No, desires are generally physiological needs, accompanied by mental awareness of the need. — Dfpolis

I don't think that's quite right. According to Aristotle, desires are appearances of the good. They thus are directed outwardly to what appears good. If something is good because it fulfills a need, then desiring it betrays awareness that it indeed fulfills that need; if an agent is rational and self-conscious, she can self-ascribe the need that is being fulfilled by the desired object. But the intentional content of the desire is the proposition (true or false) that the desired object is good.

No, desires are generally physiological needs, accompanied by mental awareness of the need. — Dfpolis

I don't think that's quite right. According to Aristotle, desires are appearances of the good. If something is good because it fulfills a need, then desiring it betrays awareness that it indeed fulfills that need; if an agent is rational and self-conscious, she can self-ascribe the need that is being fulfilled by the desired object. But the intentional content of the desire is the proposition (true or false) that the desired object is good. — Pierre-Normand

I recall Aquinas saying that whatever we choose, we choose under the aspect (appearance?) of good. I would not be surprised to find that he derived this claim form Aristotle, but I do not recall the text. Do you?

While "aspect" and "appearance" can have the same denotation, their connotations are quite different. To see according to an aspect is to say that we see reality, but only partially, from a certain perspective. To say that we see an appearance leaves open the possibility that we are deceived -- that what we think see is not really there. Of course, we do err in judgements of perception, so we could choose something we think is good, but really is not. For example, one partner can deceive another in love, so the deceived commits for a sound, but false, reason.

If one has exercised due diligence, committing for a sound, but false reason, is not a culpable act, and culpability for sin is the context of Aquinas' discussion. So, "appearance" is not how I read Aquinas' (and presumably Aristotle's) main point. I think his main point is, that we do not choose evil acts because of their privative (evil) nature, but because of the actual, but lesser good, incorporating the privation. A suicide, for example, wishes the cessation of pain, which is a good, at the cost of deprivation of life, which is evil.

So, to return to my point, desires reflect states of need -- goods required for the realization of our potential that we lack. Thus, needs are based on our end-directed nature, some are physiological in origin, others intellectual or spritual. We know these by connaturality (as Maritain notes), by attending to the natural responses of our being to presented situations. Physiologically, the brain is informed of needs by neural and endocrine signals. Our awareness of this information, of the need for action directed to our natural self-realization, is, in my view, desire.

So, desire is an intentional state, but, as Brentano points out, the nature of intentional states it to point beyond themselves -- here to the need for action to continue toward our natural end (telos).

I recall Aquinas saying that whatever we choose, we choose under the aspect (appearance?) of good. I would not be surprised to find that he derived this claim form Aristotle, but I do not recall the text. Do you? — Dfpolis

Maybe the most relevant place is De Anima 433a27-28 (Translated by J. A. Smith, in The Complete Work of Aristotle - The Revised Oxford Translation Vol 1):

Now thought is always right, but appetite and imagination may be either right or wrong. That is why, though in any case it is the object of appetite which originates movement, this object may be either the real or the apparent good. -- 433a27-28

Here is the broader context:

That which moves therefore is a single faculty and the faculty of appetite; for if there had been two sources of movement—thought and appetite—they would have produced movement in virtue of some common character. As it is, thought is never found producing movement without appetite (for wish is a form of appetite; and when movement is produced according to calculation it is also according to wish), but appetite can originate movement contrary to calculation, for desire is a form of appetite. Now thought is always right, but appetite and imagination may be either right or wrong. That is why, though in any case it is the object of appetite which originates movement, this object may be either the real or the apparent good. To produce movement the object must be more than this: it must be good that can be brought into being by action; and only what can be otherwise than as it is can thus be brought into being. That then such a power in the soul as has been described, i.e. that called appetite, originates movement is clear. Those who distinguish parts in the soul, if they distinguish and divide in accordance with differences of power, find themselves with a very large number of parts, a nutritive, a sensitive, an intellective, a deliberative, and now an appetitive part; for these are more different from one another than the faculties of desire and passion. -- 433a21-433b4

I'll respond later to the rest of your challenging post.

