did. Lost in the fog of Janus' posts. — Banno

I'll start a thread on it just to get it straight in my mind. It's an interesting issue.

Yes. The thread has been ruined by the odd insistence of two folk that we not progress past the first few pages. A new thread is appropriate.

So, we haven't really covered the necessity part of Kripke's book. Or did I sleep through it?

Given that there are folk here who will not read or refer to the actual text at hand, I have no reason to think secondary or tertiary texts wold help. The first paragraph of the Wiki article on definite descriptions shows were Janus is wrong, yet he bulldozes on.

But, you do agree that in some cases where ambiguity arises about the object of interest, that a definite description can attain the status of a rigid designator?

No. 'Donald Trump' picking out Donald Trump is not contingent on his being named so in another world. — Snakes Alive

I didn't say it was; I said it was contingent upon the man named Donald Trump being so named in this world. — Janus


Yeah, so? That's a trivial fact. How does that mean the name isn't a rigid designator? — Snakes Alive

I haven't said the name is not a rigid designator and the fact might or might be be "trivial", but that is irrelevant since I was merely correcting your mistaken reading of what I had said.

In any case if you say it is a trivial fact, then you agree thereby that it is a fact. A name by itself does not rigidly designate, it can do so only in a context either ostensive or descriptive; do you acknowledge that?

As I see it there are two related issues when it comes to reference: the referentiality of names and the referentiality of descriptions. If a name definitely refers to a particular entity we can say that it rigidly designates that entity. The fact of the name definitely referring is a fact of this world, and it is on account of that fact that the name can be used to definitely refer to the entity it designates in counterfactual or possible scenarios.

The referentialty of descriptions is subject to the same conditions; if a description definitely refers to a particular entity we can say it rigidly designates that entity. The fact of the description definitely referring is a fact of this world, and it is on account of that fact that the description can be used to definitely refer to the entity it designates in counterfactual or possible scenarios.

So, the question becomes: How do we know that a name or a description definitely refers to just one entity?

The only test I can think of is that the name or description should allow anyone with the requisite knowledge to understand the reference of the name or description to infallibly identify which entity is being referred to. So, the name Donald Trump by itself does not definitely designate any entity, since there could be any number of entities (including my car) named Donald Trump. So, then an accompanying description is required to fix which entity named 'Donald Trump' is being referred to.

In contrast to this the description: 'The POTUS at 10.03 AM EST on January 6 2019' does uniquely refer to just one entity. The description 'The entity named Donald Trump' or for short 'Donald Trump' refers to the same entity iff the entity named Donald Trump is in fact named Donald trump and is in fact the POTUS at that time. Moreover, 'The POTUS at 10.03 AM EST on January 6 2019' refers to just one entity (provided there is a POTUS at that time of course) even if we don't know which entity it happens to refer to.

All reference in counterfactual discourse is established by reference to the actual world; and this goes equally for names as it does definite descriptions. — Janus

No, it doesn't. If we say if the South successfully split from the Union, the president of the United States at the end of the 19th century would have governed a smaller territory. Here the definite description does not depend in any way upon who was the president of the United States at which time in the actual world – only in the counterfactual scenario. — Snakes Alive

So, what reference exactly in your scenario is not established by reference in this world? We have "the South", "the Union" and " the president of the United States at the end of the 19th century". Are you saying that the fact that we don't know who would have president of the United States at the end of the 19th century in that alternative scenario is somehow relevant to what I have been arguing? I'm not seeing it.

The referent of the description 'the president of the United States at the end of the 19th century' in the alternate scenario may or may not have been the same person who was president of the US at that time, but the reference is not a definite reference to a particular person in this alternative scenario (since we obviously cannot identify who that would be), but to whatever person would have been president in that scenario. 'President', 'United States' and 'end of the 19th Century' are all designations that are established only by reference to this world, though.

This is simply irrelevant. Yes you could name anything anything you wanted. So what? The name, as it is actually used, based on the actual naming convention, rigidly designates. — Snakes Alive

There are two points, which you seem unable to grasp. The first is that names only rigidly designate by virtue of descriptive or ostensive contexts. The second is that names are themselves shorthand descriptions, the definiteness of which depend on further description. 'Donald Trump' is equivalent to 'the entity named 'Donald Trump' and doesn't rigidly designate until further information is provided: 'the man named Donald Trump who was POTUS at December 5 2019' for example; or 'the car that was named Donald Trump at (insert latitude and longitude) at (insert precise time)'.

