How would you provide justice for every person murdered? There's often no good evidence regarding just who perpetrated a murder.

But there's no other way. It's either that or nothing, and nothing isn't a real option. You can't just switch off your moral feelings.

The experience you've described in this discussion is of feeling and thinking about the stuff of ethics differently over time. That's not so unusual, and it's no reasonable basis for rejecting a position such as mine. — S

I am not sure what you position is. However It does not follow that if you reject objective morality you have endorse a "feelings" approach.. People have spent a lot of time and effort on and written a huge amount on morality wherein they have not simply been referring to their feelings

The equivalent is the notion of ether in physics. The ether was believed to exist and was a serious postulate that turned out not to exist. People have rigorously examined moral issues and that is what might lead them to moral nihilism. The role of emotion in morality has been one among different postulates

I don't see how feelings can resolve a moral dispute or how you can know which of your feelings is the appropriate one.

How would you provide justice for every person murdered? There's often no good evidence regarding just who perpetrated a murder. — Terrapin Station

I am not attempting to do that I am just pointing out the failures of morality.

Another problem for morality is humans persistent bad behaviour. Humans don't even abide by their own moral codes. We have done slavery, war, racism,sexism etc.

I am not sure what you position is. — Andrew4Handel

In what respect? You must have picked up something. I'm not a moral objectivist and I'm not a moral nihilist. I'm a moral subjectivist.

However It does not follow that if you reject objective morality you have endorse a "feelings" approach. — Andrew4Handel

That wasn't my argument.

People have spent a lot of time and effort on and written a huge amount on morality wherein they have not simply been referring to their feelings. — Andrew4Handel

So?

The equivalent is the notion of ether in physics. The ether was believed to exist and was a serious postulate that turned out not to exist. People have rigorously examined moral issues and that is what might lead them to moral nihilism. — Andrew4Handel

That's a hilarious comparison. That's only appropriate in relation to objective morality. Subjective morality is extremely obvious, as you yourself have noted with your reference to YouTube comments. To conclude moral nihilism, you'd have to reject moral subjectivism, but you haven't provided a strong enough argument for rejecting moral subjectivism. What you have argued against is a caricature of moral subjectivism where morality is mindless and anything goes. Morality is what you make of it. You don't have to share the crass moral judgements of others under moral subjectivism.

The role of emotion in morality has been one among different postulates. — Andrew4Handel

So? These comments are irrelevant or at least incomplete.

I don't see how feelings can resolve a moral dispute or how you can know which of your feelings is the appropriate one. — Andrew4Handel

Through appealing to empathy and reason. And again, infallibility is unnecessary. You just go with what you feel and think is right at the time. There's no other option. Well, there's throwing the baby out with the bathwater, but that's unreasonable.

My first post in this thread.

1. Do what is positive for the well-being of yourself and others combined.
2. Morality is an evolving process and each situation must be assessed carefully according to point 1.
3. Assessing what is morally good needs to involve current knowledge about human psychology, sociology, and knowledge about human well-being for the individual and larger groups. — Christoffer

Adjustments to that list of points:

1. Do what is positive for the assessed well-being of yourself and others combined.
2. What is well-being need to be assessed according to each situation.
3. Assessing what is morally good needs to involve current knowledge about human psychology, sociology and common/advanced definitions about human well-being for the individual and larger groups.
4. If the consequence of the choice isn't within the assessed parameters of well-being even though the choice was carefully defined to the best possible assessment of well-being, the choice is still good (the one assessing the choice cannot see the future).
5. Neither can the assessed choice be considered morally bad if unforeseen consequences occur later on. But the assessed choice need to take everything possible into consideration to the best ability of the one making the choice.
6. The choice is about maximizing the assessed well-being.

If we are to find an objective method to calculate a morally good choice, this is as close as I can get at the moment. If you take into consideration, psychology, sociology, common definitions of well-being but also advanced forms, like a relief of pain by death; take into consideration further consequences, how it affect society, larger groups and yourself at the same time. Then you can end up at a choice that tries to maximize the assessed well-being and in doing so make a morally good choice.

