I think it depends on what you mean by "mind". Clearly we can say that your brain is in your head, but not that your head is in your brain.Via your senses you can experience your head; in fact that is the only way you know about it, or anything else. Does that mean its existence is dependent upon your experience of it?

But, taking, for example, quantum mechanics and the observer effect, you have this relationship existing in nature. Take the wave-particle duality as another example. — Wallows

First point: the notion quantum effects in the macro-world are just that, notions; and they're on very shaky ground and can be disregarded unless compelling evidence be given as to their specific and particular relevance.

Second: the ideas of mind and and matter (head) have to be carefully defined and laid out. Michelangelo's David, for example, is just stone, yes? The mind, then, that rises out of matter is just matter, yes?

And your author's "strange loop structure" seems language on holiday. Until and unless you can add more of Wick's idea that develops it a bit more, I'm compelled to dismiss it for lack of substance (for the moment).

And at the moment, it all just seems one of those weeds that can appear in the garden of thinking when that garden is neglected or not carefully attended to. In sum and absent more clarity, I have to judge the ideas represented as artifacts of uncritical use of language

Clearly we can say that your brain is in your head, but not that your head is in your brain. — Janus

No, that would be nonsensical. To say that your mind is in your head and your head is in your mind seems like a legitimate linguistic expression. Is it?

Does that mean its existence is dependent upon your experience of it? — Janus

Yes, it is. Again, the subject/object divide crops up and is in a constant state of perpetuity when we have an observer observing their own behavior.

Second: the ideas of mind and and matter (head) have to be carefully defined and laid out. Michelangelo's David, for example, is just stone, yes? The mind, then, that rises out of matter is just matter, yes? — tim wood

Yes, but, for the sake of discussion we are talking about sentience or consciousness.

And your author's "strange loop structure" seems language on holiday. Until and unless you can add more of Wick's idea that develops it a bit more, I'm compelled to dismiss it for lack of substance (for the moment). — tim wood

He does go on to say the following:

The result of Schopenhauer's discussion is to indicate that the inner nature of the world, or thing - in - itself, transcends the division between subject and object, along with the ceaseless transformation - like traveling along the surface of a Mobius strip - between subjective and objective standpoints inherent in the above antinomy. The inner nature of the world is the ground of the subject - object distinction itself, and is not accessible through proofs or assertions of necessary connection of any kind, whether the connections obtain between concepts, material objects, mathematical or geometrical entities, or personal spiritual entities. Schopenhauer consequently maintains that the thing - in - itself, is toto genere different from representations and the world of representations. If one is to gain access and it will not involve any forms of the principle of sufficient reason. — Robert L. Wicks

What do you think?

Yes, but, for the sake of discussion we are talking about sentience or consciousness. — Wallows

Are you sure? Then how or why would you suppose that sentience or consciousness is made of stone, flesh, brain matter, or any matter at all? I think the roots of the question are choked by confusion about terms and the failure to, if not understand the terms, at the least to define them for the purpose of the discussion. There is also the blending of considerations based in science and in philosophy, without of course making the effort to do make the preparatory - propaedeutic - study needed in order for what follows it to make sense.

Are you claiming to have even any understanding of the second of Wick's paragraphs you've troubled to provide If you do, you're a better man than I am. My impression at the moment is that he must be being paid by a combination of syllables per word, obscurity, nonsense, and the density thereof.

Schopenhauer consequently maintains that the thing - in - itself, is toto genere different from representations and the world of representations. If one is to gain access and it will not involve any forms of the principle of sufficient reason. — Robert L. Wicks

Now this I think I understand: it amounts to this: your idea of a brick is not a brick, and if you want access to the brick (in itself as it is in itself), it won't involve the principle that "nothing is, without reason."

Yes, it is. Again, the subject/object divide crops up and is in a constant state of perpetuity when we have an observer observing their own behavior. — Wallows

But other observers exist independent of your experience of them. Where do they exist relative to your mind? If they are seperate minds then that implies some kind of medium where minds exist which would be the shared world. What seperates minds from each other?

Are you claiming to have even any understanding of the second of Wick's paragraphs you've troubled to provide If you do, you're a better man than I am. My impression at the moment is that he must be being paid by a combination of syllables per word, obscurity, nonsense, and the density thereof. — tim wood

Here a pic from the Wick's book to give you more content:

Now this I think I understand: it amounts to this: your idea of a brick is not a brick, and if you want access to the brick (in itself as it is in itself), it won't involve the principle that "nothing is, without reason." — tim wood

Yes, preliminarily that's the idea. But, Schopenhauer isn't a subscriber to transcendental idealism. He stipulates that the Will is manifest in all living entities, including nature.

