But what is the negative outcome of no one living a good life? — schopenhauer1

I've answered that loaded question without playing into your hand.

You haven't really answered that except with an elusive "it's a net benefit". Non-existent people don't cry over spilt milk. But it is true actual people will experience adversity if born. Thus Benatar''s asymmetry applies. — schopenhauer1

If it's a choice between a neutral option and a better option, then obviously the better option wins. And the better option is obviously the one with a net benefit.

Not experiencing good, does not matter if there is no actual person being deprived. However, it is always good that someone was not exposed to adversity or harm needlessly — schopenhauer1

That argument doesn't work, in spite of my agreement with you that a nonexistent person cannot be deprived of anything. It doesn't work because as moral agents we are capable of making decisions for better or worse, and if we consciously refrain from making a better decision, then we bear the responsibility for that. So, if we consciously decide to refrain from procreation, knowing that the chances are that procreation will lead to a life worth living, then, without good reason not to, that's the least moral option of the two.

like your notion of someone has to live out a good life for some elusive idea of having a "net benefit" obtain in existence. — schopenhauer1

But you don't have a better alternative. A lifeless world can't be a benefit for anyone.

Odd, but since it is not the usual way of looking at things, you automatically dismiss it. — schopenhauer1

I'm not automatically dismissing it, as anyone following our dialogue can see, I've been providing a reasoned basis for rejecting your position.

And this matters why and for whom? — schopenhauer1

It matters to anyone who cares about the topic, and it matters because, arguably, it counts against your favoured option.

The rest of your paragraph misses the point. So I'll skip past it.

Why does a total matter here? — schopenhauer1

Of course it matters! Why on earth wouldn't it? Because it works against your selectively narrow parameters?

If we are summing up bits of good from everyone in some grand total (in what, a calculator in the sky?) then one can conclude that billions of lives only barely worth living would be the best outcome, but that would make no sense. This idea called the "Repugnant Conclusion" by Derek Parfit, is the kind of outcome you get with utilitarian notions of simply summing up net positive and negative the way you seem to explain it. — schopenhauer1

Sure, lots of contented people, a better alternative to lots of miserable people or a world empty of life... completely bonkers suggestion.

Rather, it should be looked at on the level of harm to the individual, not how an individual somehow adds to the grand total of some universal utilitarian calculation. — schopenhauer1

Right, we should instead look at it in a way that completely clashes with the testimony of the majority of individuals themselves, and leads to valuing extinction over and above people, and over and above proportional solutions to problems. (E.g. you don't blow up a school to avoid going to maths class).

Granted, my opinion comes from the idea of the asymmetry. No person will be harmed, and it is not good or bad if someone is not born to experience good. — schopenhauer1

Neutral vs. good is an easy choice, and that's my justification.

I participated in that thread, and I'll give a second, closer look at posts there, but I'm not sure what to look for. Many posts contain comments like this of yours:

No one needs to go though adversities and life experiences of overcoming-to-get-stronger, if they don't exist in the first place to need it. Why create this need for need? Why create a situation that exposes new people to lacking something that they need to fulfill? Why create a situation that exposes new people to adversity that needs to be overcome? This impulse to create these situations on behalf of someone else is more an indication of the already-living person's inability to cope with the idea of nothingness. Our restless, willful natures prevents creates the notion that a non-existent person is a sad future.. That nothingness is sad. Nothingness is nothing. A philosopher once said, the nothing "noths". Whats wrong with noth-ing? Let non-existent people stay non-existent. Why do people feel we are bearers of some Promethean fire of being that needs to be carried forth and spread? Why use future people as "bearers of knowledge" or "bearers of experience" in such a matter? Is non-existence this scary to people? Is the blessed calm of nothingness seen as a blithe that must be eradicated with the strum und drang of life? What about survival-comfort-relief-boredom-relief needs to be lived out by a future person? What pleasures need to be had, if there was no person there in the first place to care? Certainly we can see the logic that preventing harm is a good thing, and no one loses out who doesn't exist in the first place.

Nothing there argues for how it can make sense to say that something can be a good thing regardless of the good not being enjoyed by anyone. An argument for that is going to explain just what we're referring to by "good"--it's going to have some meta-analysis of what good even is, and then provide some some sort of support for how it's possible to have a "good" that's independent of what anyone thinks about it.

In other words, it's not going to be an argument for a specific thing being a good that no one enjoys. It's going to be an argument for how it is coherent to suggest that anything could be a good that no one enjoys.

So what should I look for in the thread re where to find the relevant post(s) arguing that?

I've answered that loaded question without playing into your hand. — S

Really?

If it's a choice between a neutral option and a better option, then obviously the better option wins. And the better option is obviously the one with a net benefit. — S

In the scenario of whether it is good to start life vs. good to continue it once born, I believe these to be separate situations. Once born, it makes sense to perhaps try to gain net benefits. In the situation where NO ACTUAL PERSON EXISTS YET, the ALWAYS good outcome is to not allow harm to occur. The neutral (not bad) outcome is whether someone might experience good. So the "obvious" option to you, is not that obvious to me, considering the asymmetry of the scenario of whether to reproduce.

That argument doesn't work, in spite of my agreement with you that a nonexistent person cannot be deprived of anything. It doesn't work because as moral agents we are capable of making decisions for better or worse, and if we consciously refrain from making a better decision, then we bear the responsibility for that. So, if we consciously decide to refrain from procreation, knowing that the chances are that procreation will lead to a life worth living, then, without good reason not to, that's the least moral option of the two. — S

Capable on behalf of someone else, to create a whole life for them, where they will experience adversity because they might experience the "good life" according to the parents' version of such a concept? Rather, adversity is always a bad when it is not necessary to foist on a new person. I've explained to Terrapin Station that it is a matter of what we value. Do you value bringing forward people so that they can experience the goods of life at the cost of bringing about situations of adversity? What matters in this scenario is always prevention of adversity/harm without any cost to an actual person. It would be wrong to create situations of adversity on the behest of someone else, PERIOD. It is quite arrogant to think that it is your job to create this for someone else and then tell them to post-facto "deal with it" because it provides for a chance of the good life, and brings a net benefit to the universe somehow.

.
I don't have time to find them.. but there are plenty of copy pasting from the book in that thread. Maybe later I'll try to find them for you.