Mentality is physiological, by the way. But I wouldn't say that there's any reason to believe that a desire, per se, can be nonmental. I don't buy the notion of unconscious mental content in general.

Also, needs always hinge on wants.

Thank you for the informative post. The citations are quite helpful.

Reflecting on them, we have used "desire" ambiguously. I was focusing on desire as based on a natural need, (call it "intrinsic desire"), while the passage you cite, and your subsequent discussion focuses on desire for a specific object (call it "directed desire"). If I thirst, I have a need for hydration, but that does not mean that I fixed on a particular beverage as the object to meet my need. So, we have intrinsic desire as a state of being (thirst) that we can be aware of, and an analogous use of "desire" as an intentional relation directed to an object, universal or specific, that we believe can meet that need in whole or in part.

Aristotle anticipates me on relation of desire and telos at 433a15: "And every appetite is directed to an end (to telei)."

The following passages also caused me to reflect:

Now thought is always right, but appetite and imagination may be either right or wrong.

I find this quite problematic as translated. Clearly, even in careful reflection, there is a chance for error. My Liddel and Soctt says orthos can also mean "norm." I can agree that the norm should be to follow thought over impulse.

To produce movement the object must be more than this: it must be good that can be brought into being by action; and only what can be otherwise than as it is can thus be brought into being.

This relates to what I sad about potential. Objects of desire have to have real potential if they are to advance the realization of our natural ends.

That then such a power in the soul as has been described, i.e. that called appetite, originates movement is clear. Those who distinguish parts in the soul, if they distinguish and divide in accordance with differences of power, find themselves with a very large number of parts, a nutritive, a sensitive, an intellective, a deliberative, and now an appetitive part; for these are more different from one another than the faculties of desire and passion.

These well-founded distinctions are lost in the projection of naturalist and purely neurophysiological thinking.

Mentality is physiological, by the way. But I wouldn't say that there's any reason to believe that a desire, per se, can be nonmental. I don't buy the notion of unconscious mental content in general.

Also, needs always hinge on wants. — Terrapin Station

Mentality is physiological in the sense that it is normally supported by the neurophysiological processing of informative contents. It is equally clear that it is inadequate to explain awareness of contents.

1. Neurophysiological data processing cannot be the explanatory invariant of our awareness of contents. If A => B, then every case of A entails a case of B. So, if there is any case of neurophysiological data processing, and it explains our awareness of the processed data (consciousness) then we would be aware of all the data we process. Clearly, we are not aware of all the data we process.

2. All knowledge is a subject-object relation. There is always a knowing subject and a known object. At the beginning of natural science, we abstract the object from the subject -- we choose to attend to physical objects to the exclusion of the mental acts by which the subject knows those objects. In natural science care what Ptolemy, Brahe, Galileo, and Hubble saw, not the act by which the intelligibility of what they saw became actually known. Thus, natural science is, by design, bereft of data and concepts relating to the knowing subject and her acts of awareness. Lacking these data and concepts, it has no way of connecting what it does know of the physical world, including neurophysiology, to the act of awareness. Thus it is logically impossible for natural science, as limited by its Fundamental Abstraction, to explain the act of awareness. Forgetting this is a prime example of Whitehead's Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness (thinking what exists only in abstraction is the concrete reality in its fullness).

3. The material and intentional aspects of reality are logically orthogonal. That is to say, that, though they co-occur and interact, they do not share essential, defining notes. Matter is essentially extended and changeable. It is what it is because of intrinsic characteristics. As extended, matter has parts outside of parts, and so is measurable. As changeable, the same matter can take on different forms. As defined by intrinsic characteristics, we need not look beyond a sample to understand its nature.

Intentions do not have these characteristics. They are unextended, having no parts outside of parts. Instead they are indivisible unities. Further, there is no objective means of measuring them. They are not changeable. If you change your intent, you no longer the same intention, but a different intention. As Franz Brentano noted, an essential characteristic of intentionality is its aboutness, which is to to say that they involve some target that they are about. We do not just know, will or hope, we know, will and hope something. Thus, to fully understand/specify an intention we have to go beyond its intrinsic nature, and say what it is about. (To specify a desire, we have to say what is desired.) This is clearly different from what is needed to specify a sample of matter.