So, we haven't really covered the necessity part of Kripke's book. Or did I sleep through it? — Wallows

Did you have a particular part in mind? The concept of necessity is used in most parts of the book except some passages in lectures 2 and 3. It is used most heavily in the middle part of lecture 1, p34ff in my version, where he discusses the relationship between 'necessary' and a priori. Is that the bit you meant?

It is possible, even probable (if the Good Lord spares me), that I will go shopping tomorrow. I might go to Asda, or I might go to Aldi. Until tomorrow, which possible world will be actual is unknowable. The actual world of tomorrow is on equal footing with any (other) possible world of tomorrow - until tomorrow. — unenlightened

All the referents there: you, Asda, Aldi are established by reference to this world, so I am not clear what point you are trying to make here un.

It is used most heavily in the middle part of lecture 1, p34ff in my version, where he discusses the relationship between 'necessary' and a priori. Is that the bit you meant? — andrewk

Yes, I suppose so. What are your thoughts about it?

The fact of the name definitely referring is a fact of this world, and it is on account of that fact that the name can be used to definitely refer to the entity it designates in counterfactual or possible scenarios. — Janus

What is the relevance of this? It's trivial, and doesn't have anything to do with the claim that names are rigid designators. Any word needs to have certain conditions met for it to be employed – there have to be people who speak a certain language, etc. That names have such conditions is unsurprising, and no one has denied it. It is also not the issue on whihc the descriptivist v. Kripkean accounts turn.

So, the name Donald Trump by itself does not definitely designate any entity, since there could be any number of entities (including my car) named Donald Trump. — Janus

Again, this is just not relevant. It doesn't matter who or what might be named this or that. We're not talking about what names could denote if the language had been different in this or that way.

There are two points, which you seem unable to grasp. The first is that names only rigidly designate by virtue of descriptive or ostensive contexts. The second is that names are themselves shorthand descriptions, the definiteness of which depend on further description. 'Donald Trump' is equivalent to 'the entity named 'Donald Trump' and doesn't rigidly designate until further information is provided: 'the man named Donald Trump who was POTUS at December 5 2019' for example; or 'the car that was named Donald Trump at (insert latitude and longitude) at (insert precise time)'. — Janus

I think you are not reading the text, because this is precisely what is at issue, not background to be agreed upon. Kripke also addresses the view than a name N means 'the entity named N,' briefly. This view is not equivalent to the sort of classical descriptivism that Kripke is targeting. I think this latter view has more plausibility than the classical one, though it too is ultimately incorrect, because names are observably rigid in a way that descriptions like 'the entity called N' are not.

Oh, Lawd. All this confusion about definite descriptions... I've always thought that definite descriptions like Jesus being the Son of God are what enable baptism of names, which for some odd reason we haven't even touched on.

Anyone care to take a stab at baptism in contrapositive with definite descriptions?

It's trivial, and doesn't have anything to do with the claim that names are rigid designators. — Snakes Alive

It's not trivial because it shows that the rigidly designative capacity of names is dependent on description (or ostention) in ways that I have repeatedly stated that I take Kripke to be disagreeing with. If Kripke is not disagreeing then those I have been arguing with have been arguing about nothing. But if that were true then Kripke would not really be saying anything that is itself more than trivial.

I think this latter view has more plausibility than the classical one, though it too is ultimately incorrect, because names are observably rigid in a way that descriptions like 'the entity called N' are not. — Snakes Alive

'N' and 'the entity called N' seem to me to be logically equivalent. You are suggesting they are not; can you explain why you would think that. "The entity called N" is a description and it shows that names are really shorthand descriptions (outside of ostensive contexts at least), although perhaps not in the way that some of the descriptivists may have thought. The other possibility is that Kripke and his supporters are misrepresenting the descriptivist's accounts (I am not familiar enough with descriptivist literature to give an opinion about that).

The first paragraph of the Wiki article on definite descriptions shows were Janus is wrong, yet he bulldozes on. — Banno

Then you should be able to give a concise summary of my position and why it is wrong. If all you are saying is that I don't strictly adhere to Kripke's account, that may well be true, since all I am interested in is trying to clearly explicate the logic of description and naming based on the common senses of our actual practices.

