Yes, but there must be some true things said about it if we are to successfully refer to it; otherwise reference itself would become meaningless. Also we must believe that some things that have been said about it are true in order to believe that we are referring to it.

That sounds interesting! Unfortunately i know little about Frege, so I am not clear as to how he might have thought that information (in the human social and semantic context) could differ from story telling or description.

Yes, but there must be some true things said about it if we are to successfully refer to it; otherwise reference itself would become meaningless... — Janus

Hmmmm...

I do not think so. We could have nothing but false belief about 'X'. We would still be referring to 'X'.

Absurd! How could you refer to "X" if you knew absolutely nothing at all about it?

Perhaps you could give us an example: refer to something you know absolutely nothing about.

And yet we do.

All you need to know is that that is called 'X'.

So says the would-be Guru as he "pours from the Empty into the Void"!

So you know that it is called "X"? You know that what is called "X"? Is it called 'X' only by you, or by others as well?

So Hesperus turns out to be Phosphorus. Yet "Hesperus", being a rigid designator, refers to Hesperus in all possible worlds.

But Hesperus is Phosphorus.

Hence, "Hesperus" refers to Phosphorus in all possible worlds.

Puzzling.

No, my horse might be called 'Hesperus'. :joke:

That sounds interesting! Unfortunately i know little about Frege, so I am not clear as to how he might have thought that information (in the human social and semantic context) could differ from story telling or description. — Janus

The Fregean account is externalist rather than internalist. Oftentimes, when the cases of Hesperus and Phosphorus are being discussed, the (quasi-)descriptive phrases 'the Evening Star' and 'the Morning Star' are being used to express the senses of the proper names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'. This is misleading. The case of Afla and Ateb is more revealing of Frege's 'pragmatic-informational externalism' (as I might call it to distinguish it from Kripke's 'causal-chain externalism'). What distinguishes the users of both names isn't how they might describe the mountain that it refers to but how they practically are able to handle the referent -- how they are able to get to the mountain. But those abilities are enabled by the mountain actually existing, and the information required to get there is embodied in the naming-practice as a form of 'knowledge-how' (or acquaintance with the referent) rather than a descriptive 'knowledge-that'.

So you know that it is called "X"? You know that what is called "X"? Is it called 'X' only by you, or by others as well? — Janus

I know that that is called 'X'.

Does it matter if it is just I or others?

I think not. The first time a name is coined it is by one person. It refers to a thing nonetheless.

All my other belief about 'X' may be false. That holds good even if my belief is commensurate with common understanding about 'X'.

We see Venus at one time, and call it "Hesperus". At another time we see Venus, and call it "Phosphorus". Three names for the same thing. Not a problem.

Of course, it is possible that something might be given a different name. in some other possible world we might have used the name "Phosphorus" for Sirius. And of course, that does not mean that Phosphorus might have been Sirius.

In some other possible world, we see a star and call it "Hesperus". At some other time, we see a different star, and we call it "Phosphorus". How could this be, if the names designate rigidly?

SO what may have happened? Well, there may have been another object, not Venus, exactly where Venus was when it was baptised "Phosphorus". In this case, what has happened is that something other than Phosphorus has been given the name "Phosphorus". But even in that world, Phosphorus is still Phosphorus (provided, of course, that there is a Phosphorus in that world).

So you know what it is that you are calling 'X'?

So you know what it is that you are calling 'X'? — Janus

I know that that is what I'm calling 'X'. There's no need for anything else I believe about that to be true.

I do not see how this disagrees with what you've been saying.

Seems as though "that' must be nothing, in which case you are referring to nothing, which amounts ot not referring at all, as far as I can tell. Or, if "that" is not nothing, and yet not anything either imagined or sensed, then what is it?

Seems as though "that' must be nothing, in which case you are referring to nothing, which amounts ot not referring at all, as far as I can tell. Or, if "that" is not nothing, and yet not anything either imagined or sensed, then what is it? — Janus

That would be the thing I'm pointing at in your presence while naming it.

But I've been saying all along that description is only required in order to know what we refer to, in those cases where the object referred to is not present. If the object is present and you are pointing at it then you must know something about it, in any case.

So Hesperus turns out to be Phosphorus. Yet "Hesperus", being a rigid designator, refers to Hesperus in all possible worlds.

