I had said a fact was in my attempt at defending moral error theory.

SO rather than there being some empirical element to facts we are just relying upon the notion that facts are true statements -- and we are being liberal enough with the notion of statement to include commands as statements.

This is the part that gets kind of funny, I think. We are no longer correspondence theorists at this point, at least -- which might be too much for some people, though I'm willing to go along with it because I take it that correspondence theory is not a universal theory of truth, but an apt description of how we commonly think of truth. It's just worth noting that here.

At which point I might ask -- is naturalism preservable under other notions of truth? I suppose if by naturalism we mean something along the lines that statements like "Everything that exists is a part of nature" are true then, sure, naturalism is preserved.

But is that was naturalists actually mean, or are they correspondence theorists? I guess that would depend upon the naturalist.


But, to bring this back to Moore, there might be something to his notion of non-natural facts after all.

I'd just say it's something of an outdated model to call the world external, and the mind internal. — Moliere

Would it be outdated to talk about internal and external to something like a refrigerator? Because that's more or less similar to the distinction. It's a locational distinction primarily.

Isn't processing external information a mental activity, on your view? — Moliere

Mentally processing it, you mean? Obviously that's a mental activity.

I mean, even by your own notions of subjectivity, it's not like I can observe your perception. — Moliere

Sure, and the relevance of that is?

And so, given that meaning happens in the brain, and perception happens in the brain, and meaning does not require language, it would seem -- at first blush, though I am open to being corrected by you in understanding your position -- that dog perception has meaning. — Moliere

Dogs and many other animals may have very similar mental phenomena to us, and there's no reason to believe that we're the only animals with language.

The closer other animals' brains are to our own the more reason we have to believe they experience similar mental phenomena.

Emancipate is expanding my definition in a way which may bring greater clarity to how interpretation works for us all. — Judaka

I doubt that anything that he says will bring greater clarity. On the contrary, it will compound the problem by creating a greater need for clarity. I am not a member of his cult, and I am unfamiliar with his cryptic language. If only there were a filter here which could automatically translate what he says into ordinary English.

My premise for question 1 was that you agreed with that your position was that language has rules sufficient to create objective meaning but now you are saying I can understand you without rules. If there aren't rules for English then I don't understand your position any more. — Judaka

I didn't say that there aren't rules for English, and there is no contradiction between it being the case that language has rules sufficient to create objective meaning, and it being that case that you can now understand me without relying on the language rules because you've already learnt them, such that your understanding of what I'm saying is second nature. You couldn't have done that without the necessary earlier stage of learning the rules.

Your counter-argument for question 2 is that you aren't arguing for complete objective meaning. You initially said that because I could understand you, you may have demonstrated either a paradox or a contradiction, now you say that there is no complete objective meaning just partial. — Judaka

I've changed my mind since I made that point about incomplete objective meaning. I unwittingly fell into your error of confusing meaning and understanding. The meaning would be complete. It would be the understanding which would be incomplete. The latter is irrelevant to my position on objective meaning.

And I stand by the evident paradox/contradiction I demonstrated earlier. I'm curious as to how you think you can resolve it.

If you can understand the meaning of my words when they lack objective meaning, what's outlandish about you understanding the meaning of my words (at least enough so to allow language to function) if all of them lacked objective meaning? — Judaka

They don't lack objective meaning.

I don't know what you mean when you use the word "objective" but I can't think of a definition that makes sense with what you're saying. I don't understand what your argument is and I don't understand what I need to prove/disprove to further my case against yours. — Judaka

What I mean by "objective" in this context is that the meaning of a language, once set, is independent of any subject. My claim is about what it takes for there to be linguistic meaning, not what it takes for linguistic meaning to be understood. This entails that if all subjects ceased to exist this very moment, there would continue to be linguistic meaning. This is because meaning is rule based, and the rules have been set. The rules wouldn't cease to apply just because there are no subjects. That makes no sense. It would still be the case, for example, that, in English, the word "car" means a road vehicle, typically with four wheels, powered by an internal combustion engine and able to carry a small number of people.

My position is a form of realism, and the other position is a form of idealism. Idealism is a load of twaddle.

What I know is that without objective validity, objective meaning can't exist.

If we categorised all of the types, colours, sizes, shapes, textures and so on which exist under the umbrella term of "apple". In English, what is an apple? It's all of those things and none of those things. It could be any of the viable characterisations in any arrangement. The premise of "an apple" doesn't lead to a conclusion of what precisely is being talked about. — Judaka

What's the supposed relevance of precision? You seem to be committing the continuum fallacy. Wittgenstein was right with his point about family resemblance. We understand what an apple is, even if we cannot come up with a definition capable of covering every single variation of an apple.

We could go around and take every word that I'm using and demonstrate further that the possibility for interpretation is rather extreme although potentially infrequently utilised by anyone. The end result would be a near non-existent set of rules, words which can have a variety of meanings and contexts, intentions and etc which can change the meaning of the words/phrase. — Judaka

Interpretation is irrelevant to my point. Again, the specific language rules are set by the speaker, and once they have been set, then there is a specific meaning, irrespective of whether that specific meaning is, or can be, interpreted precisely or even at all. Incomplete understanding does not mean incomplete meaning.

I said objective validity is the bare minimum for an argument in favour of objective meaning but it's not the ONLY requirement. There are further hurdles to contend with but I don't see the point in bringing them up.

You act like I've presented no evidence worth contending with and I feel like you basically have nothing left to talk about in your favour which may signal it is better to agree to disagree than continue arguing. — Judaka

What you're calling "objective validity", based on the definition you gave earlier, is basically just logical validity. A logically valid argument is an argument of a form whereby if the premises are true, then the conclusion is necessarily true.

