But this doesn't really answer the question. How would you define "physicalism" such that the entirety of reality would not be subject to being understood by physics? — Metaphysician Undercover

First let me clarify what I was disagreeing with:

One, I was disagreeing with the idea of supporters defining physicalism as "that which is studied by physics." That makes physicalism basically a "parasite" on the discipline of physics per se. I think it's ridiculous to define physicalism that way. To physicalist ontologists the discipline of physics is NOT king and it doesn't get to define what counts as "physical."

Rejecting that definition doesn't imply that the subject matter of the discipline of physics couldn't be coextensive with what physicalism posits ontologically, but in practice, the subject matter of physics is NOT coextensive with physicalism. Chemistry, for example, is a separate scientific discipline from physics. But what chemistry studies is also covered by physicalism's ontology. Likewise with geology, astronomy, meteorology, oceanography, archaeology, anthropology, sociology, psychology, computer science, philosophy, music, visual art, etc. None are what is studied by physics, but they're all part of a physicalist ontology.

Could physics study everything more or less in the manner of those other disciplines? Sure, if there were a major paradigm change in the academic world regarding how to divide up fields, so that everything was simply considered physics. But that's extremely unlikely. Especially because it would be kind of stupid to do that, because you're not going to major in physics and spend years just studying sociology. But you need to study just sociology for years to get degrees in it/to be an expert in it. So there would still be a need to make a division, and there would be no utility to all of a sudden deciding to say, "Okay, well, we're going to say that all this is under the field of physics anyway."

Another reason that physicalism is not defined by what is studied by physics is that it wouldn't be impossible for physics to posit immaterial phenomena somehow, including positing real abstracts. Physicists have already posited a huge amount of nonsense, and arguably a majority of physicists buy real abstracts, because probably most are mathematical realists/platonists. Since physicalism isn't simply the cheerleading team for physics, we're not endorsing that sort of nonsense, which isn't part of physicalism's ontology.

So it's not at all the case that physicalism is defined by what is studied by physics.

Two, I was disagreeing with the comments about explanations/descriptions. I've gone into this in some detail in a few posts on different threads recently, including back and forth with you (in other threads).

Explanations are merely sets of words (or mathematical symbols, etc.) that an individual interprets so that it quells some of their "mystery to me" feeling. This, of couse, means that it's a matter of psychological factors. It means that what counts as an explanation for something is a subjective issue. The individual's beliefs, biases, intellectual capabilities, and so on, all have a significant bearing on whether any particular set of words scratches that "it's a mystery" itch for them. That makes whether something counts as an explanation interesting primarily for what it tells us about the person in question's psychology.

What's not going on is that the set of words is "really" explaining or not explaining whatever it's about. Whether an explanation is successful is always a subjective judgment.

So for some people, maybe right now, physics can already explain everything. For some people, maybe physics can explain nothing. And then you get every opinion in between those two. Neither opinion can be correct/incorrect. It's just a matter of whether something psychologically satisfies your "mystery to me" feeling for whatever it is.

When I say that everything, including consciousness, is physical, my aim isn't to get you to think that something is explained. Depending on the person, I often couldn't care less whether they (say they) feel that anything is explained. That's a matter of struggling with someone's psychology, and it's often not worth doing that, depending on their biases, their stubbornness, the degree to which they can seem to be willfully "difficult," their knowledge and intelligence, etc.

Duplicate

There is a conflict between the requirements of scientific and philosophical definition. As I am addressing a naturalistic or physicalistic position, it is reasonable to use the criteria of physics in speaking of material state definitions. — Dfpolis

This is no different than the position which apokrisis supports, that there are differences which don't make a difference. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you're missing the point, but that may be because I was insufficiently clear. The thesis I am rebutting is that physics has the potential to explain intentional reality. To do this, I'm looking at the kinds of intelligibility physics deals with -- its Fundamental Abstraction: what it looks at and what it sees as outside of its purview. To determine this, we need not consider all reality, which includes intentional subjects as well as physical objects, but at the representation of reality physics actually employs. It represents reality in terms of material states specified by dynamic variables and laws transforming these states over time.

