I think everything is a physical object*, including numbers. Yet we agree that it's a category error to assess numbers for hardness

*understanding that I'm using "object" loosely, so that it can refer to dynamic interactions of parts, such as molecules..

It was for that reason the scenario didn't seem to me to get at the issue of "empty" names as well as other examples. — Mentalusion

I used the scenario in response to a question why the holder of a name isn't the token of a type (or so I understood the question). It wasn't meant to get at the issue of empty names.

That said - and this is a parenthetical issue - I still don't think calling references to fictional entities "empty names" constitutes a category error. It's not the correct use of the concept of a name to be sure, but it's not a category error. It's just wrong. Not everything that's wrong is a category error. — Mentalusion

Of course referring to fictional entites as "empty names" is a category error. A fictional entity is not of the category "name", therefore your What am I missing here?

I'm also not quite sure how you see the relation between what a person intends to say, and what that person actually says. Grammar is something you learn as you go; it's something you can get wrong. At the same time, if enough people get the same thing wrong for a long time it changes. The category error is on the language level, not on the concept level.

Of course referring to fictional entites as "empty names" is a category error. — Dawnstorm

? Not that I agree with the idea of "empty names" in the first place (as I stated earlier, I think the whole notion of there being a problem stems from misconceived theories of reference), but names for fictional characters are often given as an example. Why would that be a category error then?

If you think all that stuff is physical, then do you think hardness is a possible predicate/property/etc. of all physical objects or just some or none?

I just saw your earlier post, including the comment that this thread is the first you've ever heard of the idea of "empty names."

Here's the beginning of the Wikipedia entry on this:

"In the philosophy of language, an empty name is a proper name that has no referent.

"The problem of empty names is that empty names have a meaning that it seems they should not have. The name 'Pegasus' is empty;[1] there is nothing to which it refers. Yet, though there is no Pegasus, we know what the sentence 'Pegasus has two wings' means. We can even understand the sentence 'There is no such thing as Pegasus.' But, what can the meaning of a proper name be, except the object to which it refers?"

Just to clarify a couple things there. There has been at least a rough consensus in philosophy that the meaning of a proper name is its referent--the object to which a proper name refers (where "object" is used pretty loosely--Paris is an object in this sense).

Traditionally (and much to its folly in my view), philosophy has treated fictions as if they can't be addressed in this way. Hence why the Wikipedia entry says that re Pegasus--there is nothing to which it refers. Obviously, in terms of fiction, there is a Pegasus with all sorts of properties.all sorts of facts re interactions, etc.--for example, with Bellerophon, but philosophy has historically had a difficult time dealing with such things, partially due to some things that philosophers have tried to avoid, to an extent where fiction is both basically dismissed out of hand (so that it's "nothing") and so that it finds names such as "Pegasus" perplexing in many ways. (When really, they're quite simple to deal with, but that means a major paradigm shift for philosophy of language, semiotics, etc.)

Just some.

So there are some physical objects for which it is impossible that they ever be hard, whatever we decide it means to be "hard"?

Of course referring to fictional entites as "empty names" is a category error — Dawnstorm

I think it would be more accurate to ask whether referring to names that reference fictional entities as "empty" constitutes a category error. And, as I said, it may be wrong to say that, but it's not a category error. Even if what you mean by "empty name" is a name that designate nothing and further assume that, by definition, all names designate unique objects (leaving aside paradoxes about referring to non-being), it's still not a category error. It would be like asking "are all primes are divisible by 2?" The statement is wrong analytically, but it's not a category error because "being divisible by 2" is still a property that belongs to numbers and so is within the same category as primes. Similarly, talking about empty names is wrong - and wrong analytically - on certain reasonable assumptions about how names work, but it is still in the category of a linguistic claim so not a category error.

So there are some physical objects for which it is impossible that they ever be hard, whatever we decide it means to be "hard"? — Mentalusion

I don't know why you'd think that's mysterious. Presumably you believe that temperature is physical, for example. Can temperature be hard? What would that possibly mean?

