Ok, taken in context of this thread, it was addressing what the "good reason" to question materialism is. I feel certain that other reasons can also be found. But I provided one.

What I posted.

Substantial being can't be just matter, or just form. And yet the folk position is that matter just IS substance and form ISN'T substantial.

First I'm not even using the term "substantial being" am I? And I wouldn't. What in the world is that term saying that "matter" doesn't say? So if I'm saying something contradictory, It's nothing about "substantial being" and its relation to matter or form.

What is "matter is substantial" supposed to be saying?

Okay. But I don't see the fact that physicalism doesn't seem intuitively right to you as a good reason to reject it.

What is "matter is substantial" supposed to be saying? — Terrapin Station

I believe that was in reference to my statement. Its saying "matter as sub-stance (that upon which everything is founded)"

"

Okay. But I don't see the fact that physicalism doesn't seem intuitively right to you as a good reason to reject it. — Terrapin Station

No, my intuition has little if anything to do with it. Materialism is self-contradictory to that which appraises its truth: the presence of awareness.

First I'm not even using the term "substantial being" am I? And I wouldn't. What in the world is that term saying that "matter" doesn't say? — Terrapin Station

I've been studying philosophy for 45 years now, and I have a "formal" background in it. — Terrapin Station

So in those 45 years, did you ever actually bone up on basic Aristotelian metaphysics? Seems not.

No, my intuition has little if anything to do with it. Materialism is self-contradictory to that which appraises its truth: the presence of awareness. — javra

Yeah - the problem with this is if we ask "How?" you're going to formulate the justification for this proposition in terms of precisely the sort of reasons everyone is haggling over in this thread. Though maybe you can do it? Would be lovely to see you pull it off. I defy you to justify this statement - "Materialism is self-contradictory to that which appraises its truth: the presence of awareness" - with reasons that don't terminate either in your intuition or in a the formulation of a line of reasoning which can be addressed and debated by someone with a materialist perspective.

I believe that was in reference to my statement. Its saying "matter as sub-stance (that upon which everything is founded)" — javra

The problem with that is that I wouldn't say that anything is "founded on matter." Everything simply is matter/dynamic relations of matter.

Materialism is self-contradictory to that which appraises its truth: the presence of awareness. — javra

That just reads like gibberish to me unfortunately.

I defy you to justify this statement - "Materialism is self-contradictory to that which appraises its truth: the presence of awareness" with reasons that don't terminate either in your intuition or in a form of reasons which can be addressed and debated from a materialist perspective. — John Doe

Yea. It's in the works. But I grant, it doesn't work well in soundbites. But I am tempted. It'll have to do with degrees of certainty, though (none of which will be absolute).

So in those 45 years, did you ever actually bone up on basic Aristotelian metaphysics? Seems not. — apokrisis

How about answering the question instead of posturing? (And will you believe me when I say I'm surprised if you never answer the question?)

Yea. It's in the works. But I grant, it doesn't work well in soundbites. But I am tempted. It'll have to do with degrees of certainty, though (none of which will be absolute). — javra

Well I look forward to reading! Make sure to cc my username if/when you get around to it.

Well I look forward to reading! Make sure to cc my username if/when you get around to it. — John Doe

:smile: Cool

How about answering the question instead of posturing? (And will you believe me when I say I'm surprised if you never answer the question?) — Terrapin Station

Did you want me to move your fingers for you as you type "hylomorphism" into Google? :razz:

You are the one posturing with your claims of 45 years of "formal" philosophical training. And I have been explaining as we have been going along. So your problem if none of this rings a bell.

I like how you said what the difference between "substantial being" and "matter" is supposed to be. (And especially with respect to claims I'm supposedly making.) I can tell you have a firm grasp on a coherent distinction, and I'm impressed with your lucidity while presenting the explanation.

Why not type something about "constraints" now?

Why not type something about "constraints" now? — Terrapin Station

Lets not run before we can walk, eh.

I'm surprised you're responding without answering questions you've been asked.


(Did you believe that?)

Yea. It's in the works. But I grant, it doesn't work well in soundbites. But I am tempted. It'll have to do with degrees of certainty, though (none of which will be absolute). — javra


Well I look forward to reading! Make sure to cc my username if/when you get around to it. — John Doe

On second thought ... Just in case you’re somewhat sincere, the “first principles” of the work can be found here: https://michaelwmoiceanu.com/2018/09/02/ch-1-first-principles-certainty-uncertainty-and-doubt/

Don’t know when I’ll get around to putting up more chapters online—it’ll likely be on a dedicated website. This first chapter, however, gives basic explanations of certainty, uncertainty, and doubt—which will then be used to establish conclusions of optimal certainty throughout the work. These topics are nevertheless standalone. I don’t want to seem like I’m BSing, so I’d thought I’d share.

You can PM me if you ever get around to reading it and care to comment.

But back to the thread’s discussion …

I'm surprised you're responding without answering questions you've been asked. — Terrapin Station

But I told you. Until we get to the bottom of how little you have learnt on the issue over these past 45 years, where could one even start?

On second thought ... Just in case you’re somewhat sincere, the “first principles” of the work can be found here: https://michaelwmoiceanu.com/2018/09/02/ch-1-first-principles-certainty-uncertainty-and-doubt/ — javra

Just briefly skimming some of that, it doesn't look like it addresses anything in the vein of "Materialism is self-contradictory to that which appraises its truth: the presence of awareness.". Although of course I'm not sure what you're saying in that quote, and I only skimmed the chapter you posted.

But I told you — apokrisis

Which jibe was the answer in?