Yes he wrote a whole book on it. Ironically your argument for it not being much of an argument is not much of an argument. — schopenhauer1

Are you engaging in a discussion or providing book recommendations? It doesn't matter if David Benetar wrote a whole book about it. Ethicists like Phillipa Foot, Alistair MacIntyre, John McDowell, Lucy Allais, to name just a few have all written books with opposing arguments. Julio Cabrera has written directly opposing Benetar's position. So just saying "he's written a book about it" is not an argument. Summarise his reasoning and submit it for criticism or else there's little point in raising the matter.

Okay, thanks.

So just saying "he's written a book about it" is not an argument. Summarise his reasoning and submit it for criticism or else there's little point in raising the matter. — Isaac

Perhaps you should read a little of it. I presented his main point. If you don't like it, then explain why other than that you want me to put more explanation on it than I already have for three pages of this thread.

I'm not automatically dismissing it, as anyone following our dialogue can see, I've been providing a reasoned basis for rejecting your position. — S

I will testify to this. I've been reading this thread since the beginning (though I am trying to stay out of the fray) and it is clear to the outside observer that you are arguing in good faith.

Ethicists like Phillipa Foot, Alistair MacIntyre, John McDowell, Lucy Allais, to name just a few have all written books with opposing arguments. — Isaac

Had to quit lurking and post just to ask this: Does John McDowell ever discuss anti-natalism or the "value of existence" or anything of the sort directly in any of his papers? Can you point me to something?

Does John McDowell ever discuss anti-natalism or the "value of existence" or anything of the sort directly in any of his papers? Can you point me to something? — John Doe

No, nothing directly about Antinatalism. I only meant that, for example, his anthropocentricising of moral value would have prevented there from being a moral value in the event of non-existence and so would oppose any view which sees a moral virtue in ending the human race. This is outlined in his 'Mind, value and reality' and but I guess you'll already know that much in order to have been interested enough to ask in the first place. Nothing more exciting than that I'm afraid.

Thanks! I think you're right, if I've understood your posts correctly, that the ideas being addressed in this thread are hopelessly entangled in a very broad set of meta-ethical concerns that are only being addressed by referring to 'you should read this book/thread'. I'm assuming that's why you asked at the outset whether the thread's thought experiment was intended to be persuasive to folks with a different meta-ethical stance or whether OP's already taking certain moral axioms for granted (of course there's nothing wrong with that if he wanted to have an ethical conversation that did not get bogged down in meta-ethics).

Personally I find McDowell and MacIntyre a lot more persuasive on meta-ethics than the anti-natalists being discussed in this thread, though I'm a hopeless dilettante w/r/t moral philosophy.

that the ideas being addressed in this thread are hopelessly entangled in a very broad set of meta-ethical concerns that are only being addressed by referring to 'you should read this book/thread'. I'm assuming that's why you asked at the outset whether the thread's thought experiment was intended to be persuasive to folks with a different meta-ethical stance or whether OP's already taking certain moral axioms for granted (of course there's nothing wrong with that if he wanted to have an ethical conversation that did not get bogged down in meta-ethics). — John Doe

It's meant for both. Ideally the axiom would be taken at face value as true, but of course, it is always me defending the asymmetry that while it is person-independent that no person was harmed (whether there is actually someone there to benefit), it is person-dependent whether it is bad for pleasure/benefit to have been deprived (to someone).

Once during my teens, while feeling particularly angsty and depressed I demanded to know why my mother had inflicted life upon me (and my 5 siblings). Her response? She wanted babies. She loves babies and wanted her own. She wanted to surround herself with babies like a child does with teddy bears. So she birthed 6 of them and now each one of us has to deal with our embodiment.

I think this thread might be arguing against something that doesnt really exist. That is, the notion that people are rationally creating children for these grand meanings or purposess (eg, so that they may learn, or grow, or face adversity and "overcome") My observations are that its all far more mindless, simple and irrational than that. A man wants to have sex with a woman, and then a baby happens. A couple gets drunk, then a baby happens. A woman wants to be a mother, so she gets her husband to impregnate her. Maybe when asked, these people retrospectively give reasons for having the child (eg, "I wanted to give the gift of life", "so that the child may learn and overcome", etc), but these are essentially just lies the parents tell themselves to mask something that was so mindless and irrational. People have sex for various reasons, babies follow and by consequence human misery and suffering proliferates.

Is it wrong? Yes I think its wrong to *rationally* create human embodiment, but the more I actually see the way in which children are so mindlessly and irrationally created, the less I think reproduction is really even in the realm of moral judgment at all. Sometimes it seems like sex, pregnancy and reproduction can be treated entirely as biological functions, much like eating or sleeping. Does it make sense to question the moral value of your stomach digesting its food? Perhaps questioning the morality of reproduction is along the same nonsensical lines.

Case in point, I am myself solidly antinatalist. I think it is wrong to create human embodiment and the suffering it necessarily entails, and it ought not be done. But at the start of this year me and my girlfriend had a pregnancy scare. Thankfully she ended up miscarrying but still, it just really brought home how mindless and crudely biological it all is. We were drunk and (to put it crudely) wanted to fuck, didn't bother with protection and she became pregnant. At the time of sex, the moral weight of what we were risking couldn't have been further from my mind. If she didn't miscarry, human suffering would have mindlessly proliferated itself. And perhaps when the child was old enough to question its predicament I'd tell him or her that life is gift, and overcoming and learning from its struggles and miseries makes it all worth it. Maybe the child will question and argue against these reasons for its creation, but these were not actually why it was created, it was all so much more mindless and biological than that.

One thing Ive noticed while reading the (scant) antinatalist literature, is just how little has been written on the actual means of human reproduction. There's a whole bunch of talk about potential persons, consent, and moral asymmetries, but essentially nothing on how it all actually happens; sex, fucking, cumming inside a woman, knocking up your partner or wife. Maybe its all too crude to write about, but reproduction is whats crude. You can argue all you like about the morality of bringing a child into the world, about the moral assymetries and the nonconsensual infliction of harm, but at the end of the day advocating for antinatalism is really nothing more than an intellectual round about way of expressing angst about your own birth, lamenting your own existence. Barely a single child has been prevented by an antinatalists argument. If you truly want to prevent births, you need to convince people to stop fucking each other. Good luck with that. You'll probably have about as much success as convincing stomachs not to digest its contents.

