It's all a bit weird, but that's counterfactuals for you. Few of them make much logical sense. — andrewk

Well, they do outside of this thread.

So, how do you address the issue of trans-world identification?

In all honesty, i don't understand how you could possibly ask that after the first few pages of this thread, let lone the next fifty. It's as if you hadn't understood any of it. Bloody unbelievable.

Transworld identity is not a problem because transworld identity is stipulated, not discovered.

Remember that?

If you had understood it, you could point out to @andrewk where he has gone astray.

This is like trying to teach table manners to a kangaroo.

The actual-world properties by which we identify the person depend on what our counterfactual is... — andrewk

:rofl:

'John Kennedy' is a rigid designator referring to a particular entity in all possible worlds. 'Jack Kennedy' is also a rigid designator referring to a particular entity in all possible worlds. In this actual world, they are the same entity, which means that 'John Kennedy' and 'Jack Kennedy' mean the same thing. But normally (assuming analycity), when words mean the same thing, we can interchange them in a sentence. But the sentence "is John Kennedy Jack Kennedy?" does not mean the same as "is John Kennedy John Kennedy?". The first is a question about the proper application of an alternative name, the second is nonsense. So the terms 'John Kennedy' and 'Jack Kennedy' do not mean the same thing in each use within a sentence.

That's what I was referring to.

Ok, that much I understand. But, the standard length of a meter isn't stipulated, is it?

Napoleon: "See this here stick? From now on, we call the length of this stick, right here and now, 'one metre'. Got that? And it works in all possible worlds, right? Just like any proper name"


Well, it probably didn't quite get a baptism like that, but it might have...

So, let me break it down.

The meter stick is not the rigid designator, but the length of the meter stick is? How can this be?

No, the proper name "metre" is the rigid designator. It refers to a specific length in every possible world.

'John Kennedy' is a rigid designator referring to a particular entity in all possible worlds. 'Jack Kennedy' is also a rigid designator referring to a particular entity in all possible worlds. In this actual world, they are the same entity, which means that 'John Kennedy' and 'Jack Kennedy' mean the same thing. — Isaac

Having the same referent is not equivalent to meaning the same thing...

Having the same referent is not equivalent to meaning the same thing... — creativesoul

Unless you've solved the arguments around sense and reference I think what you meant to say was that having the same referent is not necessarily equivalent to meaning the same thing. (there seems to be something of an epidemic of this sort of absolutist hyperbole in this forum at the moment, this thread is a classic, you'd think Kripke had solved reference and the rest of the linguistics department might as well retire).

Notwithstanding that, however, you're basically making the point I was trying to make. Two uses of the term 'Nixon' can be used in different senses, and so saying that any use applied to one must apply to the other is not necessarily accurate. The overly simplistic idea that if 'Nixon' means 'the individual named Nixon', then the sentence "Nixon might not have been named Nixon" would be obviously contradictory, relies on both uses of the word 'Nixon' having to have the same sense. I'm just pointing out that they needn't.

Unless you've solved the arguments around sense and reference I think what you meant to say was that having the same referent is not necessarily equivalent to meaning the same thing. — Isaac

I said precisely what I meant.

From the very beginning of rudimentary, elementary, and/or otherwise basic thought/belief formation throughout the ends of our lives and amongst some of the most complex linguistically informed notions of thought and belief that we can imagine...

During our entire thought-life, a referent is always picked out of this world. Meaning is part of the picking process. Having the same referent is not equivalent to meaning the same thing... ever. The meaning of a statement/proposition and it's referent are not equivalent... ever. Reference and meaning are not equivalent... ever.

That said...

I'm not all that clear on what "the arguments around sense and reference" is referring to, nor do I care much at all to get mired in such historical baggage. That is confidently said as a result of knowing that I haven't adopted the terminological framework, conceptual scheme, historical academic school of thought, and/or taxonomy/lexicon that those problems arose from. That much I can guarantee. Thus, there is ample good reason to doubt that I arrive at those same issues.

With that much in mind, it always behooves us all to remain aware of our own fallibilities. Very important. So, as aways I'm ready, willing, and able to learn better through better reasoning. I've not seen this yet. Unless someone here can show me how my framework suffers the same problems as the academic ones you're referring to, they're an utterly inadequate means by which to measure their own unseen problems. My position sets those out and simultaneously avoids them.

