Perhaps one's authentic natural self is violent, cruel, demanding, and if so then only way to behave morally is to be inauthentic, — Cavacava

That would only be the case if that person felt that behaving violently, cruelly, etc. was immoral.

Likewise, if one did not behave violently, cruelly, etc., but one felt that behaving violently, cruelly, etc. were moral, then one would have to behave inauthentically to be moral.

Of course, most people feel that whatever is authentic for them is moral. Which means that the violent, cruel, etc. person would likely feel they're acting morally by being violent, cruel and so on.

maybe that is what authenticity is, the acceptance of one's own fundamental weakness and the willingness to act toward others, not naturally, but as dictated by norms. — Cavacava

Could be. But it's also possible that one is caring and empathetic by nature and the norms at hand say to choke those feelings down and put those Jews on that train. That's an extreme case, but I do believe that (in my society anyway) growing up means learning to be the master of ones feelings. That's morally precarious. The child who acts spontaneously will learn from experience the best ways to satisfy desires. The notion that morality is all about teaching the child to be numb and alienated from himself is wrong.

The only thing with that is that "societies should flourish" or "it's better for societies to flourish" (or whatever similar formulation) isn't objective. — Terrapin Station

It's also so general as to be practically useless in terms of ascribing action, since what makes a society flourish will depend on who you're asking. And of course there's some who would deny that society should flourish - we call those people discontents, who have a morality of there own entirely dissimilar to that of everyone else's.

What is acceptable as a ground for morals anyway (if anything)? — jorndoe

Virtue ethics, as developed in the Aristotelian tradition. And I agree with Wayfarer that the subjective/objective distinction is just a tool of thought, not something to be found as part of reality.

And I agree with Wayfarer that the subjective/objective distinction is just a tool of thought, not something to be found as part of reality. — Agustino

So you don't believe that there are minds and existents that are not minds?

That is very confusing for me. What do you mean there are minds and existents that are not minds? Mind is not purely subjective, neither is the world purely objective.

And of course there's some who would deny that society should flourish - we call those people discontents, who have a morality of there own entirely dissimilar to that of everyone else's. — darthbarracuda

That's where my actual theory of society - the standard systems view that it is an organic whole in being a balancing of constraints and freedoms, global cooperation mixed with local competition - has the advantage.

It says at the local level of the individual, there should be plenty of scope for "discontent" if the society as a whole indeed has a flourishing balance. There needs to be creative tension feeding in novelty from the bottom - just like biological evolution needs "mutation" or genetic variability to ensure the continual adaptivity which allows life to persist in the face of environmental change.

So a natural philosophy approach to morality doesn't seek to impose absolute constraints on behaviour. It also places value on a certain level of variety. The super-empaths and the psychopaths are part of the same gene pool for a reason. And a workable notion of morality would need to follow the same evolutionary logic.

Yeah, I'd agree that there are such facts--although most of the conventional moral stance-related things that people claim to be such facts I think are highly dubious as such. In other words, I don't think it's at all clear that societies couldn't allow murders, rapes, etc. and persist. — Terrapin Station

So as I say, evolution depends on a grain of variety. Therefore moral naturalism would target average states of constraint, not absolute states of constraint, when it comes to individual behaviour.

You find this really is the case in governments having to take the pragmatic view in regulating a society. In public, politicians have to be absolutist - not a single case of child abuse can be tolerated. But when it comes to actual policy, it becomes about what can we do to suppress child abuse to the level where it doesn't really disrupt things too much. The same with murders, rapes, terrorists blowing things up, or whatever.

I'm not saying these are a healthy form of individual variety. But I am saying that even anti-social variety only needs to be constrained by a system of morality to the point where it is not disrupting the overall continuation of that social system. The honest answer is that the system does not even need to care once misbehaving becomes small change so far as its general goals are concerned.

If there are bums on the street, drug addicts in the gutter, that is part of life and not necessarily a moral crisis. The ability not to care about what doesn't really matter is part of the definition of flourishing - being the flipside of being able to control things at the level which does matter..

That is very confusing for me. What do you mean there are minds and existents that are not minds? Mind is not purely subjective, neither is the world purely objective. — Agustino

Re the way I use the terms, subjective simply refers to minds--or we could say, "in" or "of" minds, and objective is the complement--"outside" of minds.