But at the same time, we have common definitions of well-being. We do not harm, kill or inflict pain on people and call that "well-being". So the above is the detailed argument for situations like my allegory about aliens. But we can simplify it to standard definitions of well-being, as it is defined by a dictonary: https://www.dictionary.com/browse/wellbeing
We can argue details about this definition, but in order for the method to be practical we can distill it down to:

1. Do what is positive for the well-being of yourself and the group combined.
2. Assess the well-being according to current knowledge about human psychology, sociology and standard definition of well-being.
3. If the choice is made with careful consideration of point 2 with the intention of point 1, it is considered a morally good choice at the time the choice was made to the best of your ability.

This is a practical method in our society, even if our society shifts. But this simplification is based on the standard and common definition of "well-being". What is and what is not well-being is in this regard academic, not practical. Moral choices based on emotion does not work since emotions can be corrupted. A person might feel good about killing others, but considering that "good morals" based on his emotions is flawed.

Yes, you could argue a nihilistic point of view and say that there are no moral values what so ever. But if good and bad morals should be defined, this method defines it outside of emotion and feelings, focusing on assessing well-being to the best of the choice-makers ability. If good morals are about maximizing well-being in yourself and others combined and bad morals are the opposite, this method can calculate the difference between them without feelings or emotions involved.

People have been killed in terrible ways or died in slavery and there has been no justice. It is rather futile moralizing about an event like this when there is no hope of justice. Religious moralities have offered an afterlife justice of some sort or karma. But if you don't believe in this or objective morality then lots have people have suffered with no recompense, recognition or hope. — Andrew4Handel

Calculate the maximized well-being for yourself and everyone else. The result might not be obvious, but I consider that "good morals". Justice has nothing to do with morals since justice is an invention out of emotional responses to an immoral act, so morals comes first, justice is another question entirely, but what you choose to do with that justice is a moral choice and can be assessed.

You just go with what you feel and think is right at the time — S

That is highly problematic because people feel all manner of things at different stages in their life and different moods. My ethical intuitions lead me to moral nihilism based on the evidence from human behaviour, history and the innate lack of justice. I don't think the fact that I don't like a certain behaviour makes it wrong.

It sounds like you are just selecting some things you like and calling that your morality.

I don't think reason and empathy can resolve moral disputes and they certainly haven't resolved all the on-going moral disputes including meta-ethical disputes. I think you are putting too much faith in peoples moral discernment.

I was badly bullied in school and in my local area until I was in my late teens and I did not realize it was inappropriate at the time. Now that I look back and think how terrible it was it is too late. People can have all sorts of confused emotions and a lack of intuition and cultural or peer group generated emotions.

You just go with what you feel and think is right at the time. There's no other option. — S

Look at the method above, isn't that an option? Feelings can be corrupted and therefore, if you base morals on it, you essentially throw all moral values out the window. There's no point to define morals at all. The method above is my attempt to define a moral scale that isn't connected to emotions but still generate what we would consider good morals by the common definition.

No, you can deduce what is good for you. — Christoffer

I think you can deduce what is good for your physical body but not necessarily what is a good action or purpose. I think physical health can be fairly uncontroversial but as to what we should do with our lives I don't see answers.

Have you ever had the (dis)pleasure of reading Fear and Trembling?

Silentio's account of the knight of faith and Abraham comes pretty close to a plausible account that is far better than anything I've cooked up.

When it's more dissimilar or not understood is when you get the "bad reasoning" judgment. — Terrapin Station

I don't think that this is accurate. Not understanding that you are even dealing with an argument is not a judgement of the content of that argument. It's a failure to communicate. There is a difference between "I do not understand this because it is Chinese" and "I do not understand this because the argument confuses me".