Your point that there is more to reality,is exactly the what I'm trying to show. It's not that this "more" doesn't make difference. It is crucial to our understanding of mind. It is rather that it makes no difference to physics, which is limited by its Fundamental Abstraction.

if you believe that physics does not give us an exhaustive understanding of reality, then why choose an ontology which contradicts this? In your ontology you have stated that you believe there is no difference between a material state as represented by physics, and the material state as it is in reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Such an ontology is precisely what I am arguing against.

Our abstract ideas, such as <material state> can be well-grounded in reality without exhausting reality. That is why I keep referring to Whitehead's Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. There is an adequate foundation in reality for the concept <material state>. If there were not, it would be hard to understand the phenomenal success of physics. Still, since that concept is not exhaustive of what is, its foundation is not the whole of reality.

I meant the general resurrection. The idea being that the end of man cannot result in an incomplete realization of human nature.

I sent you a message on the immortality thread idea.

One, I was disagreeing with the idea of supporters defining physicalism as "that which is studied by physics." That makes physicalism basically a "parasite" on the discipline of physics per se. I think it's ridiculous to define physicalism that way. To physicalist ontologists the discipline of physics is NOT king and it doesn't get to define what counts as "physical." — Terrapin Station

But the other way around makes no sense. If we allow that the physicalist defines what counts as "physical" then everything is physical, because that's the assumption of physicalism. If there is something which is not physical, then physicalism is denied, so it is not a physicalist making this claim. And if everything is physical, as physicalism claims, then why shouldn't physics, which is the study of that which is physical, study everything?

So it doesn't make any sense at all to allow a physicalist ontology to define what counts as physical. If you want ontology to decide what counts as physical, you must allow for the possibility of something which is non-physical, and this would contradict physicalism, which denies the possibility of anything non-physical. Therefore, if it is true that ontology ought to define what counts as "physical", physicalism must me disallowed as contradictory to this, because it has already decided that all is physical.

To determine this, we need not consider all reality, which includes intentional subjects as well as physical objects, but at the representation of reality physics actually employs. It represents reality in terms of material states specified by dynamic variables and laws transforming these states over time. — Dfpolis

OK, so this is where I get lost. You have claimed that physics does not have 'the potential to explain intentional reality". I have followed that. Now you distinguish intentional subjects from physical objects, and imply that we ought to consider that these two are distinct, according to "the representation of reality physics actually employs". So how does this make sense to you? You have claimed that physics cannot, and cannot even potentially, explain intentional reality, therefore intentional reality lies outside the field of physics. Now you say that we ought to distinguish intentional from non-intentional, using the method of physics, which has no capacity to even recognize the intentional. if we are to distinguish intentional from non-intentional, then we need to start from principles outside of physics, because we cannot do this using the method of physics.

How are you going to convince a physicalist, who believes that there is no aspect of reality outside this physical part of reality, without referring to this part of reality which is outside. Do you see what I mean? The physicalist thinks that there is no such thing as that which is outside the physical, the non-physical. So you cannot demonstrate to the physicalist that there is reality outside the physical, without first demonstrating that there is something outside the purview of physics. You cannot assume that the physicalist will accept your assumption that there is something outside the purview of physics, because this contradicts the physicalist premise, fundamentally.

But the other way around makes no sense. If we allow that the physicalist defines what counts as "physical" then everything is physical, because that's the assumption of physicalism. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not that everything is physical because it's an assumption of physicalism. Physicalists are physicalists because everything seems to be physical empirically, where that's not defined by the field of physics, because it's in no way parasitic to the field of physics.

If there is something which is not physical, then physicalism is denied, so it is not a physicalist making this claim. — Metaphysician Undercover

"So it is not a physicalist making this claim" doesn't seem to fit there.

And if everything is physical, as physicalism claims, then why shouldn't physics, which is the study of that which is physical, study everything? — Metaphysician Undercover

Whether it should or shouldn't isn't my concern. I don't buy normatives like that. I explained why the divisions would probably be the same above. In any event, I'm not in the PR department for physics, so what physics as a discipline decides to do or not do isn't my concern as a philosopher.