I wasn't asserting anything, just trying see where your belief that molecules are categorically not hard stems from. Claiming that you think numbers are physical objects does help to understand a bit where you might be coming from. I disagree with that claim, but if it's what you think it could explain what seems like an eccentric use of "category error" to me. It also seems to me that if you think numbers are physical objects, you shouldn't assume (as I do) that asking whether they are hard constitutes a category error. Rather, that seems like it could be a legitimate property to ascribe to numbers given your beliefs about them. I am assuming that it is a sensical question to ask about any physical object, whether it is hard or not. The answer may be "no" - it could be a soft or gaseous or liquid physical object - but asking the question isn't categorically mistaken.

W/re to temperature, what I understand it to be essentially is the measure of molecular motion under different conditions and so would not call it either an object or physical. In fact, strictly speaking, as a type of measurement, it's by definition conventional, even if what it's measuring is (let's assume) not the product of convention.

W/re to temperature, what I understand it to be essentially is the measure of molecular motion under different conditions and so would not call it either an object or physical — Mentalusion

All objects, aside from elementary particles at least, are dynamic--they're things in motion. And even elementary particles are in motion relative to each other So that something is dynamic doesn't preclude it from being physical.

That's why I wrote this above: "*understanding that I'm using 'object' loosely, so that it can refer to dynamic interactions of parts, such as molecules."

Saying that temperature is a non-physical property or quantity doesn't make much sense--especially given that temperature is often important in physics, astrophysics, etc.--you don't think of physics as dealing with stuff that's not physical, do you? Not that I want to promote a conflation of "physical" and "the content of physics" necessarily, but there is definitely a connection there.

Of course temperature relates to or "deals with" physical stuff. That doesn't in any way imply that temperature itself is physical (I mean, it might for you b/c you think numbers are physical, but I don't think most people believe that, even math platonists. At any rate, I don't believe it and you've provided no reasons why I should).

Further, I didn't claim temperature was a property or quantity, physical or otherwise. As a type of measurement it is simply a conventional way of designating states of affairs. For example 75 F = 23.8889 C. Both are temperatures and both describe the same state of affairs. Neither is more accurate than the other and neither is a property of the object(s) being measured, although they do signify that the objects being measured are in a certain kind of unique state. The state the objects are in that generates the temperature is not itself "temperature" though.

In addition, it seems to me that to think of objects as dynamic by nature is going to lead to a lot of confusion. Something is dynamic because it constantly changes, which in terms of physics usually means that it's in motion. However, by definition motion is the measure of the change in the position of an object over time. If an object by definition is in motion, then you can't measure its change, which means it won't have motion, which is a contradiction...but that is maybe a discussion for a different thread.

Of course temperature relates to or "deals with" physical stuff. That doesn't in any way imply that temperature itself is physical (I mean, it might for you b/c you think numbers are physical, but I don't think most people believe that, even math platonists. At any rate, I don't believe it and you've provided no reasons why I should). — Mentalusion

Wel, you think that molecules are physical, right? Do you think that motion is physical?

neither is a property of the object(s) being measured, although they do signify that the objects being measured are in a certain kind of unique state. — Mentalusion

What's the difference between the unique state of the objects being measured and a property of the objects being measured?

The state the objects are in that generates the temperature is not itself "temperature" though. — Mentalusion

What is temperature in addition to the state in your opinion?

If an object by definition is in motion, then you can't measure its change, — Mentalusion

No idea why you'd think that. You measure it relative to something else.

Wel, you think that molecules are physical, right? Do you think that motion is physical? — Terrapin Station

Above is a definition of what I take motion to be: change in an object's position over time.

I don't see anything in the definition that commits one necessarily to believing that motion is something physical or itself an object.

What's the difference between the unique state of the objects being measured and a property of the objects being measured? — Terrapin Station

Depends which property your referring to. Maybe no difference at all.

What is temperature in addition to the state in your opinion? — Terrapin Station

As I said, the measure of the state, i.e. a unique designator of the state of affairs relative to other possible (similar) states of affairs

No idea why you'd think that. You measure it relative to something else — Terrapin Station

How can you measure an object's change in time if by definition its always changing? As soon as you try to say where it is at time t1, it's already gone!