4. Intentional realities are information based. What we know, will, desire, etc. is specified by actual, not potential, information. By definition, information is the reduction of (logical) possibility. If a message is transmitted, but not yet fully received, then it is not physical possibility that is reduced in the course of its reception, but logical possibility. As each bit is received, the logical possibility that it could be other than it is, is reduced.

The explanatory invariant of information is not physical. The same information can be encoded in a panoply of physical forms that have only increased in number with the advance of technology. Thus, information is not physically invariant. So, we have to look beyond physicality to understand information, and so the intentional realities that are essentially dependent on information.

(I am posting most of this as a new thread.)

Mentality is physiological in the sense that it is normally supported by the neurophysiological processing — Dfpolis

It's physiological in the sense that it's identical to physiology.

Neurophysiological data processing cannot be the explanatory invariant — Dfpolis

"Explanatory invariant"? What's that?

It's physiological in the sense that it's identical to physiology. — Terrapin Station

That is your belief. What is your justification?

"Explanatory invariant"? What's that? — Terrapin Station

The one principle explaining many cases. For example, the laws of nature are explanatory invariants because they, while unchanging, explain many, variable phenomena. It is by seeing what remains the same while the details vary that we come to an understanding of causality.

So, say that someone says "(Part of) The explanation for billiard ball B moving in vector v after being struck by billiard ball A is F=ma."

And then the other guy goes, "That doesn't actually explain why billiard ball B moved. 'F=ma' doesn't seem anything like billiard ball B moving."

Is F=ma part of the explanation for why billiard ball B moved in vector v or not?

Is F=ma part of the explanation for why billiard ball B moved in vector v or not? — Terrapin Station

Materially considered, which is to say as a piece of text, it has nothing to do with the motion of billiard balls. Formally considered, which is to say as indicating relevant the physics, rather than the proposition as a text, yes, it partly explains the motion.

I didn't ask what I wanted to ask clearly enough there.

The guy who says "That doesn't actually explain why billiard ball B moved. 'F=ma' doesn't seem anything like billiard ball B moving" says that F=ma is thus not an explanation.

The other guy says that it is.

What's required for it to "really be" an explanation in a case like this? We have two different opinions on whether F=ma is an explanation.

I am still not sure what you're asking. The first thing that comes to mind is that there are many kinds of explanation. Aristotle distinguishes material, formal, efficient and final causes.

Materially, the ball moves because it retains its integrity and so is the principle of continuity in the change.

Formally, the ball moves as it does because of the laws of nature, approximately and partially described by F=ma.

The efficient cause of the ball moving is the strike of the cue, and beyond that the action of the player.

The final cause of the ball moving is, perhaps, the player's desire to win the game.

Is that what you are asking? In any event, F=ma is part of the explanation, but not all that can be said.

The exact explanation for the example, and what we're explaining in the example, don't really matter. That's why I just picked something simple--it's just an example.

What I'm asking you is simply:

Joe says that "F=ma" isn't an explanation, because F=ma doesn't at all seem like what it's supposed to be explaining.

Frank says that "F=ma" is the explanation.

Is Joe right and Frank is wrong? Vice versa? What decides?

Joe says that "F=ma" isn't an explanation, because F=ma doesn't at all seem like what it's supposed to be explaining. — Terrapin Station

OK. Now I understand. For "F=ma" to be the explanation involves a lot of indirection. The string/proposition "F=ma" points to/elicits the mental judgement <Applied force is equal to mass times induced acceleration>. (I use "" for words, <> for thoughts.) The concepts in the judgement (<force>, <mass> and <acceleration>) point to any aspects of reality capable of properly eliciting them. So, <force> has for its referents any possible measured values of pushes and pulls, for example. It is because these concrete cases are all equally capable of eliciting <force> that <force> is a universal concept. The judgement, <Applied force is equal to mass times induced acceleration> states a relation between these concepts that we believe always obtains in reality.