So it doesn't make any sense at all to allow a physicalist ontology to define what counts as physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not a matter of making sense or not. It's a matter of what we're doing, or at least what some of us are doing. We're not a cheerleading squad for field of physics, period. That's not at all what we're doing. And figuring that that's what we're doing is just going to amount to not understanding us. That's up to you, though. Do you want to understand what we're doing or not?

you must allow for the possibility of something which is non-physica — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure. It's just up to folks positing nonphysical existents to make any sense of just what they'd be ontologically, and then to offer any good evidence for buying that there are such things.

this would contradict physicalism, which denies the possibility of anything non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's like you're dedicated to not getting anything right. We're not denying the possibility. We're saying there are no non-physical things, because there's no good reason to believe that there are, including that to some of us, the idea of non-physical things doesn't even make much sense. That doesn't mean that someone couldn't make sense of it, but let's find that person and then examine what they have to say.

Shannon defined information as communicated code (which can apply to physical, biological, and semantic processing), not as "the reduction of logical possibility" (which can only apply to semantic processing). — Galuchat

Shannon wrote:

The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point. Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. The significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of possible messages (Italics added). — Claude Shannon -- A Mathematical Theory of Communication

Shannon then gives three reasons for using logarithms of the number of possible messages to measure information. So, it is clear that Shannon saw information as the reduction of possibility.

In support of your second point, he also says "These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem." However, he is not denying a semantic aspect -- only saying that any semantic aspect is irrelevant to communications engineering. In other words, communications engineering does not deal with information holistically, but in abstraction from its meaning.

That said, I think you're confused about what I am saying -- about what possibility is reduced in Shannon's definition. Messages can be considered formally or materially -- in terms of their meaning, or in terms of their physical character. While related, these are distinct concepts. Shannon, as an engineer, is concerned with the message's physical character, not specifically, but in abstraction as a way of encoding, say, bits.

If we take bits as an example, the engineering problem is that of receiving the bits properly. That problem conceives of the message materially, not formally. We care what the bits are, not what they mean. So far, I think we agree.

Where we disagree is how logical possibility relates to this. You have brought in semantics, pointing out that not all codes communicate meaning to minds. However, that is not what I meant in saying that the the possibility in Shannon's definition is logical. I am considering the message materially, as Shannon did -- not formally (as meaning something) as you are.

Thinking of messages materially, what is logically possible before a bit is received is that the bit can be an a or a b. What each state means semantically, or even in terms of 0s and 1s, is irrelevant to the engineering problem. So, the logic of this logical possibility relates only indirectly to the meaning a bit may evoke (its semantics). It relates to what the bits of the message might be before they are received.

So, as I have said, once the bits are transmitted, they are physically determined and it is no longer physically possible that they be other than they are. What is open before each bit is received, is the logical possibility of what it will be. Even if no mind is informed as each bit is received, the intelligibility of the received message is further determined (its possibilities are reduced). Intelligibility belongs to the logical order, or, perhaps, the ontological order.

Now consider a non-semantic "message," say a DNA sequence. If we are determinists with respect to purely physical processes, as I am, then every purely physical state, together with the laws of nature, determines the subsequent states. As there is only one physical possibility, information cannot reduce the set of physical possibilities. All the execution of the DNA code can do is inform the resulting structure -- reducing what is ontologically possible to what is physically actual.

So, in such cases we are not dealing with the reduction of physical possibilities (because there is only one), or with the reduction of logical possibilities (ignorance), because no one is being informed, but with the reduction of ontological possibility, because being can take many forms beyond that actualized by the DNA code.

Where we disagree is how logical possibility relates to this. You have brought in semantics, pointing out that not all codes communicate meaning to minds. However, that is not what I meant in saying that the the possibility in Shannon's definition is logical. I am considering the message materially, as Shannon did -- not formally (as meaning something) as you are. — Dfpolis

Or rather, as I suspect you were (i.e., considering the message formally), as follows:

The problem is that information cannot be a primary concept. Since it is the reduction of logical possibility, it presupposes the existence of logical possibilities to be reduced. Logical possibilities are possibilities in the realm of knowledge, and knowledge presupposes a knowing subject. So, we need knowing subjects (minds) to ground the concept of information -- as well as that of intentionality. — Dfpolis

However, thanks for your clarification. From that, it appears we agree on the nature of Shannon information, and on the role of genetic code (DNA) in gene expression. Where we disagree concerns whether or not your original comment was "considering the message materially, as Shannon did".