Don't get me wrong here. These aren't flippant dismissals I'm expressing here. Rather, I am more than happy to not only grant but readily acknowledge the tremendous mental abilities of philosophers of old, particularly given the familial, social, cultural, and/or historical particular circumstances. In the bigger picture, thought and belief begin simply and grow in complexity. The history of human knowledge supports this. Therefore, because we ought be confident in the kings' wisdom given their individual particular circumstances, we can conclude that if those problems were solvable by the available means(linguistic/terminological framework) at their disposal, they would have been solved already. They're not. There's no better reason to begin to question the framework itself.

It's taking an account of that which exists prior to the account itself. Therefore, it can be very wrong...


A thought/belief system is 'self-contained'. No one makes a mistake on purpose. We cannot see the flaws in our own thought/belief system. Godel shows that that is true of all axiomatic and/or otherwise purely inductive reasoning. Granted, not all thought/belief is purely inductive/axiomatic type thinking. However, that kind of thinking(axiomatic/inductive) - is itself - thinking about thought/belief. Thought/belief is something that exists in it's entirety, prior to our account of it. Our account of it is existentially dependent upon lots of things like shared meaning and/or language use itself. What we're taking account of is not always. Some thought/belief is prior to language. All thought/belief systems begin simply and grow in complexity.

If we could see our own flaws, none of us would ever have false belief. Rather, amongst other things, it takes someone else to show us our flaws. But I digress...

If two sides of a historical debate both shared the same flaw, then neither side would be able to see it. Some problems are consequences stemming from our terminological use and dissolve all by themselves when better language comes to bear. So, I suspect there's nothing for me to 'solve' despite others finding themselves needing to.

Open the lid...

...you're basically making the point I was trying to make. Two uses of the term 'Nixon' can be used in different senses, and so saying that any use applied to one must apply to the other is not necessarily accurate. — Isaac

I don't think we were making the same point.

You're talking about the rules of thinking about thought/belief:What we're doing here... now... You're then applying that to all reference and/or sense. Some of that is prior to your account, ya know? The methodological/terminological framework you've adopted cannot take that into account.

I'm talking about what all successful reference takes and applying that standard to the differing positions actively taking account of reference at any level.

Sense, on my view, is equivalent to accepted usage. Some of the same terminological expressions mean different things to different people. These are different senses. Sense is existentially dependent upon shared meaning. Shared meaning is existentially dependent upon two creatures drawing mental correlations between the same things. That is existentially dependent upon a plurality of capable creatures.

The overly simplistic idea that if 'Nixon' means 'the individual named Nixon', then the sentence "Nixon might not have been named Nixon" would be obviously contradictory, relies on both uses of the word 'Nixon' having to have the same sense. I'm just pointing out that they needn't. — Isaac

I've no idea what you're trying to say here either. Here's what I do know...

If "Nixon" means the same thing as "the individual named 'Nixon'" then both are capable of standing in as proxy - one for the other - without losing coherence and/or changing truth conditions of the statement/proposition containing them. If two different designators mean the same thing, then we will be able to effectively substitute one for the other.

If we replace "Nixon" with "the individual named 'Nixon'" and reconstruct the claim in question, we arrive at the following, which I'm sure we'll all agree amounts to gibberish...


The individual named Nixon might not have been named the individual named Nixon.




That clearly doesn't work regardless of how we use quotes. Now, let's try the other...


Nixon might not have been named Nixon.

That makes perfect sense when spoken and/or written in lots of cases.

When written, successful reference may vary due to the different senses in use being represented by the same marks. So, depending upon both the reader and the writer the sensibility of the second can and often does make perfect sense. Other times can be more precise as well. Philosophers are the only ones to get themselves all befuddled... along with those around them at times.

"Nixon might not have been named 'Nixon'" is as clear as a bell. "The individual named Nixon might not have been named the individual named Nixon" is gibberish.

Because the already meaningful example loses all sensibility when we attempt to substitute one for the other, we can only conclude that...

...the name and description do not have the same meaning despite the fact that they have the same referent. That was the point. It has been made.

What problems of reference and sense?

:joke:

What is a counterfactual existentially dependent for successful reference?

