However what would this approach look like if there was agreement when one is using propositions and one is using purely grammar- when one is looking how we understand the world using propositions, and one is using how we understand names using modal logic? — schopenhauer1

The difference is profound, while subtle.

SO one says that gold has an atomic mass of 79, and hence if some sample has another atomic mass, it is not gold.

The other says that gold has an atomic mass of 79, and hence if some sample has another atomic mass, we ought not call it "gold".

:wink:

Was it just a mistake to include "yellow" in the essence of gold? Perhaps if we remove that, we have some agreement between Kripke and Kant. .
— Banno

I think it was, especially keeping in mind the definition of analyticity and with Kripke's further critique using modal logic. — schopenhauer1

Yoohoo! Depends on a careful definition of what Kant meant by "yellow," don't you think? You can play with this all you want but the substantive issues don't go away.

And,

Only, I'm going to follow Davidson and say that incommensurability is not an option. If two groups of ideas don't meet well, then one or both of them are wrong. — Banno

Sure. But I am sure you have had the experience that when you thoroughly analyze something, it turns out to be not what you thought it was, or the distinctions to be made not where you supposed they might be. With respect to two sets of ideas, does it not depend on the thing that is the mean between them - the third term? Which in itself is arguably subject to a fourth term, and so on?

Whereof we cannot speak, and so on. How does this part of the discussion relate back to Kant and Kripke? — Banno

Some things that we know a priori are necessarily true, like the LONC. Kripke just adds that you also have a priori knowledge about your own choices.

Yoohoo! Depends on a careful definition of what Kant meant by "yellow," don't you think? You can play with this all you want but the substantive issues don't go away. — tim wood

No I don't. I certainly don't think that yellow is necessarily wrapped up in the meaning of gold, in the same way that bachelors is literally the definition of unmarried males. Yellow seems to me a contingent property of gold- it doesn't have to be a primary property. If it wasn't yellow, it wouldn't make it any less "gold". So that statement synthetic a posteriori.

However, if we took away the atomic number of 79, it certainly wouldn't be gold anymore. However, even according to Kant's own idea of judgements, this proposition wouldn't be analytic. It certainly is something I had to find out in the world (synthetic), but holds universally and necessarily true. However, you can correct me where you think I misapply Kant.

Depends on a careful definition of what Kant meant by "yellow," — tim wood

But of course we wouldn't want to just be adding auxiliary hypotheses in order to protect our pet theory.

I am under the impression that "primary and secondary characteristics," credited by English readers to Locke, was investigated much earlier by continental philosophers; i.e., non-English. But I don't have any citation.

Anyway, the entire notion of primary v. secondary was (again, no citation) blown up long, long ago. What really matters is a strict definition of "yellow." Oh, wait, you don't think so. Nothing about gold, then, then determines its color under a specified light - maybe I should be talking about its spectrum; i.e., maybe gold has a specific spectrum.

However, you can correct me where you think I misapply Kant. — schopenhauer1

I think you misapply Kant in that you overlook that he is talking about judgments.

Neither of my rings would be accurately described as yellow.

But of course we wouldn't want to just be adding auxiliary hypotheses in order to protect our pet theory. — Banno

You ought to able to do better than that. It's not to "protect a pet theory" but to assist folks to a better - necessary - understanding of what they're criticizing.

Neither of my rings would be accurately described as yellow. — Banno

BECAUSE THEY'RE NOT PURE GOLD! Pardon.

But then the gold ingots I have seen weren't much different.

Anyway, that's all beside the point. I think @schopenhauer1 has a pretty good response. Along with @frank's suggestion.

Ah! I see. You bought them. Well, if they're not yellow, may I suggest you have the assayed?

You bought them. — tim wood

Nah. Watched the Demonstration at the WA mint. They melt a gold bar and then set it. It's not yellow. It's - gold.

If it wasn't yellow, it wouldn't make it any less "gold". — schopenhauer1

Eh? Really? There's gold that's not yellow (or "gold" as Banno would have it)?

Eh? Really? There's gold that's not yellow (or "gold" as Banno would have it)? — tim wood

I guess the point is- what makes gold essentially gold? Is it its yellowness? But, I see where you are coming from using Kant's own theory of categories. Before we can define gold, we must figure out what is legitimate in a definition. Kripke and @Banno are claiming that modal logic seems to indicate that only certain essential properties can be considered gold, otherwise it is not designating gold, really.