But other observers exist independent of your experience of them. Where do they exist relative to your mind? If they are seperate minds then that implies some kind of medium where minds exist which would be the shared world. What seperates minds from each other? — Harry Hindu

Yes, I think solipsism deserves a mention here. Each mind exists in its own subjective-objective nature. But, the world as we know it is composed of individuals. Therefore, we are aware that other minds exist; but, are limited in scope to only own subjective-objective existence. Have a look at the context Schopenhauer is talking about this in the previous reply to Tim Wood.

Sorry, I messed up the ordering of the images. Might have caused confusion.

I corrected it now.

I think indirect realism deserves a mention as well. Why do we experience bodies instead of minds? How can we lie to each other where the contents of another mind isnt what we are told by the body?

It seems to me that minds are objects themselves. You are your mind that exists relative to me. You are nothing more than another object that I can interact with both physically and mentally. We can trade punches and ideas.

It seems to me that minds are objects themselves. You are your mind that exists relative to me. You are nothing more than another object that I can interact with both physically and mentally. — Harry Hindu

Under Schopenhauer's understanding, mind as primary subjects, that can perceive themselves as only subjects. This is where the loop between subjectivity and objectivity arises. I'm still reading along here and can say that the chief element that Schopenhauer mentions is the unclearness of the will of the Will. In some sense, it is a noumena or thing in itself. I'll come back later as I progress through the book.

Yes, it is. — Wallows

So, this would apply to everything, then. You seem to be saying that the existence of anything and everything depends upon our experience of it. Is that right? If it is right, then you are some kind of idealist or anti-realist.

So, this would apply to everything, then. — Janus

The interesting fact that arises from this is that you can go many ways with this line of thought. It could imply monism or panpsychism or transcendental idealism or some other stuff.

You seem to be saying that the existence of anything and everything depends upon our experience of it. — Janus

Well, yea. We don't really know what are qualia, and they seemingly exist given the beetle in a box thought experiment. Language constraints our understanding of reality here because referentially, we seem to always need to denote something when talking about "stuff". But, what does me posting "here" denote? The server in which this forum is made apparent, the conglomerate of individuals posting on this forum?

If it is right, then you are some kind of idealist or anti-realist. — Janus

I think, @Harry Hindu indicated that indirect realism might be more appropriate here. What do you think? :)

Under Schopenhauer's understanding, mind as primary subjects, that can perceive themselves as only subjects. This is where the loop between subjectivity and objectivity arises. I'm still reading along here and can say that the chief element that Schopenhauer mentions is the unclearness of the will of the Will. In some sense, it is a noumena or thing in itself. I'll come back later as I progress through the book. — Wallows

We could just as well say that the mind is an object that observes other objects. We can dispense with the terms, "subjective" and "subject" all together. In this sense, it would be a feedback loop (not a mobius strip), like a camera observing its monitor creating a visual feedback loop.

If something only exists when you experience it, then you exhaust what that thing is. This is direct realism, not idealism or anti-realism. In this sense, idealism and anti-realism refute themselves.

although my mind is in my head, my head is in my mind, — Robert L. Wicks

Oops! No, his head isn't in his mind.

So, how does anyone interpret this Mobius strip constructed and explained by Schopenhauer of the mutual relationship between mind and matter — Wallows

Schopenhauer didn’t construct a Möbius strip, didn’t equate his philosophy to one, didn’t consider it an explanation with respect to the subject/object dichotomy. All Wick did was make Schopenhauer’s version of Kantian Transcendental Idealism unrecognizable.

For a much better synopsis of “mind in my head; head in my mind” characterization, closer I think to the author’s intent, see the introduction to the Cambridge Library’s translation here, particularly pg 20-22: http://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/71846/frontmatter/9780521871846_frontmatter.pdf

Being one of “anyone”, there ya go.......

I think, Harry Hindu indicated that indirect realism might be more appropriate here. What do you think? :) — Wallows

I don't think indirect realism is equivalent to idealism, because idealism, in one way or another, claims that everything is fundamentally mind, whereas indirect realism does not necessarily make any claim about the ultimate constitution of things, but does assert that there is a mind-independent reality, that is reflected in our mind-dependent perceptions.

Thanks for the paper. I think Wick's account is still valid, just misconstrued. His point seems to be that the subject-object distinction is inescapable, and from memory, the only way out of it is through the intellect or aesthetic appreciation of music or art. I'm still fairly early on in the book, so I still have gaps to fill in here and there.