Re the way I use the terms, subjective simply refers to minds--or we could say, "in" or "of" minds, and objective is the complement--"outside" of minds. — Terrapin Station

Okay. Then I don't think there's any such thing as purely "subjective" and "objective". I also don't think things are "in" minds. Rather minds are in existence.

Do you think that the flourishing of society is, in itself, good? i.e. no matter what the discontents think, they're wrong when they wonder if society maybe shouldn't keep going?

For example, a society may inevitably be based on the consumption of other animals - a carnivorous society. Being the progressives we are we might look down on such a society; such a society should be abandoned, eliminated, because its members eat other animals (organic cannibalism).

Okay. Then I don't think there's any such thing as purely "subjective" and "objective". — Agustino

Because you think that everything is some "blurry" combo of mental and not-mental?

I also don't think things are "in" minds. Rather minds are in existence. — Agustino

Okay, so thoughts, desires, etc. aren't "in" or "of" minds in your view?

Because you think that everything is some "blurry" combo of mental and not-mental? — Terrapin Station

Again - mind to me is not purely subjective, so this question doesn't make sense in my framework.

Okay, so thoughts, desires, etc. aren't "in" or "of" minds in your view? — Terrapin Station

Thoughts, desires, etc. can be objective states of the world. It's objective that X is thinking Y. Furthermore, certain experiences can objectively demand certain feelings - such as when your mother dies, you don't start laughing - you start crying.

mind to me is not purely subjective, — Agustino

Oh, I thought you were saying that nothing is purely subjective in the context of how I use the terms. You mean in the context of some alternate way that you're using the terms.

I have no idea how you're defining the terms, especially given the comment that "thoughts, desires, etc. can be objective states of the world."

Also, per however you're using the terms, you'd not actually be answering the question I asked, which is whether thoughts, desires etc. aren't "in" or "of" minds in your view. If mental phenomena can be objective per whatever definition you're using, saying that thoughts and desires can be objective doesn't answer the question I asked.

Also, per however you're using the terms, you'd not actually be answering the question I asked, which is whether thoughts, desires etc. aren't "in" or "of" minds in your view. If mental phenomena can be objective per whatever definition you're using, saying that thoughts and desires can be objective doesn't answer the question I asked. — Terrapin Station

The question you asked depends on a framework. The framework involves certain presuppositions about thoughts, reality, and how they relate together. For example you presuppose a distinction between subjective and objective. But this framework is precisely what I am denying. So of course I don't have an answer to your question - the question simply doesn't make sense under my framework, it's a false problem.

Do you think that the flourishing of society is, in itself, good? i.e. no matter what the discontents think, they're wrong when they wonder if society maybe shouldn't keep going? — darthbarracuda

Why would judgments of good or bad be relevant to my point of view? Surely my point is that morality - as it pragmatically exists in the real world - is beyond such obviously absolutist and subjective terminology.

Again, if I had to judge flourishing in terms of some universal and absolute telos, I would point to the Universe's thermodynamic imperative. Flourishing in the natural sense - the sense we can actually see and measure as what reality is all about - is the maximisation of entropification.

So "goodness" would be defined by a system being good at that. And "badness" by a failure to degrade entropy gradients.

Given that modern Homo sapiens is spectacularly successful at entropy production, then of course it would be a bad thing for "society to just stop".

A fighter pilot - able to get through 14,000 gallons per hour once he kicks on the after-burners - must be the highest form of life that exists on the planet. No wonder they are our heroes. ;)

For example, a society may inevitably be based on the consumption of other animals - a carnivorous society. Being the progressives we are we might look down on such a society; such a society should be abandoned, eliminated, because its members eat other animals (organic cannibalism). — darthbarracuda

But then plants have feelings too. And then why shouldn't we respect the rights of the minerals of the earth, the gases of the atmosphere?

Yes, we progressives ought not only eliminate ourselves, but eliminate all animals (as they are barbaric consumers too), and even all plants (as they too show no respect for minerals and gases).

But then what is the progressive programme for those stars that just burn away merrily, or the Cosmos which is consuming its very self in pursuit of its heat death?

I mean your logic here is unassailable in its progressiveness. It is very superior in its morality. And yet it seems all a mite ... impractical?