Re validity, there are different species of logic and different definitions of validity. For example, validity is different in relevance logics than in traditional logic. (And quirks with the traditional definition of validity was really the whole initial motivation for relevance logics.) — Terrapin Station

But does this impact my argument? If I can reason about logic and try to iron out "quirks" could this not also apply to morality? Do the proponents of relevance logic merely feel that traditional logic has quirks or is this more than just a personal impression? If it is just a personal impression, is their work useless?

I think when someone says "Murder is wrong" they mean it is wrong to inflict serious harm on someone and rob them of life.

I do not think they are saying "I feel it is wrong to harm someone" I people usually mean it is the harm that makes the action wrong.

So the problem is it actually wrong to murder someone or does it just feel wrong?

I think you can deduce what is good for your physical body but not necessarily what is a good action or purpose. I think physical health can be fairly uncontroversial but as to what we should do with our lives I don't see answers. — Andrew4Handel

Look at the method I provided. You mean it's impossible to find out if an action is good or bad with that? Well-being is not only about physical health. If you find the method I wrote isn't working, please point out where the flaws are.

So the problem is it actually wrong to murder someone or does it just feel wrong? — Andrew4Handel

Murder for selfish pleasure or personal gain...
Does it maximize well-being for you and others combined?

By the common standard definition of well-being, no.

Therefore, murder in this situation is morally bad.

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Murder or rather, killing someone to save others.
Does it maximize well-being for you and others combined?

By the common standard definition of well-being, yes, it maximizes the well-being. Not doing it is to let others die and fill yourself with the guilt of that consequence.

Therefore, killing someone in this situation is morally good.


Can there be dire consequences outside of this, yes, but the assessment of the situation defines the morality of you, not if you can predict the future or not.

That is highly problematic because people feel all manner of things at different stages in their life and different moods. — Andrew4Handel

It's an irresolvable problem. You have a burden to justify what I don't think you can justify, namely that it's justified to reject a position just because it is fallible. You need to stop evading this point I've made multiple times and begin to actually address it.

My ethical intuitions lead me to moral nihilism based on the evidence from human behaviour, history and the innate lack of justice. I don't think the fact that I don't like a certain behaviour makes it wrong. — Andrew4Handel

Please do not send us around in circles. Focus! What did I say before? I said that whatever you like or dislike is not relevant unless it leads to moral judgement. This is what you need to address for our discussion to progress rather than revert back to a previous stage.

I also said something along the lines that it's not realistically possible for you to refrain from moral judgement. You're not a lion, and running around after deer won't make you one. I suspect that your meta-ethics is influenced by your psychology. You want to be a lion, figuratively speaking. Some sort of escapism or coping mechanism.

It sounds like you are just selecting some things you like and calling that your morality. — Andrew4Handel

It sounds like you're just trying to trivialise my position, and make it seem weaker than it is. I haven't endorsed the caricature of moral subjectivism where it is a simple matter of like and dislike, so you should stop wasting time with this straw man. There are different categories of feelings and different levels of severity. I'm only talking about moral feelings, not feelings of any other kind, like feelings about foodstuffs. That's the wrong category, and it isn't anywhere near the level of severity of my feelings about murder.

I don't think reason and empathy can resolve moral disputes and they certainly haven't resolved all the on-going moral disputes including meta-ethical disputes. I think you are putting too much faith in peoples moral discernment. — Andrew4Handel

That's an example of fallacious black-and-white thinking. They can and sometimes do resolve moral disputes, whether you recognise that or not. But, once again, it's not an infallible method, and it doesn't need to be. It's unreasonable of you to expect of it what is practically impossible, like infallibility and resolving all disputes.

I was badly bullied in school and in my local area until I was in my late teens and I did not realize it was inappropriate at the time. Now that I look back and think how terrible it was it is too late. People can have all sorts of confused emotions and a lack of intuition and cultural or peer group generated emotions. — Andrew4Handel

You have an annoying tendency to leave out your conclusion. I went by a different standard when I was at school. I wouldn't behave the way I did back then. I changed. It doesn't follow from that that we should throw the baby out with the bathwater, which is what you're effectively doing. You need to understand that you're being unreasonable.