Is it wrong? Yes I think its wrong to *rationally* create human embodiment, but the more I actually see the way in which children are so mindlessly and irrationally created, the less I think reproduction is really even in the realm of moral judgment at all. Sometimes it seems like sex, pregnancy and reproduction can be treated entirely as biological functions, much like eating or sleeping. Does it make sense to question the moral value of your stomach digesting its food? Perhaps questioning the morality of reproduction is along the same nonsensical lines. — Inyenzi

You have some very well-stated points. I often think the same thing. There is a mindlessness to procreation, which is so at odds with the immense philosophical stakes of creating a whole new being. People rarely stop to rationally reflect on it being that the process itself is so embedded in the messiness of sexual relations, and the ever-intertwined socio-biological lens through which it is viewed. Thus, people who would otherwise gladly debate some abstract ethical logic in regards to the Trolley Problem or Prisoner's Dilemma, or wax on about the Categorical Imperative and lying and murder, will look with contempt at questioning procreation as a whole. Perhaps it is seen as so natural that it cannot be questioned in its entirety.

Case in point, I am myself solidly antinatalist. I think it is wrong to create human embodiment and the suffering it necessarily entails, and it ought not be done. But at the start of this year me and my girlfriend had a pregnancy scare. Thankfully she ended up miscarrying but still, it just really brought home how mindless and crudely biological it all is. We were drunk and (to put it crudely) wanted to fuck, didn't bother with protection and she became pregnant. At the time of sex, the moral weight of what we were risking couldn't have been further from my mind. If she didn't miscarry, human suffering would have mindlessly proliferated itself. And perhaps when the child was old enough to question its predicament I'd tell him or her that life is gift, and overcoming and learning from its struggles and miseries makes it all worth it. Maybe the child will question and argue against these reasons for its creation, but these were not actually why it was created, it was all so much more mindless and biological than that. — Inyenzi

Great case in point. Most people are procreated through mindless actions related to pleasure and emotions related to affection. Lofty reasons like "overcoming and learning from struggles" are just post-facto answers for a much more basic reason. So what do we conclude from this?

@schopenhauer1

I have some questions for you.

Q1. Whose side do you think you are on? As in, whose interests do you think you're defending?

Q2. Do you accept that a variation of your argument can be used against you?

Q3. Are you against any kind of activities where you might - or are likely to - face adversity, which would include countless activities like reading a book, playing a game, going to school, playing an instrument, participating in a sport, engaging in debate, and so on and so forth?

I ask the first question because the answer isn't clear to me, and the possible answers seem peculiar to me. You can't be on the side of most people, because you're against the wishes of most people. Are you on the side of a minority of people? If so, why should the wishes of a minority supersede the wishes of a majority? Or are you on the side of no one? In other words, people themselves are the problem, and only a world devoid of people is what matters.

I ask the second question because it seems clear to me that the tables can easily be turned on you by imagining a hypothetical person who wants to live a good life and is willing to face adversity in the hope of achieving that. Like your scenario with the monk, one can imagine an innocent prisoner who wants to be freed in order to live a better life, and you have the key. Would you keep him locked up? Would that be ethical?

And I ask the third question because if adversity is such a problem - apparently so much of a problem that it's not even worth the possibility of starting a life and living through it to reap the rewards - then, for sake of consistency or in other words so as to avoid a double standard, shouldn't you be endorsing the avoidance and minimisation of adversity in life? And if so, that would seem to rule out a lot of activities.

I think that life can be a burden regardless of what is happening and that we cannot justify making someone experience life without consent.

I only do things for people or to people with their consent as consent is impossible here life is an imposition.
It is down to the individual how they view life or react to life. People have different preferences.

The consent argument has been refuted so many times. It's unreasonable to accept it in spite of this. There are situations where it isn't possible to obtain consent from someone, but it's justified to make a decision to act on what you reasonably believe would be in their best interest. If you notice someone lying on the ground unconscious and you don't try to help them because it isn't possible for them to give their consent, then you're either a fool or a horrible person or both.

(...)it's justified to make a decision to act on what you reasonably believe would be in their best interest — S

But someone who does not exist does not have interests that can be furthered.

If someone is unconscious and you help them that could be against there interest if they wanted to commit suicide. if you say that it is in someones interest to be born before conception you can equally say it is against their interests and they could have reverse preferences.

On the issue of burden I find it absurd and cruel to create someone and then attack them when they complain about a life they didn't chose.

I think there are good reasons to think life is unethical or bad thing even if someone has a preference for it. So even if you don't think consent is important you can still make an unethical choice on someone else's behalf.
The only situation where consent might not be an issue if one far far removed from this reality where absolutely everyone was deliriously glad to be alive and lived in total equality.
However being glad to be a live still does not tell us whether the context is a good one. You could engender this delirium by a drug.

My life could have been less of a burden to me and I greatly resent that fact. Some parents and societies make life worse and also refuse to take responsibility for this.

Q1. Whose side do you think you are on? As in, whose interests do you think you're defending? — S

The future person. Preventing harm and adversity for them. Guess what though? No one needs be deprived of the flipside of the benefits :D. In the scenario of uniquely preventing all adversity for a future person, without any deprivation to that individual, then one should prevent adversity. That is the argument. There is not even a person that I have to promote their "welfare" or "happiness". What counts in the scenario of birth is prevention of harm only, as the downside is nothing to no one. I have no divine command to promote someone's future "good life" in the scenario or any other agenda I might have for the future person, simply to prevent unneeded adversity or harm.

Q2. Do you accept that a variation of your argument can be used against you? — S

I'm not sure which one you mean other than something along the lines of, "If you are thinking of potential children, why not think of their net benefits rather than just preventing adversity? Why should that be the only thing to worry about?". Again the response is that preventing pleasure/good is not bad when there is no one there to be deprived. It is always good to prevent harm however.

Q3. Are you against any kind of activities where you might - or are likely to - face adversity, which would include countless activities like reading a book, playing a game, going to school, playing an instrument, participating in a sport, engaging in debate, and so on and so forth? — S

Not in an absolute "this is a definite" way. Once born, we can choose all sorts of adversity that we would like to challenge ourselves with. That is not the scenario of birth where there is uniquely no one there to be deprived of pleasures in the first place, and no one that needs to overcome challenges to get to a "better" place (whatever that might mean metaphysically speaking).

I ask the first question because the answer isn't clear to me, and the possible answers seem peculiar to me. You can't be on the side of most people, because you're against the wishes of most people. Are you on the side of a minority of people? If so, why should the wishes of a minority supersede the wishes of a majority? Or are you on the side of no one? In other words, people themselves are the problem, and only a world devoid of people is what matters. — S

I'm on the side against creating adversity for people for whatever reasons are projected onto the new humans.