So, while Joe is right that the proposition is unlike the reality, what he is forgetting is that what the proposition points to is the reality and others like it.

While trying to avoid diversions re semiotics, semantics, etc. at the moment (we might not be able to avoid that tangent for long, but I'll try to avoid it), Joe says that force referring to "any possible measured values of pushes and pulls" and all of the rest of that isn't an explanation because it doesn't at all seem like what it's supposed to be explaining.

So who is right and who is wrong? Is it an explanation or not? And who gets to decide?

We can each define terms to suit ourselves. So, Joe can define "explanation" in his way and Frank in his. That seems to be what is happening here. Assuming that both understand the relations I outlined, they agree on the facts of the case. Instead, each has a different idea in mind when they say "explanation." Logically, this is equivocation, and so it is not a problem about reality, but about choice of linguistic convention.

Just to be clear, Joe is saying that the relations you outlined, as something general about the world, do not seem like billiard balls striking billiard balls and what happens to them when struck.

Then he does not understand how predication works.

I don't think I understand "how predication works," either, if that would be pertinent here.

How would you say it works? (I wonder if it's something that I'd think has some merit or that I'd think gets things wrong.)

When we judge that A is B, it is because what evokes the concept <A> is identically what evokes the concept <B>. For example, when we judge <This triangle is equilateral> it is because the object evoking <this triangle> is the very same object that evokes the concept <equilateral>. Thus, the copula "is" betokens identity -- not in the concepts it links, but in the source of the concepts it links. If what evoked <this triangle> did not also evoke <equilateral>, even if some other triangle did, the judgement would be false.

So, when we make affirmative predications, we are affirming identity of concept source, and when we make negative predications, we are denying it.

So, the explanation works, because in the actual case, the relevant concepts are all evoked by the same event -- and we have previously accepted that in any case evoking all the required concepts their relation will be given by F=ma.

When we judge that A is B, it is because what evokes the concept <A> is identically what evokes the concept <B>. For example, when we judge <This triangle is equilateral> — Dfpolis

First, "This triangle" isn't a concept, it's a particular. ("Triangle" is going to be a concept, but "this triangle" conventionally refers to a particular, as a particular.)

If A is a particular and B is a concept, then "A is B" is the case because A fits the concept, B, that someone has in mind. (That is, of course, per their perception of A, per the way they've formulated their concept B, etc.)

Thus, the copula "is" betokens identity — Dfpolis

Not necessarily. It can refer to set membership. That's a different idea than identity. Or at least we need to point out that "identity" is often used to refer to "the very same thing" and not just "a property of this thing."

affirming identity of concept source — Dfpolis

That phrase doesn't read so that it makes grammatical sense to me. Maybe that's partially because of ambiguity over how you're using "identity," though, and also because the source of concepts, on my view, is individuals--more specifically, the way that individuals formulate mental abstractions that range over a number of particulars.

So, the explanation works, because in the actual case, the relevant concepts are all evoked by the same event — Dfpolis

Given what concepts are on my view, then, it's simply a matter of whether the concepts fit per the individual in question, since concepts are an individual phenomenon.

In this example, obviously there's a problem with the concepts fitting, since to Joe, it didn't actually count as an explanation.

First, "This triangle" isn't a concept, it's a particular. ("Triangle" is going to be a concept, but "this triangle" conventionally refers to a particular, as a particular.) — Terrapin Station

It is not a universal concept. It is a particular concept. It is not the thing itself, but a formal sign referring to a specific thing. Call it an "idea" if you prefer. In particular concepts we have not abstracted away the relations that individuate the object. The critical point here is that we are primarily dealing with thoughts, formal signs, and not words or the objects they reference.

If A is a particular and B is a concept, then "A is B" is the case because A fits the concept, B, that someone has in mind. — Terrapin Station

"A fits the concept, B" is just another way of saying what I said, that A properly evokes the concept <B>.