I guess I shouldn't be surprised, as you're also an anti-natalist, aren't you? Even though that seems incompatible with moral nihilism, since it's a moral stance, not an amoral stance. Anti-natalists also throw the baby out with the bathwater. Have you no understanding or appreciation for balance and proportionality? Why do you jump to such extremes?

Look at the method above, isn't that an option? — Christoffer

An option for who? Let's say for you. That depends. How do you feel about it? It would be lose-lose for you, I think. You either concede to the emotional foundation in ethical judgement, in which case yes, it's an option; or you implausibly deny any associated feelings of relevance, and at the same time tacitly admit that it is just an empty formula, which isn't what I consider to even fit the category of morality, meaning that no, it's not an option.

Feelings can be corrupted and therefore, if you base morals on it, you essentially throw all moral values out the window. There's no point to define morals at all. — Christoffer

No, that doesn't follow. That's the same error that Andrew is making. Fallibility isn't sufficient reason for rejection. That argument is untenable. But feel free to try a different argument.

The method above is my attempt to define a moral scale that isn't connected to emotions but still generate what we would consider good morals by the common definition. — Christoffer

Again, the problem is twofold: 1) it's not plausible that it's disconnected from emotions, and 2) even if it is disconnected from emotions, then it doesn't come under morality in any way that makes sense.

I think when someone says "Murder is wrong" they mean it is wrong to inflict serious harm on someone and rob them of life. — Andrew4Handel

That only makes sense in the hidden context where they already feel that serious harm is wrong. Whatever you say, you can always go back a step until you can't go back any further, and that's where it ends in the emotional foundation.

namely that it's justified to reject a position just because it is fallible — S

I am not sure what position I'm supposed to be rejecting.

My initial argument is that feelings is not a sufficient basis for morality.
The reason is that it is not sufficient to resolve moral disputes or to enforce morality or reflect the gravity of a harm.

For example imagine your family (god forbid) were murdered. Would you put any significance on my feelings in this situation?

You seem to be saying that because my intuitions don't match yours I am misguided and not you, when we are both apparently restricted to the same methodology.

My bullying experience is troubling because I spent years being victimized without defending myself. Now that I have a more robust intuition paradoxically I am not facing that situation. I would like to have recognition of childhood abuse that happened to me but people claim it is unfeasible and to pull your socks up. Now that I judge my whole childhood to be abusive in various ways no one is interested in compensating me for that. What is the point of moral intuition at this stage?

I am not sure what position I'm supposed to be rejecting. — Andrew4Handel

Well then work towards an understanding. It isn't helpful to simply say "I'm not sure what your position is".

Also, I'm going to take this opportunity to say that I really don't like your style of reply where you only quote a tiny part of what I say and then miss out the rest, or when you don't quote me at all. It makes me feel like I'm typing it all up for nothing and wasting my time. It doesn't feel like quid pro quo. Can you please quote and address all - or at least most - of what I say by breaking it down into key sections, quote by quote? Otherwise I might decide to stop engaging you.

In fact, I was going to continue with the rest of your reply, but I think I'm going to stop right here instead.

I don't think people would believe something was wrong if they perceived no harm from the action, unless they were under duress.

For example, no one I know thinks eating bananas is wrong

In order to convince someone this was wrong you would have to provide good evidence or a threat. You might say bananas were poisonous or that God would strike you down if you ate bananas, or that bananas caused cancer. Or just create a threatening environment around bananas.

So I think a lot of basic instinctual morality is based around actual harm or threat and not simply derived from emotional responses to it.

I think a morality divorced from actual real world harm would be absurd

I read it but a long time ago. I'd have to review it.

Okay, I'm over your annoying way of replying to me enough for me to reply to you. Take two:

I am not sure what position I'm supposed to be rejecting. — Andrew4Handel

Mine, it seemed. It seemed as though you were rejecting it on the basis that it's fallible.