I ask the second question because it seems clear to me that the tables can easily be turned on you by imagining a hypothetical person who wants to live a good life and is willing to face adversity in the hope of achieving that. Like your scenario with the monk, one can imagine an innocent prisoner who wants to be freed in order to live a better life, and you have the key. Would you keep him locked up? Would that be ethical? — S

This is silly. No person existed prior to birth who wants anything. You would literally be creating the desire for the good life out of nothing by creating the person. The creation happens first. However, there is no need to want to overcome diversity prior to birth. Adversity also includes non-desired adversity too, don't forget.

And I ask the third question because if adversity is such a problem - apparently so much of a problem that it's not even worth the possibility of starting a life and living through it to reap the rewards - then, for sake of consistency or in other words so as to avoid a double standard, shouldn't you be endorsing the avoidance and minimisation of adversity in life? And if so, that would seem to rule out a lot of activities. — S

I explained earlier I think there is a different decision for starting a life and continuing a life. Once we are alive we do whatever utilitarian things we must to prevent adversity. But we cannot avoid most adversity, I'm aware of that. The real world demands it. I am opposed to making people go through it, even if people are enculturated that some of the adversity is good for them. We can get into the psychology of what people say, but I'd rather not. But if you think that is needed beyond the simple axiology of preventing all adversity, I will be glad to provide it for you.

But I do think in general, giving others adversity unduly is not good. However, sometimes it "has" to be done. So that is another ethical dilemma. Now we must put people in adverse situations and that is the "best" scenario for them. Sure, that is the real world, but someone was brought into the real world.

But someone who does not exist does not have interests that can be furthered. — Andrew4Handel

Whoosh! I see it's that time again. All aboard the truism train! By the way, a train is a number of carriages, cars, or trucks which are all connected together and which are pulled by an engine along a railway.

We both know that someone who does not exist does not have interests that can be furthered, cannot be burdened by anything, and cannot consent to anything. That is beside the point I was making.

If someone is unconscious and you help them that could be against there interest if they wanted to commit suicide. if you say that it is in someones interest to be born before conception you can equally say it is against their interests and they could have reverse preferences. — Andrew4Handel

So you wouldn't help, or...? Answer the question. Let's face it, you're either a bad person or you have a double standard.

On the issue of burden I find it absurd and cruel to create someone and then attack them when they complain about a life they didn't chose. — Andrew4Handel

Oh please. Where have I endorsed attacking people? Try to make your points without twisting words or exaggerating.

I think there are good reasons to think life is unethical or bad thing even if someone has a preference for it. — Andrew4Handel

Yeah, well I don't. Not without qualification anyway.

So even if you don't think consent is important you can still make an unethical choice on someone else's behalf. — Andrew4Handel

Yeah, you can. So what? That's by no means a sufficient basis for any kind of justification. Should parents just stop being parents and leave their kids to fend for themselves? Ludicrous! Have you even begun to think through what you're saying?

The only situation where consent might not be an issue if one far far removed from this reality where absolutely everyone was deliriously glad to be alive and lived in total equality. — Andrew4Handel

Cloud Cuckoo Land? What's it like there? You'd know all about that, I presume. But anyway, back here in reality, we tend to judge the issue of consent more sensibly than your what your fringe view maintains.

However, being glad to be alive still does not tell us whether the context is a good one. You could engender this delirium by a drug. — Andrew4Handel

Alright, then simply add an appropriate context.

My life could have been less of a burden to me and I greatly resent that fact. Some parents and societies make life worse and also refuse to take responsibility for this. — Andrew4Handel

That's a personal problem, and a problem with some - but not all - parents, and an ongoing problem for society. Taking it out on humanity as a whole is a little extreme. Extinction is taking it a little bit too far. Perhaps - just perhaps - you should climb down from such dizzying heights and think about this more sensibly.

The future person. — schopenhauer1

No, that's not possible. You can't be on the side of the future person because a consequence of what you're advocating is that there would be no such person to benefit from our actions.

And what we know about present people makes it more likely that you would be acting against the wishes of the future person, which is another reason why you can't be on their side.

So, with that in mind, and thinking about this rationally, I ask again: whose side do you think you're on?

Preventing harm and adversity for them. — schopenhauer1

They cannot possibly benefit from that. They cannot benefit from anything at all if they don't exist, and your position makes it impossible for them to exist.

Guess what though? No one needs be deprived of the flipside of the benefits :D. In the scenario of uniquely preventing all adversity for a future person, without any deprivation to that individual, then one should prevent adversity. That is the argument. — schopenhauer1

That argument is nonsense on stilts. It is not rational to maintain, on the one hand, that a future person would benefit from the prevention of adversity, yet, on the other hand, that they would not lose out from the prevention of joy.

There is not even a person that I have to promote their "welfare" or "happiness". — schopenhauer1

There doesn't need to be for my argument to work. And I'm guessing that you think the same about your argument. So why even bring that up?

What counts in the scenario of birth is prevention of harm only, as the downside is nothing to no one. — schopenhauer1

No, either both count or neither count. Take your pick. Or, perhaps you already have in effect. If the prevention of joy means nothing to no one because no one is around to lose out, then the prevention of harm means nothing to no one because no one is around to benefit. You can't have your cake and eat it. And if you think otherwise, then you've abandoned reason.

I have no divine command to promote someone's future "good life" in the scenario or any other agenda I might have for the future person, simply to prevent unneeded adversity or harm. — schopenhauer1

That's a red herring. You don't need a "divine command" to do anything that I'm arguing in favour of. You don't need to do anything at all, really, because hundreds of babies are born every minute.

I'm not sure which one you mean other than something along the lines of, "If you are thinking of potential children, why not think of their net benefits rather than just preventing adversity? Why should that be the only thing to worry about?". — schopenhauer1

I mean the one that I typed up and submitted as part of my reply.

Again the response is that preventing pleasure/good is not bad when there is no one there to be deprived. It is always good to prevent harm however. — schopenhauer1

No, if preventing pleasure isn't bad because there is no one there to be deprived, then preventing harm isn't good because there is no one there to gain.

Not in an absolute "this is a definite" way. Once born, we can choose all sorts of adversity that we would like to challenge ourselves with. That is not the scenario of birth where there is uniquely no one there to be deprived of pleasures in the first place, and no one that needs to overcome challenges to get to a "better" place (whatever that might mean metaphysically speaking). — schopenhauer1

You've kind of skimmed over the point without really addressing it. I know that, once born, we can act so as to either increase or reduce the chances of encountering all sorts of adversity, such as that which would inevitably be encountered in the activities that I listed. The question is, given that this adversity can be avoided or minimised to the extreme, why aren't you endorsing this? It's because you don't really believe that adversity is as big a problem as you make it out to be when the context is your pet topic. That's a double standard.