It's not that everything is physical because it's an assumption of physicalism. Physicalists are physicalists because everything seems to be physical empirically, where that's not defined by the field of physics, because it's in no way parasitic to the field of physics. — Terrapin Station

Here's how I interpret what you say here. Empirically, everything seems to be physical, therefore everything is physical. This is what you are stating as the premise of physicalism.

"So it is not a physicalist making this claim" doesn't seem to fit there. — Terrapin Station

The ontological claim made was that it is possible that there is something which is not physical. This is the claim which produces the need for someone to determine "what counts as physical". The physicalist, according to the premise stated above, does not believe that it is possible that there is something which is not physical. Therefore, it is not a physicalist who states that there is a need for someone to determine what counts as physical. Do you follow this TS? For the physicalist everything is physical. Therefore there is no need to determine what counts as physical. Therefore it is not a physicalist who is making the claim that someone needs to determine what counts as physical.

It's not a matter of making sense or not. It's a matter of what we're doing, or at least what some of us are doing. We're not a cheerleading squad for field of physics, period. That's not at all what we're doing. And figuring that that's what we're doing is just going to amount to not understanding us. That's up to you, though. Do you want to understand what we're doing or not? — Terrapin Station

If what you are doing, in your ontology doesn't make sense, don't you see this as a problem? But it's even worse than just a matter of not making sense, it's actually contradictory. You say that there's a need for someone to determine what counts as physical, when you've already determined, according to the statement above, that everything is physical. Don't you see this as contradictory? How can I understand what you are doing when the statements you make are contradictory?

It's like you're dedicated to not getting anything right. We're not denying the possibility. We're saying there are no non-physical things, because there's no good reason to believe that there are, including that to some of us, the idea of non-physical things doesn't even make much sense. That doesn't mean that someone couldn't make sense of it, but let's find that person and then examine what they have to say. — Terrapin Station

Saying "there are no non-physical things" is explicitly denying the possibility that there are non-physical things. If you turn around now, and say "we're not denying the possibility", then all you have done is contradicted yourself.

The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point. Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. The significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of possible messages (Italics added). — Claude Shannon -- A Mathematical Theory of Communication

Sort of like how one has to select from a set of possible options. But there is only one meaning to the message - the source's intent. What did the sender intend when they wrote the message? How you interpret the message depends upon your experiences. Try to understand a message in a different language. How could you ever hope to come up with even a set of possible messages when looking at a different language? You'd have to learn the language, just as you have to learn the language of your sensory impressions. What does the color red on an apple mean? What does that sound downstairs at night mean?

If we allow that the physicalist defines what counts as "physical" then everything is physical, because that's the assumption of physicalism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly. And the idealist can do the same thing - claim that everything is ideas.

What are they actually saying? They are both saying the same thing, just with different terms. They are saying that everything is the same "essence" or "substance", but are using different terms to refer to that. This is no different than two people using a different language to say the same thing.

The materialists and idealists can't even explain the differences between matter and ideas. How would the world be different if the world was made of ideas as opposed to matter, and vice versa?

Let's just do one thing at a time and see if we can get past anything:

Here's how I interpret what you say here. Empirically, everything seems to be physical, therefore everything is physical. This is what you are stating as the premise of physicalism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Physicalists are asserting what seems to be the case in the world in their view, yes. I hope you're not thinking that's controversial. Isn't that what everyone does?

No, I don't think that's what everyone does. If it seems to be the case, or appears to be the case, I do not assert that it is the case.

What do you assert is the case, what doesn't seem to be the case? That would be a novel approach, at least.

I don't get you. Are you trying to change the subject?

Do you mean like "physicalism is false"? I assert that this is the case, though it doesn't seem to be the case. If this is what you mean, then logic often convinces us that what seems to be the case is not actually the case. So we assert on the merits of logic, that what seems to be the case is actually not the case, and what seems to be not the case is actually the case.