My initial argument is that feelings is not a sufficient basis for morality.
The reason is that it is not sufficient to resolve moral disputes or to enforce morality or reflect the gravity of a harm. — Andrew4Handel

But no one to my knowledge is advocating that feelings alone are sufficient. It's moral feelings in combination with reason which lead to a moral judgement. Hence that is what we have to work with in trying to convince others. And I don't think that you can rightly generalise about sufficiency in relation to the resolution of moral disputes in the way that you're doing, because there are too many factors which you're leaving out from consideration. In some cases it can be successful, and in others it can fail, and the reasons why one particular outcome occurs instead of a different outcome is actually very complex, and relates to technique and psychology.

For example imagine your family (god forbid) were murdered. Would you put any significance on my feelings in this situation? — Andrew4Handel

Likely none greater than that of mine, as you'd expect.

You seem to be saying that because my intuitions don't match yours I am misguided and not you, when we are both apparently restricted to the same methodology. — Andrew4Handel

But it's two different perspectives. How can that not be massively relevant? The methodology is the same, but a variation in the results is to be expected if we have different feelings on the matter.

Where is this leading? Is it leading anywhere at all?

My bullying experience is troubling because I spent years being victimized without defending myself. Now that I have a more robust intuition paradoxically I am not facing that situation. I would like to have recognition of childhood abuse that happened to me but people claim it is unfeasible and to pull your socks up. Now that I judge my whole childhood to be abusive in various ways no one is interested in compensating me for that. What is the point of moral intuition at this stage? — Andrew4Handel

So, just because you can't change your own past, you now see no "point" in moral intuition? Sorry if this sounds abrupt, but how is this anything other than your own personal psychological dilemma? How does this relate back to a reasonable discussion of metaethics? I think that there is probably a "point" for moral intuitions in an evolutionary sense. But this seems like a tangent.

An option for who? Let's say for you. That depends. How do you feel about it? It would be lose-lose for you, I think. You either concede to the emotional foundation in ethical judgement, in which case yes, it's an option; or you implausibly deny any associated feelings of relevance, and at the same time tacitly admit that it is just an empty formula, which isn't what I consider to even fit the category of morality, meaning that no, it's not an option. — S

So it's not able to act as a moral guide in order for us to, as close as possible, conclude in what we generally define good morals as objectively as possible? Either we try and define a moral that works for all or we abandon morality as a concept altogether. I don't see any reason to try and define morality without any parameters. The desire to maximize well-being for the self and others combined is as close to a general good moral we can get and that method assesses that for any moral choice. You seem to miss that the assessment of well-being is for the self and others combined. That's the key because otherwise it's either giving up well-being for either yourself or others in any given choice. To maximize it for both pushes you towards a balanced moral choice. The things you bring up are already addressed in that argument. I don't see anything that really breaks the method, only your judgment of it because you are of the opinion it is impossible, but the method itself is still solid.

No, that doesn't follow. That's the same error that Andrew is making. Fallibility isn't sufficient reason for rejection. That argument is untenable. But feel free to try a different argument. — S

The point is that you cannot base morals on feelings since there are people who are so corrupted in their emotional life that what you consider good morals, they consider bad and vice versa. So you cannot measure morality based on emotional responses of events. The argument for using emotions to define morality is flawed from the beginning so that needs to be a solid argument first.

Again, the problem is twofold: 1) it's not plausible that it's disconnected from emotions, and 2) even if it is disconnected from emotions, then it doesn't come under morality in any way that makes sense — S

These points are not counter arguments since you define morality based on emotions and you assume that conclusion to be true before you present the premises above. In my argument, I argue that emotions are feedback on the choices we make, but assessing what is morally good or bad can only be assessed through a common parameter between all humans. I.e well-being. Emotions are detached from assessing what is well-being, you can deduce those things through that method, make the choice and let emotions enter after that.

Why is emotion necessary in order to make a moral choice? What happens if you have a mental health issue that means you lack empathy. How do you make good moral choices in any given situation? If you can't feel empathy or normal emotions, you can still calculate what is good for others. You could understand that a hug generates higher dopamine and because of this, heightens the feeling of well-being.