Why would judgments of good or bad be relevant to my point of view? Surely my point is that morality - as it pragmatically exists in the real world - is beyond such obviously absolutist and subjective terminology. — apokrisis

Then it quite simply is not morality. Morality is a guide to action, based on what we ought and ought not do. Without absolutism you end up getting either arbitrary subjectivism or inertness (i.e. an inability to decide what to do - nevertheless an action in the objective sense).

Again, if I had to judge flourishing in terms of some universal and absolute telos, I would point to the Universe's thermodynamic imperative. Flourishing in the natural sense - the sense we can actually see and measure as what reality is all about - is the maximisation of entropification. — apokrisis

But this equivocates flourishing. Seems to me that people decide what is flourishing and what is not, not the universe at a cosmic scale. Indeed the addition of a mind to the world's inventory creates a sort of world-inside-of-a-world, in which a person can sit around all day and nevertheless flourish despite not creating as much entropy as he would if he were playing soccer or something like that. The mind, the ego, becomes a microcosm of the world.

So "goodness" would be defined by a system being good at that. And "badness" by a failure to degrade entropy gradients. — apokrisis

You're equivocating ability to perform an action, i.e. accomplishment, with normative good. This is why Mackie argued that moral properties probably don't exist outside of our minds, because they'd be "alien" to the rest of the world.

A hammer is good at hammering nails, but that doesn't make it morally good. A gun is good at killing people, but that doesn't make it morally good nor morally good to kill people. The point being made is that the mind, being a microcosm, has its own rules, its own system. It doesn't follow the same rules that a general model of the entire universe does. This is why non-natural properties ("subjective concepts") can exists in a mind but not in the rest of the world. They are endemic to a mind.

A fighter pilot - able to get through 14,000 gallons per hour once he kicks on the after-burners - must be the highest form of life that exists on the planet. No wonder they are our heroes. ;) — apokrisis

No offense but really you need to step down from this holistic picture for second and realize that nobody but yourself actually considers fighter pilots to be the highest form of life, and if they did, it would be for their apparent heroism (risk)/sacrifice and not for their entropification. You can't explain everything using your holistic metaphysical model. There exist pockets and corners in reality that don't quite match up with the rest of the world in the global sense, like a bug in a computer program. Separating yourself from this particular zone we call Earth in favor for a holistic picture ends up ignoring Earth entirely.

It's not too difficult to see how, despite what you claim, many or most of our commitments are explicitly fighting against entropy. The focus of morals is on sentient welfare, and to focus on something else is to completely lose sight of what morality even is.

But then plants have feelings too. And then why shouldn't we respect the rights of the minerals of the earth, the gases of the atmosphere? — apokrisis

What, no, plants don't have feelings, neither do minerals. I'm talking about sentient organisms, the only things of moral weight.

Say you're an animal that just got caught and is about to be roasted on a fire. You beg and plead to be let go, but in the end the hunter calmly tells you that what he is doing is perfectly acceptable, because he's increasing entropy. Furthermore he tells you that you ought to accept this and be glad you are being roasted alive.

It's what said elsewhere: if there exists any value independent of people, we shouldn't give a shit about it.

Yes, we progressives ought not only eliminate ourselves, but eliminate all animals (as they are barbaric consumers too), and even all plants (as they too show no respect for minerals and gases). — apokrisis

No, we ought to eliminate our dependency on cannibalism.

And yet it seems all a mite ... impractical? — apokrisis

So you're a moral conventionalist. Our abilities dictate our responsibilities. A great way to excuse immoral habitual behavior. History dictates value.

No thanks.

The question you asked depends on a framework. The framework involves certain presuppositions about thoughts, reality, and how they relate together. For example you presuppose a distinction between subjective and objective. But this framework is precisely what I am denying. So of course I don't have an answer to your question - the question simply doesn't make sense under my framework, it's a false problem. — Agustino

But the question I'm talking about there didn't have anything to do with subjective/objective. It was about the relationship between thoughts and mind in your view.

Without absolutism you end up getting either arbitrary subjectivism or inertness (i.e. an inability to decide what to do - nevertheless an action in the objective sense). — darthbarracuda

Ah. That good old slippery slope again.

The difference with my point of view is precisely that it includes the practical business of drawing a boundary that, in marking out the degree to which we do care, marks out also where we then cease to care.

So the slippery slope is the world you inhabit. It is not my world.

But this equivocates flourishing. — darthbarracuda

No. It makes it a measurable concept. It puts a vague philosophical notion that connotes ideas about "healthy growth" on a sound natural philosophy footing.