I can see where the clash comes in though. As I mentioned before, Kant is interested in how we understand the world through our transcendental lens. Thus other possible worlds logic would be conditioned by our very own epistemology. His work did not seem to go beyond the scope of what is possible outside of our own psychological understanding in this world.

Hi. Yours is the kind of synthetic reply that provides clarity and furthers a discussion, in my opinion. It seems to me, in response to your good sense, that part of the difficulty lies in how "all possible worlds" (APW) and PWS are got to, from here. Kant, being some eighty years before Medeleev, I think could not have known gold was an element. He might even not have had a concept of elements. And the connection of his judgment to any fact about gold is more than I know.

But we do know gold is an element. AU, then, is AU wherever in the universe you go, in those places where there is gold (maybe none in some places in the universe, maybe where atoms cannot exist). That leaves the question, what does "gold" mean in the context of APW and PWS. My answer: it doesn't mean anything in those worlds because they're just conjectural worlds concocted to test certain logical propositions. Which means in brief, you can't get theah from heah, and you cant get heah from theah, as Bert says to Ernie. And "existence" in any such world does not imply existence in ours.

I accept correction.

Which Kant was careful to make clear and document. — tim wood

Really, I don't remember Kant stressing that it purely depended on how individuals formulated their concepts, so that an a priori claim that holds for one person might not hold for another. Wouldn't that basically negate the idea of there being any necessary a priori claims in a broader context (rather than, as I noted, only possibly amounting to someone being stringent or stubborn in their concept-usage over time?)

But we do know gold is an element. AU, then, is AU wherever in the universe you go, in those places where there is gold (maybe none in some places in the universe, maybe where atoms cannot exist). That leaves the question, what does "gold" mean in the context of APW and PWS. My answer: it doesn't mean anything in those worlds because they're just conjectural worlds concocted to test certain logical propositions. Which means in brief, you can't get theah from heah, and you cant get heah from theah, as Bert says to Ernie. And "existence" in any such world does not imply existence in ours. — tim wood

Kripke was concerned with names. That is the main point we must not forget with him. His question is, "How do proper names and natural kinds designate their referent?". Statements like, "Gold is a yellow metal" were not good enough for him. To him, these "descriptivist models" of names and natural kinds were too weak to really designate "that" kind of natural kind. For example, "The definition of gold is a metallic yellow substance" doesn't hold up. In another possible world, metallic, yellow, and substance might not be how to describe gold, but gold would still somehow retain its goldness in those worlds. It is considering what properties hold up in these worlds, that he considers the name gold to actually designate "that" kind of natural kind. Thus, since it is a name that is given to an object after experiencing an object and sensing it in the world, it is a posteriori. However, unlike most other a posteriori statements that are contingent, the NAME gold is always and necessarily attached (rigidly designated) to some essential property in all possible worlds (something like let's say the atomic number 79). If it doesn't have this essential property, the name "gold" does not rigidly designate that object. Thus he says that Kant is missing a category for necessary a posteriori judgements, like the ones (he thinks) are needed for rigidly designating proper names and natural kinds.

As far as Kant's synthetic a priori- I think I take back my statement that atomic number 79 being essential to gold is a synthetic a priori statement. In Kant's view, this should simply be synthetic a posteriori. It is gained through experience which makes it a posteriori and it is adding information that is not contained in the subject, so it is synthetic.

Synthetic a priori would be things like cause and effect and mathematics. You don't need to experience things in the world for them be proven, but they are also not contained in the subject by definition.

The question for me is, if ɸ is a priory, is ɸ also necessary? — Banno

So on your account, some things can be a posteriori and yet necessary - agreeing with Kripke. Gold having an atomic number of 79 being one of these.

And further, gold having atomic number 79 is synthetic; it brings together two distinct concepts, atomic number and gold, or if you prefer the phenomenological experience of gold.

So we have a necessary synthetic statement: gold has atomic number 79.

Or do we take the discovery of gold to be analytic, post hoc? The very idea of gold contains within it the idea of atomic number 79; to be gold is to have atomic number 79; only we needed to do some experiencing in order to learn this...

Or does this whole structure of a priori/a posteriori and synthetic/analytic fall apart on analysis?



AND is being a priory the same as being necessary?

So on your account, some things can be a posteriori and yet necessary - agreeing with Kripke. Gold having an atomic number of 79 being one of these.

