What exactly is the property dualist concept of mind?

This is the complete question. I am in theological formation and we were posed multiple questions.
None were problematic except this one:
Considering the “soul as a harmony view” in what ways does this consider an “emergent property” or “property dualist” conception of mind, and why does Socrates reject this view?

Is this question being asked in relation to specific texts that you have been asked to read?

We have studied and discussed the Phaedo

I would think this is in reference to the objections to the immortality of the soul by the interlocutors per the argument of the harmony and the lyre and Socrates subsequent rejection thereof, but I am confused with respect to the details of his rejection.

Okay, joe b, that put your question in more context.
Is there something you are reading that uses the phrase: property dualist concept of mind?
Is there something about the "rejection" (if it is that) you would like to talk about independently of the previous question?

Those terms are just in the prompt of the question. I believe that is the heart of my confusion. I dont know if they are suggesting "property dualist" is dualism or something else. Why does Socrates then reject the harmony view?

This website describes the term this way:

"Property dualists argue that mental states are irreducible attributes of brain states. For the property dualist, mental phenomena are non-physical properties of physical substances. Consciousness is perhaps the most widely recognized example of a non-physical property of physical substances. Still other dualists argue that mental states, dispositions and episodes are brain states, although the states cannot be conceptualized in exactly the same way without loss of meaning."

That page includes comparisons with other arguments.

Perhaps you could say precisely which text confuses you.

Why does Socrates then reject the harmony view? — joe b

If I remember correctly, Socrates dismisses the harmony theory because the soul must necessarily rule over the body, and therefore not be harmony which is derived from it. There is an issue with illness and evil actions, which is used to discredit the harmony theory. If the soul were a harmony there would not be such discordance.

In relation to emergence and property dualism, a harmony is produced by the appropriate order of the physical parts of the physical body (musical instrument). Therefore the harmony is emergent. Socrates would argue that the physical body, the musical instrument, does not necessarily produce a harmony, it might just as well produce discordance. So the soul cannot exist as the harmony because it is required to produce the harmony, and is therefore prior to the harmony.

Finally the complete story comes out. You should have stated this in your opening posting.

Thanks V for that update and clarification.

Thank you for resolving this for us M/U.

For me all of Plato can be distilled down to one metaphor. He states that if you go out into the wilderness and stay there for some length of time then you will eventually miss the City and your friends and want to come back. All the rest of Plato for me is simply a footnote to this.

Plato is simply too speculative to be very useful in modern times.

I don't remember where Plato talks about going into the wilderness. Some of you other more august philosophers here may recall it. I intend to find it somehow, but I sure do not want to re-read all of Plato to do it.

If in divinity school, you may want to concentrate on Augustine and Aquinas. Anything pre-Aquinas is going to simply be a challenge against your divinity philosophy.

Pure philosophy teaches people to think for themselves and avoid brainwashing and any doctrines. It is antithetical to Religion.

Good luck with Aquinas. Whenever you embrace him you are bowing down to Catholic Philosophy -- not that this is anything bad -- just that if you are Protestant then you are in somewhat of a quandary.

By the way in music, harmony obtains simply via simultaneous pitches.

"Harmony" has no connotation of assessment or value judgment.

If you want to talk about consonance versus dissonance, you're bringing subjectivity into the equation.

At any rate, I'd have to reread the Phaedo to do your homework for you. ;-)

I follow your explanation about the soul being prior to harmony. I am confused how the "attunement" discussion relates directly to versions of duality. In Phaedo 94c, Socrates says:

"Well surely we can see now that the soul works in just the opposite way, it directs all of the elements of which it is said to consist, opposing them in almost everything all through life. and exercising every form of control-- sometimes by severe and unpleasant methods like those of physical training and medicine, and sometimes by milder ones, sometimes scolding, sometimes encouraging--- and conversing with the desires and passions and fears as though it were quite separate and distinct from them. It is just like Homer's description in the Odyssey where he says that:
Then beat his breast, and thus reproved his heart,
Endure, my heart, still worse hast thou endured."

I don't see how this exposition on the character of the soul relates to "attributes of brain states."

Thank you everyone. This has helped me. It is very difficult for us when we basically get 12 hours of lecture on the apology, logic and the forms and then have to grasp this on our own. Many of us never had a simple philosophy course either. Thank you. Doing some more reading on the points you all have raised.

I don't see how this exposition on the character of the soul relates to "attributes of brain states." — Valentinus

Well, let's say that attributes are properties, so you're asking about the properties of brain states, like harmony is a property of musical notes. If the soul must act to create the property, how could it be the property? Now consider your quoted passage. The soul must act to direct and control the elements of the human mind to bring about the desired disposition. Human disposition is an attribute of brain states. The disposition (attribute of a brain state) is not itself the soul, it is the result of the activity of the soul.

If it is true that "human disposition is an attribute of brain states", then there doesn't seem to be any purpose to maintaining a dualism. Nothing is just dumb unformed matter any longer.
Using an "idealist" model may be useful for some things but this sounds like a misuse of it.