It is you who equivocates in not offering a definition (except probably in subjectivist/dualistic terms of "god, life feels crap to me no matter how much I dream of a state of untroubled bliss").

A hammer is good at hammering nails, but that doesn't make it morally good. A gun is good at killing people, but that doesn't make it morally good nor morally good to kill people. The point being made is that the mind, being a microcosm, has its own rules, its own system. It doesn't follow the same rules that a general model of the entire universe does. — darthbarracuda

You say hammers and guns have no relation to the generality that is the Universe. But clearly you are not understanding the logic of constraints. The Universe only requires us to maximise entropy production. It doesn't sweat the detail of how we might achieve that.

So building things, destroying things - the issue is only that overall any energy gradients are degraded.

And just look at the entropic curve that charts Homo sapiens' progress. On that objective score, hammers and guns are certainly being put to good use. You can't argue with the data even if you might be confused about exactly how our little human world fits so neatly together.

No offense but really you need to step down from this holistic picture for second and realize that nobody but yourself actually considers fighter pilots to be the highest form of life, and if they did, it would be for their apparent heroism (risk)/sacrifice and not for their entropification. — darthbarracuda

You take life so seriously! Why do you object so strenuously when I put it in terms that you claim to support - framing it as an absurdity?

(Again to short-circuit your response, remember that my case is that our current fossil fuel predicated existence may indeed be absurd in comparison to a more properly self-interested "rate of burn" - we should be aiming instead at a more "moral" or sustainable rate, which would be a social organisation living within the constraints of the solar flux.)

Separating yourself from this particular zone we call Earth in favor for a holistic picture ends up ignoring Earth entirely. — darthbarracuda

It is hardly separating to want to return to nature. It is your choice to fly off into dualistic realm of the transcendently subjective in search of "a metaphysical foundation". I instead am talking about what it is like to ground everything in physical immanence, the world as it is actually now known to us in measurable fashion.

So the earth and life are highly individuated - the most complex state of being known to us. And we can certainly celebrate that fact (although you get upset when I suggest the big brained human is the peak of all such peaks). But to ground that, we must also look to the limiting simplicity which is the context to our individuation. To talk about the general is not to ignore the particular - when, as I keep saying, systems logic shows them to be reciprocal in their very existence.

What, no, plants don't have feelings, neither do minerals. I'm talking about sentient organisms, the only things of moral weight. — darthbarracuda

Ah, dualism. Or are you finally going to define "mind" in objective and physicalist fashion here?

What limit to caring now marks your usual slippery slope metaphysics now we have introduced this sly boundary term of "sentience"?

Say you're an animal that just got caught and is about to be roasted on a fire. You beg and plead to be let go, but in the end the hunter calmly tells you that what he is doing is perfectly acceptable, because he's increasing entropy. Furthermore he tells you that you ought to accept this and be glad you are being roasted alive. — darthbarracuda

Yep, let's pose crazy scenarios as a last resort when our arguments are falling apart.

As a morality tale, The Magic Pudding is far more convincing on this score - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Magic_Pudding

So you're a moral conventionalist. Our abilities dictate our responsibilities. A great way to excuse immoral habitual behavior. History dictates value. — darthbarracuda

Yep. Just turn everything I have said into something different. Chalk up another victory for yourself. Imagine the round of applause.

(Hint: My naturalism is pragmatic and thus anticipatory. The future confirms value. The present thus needs its seeds of unconventionality so as to be able to advance. The past can only be a general guide,)

What I am trying to elicit is what it means to be authentic. We as humans seem to be both bad and good at our core. Perhaps being good means acting in accordance with one's self, and being bad is acting out of accord with what we believe in, 'sinning' against one's self. Acting bad, leading to a bad conscience, leading to guilt involves action, in a sense all actions are violent, since to act means to change something.

The problem that comes up is what we does it mean since in our life means little (without God). We are finite mortal creatures, the meaning we give to events are not in the events, the meanings are in us and as such morals are fictive, stories we tell our self. In spite of this willfully acting with a good conscience means acting in accordance with laws we give to our self which is, I think, the only way we can act freely.

