I think that's what I'm getting at here. I think the point here that I'm making is that contextualism is the only way to go about discerning meaning present in empty names. There really doesn't seem to be any other alternative. — Posty McPostface

I don't really have anything against that, except framing it like this I agree with StreetlightX: all names are empty. It's sort of like the move from Ogden/Richards to Saussure and eliminating the referent. The problem is that no-matter what meanings you attach to them real world referents aren't really divisible in any other way than analytically.

In a figurative sense we only have access to our conscious persona, when in reality we're much more complex than just our day to day conscious aspect of being. Think unconscious, super-ego, ego. — Posty McPostface

The tripartite idea at least introduce complexity. I'd say that we are mostly flowing and reactive as we move through life. We 'live' the 'unconscious.' It's hidden in plain sight. It's our retrospective narrow accounts that betray that complexity.

Is Superman the same person as Clack Kent? — Posty McPostface

Same denotation. Different connotation.

The problem is that no-matter what meanings you attach to them real world referents aren't really divisible in any other way than analytically. — Dawnstorm

What do you mean by that?

The tripartite idea at least introduce complexity. I'd say that we are mostly flowing and reactive as we move through life. We 'live' the 'unconscious.' It's hidden in plain sight. It's our retrospective narrow accounts that betray that complexity. — macrosoft

Yes, I think that empty names refer to concepts and ideas. But, does that make meaning only mental? Isn't there cases when we have sensical, nonsensical, and senseless propositions?

Same denotation. Different connotation. — Terrapin Station

And?

And that's it. Same denotation.

Yes, I think that empty names refer to concepts and ideas. But, does that make meaning only mental? Isn't there cases when we have sensical, nonsensical, and senseless propositions? — Posty McPostface

I don't think saying meaning is only mental address the phenomenon exhaustively. We share meaning. So the mental is somewhat public. All these terms are connected. They are caught up in that same field of shared meaning. 'Mental' has no fixed meaning apart from context. The shared meaning space is 'one' in some sense, and all the usual dichotomies are threatened by this semantic holism. I can only talk about the in-explicit ground by constantly distancing myself from the atomistic dichotomous thinking that is so natural for us and exactly what I am trying to point beyond. [And I'm really just paraphrasing interpretations of the folks who really made these leaps, so I don't claim some novel philosophy here.]

And that's it. Same denotation. — Terrapin Station

But, you aren't posting under your REAL name, are you?

So the mental is somewhat public. — macrosoft

Why "somewhat"?

Some names have a direct reference. Nonsensical, sensical, and senseless propositions derive their meaning from what reference they have. Think, the present King of France is bald. — Posty McPostface

I'm not denying that some names have a 'direct' reference. Of course some names do. The question is over the nature of this directness. And the point is that such 'direct reference' does not differ in kind from 'non-direct' reference. The idea that reference determines sense is balderdash. 'The present king of France is bald' is a perfectly sensical proposition, to which one can sensibly reply: 'there is no present king of France', and not just sit there looking quizzically.

The question is over the nature of this directness. And the point is that such 'direct reference' does not differ in kind from 'non-direct' reference. — StreetlightX

What's the answer to that question then?

Are we talking now about modalities and necessity?

Why "somewhat"? — Posty McPostface

If I give you a proposition like 'the mental is public,' then that suggests an explicitness that betrays my own message. That suggests that I want to do math with concepts that have significant meaning crammed into cute little tokens like 'mental' and 'public.'

That said, I'd they there is something like a continuum. If the mental were purely public, then you would have no need to ask me to elaborate. If the mental were not at all public, then you would not bother to ask, since we would share no meaning space in which such an elaboration were possible.

To be clear, I don't know exactly what 'meaning space' is. One of my theses is that we can't make certain things explicit without betraying them. As we try to make them explicit, we find that our spiderwebs are fragile. They don't play nice with other such spiderwebs. For instance, I think we live in a shared world. What is it for something to be true about this 'world'? I'd say something like 'true-for-us and not just true-for-me.' But I'm not saying 'X' is in everyone's head. That's too explicit. Too much baggage comes along with it. Because we could debate about my theory of truth to find out whether it was true for us without anyone having an explicit theory of this other kind of truth used in-explicitly to judge my conceptualization. We 'live' a faith in this elusive sense of truth. Or 'truth' doesn't have a crystalline meaning, despite its importance to us.