If it is true that "human disposition is an attribute of brain states", then there doesn't seem to be any purpose to maintaining a dualism. Nothing is just dumb unformed matter any longer.
Using an "idealist" model may be useful for some things but this sounds like a misuse of it. — Valentinus

I don't see your point. As Socrates' argument demonstrates, we still need to turn to the "soul" to account for the existence of "brain states". Where's the misuse?

I was referring to the definition of property dualism that I quoted above from the IEP :

""Property dualists argue that mental states are irreducible attributes of brain states. For the property dualist, mental phenomena are non-physical properties of physical substances."

In this context, what does it mean to distinguish the non-physical from the physical? What is being separated?

In this context, what does it mean to distinguish the non-physical from the physical? What is being separated? — Valentinus

That's a good question, and it probably depends on what is meant by "irreducible" here. Let's assume a brain state is physical and that a mental state is non-physical. Now, try to reduce the non-physical mental state to some further non-physical source, like the soul, like Socrates does, claiming that the non-physical soul is required to produce the physical brain state.. The property dualist would disallow such a reduction, claiming that the non-physical mental state is completely dependent on, as an attribute of, the physical brain state, disallowing that the non-physical mental state is dependent on some further non-physical thing like the soul. In the mean time one would be arguing that the physical brain state is in no way dependent on any further non-physical thing like the soul, because the non-physical mental state is dependent on the physical, as an attribute of it.

Let's assume a brain state is physical and that a mental state is non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can assume those things but that is exactly what I am trying not to do. I am comfortable with considering the world where all mental states are attributes of physical states. It hurts my brain to imagine how I get from that frame of reference to a position where I can say what is "non-physical."

Now, try to reduce the non-physical mental state to some further non-physical source, like the soul, like Socrates does, claiming that the non-physical soul is required to produce the physical brain state. — Metaphysician Undercover

Socrates didn't know about brain states. His observation that the soul contends with other parts of a single life during its experience does not make those other parts not "life". The heart beaten by Odysseus is alive along with whatever is hitting it to get the heart on board with a larger plan.

Seeing this transposition of agency in the context of what Socrates was saying with a schema outside of his assumptions makes me wonder if there is a better way to approach the subject.

I am comfortable with considering the world where all mental states are attributes of physical states. — Valentinus

The question here though, is how is it that a physical state which is capable of having a mental state is created. If you're comfortable with it, you can forget about that question, and be happy with the assumption that physical states just naturally have mental states. But if you're philosophically inclined, you'll realize as Socrates does, that a physical state doesn't just randomly produce a harmony of notes, nor does a physical state just randomly produce a mental state. So if what is required is a very specific type of physical thing, like a musical instrument, or a brain, and that specific thing must behave in a very particular sort of way, then the philosopher will ask, what is the cause of this peculiar situation.

Socrates didn't know about brain states. — Valentinus

Doesn't your quoted paragraph indicate the very opposite of this statement? The soul is said to consist of all these elements, the body and brain. But in order for the brain to think in the correct way, the soul must exercise power over it. Why would you think that Socrates didn't know about brain states?

The manner in which a physical state is said to produce a mental state is where the two models diverge.
There is the general distinction between form and matter, where the principle of action is said to be from the form itself. Socrates is constantly saying things like: "Physic does the work of the physician and carpentering does the work of the carpenter"

There is also the context which the attunement of the musical instrument appears, namely whether the soul is immortal or not:

"The body is held together at a certain tension between the extremes of hot and cold, and dry and wet, and so on, and our soul is a temperament or adjustment of these same extremes, when they are combined in just the right proportion. Well, if the soul is really an adjustment, obviously as soon as the tension of our body is lowered or increased beyond the proper point, the soul must be destroyed, divine though it is---just like any other adjustment, either in music or in any product of the arts, although in each cease the physical remains last considerably longer until they are burned up or rot away. Find us answer to this argument, if someone insists the that the soul, being a temperament of physical constituents is the first thing to be destroyed by what we call death." Phaedo 86 b

To argue that mental states are irreducible attributes of brain states is to stand on this side of the argument. When the brain dies, so does the soul. One of Socrates' argument for immortality is to see "mental states" as not being dependent upon corporeal premises:

"Well, said Socrates, this does not harmonize with your view. Make up your mind which theory you prefer----that learning is recollection, or that soul is an attunement." Phaedo 93 c

The rest of the arguments, including the one I quoted initially, are directed against the analogy of attunement as what a soul does. Adding "brain states" to one of the elements being controlled by the soul is putting the possibility of mind as coming from two sources that have been framed to be incompatible by definition.

When I said I was comfortable with the "physical" model, I didn't mean to say that it was the last word or explained everything. I am saying it is consistent with its own premises. I am objecting to overlaying this model upon Socrates' because the action doesn't give itself enough problems. It dismisses what it doesn't want to include and includes new things without their introduction requiring any work. I am not dismissing the difficulty of seeing mental states as physical and something else at the same time. This approach looks too easy to me.