I really don't see how your argument is more valid when you assume your conclusion true before making the argument. I don't define morality to be based on emotions since the argument about corrupted emotions makes it impossible to scale morality based on it. Well-being is scalable as a measurement that you can base moral choices on, even for those who have corrupted emotions.

That only makes sense in the hidden context where they already feel that serious harm is wrong. Whatever you say, you can always go back a step until you can't go back any further, and that's where it ends in the emotional foundation. — S

It doesn't have to. You can deduce a conclusion that harm is the opposite of well-being by the very definitions of those words. If you have your own idea that the harm you do is for their well-being and test that idea against common standard definitions, you would come to the conclusion that you are wrong and that the harm you do is morally wrong. You are talking about emotional guesswork, but if you use something like the method I brought up, then you are calculating the choice outside of your emotional spectra and personal definitions. What are the common standard definitions of harm and well-being? Are you saying you are unable to calculate a choice of what is morally good or morally bad when you test the choice against harm and well-being? If you kill someone, is that morally good or bad? What maximizes well-being for both you and others combined? You can't calculate that into an answer about whether killing is good or bad? Doesn't matter what you feel, you cannot argue it isn't harmful to the one you kill, therefore it's morally bad. If you add more parameters to the situation, it gets more complex, but you can still assess where the choice end up between good or bad morality.

That is, if you agree that morality can be assessed outside of emotions, which I argue you can.

I think what people are getting at is that you decide the basis for morality, for you its suffering/harm, for emotional reasons and not objective ones.
I think what you are getting at is an objective standard after the fact. The analogy I use is a ruler, say one that measures inches. An inch isnt objective, a person made up the inch and how long it is, it is man made and not objective. However, once this has been done you have an objective standard, an inch is an inch regardless of peoples feelings about it. Morality is like that, and I think the discussion here is divided by that distinction. The points made against you are talking in terms of the basis for morality, which is subjective or feelings or whatever term you want to use. Your points are being made in terms of already established parameters (objective standard) , which you are refering to in your arguments. You are asking, “ok, see that 12” ruler? How many inches do you think that tree over there is in height?”.
Obviously, morality is a lot more complex than a ruler but I think it makes the point. Does that fit with what you are saying or am I talking out my ass?

I think what people are getting at is that you decide the basis for morality, for you its suffering/harm, for emotional reasons and not objective ones. — DingoJones

No, for me it's a calculated choice about others and my own well-being. I do not define it by suffering/harm without calculation about in what way it is harmful or cause suffering. It's not an emotional value choice for me. I take the common, standard definition of well-being and harm and use it for the calculation of the moral value of a choice. I don't apply my emotions to that calculation, only the common standard definitions of harm and well-being and measuring in what way harm and well-being apply to the situation. I can assess if someone is harmed without any emotional value.

I don't call my morality objective I say the method is a way to calculate objectively, outside of my emotional and subjective experience. There are no objective moral values in the method. You can argue in favor of killing someone being a good moral choice if the deduction of that choice shows it to be the best moral route. Objectiveness, in this method, is about it being detached from our subjective moral opinions and be able to apply the method for all people, even the emotionally corrupted.

Try using the method on any moral situation, can you assess good moral choices with it? If not, we need to adjust its parameters. The method itself doesn't create solid and strict moral rules, it is a calculation for what is the optimal good moral based on our understanding of harm and well-being. How to assess harm and well-being is done out of our knowledge in psychology and sociology, so it's not even about opinion in that assessment.

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The problem with defining moral by emotion and feelings is that the rulebook goes out the window and morality, good and bad morals cease to exist since they can't be defined. If morality is whatever you feel like it to be, then there's no point in even labeling it as moral. My coffee cup is morality because I feel like my morals measure by the amount of coffee in my coffee cup, therefore my coffee cup is my morality. It's an absurd conclusion.