(If the Cartesian Cogito is epistemological truth (leaving aside ego issues), then perhaps Desire is the Cogito's ontological counterpart, which forms the basis for thought. Tired, traveling all day...just some thoughts)

You take life so seriously! Why do you object so strenuously when I put it in terms that you claim to support - framing it as an absurdity? — apokrisis

Because you're wanting to make this absurdity moral. Why, because it's naturally occurring? You're painting this picture to me that looks as if we all just entropified everything would be totally fine. Entropy is not moral. Experience is what makes morality in the first place.

Ah, dualism. Or are you finally going to define "mind" in objective and physicalist fashion here?

What limit to caring now marks your usual slippery slope metaphysics now we have introduced this sly boundary term of "sentience"? — apokrisis

Are you seriously going to argue that we ought to care about pebbles? There is a difference between things that have a mind and that which doesn't. We don't know this boundary, and it's probably a gradiance anyway. But things don't start mattering morally until they have the ability to have frustrated preferences, to be able to suffer. And so we must be reasonably cautious.

Yep, let's pose crazy scenarios as a last resort when our arguments are falling apart. — apokrisis

Yep, let's ignore legitimate scenarios because it threatens the cohesion of our worldview. :-}

Yep. Just turn everything I have said into something different. Chalk up another victory for yourself. Imagine the round of applause. — apokrisis

woooo go me :-}

Experience is what makes morality in the first place. — darthbarracuda

That's certainly a point of view. But that extreme subjective position - one that is only supported by naive realism and its implicit Cartesian dualism - is precisely what is the topic of discussion.

You are claiming subjectivity as the ontological basis for moral necessity. I am replying that morality is better understood in terms of "objective" reality - in terms of whatever general purposes or constraints nature might have in mind.

Yep, let's ignore legitimate scenarios because it threatens the cohesion of our worldview. — darthbarracuda

Talking animals and philosophising hunters? Is this Narnia where our legitimate scenario takes place?

But if we grant this craziness, then what actually follows? A sensible animal - if it is indeed taking the hunter at face value - would suggest a way to provide the hunter with an even better meal to their mutual benefit.

Isn't this the standard stuff of kid's morality tales? - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Lion_and_the_Mouse

We as humans seem to be both bad and good at our core. Perhaps being good means acting in accordance with one's self, and being bad is acting out of accord with what we believe in, 'sinning' against one's self. — Cavacava

In my opinion, no generalization like that is going to wind up being accurate. "Good" and "bad" are just indicators of preference, and people have different preferences, for different sorts of reasons.

Other than that, though, I agree with the majority of your post.

Perhaps being good means acting in accordance with one's self, and being bad is acting out of accord with what we believe in, 'sinning' against one's self. — Cavacava

I agree with this. Borrowing from J K Galbraith, we're each in motion. A visual image would be a vector. Good is what I'm reaching out for. Evil is what I'm turning away from.

I agree it's most fundamentally about identity, and that's where I see the social aspect of it. Society is the sea out of which my identity rises, and society is itself an individual among others of its kind. I partake of the identity of my society.

That's certainly a point of view. But that extreme subjective position - one that is only supported by naive realism and its implicit Cartesian dualism - is precisely what is the topic of discussion.

You are claiming subjectivity as the ontological basis for moral necessity. I am replying that morality is better understood in terms of "objective" reality - in terms of whatever general purposes or constraints nature might have in mind. — apokrisis

But why call this morality? It offers no clear guide as to how to act except in general rules, and places the emphasis on something other than people.

You claim that welfare-centered ethics is only supported by naive realism and its implicit Cartesianism and this is absolutely laughable. What was deontology all about, then? Certainly deontology respects people and isn't dependent on Cartesianism, because Kant! Certainly Mill cared more about suffering than he did entropy!

Instead of trying to make morality a global holistic thing, make it an isolated and domain-specific phenomenon. Morality is all about choices. You're making it so that it has nothing to do with the people making the choices.

Talking animals and philosophising hunters? Is this Narnia where our legitimate scenario takes place? — apokrisis

:-}

You don't seem very good at analyzing other people's positions charitably. It's not far fetched at all to think that other animals outside of our species have emotions, can feel pain, and can have future interests. And I don't see why philosophy is outside the realm of a hunter. Indeed this is exactly what Zapffe talked about with his example of the prehistoric man dying on the beaches when he realized how all life was connected as a family of suffering.