You're just using adversity as an excuse for extinction. Extinction is what you really care about, and extinction is against the wishes of most people, and the wishes of most people are a likely reflection of what the wishes of a future person would be, which means that in all likelihood you're not going to be on the side of a future person, which is a good reason for rejecting your claim that you're on their side.

I'm on the side against creating adversity for people for whatever reasons are projected onto the new humans. — schopenhauer1

It's a matter of likelihood, not projection. If, for arguments sake, three out of every four people feel that life is worth living, then that makes it very likely that a future person would feel the same way.

And I already know what your stance is in terms of being against creating new humans because of the adversity that they would face. I wasn't questioning what you're against. You've purposefully answered in a way which reveals nothing new and evades what I was trying to get out of you. So I ask again, whose side are you on? Or is it that you are in fact on nobodies side, but you're either in denial about that or you're reluctant to come out and say that that is so because you know that it would make you look bad (and rightly so!).

This is silly. — schopenhauer1

Then so is your analogy with the Buddhist.

No person existed prior to birth who wants anything. You would literally be creating the desire for the good life out of nothing by creating the person. The creation happens first. However, there is no need to want to overcome diversity prior to birth. Adversity also includes non-desired adversity too, don't forget. — schopenhauer1

You don't seem to realise here that the same kind of criticisms can be made against your own argument, which uses a similar set up. You're just providing the template for doing so. You see, there was no person who existed prior to birth who was just sitting around undisturbed in peaceful bliss like a Buddhist. There would literally be no one there to disturb. The creation happens, then there's someone, and this someone is privileged with the opportunities that only life can bring. There is no need to want anything prior to birth, and there is no need to face adversity, but that is neither here nor there. In that scenario, no one can benefit, whereas in the real world, people can. Standing a good chance is better than standing no chance. So the real world is better than your hypothetical world devoid of life (which doesn't even compete).

I explained earlier I think there is a different decision for starting a life and continuing a life. — schopenhauer1

A double standard.

Once we are alive we do whatever utilitarian things we must to prevent adversity. — schopenhauer1

But we frequently don't. You frequently don't. You put yourself in situations which count as examples of easily preventable adversity all the time! You're doing that every time you decide to engage in debate on here. You do that whenever you go to the gym, or play a game of chess, or read an intellectually challenging book, or whatever it is that you do in your spare time - there's bound to be something else that counts for you beyond this forum. Why the hypocrisy? You must really take after your namesake.

But we cannot avoid most adversity, I'm aware of that. The real world demands it. — schopenhauer1

We can't avoid it completely whilst we're alive, but that wasn't what I was challenging. I was challenging why you presumably don't do more to at least avoid it where possible or minimise it to the extreme, as one would reasonably expect if adversity is a problem so severe that it warrants nothing less than the extinction of humanity!

I am opposed to making people go through it, even if people are enculturated that some of the adversity is good for them. We can get into the psychology of what people say, but I'd rather not. But if you think that is needed beyond the simple axiology of preventing all adversity, I will be glad to provide it for you. — schopenhauer1

Yeah, well, I am opposed to using a sledge hammer to crack a nut. That's not a sensible way to approach the problem either way.

But I do think in general, giving others adversity unduly is not good. However, sometimes it "has" to be done. So that is another ethical dilemma. Now we must put people in adverse situations and that is the "best" scenario for them. Sure, that is the real world, but someone was brought into the real world. — schopenhauer1

Adversity is a consequence of life, and life for most people is worth living. If you're not like most people, and you don't see it that way, then that's too bad, but you shouldn't take it out on humanity. I worry about people who think like you. You're not so different from an incel.

No, that's not possible. You can't be on the side of the future person because a consequence of what you're advocating is that there would be no such person to benefit from our actions. — S

Doesn't bother me. Oh, and it doesn't bother "him" either ¯\_(ツ)_/¯.

And what we know about present people makes it more likely that you would be acting against the wishes of the future person, which is another reason why you can't be on their side. — S

Doesn't bother me. Oh, and it doesn't bother "him" either ¯\_(ツ)_/¯.

So, with that in mind, and thinking about this rationally, I ask again: whose side do you think you're on? — S

The future person.

They cannot possibly benefit from that. They cannot benefit from anything at all if they don't exist, and your position makes it impossible for them to exist. — S

But admitted as such. That is the asymmetry. Preventing harm is always good and that is person independent. It is just always good to prevent harm, but it is not bad if you prevent pleasure (unless there is someone who already exists to be deprived).

No, either both count or neither count. Take your pick. Or, perhaps you already have in effect. If the prevention of joy means nothing to no one because no one is around to lose out, then the prevention of harm means nothing to no one because no one is around to benefit. You can't have your cake and eat it. And if you think otherwise, then you've abandoned reason. — S

Again, I believe it is always good to prevent harm (even if there is no one to benefit from being prevented from harm), but it is not always bad to prevent pleasure unless there is someone there to be deprived of the pleasure. That is the terminus of this ethical axiom. I've always stated that beyond that, what one values is really up to the emotional resonance of the ethical agent. If you think that bringing a good life into the world trumps preventing suffering, in a situation that would uniquely not deprive any actual individual of said good life, then you value that agenda (of the possibility of a person living a good life) over the complete prevention of harm. That is where we cannot go much further. I can give you my reasoning, and I have. You can decide you are not convinced. There is no air tight slam dunk in ethics, just a back and forth of the arguments and rebuttals. You can go on and do some ad hocs, or try to entice me with some insults to how bad the arguments are, but that is how these go. Some people will just not find them convincing. I'm not going to jump off a cliff because S is unsatisfied with schopenhauer1's argument on antinatalism.

That argument is nonsense on stilts. It is not rational to maintain, on the one hand, that a future person would benefit from the prevention of adversity, yet, on the other hand, that they would not lose out from the prevention of joy. — S

No get the argument right first. Rather, I don't think a person has to exist for preventing adversity to be good. I DO think a person has to exist for prevention of pleasure/good to be bad. Otherwise, it is not bad (or good).

There doesn't need to be for my argument to work. And I'm guessing that you think the same about your argument. So why even bring that up? — S

Because you have to create the person (with all the negative effects on that person) in order to create happiness. Meanwhile, no one needed nothing, and no negative effects were incurred in my formulation. That goes with the Buddhist analogy.