And further, gold having atomic number 79 is synthetic; it brings together two distinct concepts, atomic number and gold, or if you prefer the phenomenological experience of gold.

Or do we take the discovery of gold to be analytic, post hoc? The very idea of gold contains within it the idea of atomic number 79; to be gold is to have atomic number 79; only we needed to do some experiencing in order to learn this...

Or does this whole structure of a priori/a posteriori and synthetic/analytic fall apart on analysis?



AND is being a priory the same as being necessary? — Banno

I think these are great questions and pretty much sums up this whole debate.

In order for any of this to work we have to have some basic terms that we all agree on (or at least think Kant agreed on). Let me start with the last question:

AND is being a priory the same as being necessary? — Banno

At first, I thought just that- Kant was saying a priori was just a synonym for universal and/or necessary. Now, I'm thinking it is a bit different. I think Kant's thoughts on a priori literally has to do with the term "prior to". That is to say, if terms are derived prior to (or outside of) experiential observations (with the senses usually), it is an a priori-type statement. Thus, geometric rules like "All triangles have corners that add up to 180 degrees" are not derived from experiential observations of the world (this is at least Kant's interpretation of what we are doing). One doesn't need to observe any particular thing in the world, just understand the concepts using our intuition on how triangles, corners, and degrees work when we make judgements on them. Synthetic means that the proposition is additive and not simply a tautology. Thus, 180 degrees, the concept, is not inherent in a triangle per se, but a conclusion only made through a priori investigation. Thus the sum of the degrees of a triangle is a synthetic a priori judgement.

So on your account, some things can be a posteriori and yet necessary - agreeing with Kripke. Gold having an atomic number of 79 being one of these. — Banno

Yes, if I was following Kripke's reasoning, there indeed does seem to be judgments that are made from observing the world, and as a byproduct of how we use language, create necessary a posteriori truth-statements.

And further, gold having atomic number 79 is synthetic; it brings together two distinct concepts, atomic number and gold, or if you prefer the phenomenological experience of gold. — Banno

Yes, I can agree with this.

So we have a necessary synthetic statement: gold has atomic number 79. — Banno

Technically, this would fall under necessary (if defined as being true in all possible worlds), and it is something that is additive, not just tautological in the subject.

Or do we take the discovery of gold to be analytic, post hoc? The very idea of gold contains within it the idea of atomic number 79; to be gold is to have atomic number 79; only we needed to do some experiencing in order to learn this... — Banno

This is I guess what I believe @tim wood (and maybe Kant?) believed. "Gold is the metal that has atomic number 79" would indeed be a tautology so, indeed this would be an analytical statement.

Or does this whole structure of a priori/a posteriori and synthetic/analytic fall apart on analysis? — Banno

And now we come to the real question at hand. It needs a much crisper demarcation between what counts as analytic and what does not, or this indeed does become arbitrary to the person using the concept. It breaks down unless there is absolute certainty on what fits under what category. If it breaks down, it becomes arbitrary as a way to distinguish truth statements.

So. There are "possible worlds" where Banno isn't Banno. Of course, to be relevant, that Banno must be Banno. If not, then why would we think that the Banno in the other "possible world" that isn't Banno is Banno. In that world he may just be a cruller. If he is a cruller in that world, why would we think he is Banno. And if he is Banno, then the assumption that there are "possible worlds" where he isn't Banno collapses. Which means he is Banno. So Banno is Banno in all possible worlds. Which applies mutis mutandis to everything in all possible worlds. So there is no possible world wherein there is something that is not, in this world. Hmm.

And it would be nice if folks anti-Kant would stop trying to fit his thinking to something it wasn't intended for. Procrustean metaphysics.

Kripke was concerned with names. That is the main point we must not forget with him. — schopenhauer1

For example, "The definition of gold is a metallic yellow substance" doesn't hold up. In another possible world, metallic, yellow, and substance might not be how to describe gold, but gold would still somehow retain its goldness in those worlds. — schopenhauer1

Gold is not a metallic substance. It's a metal. As to it's being yellow. IT is yellow - or "gold." What you or anyone perceives, who knows. What you call it, who cares. In Greek, gold is chrysos (approximately). That is, what's in a name. And apparently gold in all possible worlds is gold, though it may go by a different name. But we proved that must be so just above.