.

That doesn't in any way imply that temperature itself is physical — Mentalusion

The word 'physical' often gets thrown around in philosophy, without it ever being made clear what it means. The word has a clear meaning in things like medicine (to distinguish from psychological) and finance (to distinguish from financial derivatives) and has a practical use in those disciplines. But I have yet to see either a clear meaning or a use for it in philosophy.

What does the word mean to you, in a philosophical context?

Or, to align with my general position that words on their own often have no meaning, what does the sentence 'Temperature is not physical' mean to you?

I'm not sure it's really all that important but at the most general level I use it to distinguish things from other things that are not physical. That is, I think it signifies what is material, made of stuff, has 3 or 4D extension, etc. I'm happy to consider any definition that gets to roughly some idea like that.

? Not that I agree with the idea of "empty names" in the first place (as I stated earlier, I think the whole notion of there being a problem stems from misconceived theories of reference), but names for fictional characters are often given as an example. Why would that be a category error then? — Terrapin Station

I think it would be more accurate to ask whether referring to names that reference fictional entities as "empty" constitutes a category error. And, as I said, it may be wrong to say that, but it's not a category error. Even if what you mean by "empty name" is a name that designate nothing and further assume that, by definition, all names designate unique objects (leaving aside paradoxes about referring to non-being), it's still not a category error. It would be like asking "are all primes are divisible by 2?" The statement is wrong analytically, but it's not a category error because "being divisible by 2" is still a property that belongs to numbers and so is within the same category as primes. Similarly, talking about empty names is wrong - and wrong analytically - on certain reasonable assumptions about how names work, but it is still in the category of a linguistic claim so not a category error. — Mentalusion

You're both skipping ahead of what I'm actually saying. The piece about "category error" was part of bigger and more complex point I was trying to make, and it was about type/token not "empty names". I wish I remembered why the type/token distinction has come up. I wasn't part of that conversation until it was nearly done, and none of the original participants ever engaged me on that. What I'm saying is about names in general, not "empty names" in particular.

The sample sentence I gave was:

"The Harry Potter from Rowling's book is an empty name." (I should have said "books".)

The category error is this: "Harry Potter's" name is an empty name; Harry Potter himself is a character.

This is so obvious that it's normally not worth saying. I think I may not have made my point very well, if you think I mean to say that "Harry Potter's name is an empty name." You probably haven't picked up why I think it's worth it's saying in this context.

A name that's not assigned yet is still a name. It follows that names must have meanings as themselves, too. If I type sample sentences, like "Joe likes to sing in the shower," then you recognise "Joe" as a name. But the person behind the name is even less real than Rowling's Potter, since I just typed a random sample sentence, without any reference in mind. The sentences gains its meaning from the fact that we all know how naming works, and how we use them. Just using the name in not even a fictional context conjures up the expectation that there's a person (how ever hypothetical its existance). What's more, we recognise the name as a name other real or fictional people held.

"Joe", as a name, is one name in a list of names we might choose for our children, and this is the meaning we inwoke when we attach articles to the name.

On the other hand, this very meaning implies that there are person who are referents for those names: when used for individuals (without an article) the name actually starts functioning as a name: in a way it becomes active.

"A Joe" in "A Joe has eaten your cake," and "Joe" in "Joe has eaten your cake," work differently with respect to the type/token distinction: it exists in the former case, but not in the latter.

A thought experiment: A group prepares pseudonyms for participants at a meeting who wish to remain anonymous. Those names are assigned at random. Fewer people than expected show up. Some names have not been assigned. In what ways did the meaning of the unassigned names differ from the assigned ones during the meeting?

For me, there's a disjunct. If I talk about the names themselves, they don't really differ. They're all different from each other and they were potentially to be assigned to people (some were, others were not). But they're all names.