Thus, the copula "is" betokens identity — Dfpolis

Not necessarily. It can refer to set membership. That's a different idea than identity. Or at least we need to point out that "identity" is often used to refer to "the very same thing" and not just "a property of this thing." — Terrapin Station

I am speaking of "is" as a cupola in a proposition. If the subject and predicate do not have identical sources, the the judgement is false. E.g. this is an apple and that is red, "This apple is red" is unjustified.

Even in set theory, a is an element of B is unjustified if what is a is not identically what is an element of B.

Please note what is identical. It is not the concepts or set elements, it is the source of subject and predicate.

affirming identity of concept source — Dfpolis

That phrase doesn't read so that it makes grammatical sense to me. — Terrapin Station

We experience objects, and form concepts based on that experience, as I tried to show in my examples. "Identity of source" means that the identical object instantiates the subject and predicate concepts.

In this example, obviously there's a problem with the concepts fitting, since to Joe, it didn't actually count as an explanation. — Terrapin Station

That simply means that Joe's concept is not Frank's so they are equivocating on "explanation."

It is not a universal concept. It is a particular concept. It is not the thing itself, but a formal sign referring to a specific thing. — Dfpolis

Wait, one thing at a time because this is a complete mess.

Okay, re the above, yet you say that you're not talking about the word itself. That makes no sense if you're talking about the ("formal"--what's the alternative here) sign qua the sign.

Why would we say that "this triangle" isn't referring to the thing itself, by the way? That would be a very odd way to use that phrase. "This triangle" is like "this" alone, just that we're appending "triangle" to it to make it clearer (especially on a message board) what "this" we're pointing at.

you say that you're not talking about the word itself. That makes no sense if you're talking about the ("formal"--what's the alternative here) sign qua the sign. — Terrapin Station

"Formal sign" here is a term of art opposed to "instrumental sign." I explained the distinction, which is from John of St. Thomas' Ars Logica, earlier in the thread. It is also explained in Veatch's Intentional Logic. Basically formal signs are ideas, judgements and arguments in the mind and based on a binary relation. Instrumental signs are the kind we sense and are based on a ternary relation.

Why would we say that "this triangle" isn't referring to the thing itself, by the way? — Terrapin Station

It does, but mediated by the elicited concept.

Since there is no triangle to point to, I said "this triangle" to be clear.

It does, but mediated by the elicited concept.

Since there is no triangle to point to, I said "this triangle" to be clear. — Dfpolis

So you're saying "this triangle" as "this concept I'm thinking of"?

I would normally expect someone to being referring to something like:

This triangle:

So you're saying "this triangle" as "this concept I'm thinking of"? — Terrapin Station

No. I imagined we were both looking at the same triangle. My idea <this triangle> referenced it. My words, "this triangle" expressed my idea, and so, via that idea reference the same triangle.

It seems that you have a very hard time understanding me because you keep thinking of strange interpretations of what I say. As a result you raise non-issues far removed from the topic. I am wondering if you are doing this purposefully, and if it is worth my time to continue.

No. I imagined we were both looking at the same triangle. My idea <this triangle> referenced it. My words, "this triangle" expressed my idea, and so, via that idea reference the same triangle.

It seems that you have a very hard time understanding me because you keep thinking of strange interpretations of what I say. As a result you raise non-issues far removed from the topic. I am wondering if you are doing this purposefully, and if it is worth my time to continue. — Dfpolis

Lol, no I'm not doing it purposefully. I think we maybe have extremely different paradigms that we're working with.

Why would "this triangle" in your usage refer to an idea rather than referring to the triangle we're looking at? The triangle we're looking at isn't an idea.

Lol, no I'm not doing it purposefully. — Terrapin Station

Okay, thanks.

Why would "this triangle" in your usage refer to an idea rather than referring to the triangle we're looking at? The triangle we're looking at isn't an idea. — Terrapin Station

"This triangle" does refer to the triangle we're looking at. It is just that for our communication to work, my words need to express my concept and induce the corresponding concept in you, i.e. one referring to the same triangle. If I can't make you think of the same triangle, I've failed to communicate.