To be clear, I don't know exactly what 'meaning space' is. — macrosoft

I think I do. It's a state space for atomic propositions to be understood. Wittgenstein referred to it as 'logical space'. The ontology of it is still a mystery to me; but, understanding the world as the totality of facts and not things, is illuminating to my mind.

I think I do. It's a state space for atomic propositions to be understood. Wittgenstein referred to it as 'logical space'. The ontology of it is still a mystery to me; but, understanding the world as the totality of facts and not things, is illuminating to my mind. — Posty McPostface

IMV, that is a beautiful spider-web, one more attempt to grab the phenomenon in concepts. How do you make sense of Wittgenstein himself abandoning his youthful vision?

But doesn't our naming behavior result from the behavior of what is perceived? President Trump's behavior is different from Santa Claus', and for that reason we consider there to be an actual referent to the word "Trump," thus causing us to behave in a way that one has an actual referent and the other not. Since we behave differently when we consider the word "Santa Claus" then we do when we consider the word "Trump," it seems reasonable that we offer different words for them, namely "imaginary" and "actual." To say there's no distinction between imaginary and actual is itself a metaphysical statement. — Hanover

A few things. First, I didn't say that there is no distinction between imaginary and actual. All I would say is that language is indifferent to any such distinction. Second, our 'naming behaviour' results from our learning how to use names. That's it. If we find out tomorrow that Santa Claus is real, or if tomorrow, Trump turns a new leaf and becomes the Nicest, Bestest, most Lovely person in the universe, we would still use those names to refer to each respective person. That's why proper names are so-called 'rigid designators' - they reflect a fact about language and its use (our practices of using language), and not about 'the thing itself'.

Just because all names can be explained through behavior doesn't mean that there might not actually be a reason our behavior varies when speaking about one sort of thing versus the next. — Hanover

I did not say there is no reason why our behaviour varies when speaking about one sort of thing versus the next. I would emphatically agree there is such a reason. But that reason is to be found in our use of language, and not in the 'thing'.

And would you elaborate on what it means for you?

IMV, that is a beautiful spider-web, one more attempt to grab the phenomenon in concepts. How do you make sense of Wittgenstein himself abandoning his youthful vision? — macrosoft

I'm an astute Wittgensteinian, meaning that I believe that the Tractatus was a preface to the Investigations. One is supplementary to the other. Wittgenstein wanted for both works to be published alongside one another. I think I'm on point in this regard.

Are we talking now about modalities and necessity? — Posty McPostface

I don't know why you start dragging in words that were not even mentioned in my post. You do this often, and it's really quite annoying.

I'm an astute Wittgensteinian, meaning that I believe that the Tractatus was a preface to the Investigations. One is supplementary to the other. Wittgenstein wanted for both works to be published alongside one another. I think I'm on point in this regard. — Posty McPostface

I agree that he wanted them together and that they are part of a continuous journey, but I think that journey is dialectical. It's exactly because Wittgenstein thirsted for a sort of perfection that he was also one of the first to come up against its limits (just a theory I'm tossing off, offered non-authoritatively). He ran fastest and found the obstacle earlier than most. Don't get me wrong. The TLP has great value. At least for me it's no big deal if part of an approach seems wrong, especially if it's the 'mistake' of a genius. And much is not cancelled out by further reflection.

And would you elaborate on what it means for you? — macrosoft

Logical space means a state space where meaning is shared. That's all I can say without sounding metaphysical. This goes to the heart of some of my earlier posts about how facts obtain in reality and the world.

I don't know why you start dragging in words that were not even mentioned in my post. You do this often, and it's really quite annoying. — StreetlightX

Okay, then I'll stop doing it. But, as you mentioned, rigid designators alone have no meaning. Only contextually do they make sense to us.

rigid designators alone have no meaning — Posty McPostface

I didn't say this either!

Logical space means a state space where meaning is shared. — Posty McPostface

Well, I'm glad we agree that there is some kind of shared space, however we elaborate upon it.

I didn't say this either! — StreetlightX

Okay, then I'll refrain from engaging in posts that are irrelevant in your view.