But if we grant this craziness, then what actually follows? A sensible animal - if it is indeed taking the hunter at face value - would suggest a way to provide the hunter with an even better meal to their mutual benefit. — apokrisis

Or, you know, it's more about inflicting harm on an animal that can't consent. You're basically justifying murder and/or torture simply because you can get away with it (the animal can't fight back, the animal can't offer alternatives - as if the animal's life should even be on the gambling table to begin with, might=right). Sensibility is not a requirement for moral value - the ability to suffer is. Innocent, senseless suffering.

Instead the animal is senselessly thrown into a situation that it could not consent to, cannot escape, and is forced to endure extreme pain and fear so you can have a snack. It's cannibalism and barbaric. You're arguing that the animal should have been sensible enough not to walk into the trap that we set, or have been sensible enough to run away from the gunshot in a zig-zag fashion. But it's somehow the animal's fault that it got trapped and eaten? We humans get off scotch free?

Being the most intelligent organisms on the planet, we ought to use this intelligence for the benefit of all sentients, not to subjugate them. Avoid speciesism.

Being the most intelligent organisms on the planet, we ought to use this intelligence for the benefit of all sentients, not to subjugate them. Avoid speciesism. — darthbarracuda

That doesn't follow at all. Intelligence does not equate to morality. Indeed one could reasonably argue that they are utterly opposed in this case. Intelligence is after all basically a measure of the degree to which a species can manipulate and best exploit its environment for its own benefit. It is no accident that a significant proportion of the most intelligent species known to us are carnivores. The hunt both benefits from and enhances intelligence. You impose this supposed duty on humans to benefit other species because they are like us yet fail to follow through the logic that if they are like us they should also be bound by the same duty. If the sentience of a tiger is so close to our own why is it okay in your understanding for a tiger to kill me but not for me to kill a tiger? And just how sentient does a creature have to be or do you simply see them as all equal?

If, by the way, you are cryptically arguing your way toward the moral superiority of vegetarianism, as it certainly seems, then I think it would be fairer to all if you exposed that to more focused scrutiny.

But why call this morality? It offers no clear guide as to how to act except in general rules, and places the emphasis on something other than people. — darthbarracuda

Maybe you missed my first post. I argued that the systems approach supports the golden rule. It explains why social systems need a morality that encodes a way to balance the opposing tensions of competition and co-operation. Neither of these drivers are bad. Both are required. But then so is the third thing of their appropriate balance.

The question of the appropriate balance must then be answered within the larger context of an environment's carrying capacity - the entropy equation.

At the cosmological level, it is "morally good" to maximise entropy. (Although of course in attributing finality or purpose to the Universe, we would only be doing that in the weakest possible sense. And there is no reason why we can't do both those things.)

But a social system has to make some choice about its burn rate. If its growth rate is too anaemic, it will be out-competed due to its lack of efficiency. But on the other hand, too fast and it will flame out. A measure of the intelligence and foresight of a social system will be how good it is at making some right decision on the issue.

So yes. Morality can be built up from first principles in natural fashion. And it arrives at the kind of moral truths that are found to be the most general across societies. Anthropologists find a common structure across societies because - by definition - if they can survive, they must have found a suitable balance in this regard. They will have tuned their competitive~cooperative social balance so it has a good fit to their environmental carrying capacity.

Of course civilisations rise and collapse. That is natural too. A lack of foresight and natural disasters - nothing is ever perfect in life.

Instead of trying to make morality a global holistic thing, make it an isolated and domain-specific phenomenon. Morality is all about choices. You're making it so that it has nothing to do with the people making the choices. — darthbarracuda

Again this is just you ranting.

My argument is that a secure morality is one built from the ground up on natural principles. If we can see what nature wants of us, then we can tell in measurable fashion how close we are to what it says is good. That creates a context in which we can make actually meaningful and useful choices.

You're basically justifying murder and/or torture simply because you can get away with it (the animal can't fight back, the animal can't offer alternatives - as if the animal's life should even be on the gambling table to begin with, might=right). — darthbarracuda

You are just making simplistic assertions with no grounding argument other than how you personally feel about things.

As you can tell, I have no problem with what is in fact actually natural. So natural=normal. And unnatural=questionable.

Again a degree of behavioural variety is also natural. So I don't have any fundamental objection to veganism. I would only want to see it "done right" - done as an actually healthy diet.