Godel's undecidable proposition can be made reasonably clear in a paragraph or two. Is the notion of "all possible worlds" so obscure and arcane it cannot be? Challenge: make it clear, keep it simple. If you cannot do it, how do we know you know what you're writing about?

Question: What does, "all possible worlds" mean?
And, does logical necessity imply existential necessity when applied to analytic a priori judgments? — tim wood

Everybody seems to know what a possible world is - any world without a contradiction.

Does logical necessity imply existential necessity?

What do you mean by ''existential necessity''?

So. There are "possible worlds" where Banno isn't Banno. Of course, to be relevant, that Banno must be Banno. If not, then why would we think that the Banno in the other "possible world" that isn't Banno is Banno. In that world he may just be a cruller. If he is a cruller in that world, why would we think he is Banno. And if he is Banno, then the assumption that there are "possible worlds" where he isn't Banno collapses. Which means he is Banno. So Banno is Banno in all possible worlds. Which applies mutis mutandis to everything in all possible worlds. So there is no possible world wherein there is something that is not, in this world. Hmm. — tim wood

Banno is indeed Banno in every possible world in which I exist. In no world am I a doughnut, a fruit cake or anything other than human. Although in some worlds my name is Tim Wood. I am not Banno in all possible worlds, since one can posit a possible world without me in it.

It seems that you are happy to accept that science has moved on since Kant. So has logic.

It is necessary that a priori knowledge is necessary. It must be so because "a priori" refers to principles which cannot be justified by experience. Since they cannot be justified by experience, the only thing which makes them acceptable as true, is the assumption that they are necessary. If we reject their necessity then there would be absolutely no reason to accept them as true.

It is necessary that a priori knowledge is necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I didn't mean that Kant didn't think a priori to be necessary. I just meant that being necessary isn't a fully sufficient definition of a priori.

I agree, to discuss things in terms of necessity, is to use different categories than Kant uses.

There are two fundamentally different types of necessity, that which is prior to logical process, as needed for it, and that which is posterior to logical process, as that which is made necessary by logic. But this is not equivalent to Kant's a priori/a posteriori division.

We must be careful not to equivocate between these two senses of necessity, and I think Kant's categories may create ambiguity. His, are probably not the best that could be drawn..

We must be careful not to equivocate between these two senses of necessity, and I think Kant's categories may create ambiguity. His, are probably not the best that could be drawn.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I think this exercise is kind of proving that out. The fuzziness between what counts as analytic or synthetic in the definition of gold, for example makes that seem the case.

The problem I see is that the principles by which we proceed into logical process, the propositions as premises, which are necessary for logic to proceed, are usually principles which are derived from experience. So if there is such a thing as "a priori" in Kant's sense, some sort of principles which are not derived from experience (and if I remember correctly, he provides a convincing argument for the reality of this), then these must be something like the rules of the logical processes themselves. It's questionable whether a priori principles could even be accurately put into words, because the use of words is learned from experience. For example, what would be the rule for counting? Add one. But even stating with "one", simple unity, is to take an empirically induced principle. If we do not start with one, what sort of rule for counting could we produce?

Add one. But even stating with "one", simple unity, is to take an empirically induced principle. If we do not start with one, what sort of rule for counting could we produce? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but did Kant himself think that "one simple unity" was empirical? I think to him, numbers themselves and counting were all a priori, though possibly synthetic. Again, that's where I get confused with Kant. He doesn't demarcate enough. His examples are kind of fuzzy and taken as givens of why they are a priori sometimes.

Banno is indeed Banno in every possible world in which I exist. In no world am I a doughnut, a fruit cake or anything other than human. Although in some worlds my name is Tim Wood. I am not Banno in all possible worlds, since one can posit a possible world without me in it. — Banno

Let me see if I get this. Whenever there is a case of a Banno in a possible world, then it is Banno. There are possible worlds - worlds we can posit - in which there is no Banno. And of the Bannos that are, some may have different names. "Posit," your word, is very like conceive. Or does it mean something different that conceive? Square circles. Conceivable. Positable? Possible?

Questions: What is an example of something that is true in all possible wolds (i.e., cannot be conceived to be false in any possible world)?

If it's just a matter of names, where does that get anyone, and how?

Gold, in whatever world found, is just gold, yes? (If Banno is always Banno....) But it can differ from one possible world to another? - or is it just the language used in connection with it? If it differs, how is it gold?