You're asking something about your own understanding, right? — Terrapin Station

No, I'm asking about "matter" and "ideas" and how you understand the difference. You've only supplied a difference in scribbles.

Coherence is always to someone, isn't it?

Coherence is always to someone, isn't it? — Terrapin Station

Okay, so then your idea of "matter" and "mind" is only coherent to you, then.

It is when something is coherent to many, not just one, that we make strides in objective knowledge.

Are you asking if something is coherent to someone else? Or to yourself?

I'm done with the game of yours. When you can actually answer the question, we can continue.

I'm done with the game of yours. When you can actually answer the question, we can continue. — Harry Hindu

The only way we're going to get anywhere is by doing this "game."

I'm not going to keep addressing the same things over and over. It's only going to work if we go step by step.

Are you asking if something is coherent to someone else? Or to your self? — Terrapin Station

I wasn't asking anything. I was simply reiterating what you said - that your concept of "matter" and "mind" are only coherent to you, and that isn't enough. Coherence isn't subjective. It follows rules of logic that are the same for everyone.

The only way we're going to get anywhere is by doing this "game." — Terrapin Station

No. It would be by answering the question that you keep avoiding.

Coherence isn't subjective. — Harry Hindu

So, we don't at all agree on this, and we don't at all agree about logic, either, including that I think that logic is subjective, and obviously, even for those who do not, there are many different species of logics, some incompatible with others.

So, we don't at all agree on this, and we don't at all agree about logic, either, including that I think that logic is subjective, and obviously, even for those who do not, there are many different species of logics, some incompatible with others. — Terrapin Station

So then why are you trying to be coherent to others when you speak? How is it that you expect them to understand anything that you say? Do words mean things? Are they coherent?

No. It would be by answering the question that you keep avoiding. — Harry Hindu

Whether you will participate in getting somewhere is up to you, but I wasn't asking your opinion about what was required. I don't consider you qualified to know.

So then why are you trying to be coherent others when you speak? How is it that you expect them to understand anything that you say? — Harry Hindu

That would be a whole big tangent about how communication works that wouldn't help you figure out what the difference is between what idealists and materialists are saying, which is all I'd want to accomplish.

That would be a whole big tangent about how communication works that wouldn't help you figure out what the difference is between what idealists and materialists are saying, which is all I'd want to accomplish. — Terrapin Station

It is very difficult for you to stay focused. I wasn't asking about how the difference in that post. I was asking how you can expect others to understand you if coherence is subjective.

You obviously have issues that won't allow you to engage in any real, meaningful discussions. I'm done.

It is very difficult for you to stay focused. I wasn't asking about how the difference in that post. I was asking how you can expect others to understand you if coherence is subjective. — Harry Hindu

What I'm focused on is you understanding the difference of what idealists and materialists are saying.

A tangent about communication, which is what that would be, won't help us get to you understanding the difference betwen what idealists and materialists are saying.

Making it all physical is interesting but will that lead to a theory where the difference between first and third person is illuminated? — Valentinus


I don't know, but in my view, the goal isn't to lead to a theory. The goal is to have accurate views about what is. If an accurate view about what is doesn't lead to a theory, but an inaccurate view does, that doesn't make the inaccurate view better.

That's not to deny the utility of instrumentalism. But it doesn't make the instrumental approach better for anything other than making successful predictions or for applications for practical matters, just in case the instrumental approach in question can do this. It's important in those cases not to reify the instrumental theory, and it's important to not theory worship. Both of those things are big dangers, because there are personality types that are both attracted to instrumental theories and that tend to reify and worship them. (The personality type best suited to being an engineer is one of the prime examples.) — Terrapin Station

The correspondence between mental states and physical conditions ties them together in such a way that their causes are not to be separated into different kinds of existence. For the purposes of studying the physical as the cause of those states, it is an eminent example of operational assignment of meaning as per Bridgeman.

However far it can proceed on that basis, the theory goes forward on being able to explain itself against objections to its claims. The success or failure of the correspondence does not inform other ways of talking about substances because those meanings are not germane to the project as given.

While the theory revokes the use of other kinds of explanation, it does not refute them as something proven by deduction. Aren't you in danger of "reifying the instrumental" by using it in this fashion?

The limits you argue for remind me of Kant's rhetoric in the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics.

What I'm focused on is you understanding the difference of what idealists and materialists are saying. — Terrapin Station

And I already told you I'm not interested in the difference of scribbles or sounds. I'm interested in the difference of what those scribbles and sounds mean. In order for a word to be coherent it must mean something. What do materialists mean when they say, "matter" or "mind". What do idealists mean when they use those words?

Synonyms are different words that mean the same thing. It seems to me that "matter" and "ideas" are synonyms because while they are different words, saying one would be different than saying the other, but they mean the same thing.

Aren't you in danger of "reifying the instrumental" by using it in this fashion? — Valentinus

I don't think that physicalism is an instrumental theory but rather what's really the case ontologically. Instrumentally, it's not very practical for some things. Psychological, sociological, etc. approaches are often better suited for making predictions, where those approaches don't focus on more or less "mechanistic" explanations re what's going on in brains.

And I already told you I'm not interested in the difference of scribbles or sounds. I'm interested in the difference of what those scribbles and sounds mean. In order for a word to be coherent it must mean something. — Harry Hindu

Yes. We went through that. So, given that you can't grasp the differences in what each side is saying in that regard, we need to look at what your beliefs/expectations are re meaning and coherency, so we can diagnose just what's going on for you not understanding the difference.