That's a red herring. You don't need a "divine command" to do anything that I'm arguing in favour of. You don't need to do anything at all, really, because hundreds of babies are born every minute. — S

Not on their own. And you are right, I can't do anything about it. It's not a red herring. Other than harm, anything else does not need to take place, it i the desire or result of the parent for a child to be born to fulfill X reason.

No, if preventing pleasure isn't bad because there is no one there to be deprived, then preventing harm isn't good because there is no one there to gain. — S

Already explained the asymmetry that I think is the case.

You've kind of skimmed over the point without really addressing it. I know that, once born, we can act so as to either increase or reduce the chances of encountering all sorts of adversity, such as that which would inevitably be encountered in the activities that I listed. The question is, given that this adversity can be avoided or minimised to the extreme, why aren't you endorsing this? It's because you don't really believe that adversity is as big a problem as you make it out to be when the context is your pet topic. That's a double standard.

You're just using adversity as an excuse for extinction. Extinction is what you really care about, and extinction is against the wishes of most people, and the wishes of most people are a likely reflection of what the wishes of a future person would be, which means that in all likelihood you're not going to be on the side of a future person, which is a good reason for rejecting your claim that you're on their side. — S

Adversity can be used as a form of entertainment or trying to test resolve. It can also be something that is undesirable- and this would be perhaps considered not just adverse, but harmful. The point though is not about whether I would take on self-imposed adversity, but whether it is right for someone else to force someone to be exposed to all adversities that will befall that person. Now once born, we do have psychological survival instincts and attachments, but that is a difference scenario with never coming into existence in the first place. I think they are separate scenarios, which is what I've said all along in this argument. Continuing to exist and starting existence for someone else are two different scenarios. One is more or less symmetrical with good and bad (prevention of good is bad, prevention of bad is good), where the other is not (prevention of good is not bad in respect to no actual person experiencing it, prevention of bad is good, even if there is no actual person around).

It's a matter of likelihood, not projection. If, for arguments sake, three out of every four people feel that life is worth living, then that makes it very likely that a future person would feel the same way.

And I already know what your stance is in terms of being against creating new humans because of the adversity that they would face. I wasn't questioning what you're against. You've purposefully answered in a way which reveals nothing new and evades what I was trying to get out of you. So I ask again, whose side are you on? Or is it that you are in fact on nobodies side, but you're either in denial about that or you're reluctant to come out and say that that is so because you know that it would make you look bad (and rightly so!). — S

I've already explained the unique scenario of starting a life, vs. the scenario of already being born.

You see, there was no person who existed prior to birth who was just sitting around undisturbed in peaceful bliss like a Buddhist. — S

That is simply an analogy.

The creation happens, then there's someone, and this someone is privileged with the opportunities that only life can bring. There is no need to want anything prior to birth, and there is no need to face adversity, but that is neither here nor there. In that scenario, no one can benefit, whereas in the real world, people can. Standing a good chance is better than standing no chance. So the real world is better than your hypothetical world devoid of life (which doesn't even compete). — S

Why is it good to create someone who can "benefit"? What right do you have to expose someone to adversity just because you want to give an opportunity to "benefit"? That is the point of the whole thing.

A double standard. — S

A different standard.

But we frequently don't. You frequently don't. You put yourself in situations which count as examples of easily preventable adversity all the time! You're doing that every time you decide to engage in debate on here. You do that whenever you go to the gym, or play a game of chess, or read an intellectually challenging book, or whatever it is that you do in your spare time - there's bound to be something else that counts for you beyond this forum. Why the hypocrisy? You must really take after your namesake. — S

Harmful adversity. Also, creating situations of adversity for OTHER people, is perhaps a necessity, but a double bind. To CREATE someone for the SAKE OF making them go through adversity FOR THEIR BENEFIT is still a contradiction to me. I don't believe in making obstacle courses for others because we think it is best for them at the end of the day. This may be a corollary of the initial asymmetry, if you will.

We can't avoid it completely whilst we're alive, but that wasn't what I was challenging. I was challenging why you presumably don't do more to at least avoid it where possible or minimise it to the extreme, as one would reasonably expect if adversity is a problem so severe that it warrants nothing less than the extinction of humanity! — S

I did say we can try to minimize harms and maximize benefits, etc. once alive.

Yeah, well, I am opposed to using a sledge hammer to crack a nut. That's not a sensible way to approach the problem either way. — S

The problem only exists for the already born obviously. No reason to create scenarios of adversity for someone else, pace the corallary to the asymmetry, that is to say " creating situations of adversity for OTHER people, is perhaps a necessity, but a double bind. To CREATE someone for the SAKE OF making them go through adversity FOR THEIR BENEFIT is still a contradiction to me. I don't believe in making obstacle courses for others because we think it is best for them at the end of the day."

Adversity is a consequence of life, and life for most people is worth living. If you're not like most people, and you don't see it that way, then that's too bad, but you shouldn't take it out on humanity. I worry about people who think like you. You're not so different from an incel. — S

That is an extreme accusation I gather for rhetorical point-making. I don't know much about "incels" but what I've heard in the media is they are extremely misogynistic and want to harm specific groups of people. I would obviously say that both those things are bad and unethical.

Oh please. Where have I endorsed attacking people? — S

I am not saying you are endorsing this but this is but this is what many people experience when they make valid complaints about the life they didn't choose. It is not just complaints people don't like but open suffering. They prefer to celebrate stoicism.

Why stoicism? Because that way you don't upset other people with you suffering and they do not have to feel disturbed or guilty. They also prefer to portray life as a gift and not a burden.

Should parents just stop being parents and leave their kids to fend for themselves? — S

Once you have unnecessarily created a child then I believe you have a responsibility towards them, although not all parents accept this responsibility.

You can never give your child full freedom but you can ameliorate the situation by giving them as much control over their life as possible. But even the most generous parenting cannot stop bad outcomes.

A parent will always be the primary cause for their child's existence and the essential cause for the child's later outcomes and if people saw this more and its ramifications maybe they would rethink things.

It seems to me that consent is not considered a problem if life is seen as an overall good. But if you do not share this view then consent is a problem.

We would usually do something without someones consent if we were almost certain it was in their interest. I don't see how this world is good enough and ethical enough to be in someones interest accept maybe on a case by case basis for someone who is privileged and mentally well. Mental distress can quickly make any scenario highly undesirable.