However, thanks for your clarification. From that, it appears we agree on the nature of Shannon information. Where we disagree, is that your original comment was "considering the message materially, as Shannon did". — Galuchat

I think I was by arguing from the bit-by-bit reception of the message instead of from its meaning.

Nonetheless, I was not entirely satisfied with my reply, as it did not close the loop bake to a mental foundation in the case of non-semantic "messages" such as DNA sequences. I left them with the reduction of ontological rather than logical possibility. That left open the possibility of understanding information without reference to a knowing subject.

As a result, I have further reflected on the reduction of ontological possibility . I have come to see that it is convertible with the specification of intelligibility, and, as a potency, intelligibility cannot be understood without reference to its actualization by a knowing subject. Thus, while the reduction of ontological possibility (something being formed) is not logical possibility, it is at the nexus of the logical and logical orders. It is the foundation in reality for our understanding of what is so formed.

I assert that this is the case, though it doesn't seem to be the case. If this is what you mean, then logic often convinces us that what seems to be the case is not actually the case. — Metaphysician Undercover

Logic convinces us that p.

Therefore, p seems to be the case, no?

"I've been convinced that this actually is the case." Well, that means that it seems to be the case to you. "I've been convinced that this actually is the case. Yet it doesn't seem to be the case to me." That would make no sense.

"Seems to be the case" is simply another way of saying, "I believe this to be the case."

As I already pointed out, it is you that is equivocating - using terms like, "matter", "ideas", "being" and "essences" without any clear explanation of what those things are. — Harry Hindu

In the course of the thread, I have explained what each of these terms means. You did not ask for further clarification when I did so. However, even if I were unclear, that is not equivocation, which requires the same term to to be used with different meanings in different instances.

So when you use the string of scribbles, "unicorn", what do those scribbles refer to? If it refers to your idea of a unicorn, then "unicorn" is an idea of a unicorn. — Harry Hindu

The string, "unicorn" expresses, but does not refer to, the idea <unicorn>. Except when we're considering ideas, universals do not refer to ideas, but to potential instances -- to potential realities that could evoke the idea when and if we experience them. Because of ideas' potential and contingent nature, the existence of an idea has no implications for extramental reality.

As for animals and ideas, they have different essences because they can do different things. A goat can eat grass, but the idea of a goat can't. — Dfpolis

Then the grass would be a different essence than the goat. All you have done is redefine "thing" as "essence", and that throws a wrench into your explanation of "matter" and "ideas". — Harry Hindu

I am unsure what line of thought led you to this conclusion.

Things, beings, are characterized by an unspecified capacity to act. They are operational -- have "causal power" in your turn of phrase. That unspecified capacity is what is intended by the concept of <existence>.

We know from experience, however, that things can not only act, but act in specific ways. They can do these acts, but not those. Goats can eat grass. The idea of a goat can't. So, a thing being able to act in unspecified ways does not exhaust its reality. The specification of each thing's possible acts, which is its essence, resolves this indeterminacy.

In sum, essence is a specification, but an abstract specification does not entail that any operational thing has that specification. Existence reflects operational capability of what essence specifies.

So, I haven't redefined "thing" as essence. Every real thing has both essence (specification) and existence (operational capability).

Each idea does different things and would therefore be a different essence. How would you know that you have an idea of a horse as opposed to a unicorn, if those ideas didn't do different things? — Harry Hindu

I never said that the ideas <unicorn> and <horse> do the same things. <Unicorn> refers to actual and potential unicorns while <horse> refers to actual and potential horses. Contingently, there are no actual unicorns, but there are actual horses.

Logic convinces us that p.

Therefore, p seems to be the case, no? — Terrapin Station

No I wouldn't say that. When logic convinces me that p is the case I would assert that p is the case, not that p seems to be the case. I would only say that p seems to be the case if I wasn't convinced that p is the case.

"Seems to be the case" is simply another way of saying, "I believe this to be the case." — Terrapin Station

So you recognize no difference between "I am convinced that p is the case" and "p seems to be the case"? No wonder I do not agree with your ontology.