When we look at the transcript of a meeting, only the assigned names show up, and when they do they refer to the person in question. This is what they're supposed to do. But the connection is unique. If they re-use the names for the next meeting with different people involved, again assigned at random. The name, considered as a name, has now the property "Provided twice, assigned once" or "Provided twice, assigned twice", but that's something we know about the name. The relation between person and name, though, resets. The facts about the name itself are irrelevant, except when we look at the person as a token of the type "has been assigned the name".

Or do situationally assigned (or chosen) names differ from names who have all your life? (That's been an issue is in this thread.) The question of "real names".

Basically, if you insist on physical objects as the referents of names (as I understood the concept, and as the wikipedia link seems to suggest), how do you conceptualise the difference between a name that's been assigned to a fictional person, a name that is neither assigned nor used (see my thought experiment), or a name that is never assigned but used anyway (e.g. in a sample sentence)?

Out of those three situations, the name of a fictional character seems the least empty. However, a name that isn't used doesn't actually work like name. And invoking the name in a sample sentence can invoke the idea of a person, even though the name has never been assigned.

I'm not sure how to deal with this, but my hunch is that a name is something a person "has" not something a person "is". Referring to an individual entity is the function of a name, but unlike regular words, they confer no meaning unto the entity who's assigned it.

That's different from regular words, where a word confers meaning: a [word] is something that you are, not something that you have.

The problem with this is that a lot of this is dependent on the how any society organises the institution of naming. Telling names aren't impossible, but in general names need to be meaningless in themselves so that they can refer to individual entities continously (impervious to change). Basically, to be an idiot you have to behave like an idiot, and if you stop behaving like an idiot, you stop being an idiot. Similarly, to use a name you need to have that right (however that's organised), and if you lose that right, you no longer have that name.

In the case of words, the assignation of the sign to the thing is extrinsic to the meaning behind the sign. In the case of a name, the assignation of the sign to the thing is instrinsic to the meaning behind the sign. Beyond that, any real life behaviour of the object creates connotations, not denotations.

I think my conclusion would be: all names are empty when considered as names; no names are empty when used as names. Or something like that. I'm not sure.

I don't see anything in the definition that commits one necessarily to believing that motion is something physical or itself an object. — Mentalusion

That's fine. But I'm asking you if you think that it's physical.

How can you measure an object's change in time if by definition its always changing? — Mentalusion

You're thinking that changing = disappearing???

I'm not sure it's really all that important but at the most general level I use it to distinguish things from other things that are not physical. That is, I think it signifies what is material, made of stuff, has 3 or 4D extension, etc. — Mentalusion

An interesting discussion can be had in that direction, given wave-particle duality and that the closer we look at things, the more they are waves or fields rather than 'stuff'. But it's not that close to the issue under discussion so, on reflection, perhaps it's better left for another thread.

Where this came up was in discussing whether it is always meaningful to ask what is the meaning of a word, given that many words have multiple different possible meanings, and some have enormous numbers of meanings. This is recognised by some dictionaries that give a series of sample sentences containing a word, with the meanings of the sentences, rather than a meaning of the word on its own.

Now many words have only one possible meaning or referent and we can sensibly talk about that meaning or referent. But I don't see why we should invent hugely complex, metaphysically cumbersome theories like Kripke's just to deal with the fact that some words have no meanings or referents when considered in isolation.

My current opinion is that it is easy to explain the meaning of any sentence containing the word Pegasus, as long as it's a sentence that is likely to be said in ordinary conversation. And one doesn't need to load up on metaphysics or possible worlds semantics in order to do so.

Given enough context, we can say the same for Godel and Smith, another favourite example from N&N. In that case we need more than a sentence. We need to know what the speaker knows about Godel and Smith, in order to know shat she meant by her statement. But again, learning the context dissolves the problem. It just needs to be a somewhat bigger context.

You're thinking that changing = disappearing??? — Terrapin Station

Well, maybe in some sense, yes. Here's the reasoning:

1. To be dynamic is to be in motion.

2. Motion is defined as an objects change in position from time t1 to t2.

3. Assume objects are dynamic, i.e. that they are by definition in motion.

4. Assume then that at some time t1 object O1 is at position x1.

5. However, because objects are in motion by definition, that means that at time t1 O1 will be in position x2 at t2, since motion is defined as an objects change in position over time.