The future person. — schopenhauer1

Nope. You'd prevent their existence, remember? Hence they couldn't possibly benefit. So you can't possibly be on their side.

That's a sound argument. You need to have a rethink and come back with a different answer. Repeating the same answer as before doesn't resolve the problem.

Preventing harm is always good — schopenhauer1

Wrong. It does no good for anyone if no one exists to benefit. Capiche?

It is just always good to prevent harm, but it is not bad if you prevent pleasure (unless there is someone who already exists to be deprived). — schopenhauer1

Nope, what you're calling asymmetry is a double standard. The same reasoning you use against the prevention of pleasure applies to the prevention of harm.

That is the terminus of this ethical axiom. — schopenhauer1

It's not an axiom. It's not widely accepted, it hasn't been established uncontroversially, and it's not self-evident.

No get the argument right first. Rather, I don't think a person has to exist for preventing adversity to be good. I DO think a person has to exist for prevention of pleasure/good to be bad. Otherwise, it is not bad (or good). — schopenhauer1

I understand your argument, and it doesn't make sense because of your conception of what's good, so that was my interpretation of your argument where it makes sense. But then it becomes irrational. So you're stuck between a rock and a hard place: nonsensical or irrational.

Because you have to create the person (with all the negative effects on that person) in order to create happiness. — schopenhauer1

Net benefit, so not a real problem.

Meanwhile, no one needed nothing, and no negative effects were incurred in my formulation. — schopenhauer1

No one can benefit, so not a real solution.

That goes with the Buddhist analogy. — schopenhauer1

The Buddhist analogy is cancelled out by the prisoner analogy, and you can't reasonably object on the basis that no person actually exists, because that can be turned back on you.

It's not a red herring. — schopenhauer1

Divine command, which is what we were talking about here, is an obvious red herring. If you disagree, then please clarify what you think the relevance of it is.

Other than harm, anything else does not need to take place, it is the desire or result of the parent for a child to be born to fulfill X reason. — schopenhauer1

The motive doesn't matter in light of the consequences, and the consequences are a net benefit.

Already explained the asymmetry that I think is the case. — schopenhauer1

Already explained why the asymmetry argument fails.

I've already explained the unique scenario of starting a life, vs. the scenario of already being born. — schopenhauer1

That's a hand-wave which doesn't address the substance of what I was saying there.

That is simply an analogy. — schopenhauer1

Yes, and it is simply cancelled out by my analogy, and you have no reasonable means of rejecting mine without inadvertently rejecting your own.

Why is it good to create someone who can "benefit"? — schopenhauer1

Benefiting is inherently good. A world where benefiting is possible is better than a world where benefitting is not possible. A rational outside observer would chose the former over the latter.

What right do you have to expose someone to adversity just because you want to give an opportunity to "benefit"? — schopenhauer1

The ends justifies the means. Look at all of the people who benefit, then imagine the alternative of no one benefitting, then compare the two.

A different standard. — schopenhauer1

A different standard for a similar enough situation, i.e. a double standard.

To CREATE someone for the SAKE OF making them go through adversity FOR THEIR BENEFIT is still a contradiction to me. — schopenhauer1

You keep wording this wrong. No one, typically, is creating anyone "for the sake of" making them go through adversity for their benefit. Rather, typically, parents are creating people for the benefit of those people, and for the benefit of themselves, and for the benefit of others, and the adversity plays no part in their motivation despite it being an inevitable consequence.

I don't go to work "for the sake of" being tired and bored to get paid. I go to work for the sake of getting paid, and I just happen to get tired and bored whilst I'm there.

I don't believe in making obstacle courses for others because we think it is best for them at the end of the day. — schopenhauer1

The obstacle course is already there. We don't make the obstacle course, we make the person, and then it's up to them how they proceed. Lots and lots of people find obstacle courses worthwhile, yet you want to shut them down. Obviously, you are not on the side of obstacle course enthusiasts. You are not on the side of all of those people.

I did say we can try to minimize harms and maximize benefits, etc. once alive. — schopenhauer1

Lots of people not only try, but succeed. You would prevent this from continuing beyond the lifetime of the current generation, which would result in a scenario which is less ideal than what would otherwise happen.

The problem only exists for the already born obviously. — schopenhauer1

The problem of using a sledgehammer to crack a nut - that being a metaphor for using extinction to eradicate adversity - exists for the already born, but the consequences extend far beyond the already born. It would mean that, for example, all else being equal, there would be no people living worthwhile lives one hundred and fifty years from now. And that scenario is less ideal.

That is an extreme accusation I gather for rhetorical point-making. I don't know much about "incels" but what I've heard in the media is they are extremely misogynistic and want to harm specific groups of people. I would obviously say that both those things are bad and unethical. — schopenhauer1

No, it's not merely rhetorical, there are clear similarities. For example, incels blame their problems on women, and anti-natalists blame their problems on humanity.

Look, I am not going to do this back and forth anymore for a fourth round. I can answer every individual point, but this would never end, and the debate would quickly lose its main focus and my interest. I'm not going to change your mind. You are not going to change mine. We can get some value from this perhaps by strengthening our arguments, but I have no pretensions that either you or I will magically realize the other one has the "true" insight into this matter. Rather, I see this going in a dismal ad hominem way, which I already see with your accusations that my antinatalist arguments are equivalent to the "incels". [That analogy is quite spurious. I liken most antinatalist arguments to vegan arguments. That is to say, antinatalists present their case non-forcefully and it is up to the individual to decide. There is no malicious intent, there is no condemnation. The philosophy does not advocate violence towards anyone, but ironically, the opposite- it is trying to prevent all harm and in a passive way.]

I'd like to sum up what I see to be the main differences in our core values, as that is the heart of the matter. What this comes down to is a difference in values. My main value is that the moral obligation lies in not creating/exposing someone else to harm. There is no moral obligation, however, to not prevent good. Compassion for the individual who will experience harm, the injustice of forcing someone into adversity are part of the reasoning.

Connected to the above is the idea that exposing the individual to harm cannot be justified by some net calculus that this person might bring into the world (for himself or society). Exposing another individual to harm should be avoided, and preventing birth prevents exposing another person to all of life's harms. Any harm that's been done cannot be rectified (post-facto) by the hope/fruition of a future benefit either by reports of an individual (as you think the outcome will be), or by somehow adding to society's net benefit (if that kind of measurement is even commensurable or reliable).