Now you say that we ought to distinguish intentional from non-intentional, using the method of physics, which has no capacity to even recognize the intentional. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not my claim. While mathematical physics only considers objective physical reality as measurable, philosophy spans all reality. We can look at what physicists actually do, at the abstraction(s) and methods they employ, to see what physics is competent to discuss. So, I am using the method of physics materially, not formally. In other words, I'm not employing that method as my method, but looking at it as an object of study.

Now you say that we ought to distinguish intentional from non-intentional, using the method of physics, which has no capacity to even recognize the intentional. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. Reality has a wide span. Physics deals with a subset of it. We can only decide which subset by looking at what physics actually does. I am not saying that whatever is left is intentional, because there could be "more things in heaven and earth ... than are dreamt of" in our philosophy. I'm only saying that intentionality is not part of the subset dealt with by physics.

In doing that, I'm not defining the intentional as the complement of the physical -- that would beg the question in the OP. Rather, I am defining intentionality a posteriori, by looking at its nature and standing on the shoulders of those, such as Brentano, who've done so.

How are you going to convince a physicalist, who believes that there is no aspect of reality outside this physical part of reality, without referring to this part of reality which is outside. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't, nor have I tried to do so. If you look my arguments in the OP, they explicitly involve the intentional reality left on the table by the Fundamental Abstraction.

You cannot assume that the physicalist will accept your assumption that there is something outside the purview of physics, because this contradicts the physicalist premise, fundamentally. — Metaphysician Undercover

I assume only that physicalists experience more than their theory can account for. My task, then, is to induce them to reflect on the unexplained data.

I'm using "sems to be" to refer to our beliefs, what we think is the case, however we've arrived at that conclusion.

Sort of like how one has to select from a set of possible options. But there is only one meaning to the message - the source's intent. What did the sender intend when they wrote the message? How you interpret the message depends upon your experiences. Try to understand a message in a different language. How could you ever hope to come up with even a set of possible messages when looking at a different language? You'd have to learn the language, just as you have to learn the language of your sensory impressions. — Harry Hindu

Yes, there is more to semantic communication than the accurate reception of the physical message. That reception is only a preliminary step in a complex, semiotic process -- one that you have begun to sketch.

While semiotics is an important area of understanding, it is a tangent that would take us far from the topic of my OP.

So you recognize no difference between "I am convinced that p is the case" and "p seems to be the case"? No wonder I do not agree with your ontology. — Metaphysician Undercover

Both are expressions of belief, aren't they? I am convinced that p is the case if I can find no good reason to believe that it is not the case. 'I am not able to find good reason' equates to 'there seems to be no good reason'. We cannot say with certainty that there is no good reason, because there may indeed be one that I am yet to find. Being convinced does not equate to either absolute certainty or omniscience; all knowledge is fallible.

Both are expressions of belief, aren't they? — Janus

No, in my customary usage they are not both expressions of belief. "It seems to be the case" implies doubt and therefore not a belief that it is the case, as doubt is opposed to belief. One cannot doubt that it is the case, and believe that it is the case, at the same time. "I am convinced that it is the case" expresses belief that it is the case.

I'm not convinced. Being convinced does not mean you think there could not possibly be any reason to doubt. Convictions, unless they are untestable faith-based convictions or based on tautology, are always open to possible future doubt even if no present reasons to doubt seem to exist. Think of science, and you will understand.

Being convinced does not mean you think there could not possibly be any reason to doubt. — Janus

Yes it does mean that. If you thought that there was any reason to doubt it. you would not be convinced. Being convinced means that you are not aware of any reason to doubt it. That this is "possibly" not the case can not enter into your mind or else you would not be convinced.

Convictions, unless they are untreatable faith-based convictions or based on tautology, are always open to possible future doubt even if no present reasons to doubt seem to exist. Think of science, and you will understand. — Janus

What may or may not happen in the future (that one may doubt in the future what one is convinced of now) is irrelevant, what we are talking about is being convinced now. If I am convinced now, I have no doubts. and I also "think there could not possibly be any reason to doubt". If I thought that there could possibly be a reason to doubt, I would not be convinced.

Why do you want to lock down the use of “convinced” in this way? What purpose does that serve?

However, even if I were unclear, that is not equivocation, which requires the same term to to be used with different meanings in different instances — Dfpolis

Exactly. Using the same term with with different meanings in different instances would be unclear in your use of the term.