But Hesperus is Phosphorus.

Hence, "Hesperus" refers to Phosphorus in all possible worlds.

Puzzling. — Banno

I think the reason why this might appear puzzling is because when we are thinking about what might possibly, for all we know, be the case, we are thinking about epistemic possibility and we may fail to properly distinguish this from metaphysical possibility. So, before we knew that Hesperus is Phosphorus (i.e. that they are one and the same planet) it was epistemically possible (consistently with all we knew) that they might not have been the same planet (or that they might not have been planets at all, or might not have existed). However, given the fact that they actually exist and are numerically identical, then, it's not metaphysically possible that they might not have been numerically identical.

But I've been saying all along that description is only required in order to know what we refer to, in those cases where the object referred to is not present. — Janus

Ok.

If the object is present and you are pointing at it then you must know something about it, in any case. — Janus

I don't see why. Toddlers point to things all the time as a means to ask "What's that?"... Sometimes they do so(point and ask) simultaneously. Do you hold that they already know something about the object they are pointing at?

Perhaps. I'm not too happy with introducing a distinction between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility. So

before we knew that Hesperus is Phosphorus (i.e. that they are one and the same planet) it was epistemically possible (consistently with all we knew) that they might not have been the same planet — Pierre-Normand

strikes me as strictly incorrect, because Hesperus is Phosphorus in all possible words.

Instead, what might have happened is that we named Hesperus and Phosphorus "Hesperus", while naming something else "Phosphorus".

Do you hold that they already know something about the object they are pointing at? — creativesoul

Of course they do! They have picked out whatever they point at from the rest of the environment; they know it as distinct.

In any case when toddlers point to objects, how do you know they want to ask "What's that?". The further point is that they are not really referring to the object at all; that is a verbal function; they are simply pointing at something that has caught their attention, perhaps they just want you to look at it, too.

strikes me as strictly incorrect, because Hesperus is Phosphorus in all possible words. — Banno

Yes, there is no metaphysically possible world in which Hesperus isn't Phosphorus, provided only that they are numerically identical in the actual world. But there are epistemically possible worlds in which what we believe to be the referents of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' aren't the same object (provided only we don't already know them to be identical). This merely amounts to saying that such a proposition isn't logically inconsistent with what we already know.

Instead, what might have happened is that we named Hesperus and Phosphorus "Hesperus", while naming something else "Phosphorus".

Well, again, that's epistemically possible, and still not metaphysically possible. That's the relevant distinction, it seems to me.

And hence, despite all the detritus and corpses on the path, and the continued rear-guard action, we arrive at the interesting bit - Lecture Three.

Well, again, that's epistemically possible, and still not metaphysically possible. That's the relevant distinction, it seems to me. — Pierre-Normand

Sorry, I take that back. What you said in your last paragraph was correct even as a statement of metaphysical possibility.

But there are epistemically possible worlds in which what we believe to be the referents of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' aren't the same object — Pierre-Normand

I think we agree; I just would not use the distinction between metaphysical possibility and epistemological possibility. It seems to me to conceal more than it reveals. It's like de re and de dicto.

Better to say that Hesperus is Phosphorus, but "Hesperus" might not have referred to Hesperus and Phosphorus.

Cheers.

They have picked out whatever they point at from the rest of the environment; they know it as distinct. — Janus

Well, I would be more than willing to admit that spatiotemporal distinction is required for pointing at something, naming something, and referring to something. It is required for all attribution of meaning too. I would not not go so far as to say that all use of spatiotemporal distinction is equivalent to knowing something as distinct.

So, I stand by the claim that one need not know anything true about some thing(aside from knowing it's name) in order to successfully refer to that thing.

In any case when toddlers point to objects, how do you know they want to ask "What's that?". — Janus

Because they do.

I would not not go so far as to say that all use of spatiotemporal distinction is equivalent to knowing something as distinct. — creativesoul

Use of (spatiotemporal) distinction is not seeing something as distinct? To see something is to know it as you see it, isn't it? ( I am not saying this would be a reflective 'knowing that' [ for which langauge would be required]) but a knowing in the sense of familiarity or recognition. "Do you know Serena?" "Yes, I've met her". that kind of thing.