6. So, at time t1, O1 is actually at x2 at t2 which contradicts the assumption in #4.

7. In other words, at t1 O1 will have disappeared from position x1 if it is the case that by definition objects are dynamic.

perhaps it's better left for another thread. — andrewk

Start it up!

However, because objects are in motion by definition, that means that at time t1 O1 will be in position x2 at t2, since motion is defined as an objects change in position over time. — Mentalusion

That part is nonsensical.

First, objects aren't in motion "by definition," They're in motion by empirical fact.

Next,"at time t1 01 will be in position x2 at t2" is just an ungrammatical mess that reads incoherently.

Finally, "Motion is defined as an object's change in position over time" is fine--that's how it's defined, but what time is in the first place is motion or change. "Motion is an object's change in position relative to some other motion/change that we use as a base" is what's really the case there.

Empirically, objects are in motion relative to other objects.

A time-slice being a "point" is just an abstraction we make.

That's why I wrote this above: "*understanding that I'm using 'object' loosely, so that it can refer to dynamic interactions of parts, such as molecules." — Terrapin Station

The argument in the first place was related to the above where you appear to identify objects with dynamic interactions, in effect signaling that what objects are is to some extent dynamic. This would be in contrast to interpreting "objects are in motion" as predicative so that motion is just a way in which objects behave, not part of their nature. My reply was

it seems to me that to think of objects as dynamic by nature is going to lead to a lot of confusion. — Mentalusion

And I think I've given reasons to believe that claim is true, if you believe objects include as part of their definition "interactions," i.e. motion.

Consequently -

That part is nonsensical. — Terrapin Station

- the fact that it is nonsensical is exactly my point. That's how a reductio works.

Next,"at time t1 01 will be in position x2 at t2" is just an ungrammatical mess that reads incoherently. — Terrapin Station

Admittedly the formatting could be improved. However, pedantic stylistic concerns aside, this is a very common way of describing events not only in philosophy, but in scientific disciplines as well. If something was unclear, ask. The fact that you understood what was generally being communicated is clear from your comment about "time slices" that follows. Consequently, the grammatical criticism seems slightly disingenuous.

A time-slice being a "point" is just an abstraction we make. — Terrapin Station

True, but it seems to be useful and implicit the definition of motion. Since there's no alternative definition of motion on the table, it would appear we're stuck with time slices

what time is in the first place is motion or change. — Terrapin Station

A chicken-and-egg problem that doesn't need to be resolved because the issue isn't about the nature of time or motion per se, but only of how the motion of an object is determined, and it is determined by the object being in one position, x1, at one time, t1, and at another position, x2, at another time, t2. Interestingly, in any such case, the change the object undergoes will not be "dynamic" since the only change relevant is the "being" in one place rather than another.

.

The argument in the first place was related to the above where you appear to identify objects with dynamic interactions — Mentalusion

No--"so that it can"="so that this is not excluded"



The grammatical comment was because the sentence didn't really make any sense to me, overall, as written.

True, but it seems to be useful and implicit the definition of motion. Since there's no alternative definition of motion on the table, it would appear we're stuck with time slices — Mentalusion

Motion is simply movement relative to something else--in other words, differing positional relations. Again, time is simply motion or change. So I'm saying that time is simply movement relative to something else. There's no reason to treat that as if it's dividable into (literal) "points." The mathematical approach to this stuff is just an abstraction we create.

the change the object undergoes will not be "dynamic" since the only change relevant is the "being" in one place rather than another. — Mentalusion

?? "Dynamic" refers to changing. So if it's changing somehow (from one place to another), it's dynamic.

Motion is simply movement relative to something else. — Terrapin Station

circular: "Motion is movement..."

?? "Dynamic" refers to changing. So if it's changing somehow (from one place to another), it's dynamic. — Terrapin Station

fair enough

"in other words, differing positional relations"

Weren't you asking for explanations and not asking me to write dictionary entries? (And if you're asking me to write dictionary entries rather than asking me to explain something to you, why?)