I don't think indirect realism is equivalent to idealism, because idealism, in one way or another, claims that everything is fundamentally mind, whereas indirect realism does not necessarily make any claim about the ultimate constitution of things, but does assert that there is a mind-independent reality, that is reflected in our mind-dependent perceptions. — Janus

I agree; but, think that it is not irreconcilable to assert that indirect realism is at odds with idealism.

Oops! No, his head isn't in his mind. — Terrapin Station

Yeah, its not that his head is in his mind. Its the idea of his head that is in his mind.

The only time his head is in his mind is when he looks in the mirror. But then that isnt really his head either. Its a visual sensory impression of a reflection of his head that is in his mind.

I think Wick's account is still valid — Wallows

I can live with that. I don’t know from which translation (if any) Wick is working, but I’m betting it’s much newer than my 1909 Haldane/Kemp literary antique. Still, both the Masters in question, re: K and S, insist on the ineffectiveness of second party interpretations of novel epistemological enterprise, carrying the implication that if one needs to refer to an interpretation, either he is too lazy or otherwise ill-equipped to comprehend the original. This rears its subliminal head when Wicks himself references Hofstadter for the Möbius strip thing. Which to me, is merely a basic philosophical infraction squared.

FYI, and as the Great And Wonderful Janis Joplin said......of no particular social import.....
Schopenhauer, Preface WWR, 1844: “...And, in general, how is it possible that philosophy, degraded to the position of a means of making one's bread, can fail to degenerate into sophistry? Just because this is infallibly the case, and the rule, “I sing the song of him whose bread I eat,” has always held good, the making of money by philosophy was regarded by the ancients as the characteristic of the sophists. But we have still to add this, that since throughout this world nothing is to be expected, can be demanded, or is to be had for gold but mediocrity, we must be contented with it here also....”

Kant, Preface CPR 1787: “.......it would be more consistent with a wise regard for the interests of science, as well as for those of society, to favour a criticism of this kind (....) than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs of which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel....”

Odd, though, that both of these guys acknowledged his respective philosophy was most likely beyond the general understanding of the crowd to which was explicitly directed, yet decried the method for teaching it to them.

Ever onward, eh?

Odd, though, that both of these guys acknowledged his respective philosophy was most likely beyond the general understanding of the crowd to which was explicitly directed, yet decried the method for teaching it to them. — Mww

Doing their part to cement the self-important asshole template. :wink:

You mean idealism is not necessarily at odds with indirect realism? Maybe Kant's Transcendental idealism could be reconciled with IR, I suppose. There certainly are 'realist' interpreters among the Kant scholars.

Awesome post Mww. I don't know what to say. When does one ever reach an understanding of any particular philosopher seems to be the question here? Wick's book isn't that bad, I agree that I am too lazy to read the entirety of WWAR vol. I&II&III. I suppose interpretations of works will always have this issue that you outlined; but, still think that it's a helpful tool to utilize anyway to hear the words of philosophers in different voices.

You mean idealism is not necessarily at odds with indirect realism? Maybe Kant's Transcendental idealism could be reconciled with IR, I suppose. There certainly are 'realist' interpreters among the Kant scholars. — Janus

Yes, I think indirect realism doesn't necessarily have to be at odds with transcendental idealism. How, I'm not quite sure.

When does one ever reach an understanding of any particular philosopher — Wallows

First.....thanks for the compliment; ‘preciate it. As for when, ehhhhh, damned if I know. Whenever it feels right, I guess. The further back in time one goes in his choice of philosophers to understand, the less information he has to work with and the more the language used in the writing differs from the language used in the understanding. But first and foremost, the major difficulty arises directly from the degree of paradigm shift incorporated in the writing, because even if one thinks he understands what is being said, he must then relinquish his own predispositions in order to agree to any truth that may be found in it. Otherwise......what’s the point, right??

Yes, I think indirect realism doesn't necessarily have to be at odds with transcendental idealism. How, I'm not quite sure. — Wallows

If indirect realism isn't at odds with idealism then there would have to be something other than minds or ideas that separates minds. This would be the medium through which minds communicate - matter.

Do you think philosophy progresses in a dialectical manner? I don't know what to say about philosophers who "really" get the message or anything like that. I suppose everyone can get the message.

Do you think philosophy progresses in a dialectical manner? — Wallows

Dialectical, as in the Socratic dialogues, insofar as reasoned arguments tend towards a truth? Yes, as long as philosophy is discussed among rational folks. Philosophy isn’t dialectical at all, if a single rational folk is just trying to figure stuff out for himself.

If indirect realism isn't at odds with idealism then there would have to be something other than minds or ideas that separates minds. This would be the medium through which minds communicate - matter. — Harry Hindu

Matter, essentially, but, what else can be said?