Just briefly skimming some of that, it doesn't look like it addresses anything in the vein of "Materialism is self-contradictory to that which appraises its truth: the presence of awareness.". Although of course I'm not sure what you're saying in that quote, and I only skimmed the chapter you posted. — Terrapin Station

Hm, if you don’t know what the quote is saying, how would you know that the chapter doesn’t address it? You kind’s lost me with that one.

As it turns out, it doesn’t. It’s only a first chapter, whose topics set up the field, so to speak. I provided it not to derail the thread but to evidence, empirically, that I’m actually busy working on a philosophical shpeel. And not merely making stuff up about so doing.

Hm, if you don’t know what the quote is saying, how would you know that the chapter doesn’t address it? You kind’s lost me with that one. — javra

Well, it didn't appear to be about materialism, for example. It appears to primarily be about certainty. And as far as I can tell the quote doesn't have anything to do with certainty.

OK, in your view, does physicalism explain the presence of awareness? Or, as it’s more commonly addressed, of consciousness.

I ask because tmk, according to those such as Dennett (cf., Consciousness Explained), physicalism entails that our “sense” of being an awareness/consciousness—which we label in the first person as “I”—is an illusion. Hence not in fact existing.

Here, the theory of physicalism is in contradiction with our so called sense of awareness being real. Yet, as I’ve argued in a recent thread on certainty of thought, in which you’ve posted, it is impossible to rationally doubt one’s own awareness while one is aware.

Hence, the presence of one’s own awareness while one is aware is an epistemic certainty for which one cannot discern any justifiable alternative.

Physicalism has plenty of justifiable alternatives, and is hence only a psychological certainty (for those who are certain of it).

So we have a contradiction between the epistemic certainty that we hold presence as an awareness while we are aware and a psychological certainty that we don’t (in the latter case, because our awareness is nothing but an illusion).

The contradiction then implies that at least one of these positions is false.

Assuming that you can understand what I’m saying, where do you disagree?

Well, first, don't equate physicalism or materialism with being a Dennettian. Dennett and that ilk (the Churchlands, for example) are often considered eliminative materialists. Not all materialists are eliminative materialists.

I think that consciousness, and all mental phenomena in general, are physical/material, and no, i don't at all think that consciousness, qualia, etc. are an illusion. (Not to mention that the very idea of an illusion obtaining while not involving consciousness is incoherent.)

Re "explanations," are you talking about verbal (or lets say mathematical etc.) accounts of phenomena?

Re "explanations," are you talking about verbal (or lets say mathematical etc.) accounts of phenomena? — Terrapin Station

I had causal explanations in mind. You have a brain; its alive; there's this very complex thing called awareness. How?

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I should clarify. How from a physicalist's point of view?

A causal explanation given in words? The reason I'm asking is because it's important when that's what we're talking about to realize that no explanation (in words) is going to resemble what it's explaining (we're not explaining words, at least not in the same words we might be explaining if we're explaining words per se), and it's important, if we're going to be making proclamations that this set of words counts as an explanation and that set of words does not, to state, at least roughly, our criteria for what counts and why. (So that it reasonably works as demarcation criteria.)

Re brains and awareness in my view there's not a causal relationship at play. It's rather an identity. I could say that an explanation is simply that consciousness is a property of brains functioning in particular ways, from the perspective of being the brain in question, or I could say that an explanation is that consciousness involves particular activations in the occipital, temporal, frontal cortices, etc., but you could just say, "That's not an explanation." Hence why we'd need to pin down the criteria for just what counts as an explanation and why, and the criteria would have to work for some examples or what you take to be sufficient explanations of something.

OK, a fair reply. You are right in that I don’t view identity to be in and of itself an explanation. We could go about saying “X is so because it is X” or “X is so just because it is” for pretty much anything. And in most all situations, so doing wouldn’t provide any intellectual satisfaction. On the other hand, pointing to parts of the brain as being responsible for awareness rather than the whole brain doesn’t quite address the issue—namely, one of how one goes from material interactions to awareness as we know it (which, after all, holds agency via its body).

BTW, I agree that it happens, but as of yet stand firm that materialism/physicalism can’t provide for how.

But embarking upon the issue of causation so as to more properly address causal explanations for this would be for me, currently, an issue too expansive to likely settle. For instance, I agree with a few others hereabout that such a thing as top-down causation takes place … and arguing this out would take a lot of time.

As it is, it’s getting a little late for me. It’s been good chatting with you.

“X is so because it is X” or “X is so just because it is” — javra

Not that that's what I did above. But again, we'd need demarcation criteria re just what counts or doesn't count as an explanation for you and why.

namely, one of how one goes from material interactions to awareness as we know it — javra

I really believe that's a misconceived way to look at it, because what makes the difference is the reference frame. Being the brain in question rather than looking at it from a third-person perspective.

So is the idealist saying that the primary substance is mind, not ideas? If so, then the question becomes, "what is the difference betweeen mind and matter?" Ideas would be matter-dependent or mind-dependant. Again, what is the difference? — Harry Hindu

Berkeley replaces Locke's material substrata with a spiritual substances - minds. and material objects with ideas supported by minds.

But we perceive thinking objects just as we perceive non-thinking objects. The difference lies in their behavior, not how they appear - as material objects. Both thinking and non-thinking objects are governed by the laws of physics (cause and effect). — Harry Hindu

How do you perceive a thinking object? My mind is the 'thinking end' and you cannot form an idea of a mind. You can develop a notion of minds and of God, but that's not the same as an idea. Berkeley is on sticky ground at this point. Like I said demolishing materialism is easier than supporting immaterialism.

Is there a block / mute / ban option on this site?