If you think that you can demonstrate that my argument is not logically valid, then be my guest. You have failed to do so thus far, and you have failed to support your apparent idealism for which you have a burden of proof. If you reject my realism, then what's your alternative, and where is your demonstration of it?

Would it be outdated to talk about internal and external to something like a refrigerator? Because that's more or less similar to the distinction. It's a locational distinction primarily. — Terrapin Station

It just has a Cartesian ring to it -- but It's not like I am in here and the world I experience is out there. I am a part of the world. Further, it's not like the world is composed of sense-data.

But if you're being more literal, as in, inside the space within my skull is where the perception is, then OK.

I think I can get along well enough with the terminology that it shouldn't be a problem.

Mentally processing it, you mean? Obviously that's a mental activity. — Terrapin Station

Sure.

Sure, and the relevance of that is? — Terrapin Station

That perception is mental -- since I thought subjectivity and mental were pretty well linked for you.

I'm mostly just trying to get a hold of your terminology here. So when you say --

Meaning is subjective. It's something that occurs in individuals' heads. It's the inherently mental act of making associations. It can't be literally shared, but we can tell others what we're associating in many cases. You can't know how an individual is doing this without asking them. — Terrapin Station

That makes me think that perception is also meaningful, since perception requires the mental act of making associations, which seems different than what I'd say but I can go along with it. Also I'd say that meaning is tied to language, but you say it is not -- that it is something primarily mental, and not necessarily linked to language.

Dogs and many other animals may have very similar mental phenomena to us, and there's no reason to believe that we're the only animals with language.

The closer other animals' brains are to our own the more reason we have to believe they experience similar mental phenomena. — Terrapin Station

I'd say that this is language in the broad sense, but not in the narrow sense -- dogs do not speak English. We speak English. English is just one type of language, as there are many languages, but it doesn't matter which (human) language you choose a dog will not learn how to speak it.

Perhaps dogs speak dog. But even if that is so surely you can see the difference between dog and human language? Or is there none?

Perhaps dogs speak dog. But even if that is so surely you can see the difference between dog and human language? Or is there none? — Moliere

:lol:

Heh. I hope I don't come across as too funny. I really don't mean to be. I'm just trying to grapple with the ideas and see where they lead more than anything. If there is no difference then maybe we just think of language differently, but that's alright -- @Terrapin Station would certainly not be alone in thinking that human language is basically equivalent to a series of barks dictated by our evolutionary heritage and continued because of said heritage, to reproduce, ultimately signifying nothing.

Commands are not statements, so they do not have a truth value.

Cool.

So rather than "Thou shalt not kill" you might say "Killing is wrong"? And the same sort of analysis should then apply?

So rather than "Thou shalt not kill" you might say "Killing is wrong"? — Moliere

Seems so.

So some statements have a direction of world-to-word; Such statements can sometimes be re-parsed in an imperative mood. If that imperative applies to all individuals it is a moral imperative.

"Killing is wrong" can be re-parsed as "don't kill". If "Killing is wrong" is true, then one ought follow the imperative "Don't kill".

Seems OK. Counterexamples, anyone?

Here's something else to consider, especially if you are thinking along the lines of meaning being somehow internal - @Terrapin Station?

If meaning is something in one's mind, and your mind is distinct from my mind, then the meaning in my mind is not the very same as the meaning in your mind.

For example, "Paris" will have one meaning for you, and a different meaning for me.

SO when we talk about "Paris", we each mean the term in a different way.

That is, when we each talk about Paris, we are not talking about the same thing.

And yet, in a very real sense, we do both talk about Paris.

Sense and reference, intension and extension, that sort of thing.

but It's not like I am in here and the world I experience is out there. I am a part of the world. — Moliere

Refrigerators are a part of the world. But aren't some things inside of refrigerators and some things outside of them?

I want to reconsider the circularity of interpretation again; taking interpretation here to mean replacing one set of words with another.

There was mention above, in the discussion between @S and @Judaka, of language as following rules. Now a rule is another set of words... So rule-following as an explanation of language use involves the same sort of circularity as is found in looking up words in a dictionary.

The answer?

There is a way of understanding a rule that is not found in reciting it, but in actually following the rule.

"Stop at a traffic light" can be parsed in terms of saying one must press the brake until all motion stops and place the car in first gear ready to move off if the light is red; or one can actually demonstrate stopping at the red light. Both express the rule.

But it's the demonstration of rule-following that is most important.

That is, when we each talk about Paris, we are not talking about the same thing.

And yet, in a very real sense, we do both talk about Paris. — Banno

You're perhaps conflating the referent and meaning?

Not conflating - distinguishing.

If meaning is all inside one's head, how is it that you and I can talk together about Paris?

If meaning is all inside one's head, how is it that you and I can talk together about Paris? — Banno

You say "blah blah blah Paris."

I hear it.

I assign the meanings I do to those sounds, and as long as I can make sense, per my meanings, concepts, etc., of what you said, especially in the context of other things you've said (and will say), that amounts to understanding you.

I say, "Yeah, bleh bleh bleh Paris."

You hear it and assign the meanings you do to those sounds, and as long as you can make sense, per your meanings, concepts, etc. of what I said, especially in the context of other things I've said (and will say), that amounts to understanding me.

That's how we communicate.

Keep in mind that quite often people say things that don't make sense, per individuals' meanings, concepts, etc. That happens often on this board, for example. (And there are some people who post here frequently who I can never make sense of. They tend to be the people who are the most fond of continental philosophers . . . well, and/or some of the Aristotle fans.)

But much of the time, especially with simpler, more common utterances, we can make sense of what other people say.

It's not that complicated. It doesn't at all require that we have the same meanings in mind.

Yes.