The string, "unicorn" expresses, but does not refer to, the idea <unicorn>. Except when we're considering ideas, universals do not refer to ideas, but to potential instances -- to potential realities that could evoke the idea when and if we experience them. Because of ideas' potential and contingent nature, the existence of an idea has no implications for extramental reality. — Dfpolis

Okay, the string, "unicorn" represents, or symbolizes (both are synonyms of "express") the idea <unicorn>. You seemed to contradict yourself by saying that universals refer to potential instances.

Instead of "potential instances" - which seems like a loaded term, I'd use the term "category". Unicorns, cats, dogs and planets are categories. We put things (Uni) in mental boxes, or categories (unicorns) - Uni the unicorn.

As for animals and ideas, they have different essences because they can do different things. A goat can eat grass, but the idea of a goat can't. — Dfpolis

Then the grass would be a different essence than the goat. All you have done is redefine "thing" as "essence", and that throws a wrench into your explanation of "matter" and "ideas". — Harry Hindu

I am unsure what line of thought led you to this conclusion. — Dfpolis

What led me to that conclusion was your own explanation of "essence". You said they have different essences because they can do different things. Every thing does something different, which means that each idea is a different essence, and each material thing is a different essence. There is no distinction between what is ideas and what is matter if everything is different from each other. Goats eat grass, but grass doesn't eat grass, so they would be different essences. The idea of grass doesn't eat the idea of grass either and would be a different essence than the idea of a goat eating grass.

But wait a second, can you imagine grass eating grass (the idea of grass eating grass)? Would that then make it the same essence as the idea of the goat eating grass?

Things, beings, are characterized by an unspecified capacity to act. They are operational -- have "causal power" in your turn of phrase. That unspecified capacity is what is intended by the concept of <existence>.

We know from experience, however, that things can not only act, but act in specific ways. They can do these acts, but not those. Goats can eat grass. The idea of a goat can't. So, a thing being able to act in unspecified ways does not exhaust its reality. The specification of each thing's possible acts, which is its essence, resolves this indeterminacy.

In sum, essence is a specification, but an abstract specification does not entail that any operational thing has that specification. Existence reflects operational capability of what essence specifies.

So, I haven't redefined "thing" as essence. Every real thing has both essence (specification) and existence (operational capability). — Dfpolis

Then I don't see how you've said anything different or made anything clearer. Every thing has a different essence and existence. Each idea would have a different existence and essence. So what? What does that have to do with the difference between what an idea is and what matter is? You've simply explained the difference between things, not the difference between the category "idea" and "matter".

It seems to me that one's essence defines one's existence. It seems to me that they are inseparable, as one's essence/existence is a relationship with everything else, so in a sense you did redefine "thing" as "essence/existence". In a deterministic world, that relationship would be deterministic, with no potentialities. "Potentialities" are the result of our perception of time, as if the future is yet to happen and still isn't determined.

I never said that the ideas <unicorn> and <horse> do the same things. <Unicorn> refers to actual and potential unicorns while <horse> refers to actual and potential horses. Contingently, there are no actual unicorns, but there are actual horses. — Dfpolis

I didn't say you did say they were the same. My point was to restate your claim that they don't do the same things and therefore would be different essences and different existences. You still haven't addressed the differences between "idea" and "matter".

Nonetheless, I was not entirely satisfied with my reply, as it did not close the loop bake to a mental foundation in the case of non-semantic "messages" such as DNA sequences. I left them with the reduction of ontological rather than logical possibility. That left open the possibility of understanding information without reference to a knowing subject. — Dfpolis

Of course it is not possible that information can be understood (except in a metaphorical sense) without reference to a knowing subject.

In the case of non-semantic messages (e.g., DNA), understanding is irrelevant. The vocabulary (energy-mass set) used in a non-semantic message is common to (not understood by) both message source (e.g., DNA) and message destination (e.g., RNAP).

Vocabulary being: an energy-mass and/or symbol set common to and/or understood by message source (informer) and message destination (informee).

So, I consider the related general definitions of information, message, communication, code, and data to constitute a foundational concept which applies to both material (physical) and intentional (mental) domains.