Well, I'm glad we agree that there is some kind of shared space, however we elaborate upon it. — macrosoft

Yes, logical space is just a two-dimensional coordinate system where relations between objects designate their meaning, contextually speaking. But, obviously we don't live in a two-dimensional world, hence the Investigations.

Yes, logical space is just a two-dimensional coordinate system where relations between objects designate their meaning, contextually speaking. — Posty McPostface

I guess my concern is that I don't believe in objects.

I left that exaggeration by itself for dramatic effect. I mean that objects get their being from the network gets its being from the objects. Kinda-sorta-something-like-that.

Exhaustive explain/describe the house next door to me and you have explained/described all of reality. Why? You will need history, and also to give an account of your own explanation's possibility. And maybe even then the mystery won't have been touched.

What do you mean by that? — Posty McPostface

Well, when you use a word you have a meaning in mind, and when I hear the word I have a meaning in mind, too. Those meanings don't have to be the same; they just have to be compatible in a way that they don't cause problems in our interactions (or that they cause problems that don't lead to the termination of the interaction, or whatever). What connects us in communication is a real world, and the assumption that we're to one degree or another talking about it.

So when I'm taking a bath, I'm not Dawnstorm, but when I'm typing a forum post I am. In the real world, there's really only one me, and if I'm typing a forum post and someone interrupts, I'm both Dawnstorm and not Dawnstorm at the same time. All that is analytic nonsense, though. There's only one of me. I can want to save that distinction, because it matters in one way or another, but I - as the referent - don't change no matter what name I go by.

So here's the problem: if what name applies to me depends on activities, the name refers to a bundle of activities or maybe a related and perceived identity: that's a concept, though, and not a thing. That's the reference and not the referent. I'm really only talking about the difference between signifier and signified. But if a name names a person than that referent would have to be me, no matter what I'm doing. I can't exclude Dawnstorm from the more comprehensive person and say only the more comprehensive person is real. That's nonsense.

Insofar as names are bound by context, names have no direct referent. The reference, the meaning of the word, is always a layer we push over real things.

Insofar as names refer to things, I'm the referent of both the name "Dawnstorm" and "XXXX", because there's nothing else that applies. Clearly, the concepts, the reference, the signified, differ in its properties to one degree or another, but there's only one real world object that is me, no matter with how many concepts I might frame it.

It's possible that I, Dawnstorm, am lying, and that the person currently typing this post is part of a collective who alternately handle this account. In that case, the me typing this post is not the whole Dawnstorm, but only part of Dawnstorm. In that case, the difference between "Dawnstorm" and "XXX" would be a difference in referent: I'm not Dawnstorm, I'm part of it.

It's also possible (no it's not, but humour me), that I'm one of the infinite number of monkeys on an infinite number of keyboards supposed to be produced Shakespear, but failing and coming up with this instead. In that case, no only am I not who I claim to be, this isn't really a conversation, and none of this is meaningful on my end, though it might be on yours. In that case, Dawnstorm would be fictional, and so would be the "XXX" I keep referring to, but they'd still putatively be the same real-life referent, if that referent had a physical reality.

So when you say that "Posty McPostface" doesn't refer to your true self, you're talking on the level of concept, not on the level of thing. The concept of "referent" is genrally the thing-level (I'm not 100 % confident about that, but that's how I've always seen it). The person typing your posts is no less real than the person eating dinner. Whether either of them has a true self is a completely different question whether they have a name. And the same person can have two names at once - which one to use is a matter of convention, not reference. Or differently: if I were to address you as Posty McPostface during dinner, and you say that you're not Posty McPostface right now, I'd read that as an appellative rather than as a descriptive speech act, because I assume you know that I know that you're not engaged right now with a forum post. (You don't have to worry about me suddenly showing up in real life; I'm speaking hypothetically. I don't even really know if your proper ego usually eats dinner. That's just a non-absurd assumption of mine.)

So when you say that "Posty McPostface" doesn't refer to your true self, you're talking on the level of concept, not on the level of thing. The concept of "referent" is generally the thing-level (I'm not 100 % confident about that, but that's how I've always seen it). — Dawnstorm

Can you expand on this? It's quite interesting...