You had said that the idea of physicalism amounting to a "radical, brute separation of all things from one another" was a logical conclusion. — Terrapin Station

Actually I didn't say that at all; I said that the idea of the physical is the idea of the radical separation of things. Of course I was talking about actual spacial separation between things; that is the basic idea of physical things occupying actual spacial locations that are radically distinct from one another.

If you are not a "realist" on natural laws then you don't believe that the universe everywhere behaves in the same general ways re electromagnetic energy, subatomic particles, gravity, entropy and so on?

Natural laws are ways to think about phenomena we observe.

If you are not a "realist" on natural laws then you don't believe that the universe everywhere behaves in the same general ways re electromagnetic energy, subatomic particles, gravity, entropy and so on? — Janus

There are regularities, but not because of laws that somehow exist as an abstract whatever.

In my view there are no real abstracts. I'm a nominalist in that and other senses.

So how do those regularities obtain across regions that are energetically separate from one another in your physicalist view?

And who said anything about abstracts? Who is changing the subject now, eh?

Sometimes it's just one or the other. — Terrapin Station

So there goes the identity. Ideally a letter is some kind of sign.

Now I don't quite know what you want to hear. Their nature is expressed by the laws thereof. Tautologies do not always have ideal content.

It's simple the properties of the particulars in question.

The other alternative would be that the properties of the particulars would be random. But why would we assume that?

So there goes the identity. — Heiko

There goes the identity in the sense of it being just one thing, yes. Again, I'm a nominalist. Every instance of a letter, number, etc. is unique.

Every instance of a letter, number, etc. is unique. — Terrapin Station

What is unique? The ink or the brain-state?

So, what in physicalist terms would the "properties of the particulars" be? Are the particulars and their properties different from one another?

What is unique? The ink or the brain-state? — Heiko

Every instance of anything. Every ink mark, brain state, etc.

So, what in physicalist terms would the "properties of the particulars" be? — Janus

For example, the charge of an electron, the mass of a neutron, etc.

Are they different? Yes, they're not identical. The nonidentity of discernibles is pertinent here.

Aren't you folks at all familiar with nominalism?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalism

That is not really my issue. You say a letter is unique but the letter is not a letter, but a brain-state. This makes me headaches...

You say a letter is unique but the letter is not a letter, but a brain-state. — Heiko

I didn't say "The letter is not a letter." What a letter is depends on context. They're ink marks on paper, brain states a la particular ideas/concepts (such as the symbol you referred to), and so on. That doesn't mean it's not a letter. Those things are what a letter is.

Now I don't quite know what you want to hear. Their nature is expressed by the laws thereof. Tautologies do not always have ideal content. — Heiko

What makes you think I want to hear anything other than your view on the matter?

So, you're saying that the laws that govern or determine the behavior of things just are their nature? And that tautologies have physical content sometimes? What could that mean?

So, again I ask you what the laws that govern things, or their nature (which is the same thing according to you) are as understood in physicalist terms. Are they energy, matter, or something else?

For example, the charge of an electron, the mass of a neutron, etc. — Terrapin Station

So, what is the mass or the charge of an electron if it is something other than the electron itself? And what is the electron itself if it is something other than its mass and/ or charge?

So, what is the mass or the charge of an electron if it is something other than the electron itself? — Janus

Why would it be something other than the electron itself? I don't understand why you're asking that.

Why would it be something other than the electron itself? I don't understand why you're asking that. — Terrapin Station

Are they different? Yes, they're not identical. — Terrapin Station

What a letter is depends on context. — Terrapin Station

And nontheless you know it is unique? If we were looking at the same letter the problem is quite obvious.

So, again I ask you what the laws that govern things, or their nature ( which is the same thing according to you) are as understood in physicalist terms. — Janus

The development of their spatio-temporal relations. We are talking about "things"(Kant: "Ding"). Those are always physical.

So, again I ask you what the laws that govern things, or their nature ( which is the same thing according to you) are as understood in physicalist terms. — Janus

The development of their spatio-temporal relations. We are talking about "things"(Kant: "Ding"). Those are always physical. — Heiko

The "development of their spatio-temporal" relations is their behavior and the laws are usually understood to be what determines their behavior. You seem to be saying they are the same thing; so are you saying that their behavior is determined...by their behavior?

Different properties, not different than the matter they're properties of.

I'm saying the properties are different a la nominalism/contra universals or "type realism"

And nontheless you know it is unique? If we were looking at the same letter the problem is quite obvious. — Heiko

Unique a la nominalism.

The other assumption would be that the properties of the particulars would be random. But why would we assume that? — Terrapin Station

The idea is that the behavior of things would be random if nothing determined it to be invariant or regular; if there were no universal principles, in other words. Why would you expect things to behave invariantly across vast regions energetically separate from one another, or even locally, if nothing determined that?

What you have given here is just a bunch of words, a trite formula, that really explains nothing. You think your position is cogently explained, but it is really no more coherent than the idealist alternative. In some ways the latter might be thought to be more coherent since it is more compatible with the unity of all things.

So, what is nominalism as explained in physicalist terms?

By their nature, of course. You are very correct, the laws are derived from their behaviours. Of course there is Modus Ponens in play and of course this is empirical science a-posteriori.
What you do not seem to grasp is that the mind is all reality only for itself.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/235371

By their nature, of course. You are very correct, the laws are derived from their behaviours. — Heiko

Of course our conceptions of the laws are "derived" from the observed behaviors of phenomena. So, are the laws nothing more than our conceptions of them then?

If not, then it would seem to be saying nothing at all to say that the behavior of phenomena is determined by its laws and that the laws that determine the behavior of phenomena are determined by the behavior of the phenomena. What determines that the behavior of all phenomena everywhere is the same?

The rest of what you said is unintelligible to me.

There are regularities, but not because of laws that somehow exist as an abstract whatever. — Terrapin Station

But what are those universal regularities if they are anything beyond our conceptions of them? They can't just be the individual things that are regulated, because they are common to all things. And they can't just be energy because of the problem of separation by great distance I have highlighted a few times now (and which you are yet to address).

Of course our conceptions of the laws are "derived" from the observed behaviors of phenomena. So, are the laws nothing more than our conceptions of them then? — Janus

They do not not say anything about the things. Reality is negative.

They do not not say anything about the things. Reality is negative. — Heiko

That means nothing to me; it's just words...

I know.