To further explain the above, I will provide the analogy that this is like forcing someone to run an obstacle course because they can get some benefit from it, or be strengthened by it. However, this does not take back the fact that that person was created and exposed to adverse/harmful conditions in the first place. It's almost like some people have a quasi-messianic notion that they need to bring other people into a world with adversity/harm so that then they can be delivered or transformed into some "better" person (i.e. the good life). Or they are expected to experience the good despite being exposed to adversity/harm. Rather than this exposing people to harm to overcome something they didn't need to in the first place, I am saying it is always good/best not to force someone, on their behalf, into the adversity/harm of life in the first place. The obligation is on the prevention of harm, not on the promotion of pleasure/good. Whether good obtains for an individual in the future, does not take back the fact that a person is exposed to harm in the first place. It was not bad to be prevented from good experiences, if no actual person is deprived, but it was certainly good that someone was not forced into adverse/harmful experiences.

You are aware, I presume, that there are different meta-ethical positions, yes?

You are aware that the anti-natalist stance relies on a particular meta-ethical position, yes?

You are aware, presumably, that David Benetar is not God, he's just a man of the same epistemic status as any of the other philosophers who've arrived at different meta-ethical theories, yes?

Considering that these meta-ethical theories cannot all be true/right, it follows that all but one of them must be wrong.

Given that the philosophers who derived them are of the same epistemic level as David Benetar, it follows that it must be possible, no matter how clear it seems, for someone of David Benetar's epistemic level to be wrong, yes?

If Phillipa Foot is wrong, then decisions made by virtue may mislead us, where they should have been made by consequence. Likewise if Peter Singer is wrong, then we will have given to charity more than we need have and the economy may suffer.

If David Benetar is wrong we will have exterminated the entire human race needlessly.

Do you see why people are lumping you in with extremists?

Look, I am not going to do this back and forth anymore for a fourth round. I can answer every individual point, but this would never end, and the debate would quickly lose its main focus and my interest. I'm not going to change your mind. You are not going to change mine. We can get some value from this perhaps by strengthening our arguments, but I have no pretensions that either you or I will magically realize the other one has the "true" insight into this matter. — schopenhauer1

Your main focus here doesn't significantly differ from any of your other numerous discussions on the topic, yet the back and forth continues, albeit with a break here and there, with no end in sight. I thought that that's what you liked. Going back over well trodden ground. This is your favourite subject, isn't it? You're the antinatalism guy, much like the nuclear weapons guy and the animal rights guy. :grin:

Rather, I see this going in a dismal ad hominem way, which I already see with your accusations that my antinatalist arguments are equivalent to the "incels". [That analogy is quite spurious. I liken most antinatalist arguments to vegan arguments. That is to say, antinatalists present their case non-forcefully and it is up to the individual to decide. There is no malicious intent, there is no condemnation. The philosophy does not advocate violence towards anyone, but ironically, the opposite- it is trying to prevent all harm and in a passive way.] — schopenhauer1

It's not spurious at all. I could keep going with what the two have in common, but I don't mind letting it go. I'm impartial enough to accept that there are similarities with your position and both that of the incels and that of the vegans. But you don't like the former, hence you've put forward an alternative.

I'd like to sum up what I see to be the main differences in our core values, as that is the heart of the matter. What this comes down to is a difference in values. My main value is that the moral obligation lies in not creating/exposing someone else to harm. There is no moral obligation, however, to not prevent good. — schopenhauer1

Whereas my justification isn't even deontological, it's consequentialist.

Compassion for the individual who will experience harm, the injustice of forcing someone into adversity are part of the reasoning. — schopenhauer1

Compassion for the individual who will experience harm is countered by empathy for the individual who will have worthwhile experiences, and the alleged injustice of forcing someone into adversity is countered by the unjustified opposition to the opportunity of someone having inevitable worthwhile experiences and most likely a good enough life, the latter of which most people attest to.

Your objections to my counters typically involve a double standard, so they don't count and your problem lingers unresolved.

Connected to the above is the idea that exposing the individual to harm cannot be justified by some net calculus that this person might bring into the world (for himself or society). — schopenhauer1

Yes, that's a big difference. I think that it can. And I also think that you're like most people in that you wouldn't even hesitate to apply this reasoning in many other contexts. You reject it here because it doesn't lead to your desired conclusion. In other words, you put the cart before the horse.

Exposing another individual to harm should be avoided, and preventing birth prevents exposing another person to all of life's harms. — schopenhauer1

It should indeed be avoided, but not unconditionally, not at any cost. It should be avoided, setting aside the exceptions, and this is one of them. Your principles here are far too simplistic, and they lead to your adoption of ridiculously disproportionate "solutions" (using a sledgehammer to crack a nut).

Any harm that's been done cannot be rectified (post-facto) by the hope/fruition of a future benefit either by reports of an individual (as you think the outcome will be), or by somehow adding to society's net benefit (if that kind of measurement is even commensurable or reliable). — schopenhauer1

Yeah, that's another difference. I think it can, and I think that your arguments just don't work. Sure, you can piece something together for yourself and the relatively tiny number of people who share your views, but they have very little wider appeal. They're largely unconvincing. You're not too bad at this debate thing, but you don't stand a chance against someone of equal or superior skill (and I obviously fall under the latter category :strong: ) because your position suffers from a much weaker foundation. You're bringing a knife to a gun fight, mate. :wink:

And with regards to the net benefit thing, we frequently appeal to and rely on this kind of methodology and these kind of judgements. It's practically impossible to avoid. I get that you have motive to question it in this context, but meh. It makes a lot of sense to myself and many other people - to most people probably.

To further explain the above, I will provide the analogy that this is like forcing someone to run an obstacle course because they can get some benefit from it, or be strengthened by it. — schopenhauer1

Yeah, I think I'm done with these analogies. It's a weak tactic in my assessment, because I can just as easily come up with analogies of my own to counter yours effectively, as I've demonstrated at least a couple of times already.

Although actually, this one's not anywhere near as bad your Buddhist analogy, which formed the basis of your argument in the opening post. I can work with this set up at least, and I already have. I've said my piece about the "obstacle course", the people who go through it, and why I disagree with your take on it.

Very good point. :ok:

Thanks. I should say the argument from epistemic peers is actually Peter Van Inwagen's, I just applied it here to highlight the seriousness of the issue. Although what I actually think I'm highlighting is the triviality of it, in that no one actually believes in this stuff to the point that they would seriously like to see it carried through. It's just an indirect way of complaining about how hard life is and its difficult sometimes to raise any more nuanced an argument than, "get over it!".