Instead the animal is senselessly thrown into a situation that it could not consent to, cannot escape, and is forced to endure extreme pain and fear so you can have a snack. It's cannibalism and barbaric. You're arguing that the animal should have been sensible enough not to walk into the trap that we set, or have been sensible enough to run away from the gunshot in a zig-zag fashion. But it's somehow the animal's fault that it got trapped and eaten? We humans get off scotch free? — darthbarracuda

Here we are again off into your wild rants. Maybe you live somewhere where everyone runs around with spears, chasing down squirrels and possums, ripping them apart on the spot and eating them raw. But I live somewhere where we buy meat over the counter after it has been humanely reared and humanely slaughtered.

Of course the "humanely" part remains a work in progress. But that just shows there is a moral awareness that is being acted upon.

And if indeed a lamb has a happy life in a paddock, safe from all the usual diseases and predation, then dies instantly and painlessly, could you still morally object to it ending up on my dinner plate?

On your calculus of suffering, is it better that it grows up a sheep in the wild than a carefully fattened meal? How does that work exactly?

Being the most intelligent organisms on the planet, we ought to use this intelligence for the benefit of all sentients, not to subjugate them. Avoid speciesism. — darthbarracuda

This is more mindless PC sloganeering rather than moral philosophy. Why is there any "ought" here?

The hunt both benefits from and enhances intelligence. You impose this supposed duty on humans to benefit other species because they are like us yet fail to follow through the logic that if they are like us they should also be bound by the same duty. — Barry Etheridge

I am pointing out that, because of our intelligence, we are able to transcend beyond what our intelligence was originally meant for. We can recognize what it's all about and come to terms with it. Become the janitors of nature so to speak.

Other species are not capable of this. Other species are morally relevant but cannot necessarily be ascribed agency. Whereas humans are the only species whose members lead their lives (pace Heidegger), and are capable of agency.

If, by the way, you are cryptically arguing your way toward the moral superiority of vegetarianism, as it certainly seems, then I think it would be fairer to all if you exposed that to more focused scrutiny. — Barry Etheridge

Yes, I think carnivorous diets are morally unacceptable.

At the cosmological level, it is "morally good" to maximise entropy. (Although of course in attributing finality or purpose to the Universe, we would only be doing that in the weakest possible sense. And there is no reason why we can't do both those things.) — apokrisis

Cosmic tendencies are not equivalent to morality, though. Again, morality is only able to be ascribed to sentients. Any other ascriptions are merely equivocations - just as gravity is not the force of love but of a non-agential force. It would be wrong to say that two large options are in love and so they come together, just as it would be wrong to say that entropy is morally good because that's what the universe tends to.

A measure of the intelligence and foresight of a social system will be how good it is at making some right decision on the issue. — apokrisis

How do you evaluate a decision's right/wrongness? What makes the continuation of a society cosmologically right?

So yes. Morality can be built up from first principles in natural fashion. — apokrisis

But only after realizing that they correspond to the golden rule, as you said. Which isn't building from naturalistic first principles. Unless you consider the golden rule to be one of these first principles, which is rather ad hoc.

My argument is that a secure morality is one built from the ground up on natural principles. If we can see what nature wants of us, then we can tell in measurable fashion how close we are to what it says is good. That creates a context in which we can make actually meaningful and useful choices. — apokrisis

This is quite simply atheistic divine command theory. God wants us to not do something, therefore we don't do it. The universe wants us to entropify, therefore we entropify.

As you can tell, I have no problem with what is in fact actually natural. So natural=normal. And unnatural=questionable. — apokrisis

Nope. Natural is indeed what is normal, but the unnatural is what is not-normal. You jumped from the non-normative to the normative without justification. What makes it the case that the status quo is natural? Why can't morality go against the system?

Is what is natural also what satisfies our preferences? Not necessarily. Indeed satisfying preferences is "natural" but may go against the cosmic naturalness you're talking about here; see the various societal constructions meant to curb the triumph of entropy.

Again a degree of behavioural variety is also natural. So I don't have any fundamental objection to veganism. I would only want to see it "done right" - done as an actually healthy diet. — apokrisis

Sure. But previously you were making it seem as though hunting a deer is normal and therefore acceptable.