All you seem to be interested in is controlling the direction of this thread and casting aspersions on, and making assertions about, anyone who dares to ask difficult questions about what is being claimed therein. So, is this a free philosophical discussion or not? I mean you, and all participants, are free to completely ignore any posts you don't want to respond to, aren't you?

Well, Banno is still the leader of this reading group and perhaps the most competent person to be it. So, I'm content with how he is doing. Perhaps a new thread is in order in regards to the issue of definite descriptions standing in as designators for names.

Notice how this issue doesn't apply to empty names...

Well, Banno is still the leader of this reading group and perhaps the most competent person to be it. — Wallows

Who voted him to be leader? I haven't seen much evidence of his competence.

I don't have time to read N&N again, so all I've been doing is questioning what has been said in this thread. As I said in my last post, no one need respond if they don't want to, but if they choose to respond then they should do so with reasoned argument, not with bare assertion, innuendo and insult.

I designated him leader when starting the thread. He obliged, and here we are approaching page 52 of a quality thread. I don't mean to sound rude but are you being ungrateful?

Perhaps we can resort to some secondary literature or comparisons or criticisms of the descriptive theory of reference through the lens of Kripke's causal theory of reference.

If Kripke is not disagreeing then those I have been arguing with have been arguing about nothing. — Janus

That looks to be the case.

But if that were true then Kripke would not really be saying anything that is itself more than trivial. — Janus

No. Kripke's point is that the semantic value of a name is not like that of a non-rigid definite description. The latter varies in what it denotes across possible worlds, while a name does not. This is not a question about the processes, whatever they might be, that cause a word to acquire whatever meaning it might have, but rather about what its meaning is.

Kripke later does present a picture of how names come to acquire their meanings, but that's not what's at issue to begin with.

'N' and 'the entity called N' seem to me to be logically equivalent. — Janus

They are not. It is a contingent matter that Trump is named Trump; it is not contingent that Trump is Trump (i.e. that he is himself). In another world, where someone else is called Trump instead of Trump (say, Clinton), then 'the entity called Trump' refers to Clinton in that world, not Trump.

No. Kripke's point is that the semantic value of a name is not like that of a non-rigid definite description. The latter varies in what it denotes across possible worlds, while a name does not. — Snakes Alive

Well, I haven't said anything that contradicts that. I haven't said that a description which cannot infallibly pick out one particular entity could denote one particular entity either in this world or 'across possible worlds". To say that would be a contradiction; an absurdity.

They are not. It is a contingent matter that Trump is named Trump; it is not contingent that Trump is Trump (i.e. that he is himself). In another world, where someone else is called Trump instead of Trump (say, Clinton), then 'the entity called Trump' refers to Clinton in that world, not Trump. — Snakes Alive

I think this is where the misunderstanding lies. It is a contingent matter that Trump is named Trump. Any entity called 'Trump' would not be Trump if it had not been so-called, but of course it would be the same entity. So, when you say "it is not contingent that Trump is Trump" this can be misleading and seems to be leading to a kind of reification of the name, as I suggested earlier. All it really says is that it is not contingent that the entity that is called Trump is the entity that is called Trump. In other words the entity is one and the same; and this is tautologous, or trivially true.

You seem to be conflating the statement 'it is necessary that the entity that is called Trump is the entity that is called Trump' with the statement 'it is contingent that the entity that is called Trump is called Trump'.

You seem to be conflating the statement 'it is necessary that the entity that is called Trump is the entity that is called Trump' with the statement 'it is contingent that the entity that is called Trump is called Trump'. — Janus

What is contingent is that Trump is called Trump. He might have been called something else.

Yes, that's right. Of course we say that Trump would still be Trump even if he had not been called that, and we say that because he has been called that. But we wouldn't say that if he hadn't been called Trump. All we are really saying is that a particular entity is a particular entity regardless of what you call it, and that is tautologously true.

Yes, that's right. Of course we say that Trump would still be Trump even if he had not been called that, and we say that because he has been called that. But we wouldn't say that if he hadn't been called Trump. All we are really saying is that a particular entity is a particular entity regardless of what you call it, and that is tautologously true. — Janus

That is right.