I was in the process of doing that when you bowed out.

One slightly alternate way to approach this is to figure out why, in your view, people aren't saying something different than each other just in case you don't believe that they're saying something coherent.

But from that alteranate approach, we still have to deal with what you understand meaning, coherence, etc. to be, because part of the issue we need to deal with is whether you can understand that to the people in question, they may be saying someting different than each other per their own understandings, even if it's incoherent to you.

For example, one person saying "Color my love brittle" and another saying "Polecats dance planets" are both saying something that's incoherent to me, at least at first blush, but that doesn't lead me to thinking that they're saying the same thing.

In Berkeley, there's no non-idea tree is there? If you're claiming there is, what would be the textual evidence of that? — Terrapin Station

According to Berkeley the tree is not your idea or my idea but God's idea. So the tree is a real mind-independent (in the sense of being independent of human minds) thing. Unlike with a human idea which is to be a reflection of a concrete thing to be God's idea is to be a real concrete thing; a thing that can exist only as long as God holds it in mind.

According to Berkeley the tree is not your idea or my idea but God's idea. — Janus

That still makes it an idea though. So there's no non-idea tree (per Berkeley).

Yes but it's a very different kind of idea; it is an idea which is a concrete existent. It doesn't accord at all to our limited idea of what an idea is.

Also when we perceive the tree it is not the same as thinking about the tree. So perceiving the tree is using real concrete faculties to grasp a real concrete existent. In that sense it is similar to ordinary realism as Harry said. It's just that what is thought about the ultimate nature of things is different in idealism and realism.

Yes but it's a very different kind of idea; it is an idea which is a concrete existent. It doesn't accord at all to our limited idea of what an idea is. — Janus

What in Berkeley supports that he considers it a concrete existent? (Well, and where "concrete" doesn't amount to "clear and distinct" or something like that)

I already explained that; it is a concrete existent because it is thought by God. That's just what it means to be a concrete existent for Berkeley. The concrete existence of everything is on account of its being thought by God.

I already explained that; it is a concrete existent because it is thought by God. — Janus

You're misunderstanding me. I'm not asking for you to explain anything. I'm asking for some quotations from Berkeley--some textual evidence (I had specified that earlier)-- that support the notion that he believes there are concrete things.

The substance of Berkeley's philosophy is well known. What do you think it means to be a concrete thing? To my understanding it means to be a stably persistent entity that does not depend on the human mind for its existence. How would Berkeley's things, which are stable entities in the mind of God, not qualify as concrete objects?

The substance of Berkeley's philosophy is well known. What do you think it means to be a concrete thing? To my understanding it means to be a stably persistent entity that does not depend on the human mind for its existence. How would Berkeley's things, which are stable entities in the mind of God, not qualify as concrete objects? — Janus

The more I think about it I still don't understand how it all works. How do we actually receive sense data if sense data is basically Gods ideas? If it is a Brain in a vat situation I can understand, however if it isn't then where exactly do our minds exists? How do our own bodies interact with other bodies?

I also understand the frustration people are having with this discussion of ideas and matter. I still haven't understood how the immaterial universe actually functions other than God makes it so.

The substance of Berkeley's philosophy is well known. What do you think it means to be a concrete thing? — Janus

Depends on the context, of course. Above, you seemed to be suggesting a context that was close to claiming a material thing.

We should simply quote Berkeley on this, though. The only thing I recall was him using "concrete" in the sense of something being a clear and distinct idea.

The more I think about it I still don't understand how it all works. How do we actually receive sense data if sense data is basically Gods ideas? If it is a Brain in a vat situation I can understand, however if it isn't then where exactly do our minds exists? How do our own bodies interact with other bodies?

I also understand the frustration people are having with this discussion of ideas and matter. I still haven't understood how the immaterial universe actually functions other than God makes it so. — Jamesk

Good questions/comments.

Yes to be a material thing in Berkeley's view just is to be an idea in the mind of God.

Consider the well known limericks which have Berkeley's philosophy and the common sense naive realist questioning of it as their subject:

There once was a man who said: "God
Must think it exceedingly odd
If he finds that this tree
Continues to be
When there's no one about in the Quad."

Dear Sir,

Your astonishment's odd:
I am always about in the Quad.
And that's why the tree
Will continue to be,
Since observed by

Yours faithfully,
God.

Of course, God both thinks into being His creation and observes it. This is not in the least unorthodox thinking in a Christian context. All things have their being in God.

Yes. We went through that. So, given that you can't grasp the differences in what each side is saying in that regard, we need to look at what your beliefs/expectations are re meaning and coherency, so we can diagnose just what's going on for you not understanding the difference. — Terrapin Station

There was nothing to grasp. You keep referring to what scribble or sounds an idealist and materialist makes when I'm talking about what those scribbles and sounds mean. You have only shown that they make different scribbles and sounds. You have yet to explain the difference that those scribbles and sounds mean.

I already told you that for a word to be coherent, it must mean something. If you don't mean something when you make scribbles and sounds, then you aren't saying anything, you're just making noise and scribbles (what you have been doing). When someone says, "Color my love brittle" then it is only coherent if it actually means something other than just being noise. What do they mean? That is what I ask them, and they would tell me. You can't seem to do that with words you seem so sure that you know what they mean, "matter" and "mind".