The second is to have strict moral doctrines, like in religion. The problem here is that the only reason to act well is that of divine reward. I'd say that humans should be capable to act well without a false authority invented for that control and it's needed when God and religion go out the window. You cannot tell an atheist to act according to religious doctrines. While some doctrines teach good morals to be killing in the name of God, stoning people and whatever. It's a corrupted way of defining morals since people in power can change the doctrines over time, it's not universal for us as humans.

So we are unable to define morals based on emotions because they are unable to apply to anything but the subjective individual and we cannot define morals based on religious doctrines since they can be corrupted. That leaves morals being undefinable. Still, we value things that act as baseline definers for morality. All people, in any society, can, for the most part, define harm and well-being. So instead of trying to define morality as something fluid and subjective maxim or some strict doctrine, let it be fluid, but based on strict parameters. This way, morality can change according to the situation, but you always calculate the level of harm and well-being, trying to maximize it to both yourself and others.

Is this method flawed? What moral choices can't be calculated with this method? Instead of people saying the method doesn't work I haven't seen any examples of testing it to conclude that it's flawed, only opinions on it being so based on personal definitions of morality.

The basics are this:
- Morality based on emotions can be corrupted and render morality undefined and without any form.
- Morality based on strict set out doctrines can be corrupted and render morality undefined and without any form while being used as a control mechanism for people in power.
- General morality can therefore not be defined by humans, as it then becomes corrupted, it needs to be defined by something else.
- Definitions on "harm" and on "well-being" are generally existing within all societies.
- Morality calculated through a solid method of defining each situations well-being and harm measurements is a way of detaching our emotions and our strict doctrines on morals from morality to assess a more general idea about good and bad morals in each situation.
- The moral choice can change, but the method's parameters cannot and that keeps the calculation from forming corrupted moral values like what happens with religious and emotional morality assessments.

Without defining good and bad morals, why even have the concept of morality? It's a concept without meaning if it isn't able to be defined outside of whatever we feel like it to be.

It's OK. The general notion is that not only is Abraham under consideration, but the very same act of Abraham is under consideration -- so you could say that this is the same aspect of Abraham. Silentio never resolves the conflict, but goes back and forth between judging Abraham a moral monster or a knight of a faith and seems to hold both beliefs simultaneously.

Now, I don't think we have to be quite as intense as Kierkegaard makes his namesake in our own attachments -- it was just something that came to mind that demonstrates how we can feel seemingly opposing emotions towards the very same thing.

The part you quoted was sloppily put by me, I meant “you” in the general sense not “you” as in Christoffer.
Not sure you bothered reading the rest since that opening sounded like a miscomprehension on my part, but you go on to describe precisely what I went on to describe.

Yeah, wasn't really arguing against, just wanted to try and clarify my point of view on the subject of morality. I don't say my method is tested, done and finished, but I do think there is a way to create a method to calculate good and bad morals in order to guard morality against human corruption.

- Definitions on "harm" and on "well-being" are generally existing within all societies. — Christoffer

This is the subjective bit people are taking issue with. This forms the basis of your standard, but it itself is based in subjective/feelings. I don’t think what you are saying is mutually exclusive to that, nor vice versa, but I think this is what people are getting at.

Yes, but earlier I divided the method into one which carefully defines well-being before you calculate how that well-being is being applied to the situation in order to calculate the choice.

The more simple and practical method is one which acts upon the standard definition of well-being and harm that we have. But it doesn't make the final moral choice calculated by the method, simple, it just uses these as parameters so that it's impossible to make moral choices into whatever feels right or whatever you want it to be. Assessing the well-being of someone is done through the other points in the method, by using psychology and sociology as rational and by the facts as possible or within the current knowledge at the moment. That means that the definition of well-being is being calculated by such means, not by an emotional value of what well-being is.

Would you argue that the definition of harm and well-being as they are defined as concepts in our society is wrong? In what other ways can you define these concepts? Do they ever become so differently defined that they cannot be used in my method?