What is a counterfactual existentially dependent on to successfully refer to it? — Wallows

Some notions of counterfactual are rubbish. Simply put, being counter to fact is existentially dependent upon prior facts.

What is a counterfactual existentially dependent on to successfully refer to it? — Wallows

One can successfully refer to each and every individual particular conception of counterfactual by virtue of talking about the name(counterfactual) and the definitions/descriptions...

...John Kennedy' and 'Jack Kennedy' mean the same thing. — Isaac

I would bet that "Jack Kennedy" has far more emotional/familial connections to Jack Kennedy and his remaining family than "John Kennedy" does...

My friends call me "Jack"...

I'm using the word 'means' is a term to capture both sense and reference in actual use. The question is why is it necessary in the example being used to replace both instances of the term 'Nixon' with the same meaning?

"Nixon might not have been named 'Nixon' " is as clear as a bell. — creativesoul

Not to me.

If I were to hear somebody say such a thing I would ask them what on Earth they were on about. Fortunately, I have never heard anybody say such a thing. And I have only ever seen it written in a context of people arguing over philosophy of language.

I'm not saying it can't be made sense of, given a good deal of additional explanation. But that explanation is needed, and that need means it is definitely not 'as clear as a bell'.

Here, for comparison, are some statements that are 'as clear as a bell':

- I am hungry.
- I admire Nixon
- All dogs are mammals
- What is your name?
- Take your hands OFF that red, auto-destruct button!

It means, if we rolled back in a time machine (which is impossible), to way back before Nixon and his family got the name, and somehow got them to use a different name, then Nixon would not be named "Nixon".

More simply put, it's contradiction, clear as a bell.

What? You've never heard of counterfactuals?

Sure I've heard of counterfactuals

A counterfactual is a useful logical tool. But if it is used to say "if X were not named X ...", then it is just being used in an attempt to bypass the law of identity, and consequently legitimize contradiction.

How about, "John could have been named Andrew?"

Or what about "John would have been named Andrew, if his parents picked a different name?"

Do you seriously not understand these sentences?

I am saying that:

(1) they are ambiguous, and need more detail to clarify the particular meaning, and

(2) as stated and in isolation, it would be extraordinary for somebody to say it - and the same goes for your statement about John. It is not part of normal language, does not warrant analysis, and any analysis that is conducted of it tells us nothing about how language is used. There are certainly longer statements that bear some superficial similarity to it, that one could imagine being used (eg Pat says 'Oh Richard, I do love you and want to marry you, but I wish you had a Scottish name like McGillicuddy instead of plain old Nixon. I always fancied having a long, exotic last name'), but the context of those statements makes the meaning clear, which is not the case for 'Nixon might not have been named "Nixon" '.

(2) as stated and in isolation, it would be extraordinary for somebody to say it — andrewk

How????

It is not part of normal language, — andrewk

According to who??? What on Earth is in any way strange about those sentences???

This is the most baffling thing I've ever heard. Where the hell do you get these intuitions that perfectly normal sentences are things that we can't analyze for some reason?

There are certainly longer statements that bear some superficial similarity to it, that one could imagine being used (eg Pat says 'Oh Richard, I do love you and want to marry you, but I wish you had a Scottish name like McGillicuddy instead of plain old Nixon. I always fancied having a long, exotic last name') — andrewk

So let me get this straight. You get to pull entire made up conversations out of your ass, but simple sentences are just too bizarre to warrant analysis.

intuitions that perfectly normal sentences are things that we can't analyze for some reason? — Snakes Alive

Perfectly normal? Have you ever heard somebody say such a thing out of the blue?

All I can say is that, if you regard that as a perfectly normal sentence when uttered in isolation, your life experience of conversation must have been radically different from mine.

This is the most baffling thing I've ever heard. — Snakes Alive

I find that surprising. But nevertheless I am chuffed to learn that I have that unique honour and I thank you for notifying me.

Perfectly normal? Have you ever heard somebody say such a thing out of the blue? — andrewk

Yes! Parents talk about naming their kids all the time, and what names they would have had if such-and-such!

All I can say is that, if you regard that as a perfectly normal sentence when uttered in isolation, your life experience of conversation must have been radically different from mine. — andrewk

You've never fucking heard people talk about counterfactual situations in which someone has a different name?