But I live somewhere where we buy meat over the counter after it has been humanely reared and humanely slaughtered. — apokrisis

"Humanely" is not compatible with "slaughtered". Indeed if we have an option of killing an animal vs eating a perfectly good slice of synthetic meat, we'd go with the synthetic meat. There would be no point in killing the animal. There is no justification for killing animals unless it's out of self-defense - and even then this is often caused by a violation of the animal's own territory, it's own "home".

And if indeed a lamb has a happy life in a paddock, safe from all the usual diseases and predation, then dies instantly and painlessly, could you still morally object to it ending up on my dinner plate? — apokrisis

Yes, because husbandry is not as perfect as you make it seem. It's absurdly easy to market one's meat as "humanely raised" by a couple easy fixes to the farm that doesn't help the animals much. Like I said before, if we have the choice between natural and synthetic meat, would you be able to come up with a reason why natural meat is so much better that it justifies killing another creature?

We inherently don't know what's going on in the minds of other people, other creatures. It's easy to fall into the trap of believing that only the human species members ought not to be murdered. That's exactly what killing other animals for no reason is: murder. Since when did we have the right to decide how long a creature lives? Since when did we have the right to own another sentient?

Cosmic tendencies are not equivalent to morality, though. — darthbarracuda

Why not? Support your assertions with an logical argument.

I've argued how they are the natural ground to what we humans call our morality. If we look at what we actually do as societies, we can find why it in fact works due to general natural principles.

Now I'm guessing you are thinking that if something is "simply pragmatic" or "simply a result of nature", then it isn't "moral" because morality ought to involve some kind of transcending human choice. You have the Romantic conviction that humans are above "mere nature" in being "closer to God", or "closer to goodness, truth and beauty", or whatever other traditional morality tale has been part of your up-bringing.

But sorry, I just happen to go for a naturalistic view of morality where it is not surprising that human moral codes would encode a certain central naturalistic principle - the need for a society to strike its flourishing balance. And science now supports that position rigorously.

But only after realizing that they correspond to the golden rule, as you said. Which isn't building from naturalistic first principles. Unless you consider the golden rule to be one of these first principles, which is rather ad hoc. — darthbarracuda

Why is your thinking so relentless back to front?

In "unthinking" fashion, human societies evolved to express a pragmatic balance of competition and co-operation. That just is simply what works. And then once human societies started doing moral philosophy, it was understood that what works has the kind of underlying principle that could be sharply caught and taught as slogans like the golden rule. And now - as science has better come to understand systems in general - we can see that social systems are like biological and physio-chemical systems in this way.

All systems persist by striking a fruitful entropic balance. They need global coherence (physical laws, genetic programmes, ethical codes) as their organising constraints, and also local action (material degrees of freedom, evolutionary competition, individual initiative) as the dissipative flow of events that sustains the whole.

So the "ad hoc" bit is that it has taken time to learn enough about nature to understand why we are in fact expressions of nature - and not unnatural, or God's children, or demiurges recalling our origins in Platonia.

see the various societal constructions meant to curb the triumph of entropy. — darthbarracuda

Sorry. Remind me which those are again? Are we talking patents for perpetual motion machines?

Or have you simply forgotten what is meant by a dissipative structure?

There is no justification for killing animals unless it's out of self-defense - and even then this is often caused by a violation of the animal's own territory, it's own "home". — darthbarracuda

LOL. This is quite simply atheistic divine command theory.

Yes, because husbandry is not as perfect as you make it seem. It's absurdly easy to market one's meat as "humanely raised" by a couple easy fixes to the farm that doesn't help the animals much. — darthbarracuda

OK. But I ask again, where do you stand if the husbandry was perfect and the lamb had the happiest life, a painless death?

Applying your own calculus of suffering, how would it be immoral to eat the lamb?

That's exactly what killing other animals for no reason is: murder. Since when did we have the right to decide how long a creature lives? Since when did we have the right to own another sentient? — darthbarracuda

Well firstly, it's not for no reason if it's either to eat or protect ourselves. And secondly it cannot be murder. Murder is and always has been a forensic legal term with an exact definition which does not apply to any non-human (which for the purpose includes unborn foetuses, incidentally). No amount of propaganda will change that.

Since when did we have the right to decide how long a creature lives? — darthbarracuda

Since when did we not have the right? It is assumed in all the major moral and religious codes in history and prohibited by none of the world's legal systems.

Since when did we not have the right? It is assumed in all the major moral and religious codes in history and prohibited by none of the world's legal systems. — Barry Etheridge

Touche!