The name refers to the entity; it doesn't refer to whichever entity has that name. That would be what 'the entity called Trump' refers to. This description refers to people besides Trump in different possible worlds, when they have that name instead of him.

Hence 'Trump' doesn't mean the same as 'entity called Trump.' The former refers to Trump; the latter refers to whoever happens to have that name, whether it's Trump or not.

The contentious issue hereabouts seems to be not that we can and do pick an individual out to the exclusion of all others, but rather it seems to be more about what's necessary for that to happen, and whether or not those things remain necessary afterwards.

Hence 'Trump' doesn't mean the same as 'entity called Trump.' The former refers to Trump; the latter refers to whoever happens to have that name, whether it's Trump or not. — Snakes Alive

Again, this seems to be where we disagree. The former (without any further qualification or description) refers to anyone called 'Trump', just as 'the entity called Trump' refers to any entity called Trump unless we give supplementary descriptions sufficient to pick out just one entity.

and whether or not those things remain necessary afterwards. — creativesoul

I get and agree with the first part, but what you want to say with the above is obscure to me.

The former (without any further qualification or description) refers to anyone called 'Trump' — Janus

Not across possible worlds. It may refer to anyone named Trump in the actual world, but once we establish the use of the name by naming conventions, its denotation remains invariant across possible worlds in evaluating counterfactuals. That's not how definite descriptions work.

I don't mean to sound rude but are you being ungrateful? — Wallows

What do I have to be grateful for? Being misread, strawmanned and insulted?

Not across possible worlds. It may refer to anyone named Trump in the actual world, but once we establish the use of the name by naming conventions, its denotation remains invariant across possible worlds in evaluating counterfactuals. That's not how definite descriptions work. — Snakes Alive

Yes, but all you seem to be saying here is that once the particular entity called 'Trump' that is being referred to in this world is established (by ostention or sufficient description) then we can refer to that entity by the name 'Trump' across possible worlds.

So, the point is that once we have established the entity being referred to in this world, by sufficiently definite description, we can use that definite description as it obtained in this world at a particular place, time and date, to establish the same entity being referred to across possible worlds. We need such place/time/date/-indexed descriptions to establish precisely which entity is being referred to in the first place; just a name is not enough.

Yes, but all you seem to be saying here is that once the particular entity called 'Trump' that is being referred to in this world is established (by ostention or sufficient description) then we can refer to that entity by the name 'Trump' across possible worlds. — Janus

Yes, that is the point. Minus the 'ostensive/descriptive' stuff, which I never said.

So, the point is that once we have established the entity being referred to in this world, by sufficiently definite description, we can use that definite description as it obtained in this world at a particular place, time and date, to establish the same entity referred to across possible worlds. We need such place/time/date/-indexed descriptions to establish precisely which entity is being referred to in the first place; just a name is not enough. — Janus

There is no reason to think, IMO, that the initial fixing of the individual requires a definite description either.

Yes, that is the point. Minus the 'ostensive/descriptive' stuff, which I never said. — Snakes Alive

Yes, the "ostensive/descriptive stuff" was in brackets. The point of what I said there was to show that 'Trump' and 'an entity called Trump' are logically equivalent. You don't seem to be disagreeing now, so it would seem that I have shown that to your satisfaction.

There is no reason to think, IMO, that the initial fixing of the individual requires a definite description either. — Snakes Alive

The only other way I could think of would be pointing at the individual, or showing a photograph and the like; in other words: ostention. In the case of "baptism", the original act of naming, for those present it would be ostention and for anyone who subsequently met the baptized entity and was told 'it's name is X' it would be ostention also. For remote figures and historical figures, the referent of the name is established by description, and perhaps by ostention in the form of images: photographs if there are any, drawings, prints or paintings.

The point of what I said there was to show that 'Trump' and 'an entity called Trump' are logically equivalent. — Janus

We've been over this. They aren't. Read above.

The only other way I could think of would be pointing at the individual, or showing a photograph and the like; in other words: ostention. In the case of "baptism", the original act of naming, for those present it would be ostention and for anyone who subsequently met the baptized entity and was told 'it's name is X' it would be ostention also. For remote figures and historical figures, the referent of the name is established by description, and perhaps by ostention in the form of images: photographs if there are any, drawings, prints or paintings. — Janus

I don't think there is any one way in particular names get established, nor is it relevant to the question.