This is all well and good, but rules are immanent to use, and it's not a case of 'group consensus' which determimes them, as if from above and without.

This is all well and good, but rules are immanent to use, and it's not a case of 'group consensus' which determimes them, as if from above and without. — StreetlightX

All facts whether subjective or objective operate within some system of use. And it is the case that some rules are determined by group consensus. The rules of chess for example, or the rules of baseball. Even reality itself, i.e., what's veridical is decided pretty much by what the group calls reality, or what the group calls a hallucination. It doesn't necessarily have to be from above and without, although that can work too.

And it is the case that some rules are determined by group consensus — Sam26

Some, sure. But it makes little sense to say philosophy belongs, or ought to belong to that subclass. The rules of chess are more or less utterly contingent and utterly arbitrary after all (constrained only by the - already contingent - choice of an 8x8 grid, our physionomy, and our intelligence and history). Insofar as philosophy asks after how things in reality hang together in the broad sense, the constraints which govern its discourse ought to be far more significant that than those which govern a frivolity like chess.

All languages are based on rules of use, so in that sense one doesn't just get to arbitrarily choose one's own meaning, no more that you would choose to move a piece in chess one way when the rules dictate another. The rules when set up may be arbitrary, but once set, like the rules of chess, you don't get to arbitrarily suspend the rules to suit your own particular view of the game. If you did you wouldn't be playing chess. — Sam26

Oh come on Spam26. There are no such rules to language use. We can use the words however we damn well please, and actually do, that's how languages evolve. Where would these rules exist, in the dictionary? A dictionary is not a set of rules. To describe language as being governed by rules reveals an extremely naïve view of language.

But okay, how about this one?

Sally: "Casablanca is the best movie ever made".
Fred, "Nope, it's clearly the Godfather." — Marchesk

Both subjective.

Peter: "I did not like the Godfather. It insists upon itself." — Marchesk

Objective (2nd part subjective).

Millenial: "Second and third Matrix movies were better than the first." — Marchesk

Subjective.

All languages are based on rules of use, so in that sense one doesn't just get to arbitrarily choose one's own meaning, no more that you would choose to move a piece in chess one way when the rules dictate another. — Sam26

Consider what Wittgenstein demonstrates at the beginning of The Philosophical Investigations. If learning a language consisted of learning rules, then one would already have to know a language in order to learn a language, because the rules would have to be communicated to that person, via language. This is what drove him to inquire into private rules, and private language, to account for the capacity to understand rules, if learning rules is necessarily prior to using language. But that whole line of investigation breaks down into nonsense. So we ought to conclude that learning language does not consist of learning rules at all.

I found this post on Quora written by Jun-Ichi Yano to be a good guide to objective and subjective. The following is taken word for word from his post at - https://www.quora.com/Whats-the-difference-between-the-concepts-subjective-and-objective

For understanding basic meaning of words (or concepts), it is often wise to take an etymological approach: we just trace the basic meaning of words by examining the form of words (and in some cases, tracing their historical roots, though this is not important in case here).

The basic meanings of “subjective” and “objective” are something to do with “subjects” and “objects”, respectively. Then, what are the “subjects” and “objects”? In a way, this is a grammatical concept: for example, if you say, “I have an apple”, “I” is a subject that takes an action (“to have” here), and “an apple” is an object that is affected by an action.

By following these basic meanings, it immediately follows that when we use these terms in philosophy, “subjective” and “objective”, respectively, mean “from a point of view of the subject” and “from a point of view of the object”.

You can talk about an apple subjectively, that is from a point of view of the subject, that is yourself: it is about how you see it, how you feel about it. More specifically, it looks delicious, you may find it beautiful, etc. All the statements are subjective, that is only from your own point of view. Some other people may not think this apple is delicious, but your judgment that the apple is delicious is not disputed by someone else’s opinion, because it is your subjective manner.

At the same time, you can talk about an apple objectively, that is from a point of view of the object, that is apple: you examine an apple just as it is, forgetting about yourself, but talk about the apple only as if you are actually not there. A given apple may be red, if may be round, or not quite round, etc. All these statements are objective, because you can discuss about it with the other people: you may not be looking at the color of the apple carefully enough. It may be actually more like pink, rather than red, etc. You can discuss about this matter with the others, because it is an objective matter.

These are basic meanings of these two concepts.

However, in actual application of these concepts, the things are pretty much immediately getting complicated, because you cannot talk about anything objectively without yourself, that is the subject: if you are not there, of course, you cannot see the apple, henceforth, you cannot talk about this apple. We can develop a long argument about subjectivity and objectivity, and in short, we must realize that we can talk about subjectivity and objectivity only in a dynamical manner, under interactions between a subject and an object. From this dynamical perspective, subjectivity and objectivity rather mean which has a stronger role between subject and object: there is no pure subjectivity without object, nor pure objectivity without subject.

However, apart from this complication, as I said in the first part, the basic meaning of subjective and objective is very simple, and if you stay with this basic meaning, you will not be confused with many confused arguments about subjectivity and objectivity, as some of the answers try to point out.

Consider what Wittgenstein demonstrates at the beginning of The Philosophical Investigations. If learning a language consisted of learning rules, then one would already have to know a language in order to learn a language, because the rules would have to be communicated to that person, via language. This is what drove him to inquire into private rules, and private language, to account for the capacity to understand rules, if learning rules is necessarily prior to using language. But that whole line of investigation breaks down into nonsense. So we ought to conclude that learning language does not consist of learning rules at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is just not true. Think of how a child learns to use the word cup. The child has no idea what a rule is, but by learning to use the word in social settings they implicitly learn to follow rules. The two go hand-in-hand.

I agree when Yano says:
"From this dynamical perspective, subjectivity and objectivity rather mean which has a stronger role between subject and object: there is no pure subjectivity without object, nor pure objectivity without subject."
The previous question I put forward about how to understand epistemology was offerred because that term is commonly used to distinguish people who "know" things from what they hope to learn. So, as a matter of use, the one who knows is the subject and the object is thing that gets understood. One does not have to refute Yano's observation to permit the usage. On the other hand, there is a tension between accepted uses of object and subject that makes the term "epistemology" questionable. Not in the sense that thinkers should decide to abandon it or not, but in the sense it needs to carry its own weight, explain stuff and not just assure thinkers it is self-evident, etcetera.

Value statements are subjective. All other statements are objective.

Moral statements are subjective. Talk about how morals evolved is objective.

Minds are part of the world, so speaking about the state of some mind is objective.

Value statements are subjective. All other statements are objective. — Harry Hindu

What do you see as the difference between a value statement and something like "I was daydreaming that I was flying" that makes one subjective and the other objective?

You do not believe that value statements are about the state of some mind?

Also, why would you think that some people are saying that minds are not part of the world?

What do you see as the difference between a value statement and something like "I was daydreaming that I was flying" that makes one subjective and the other objective? — Terrapin Station

Simple. "I was daydreaming that I was flying" is an objective statement about the state of some mind.

"Daydreaming that you are flying is a waste of time." is a subjective statement because it might not be a waste of time outside of your mind. Now, if you were to say that "I believe that daydreaming is a waste of time." That would be objective because, again, you are describing the state of some mind, not trying to make the claim about daydreaming itself being a waste of time. You are referring to your belief, which is a state of mind.

You do not believe that value statements are about the state of some mind? — Terrapin Station

No. Statements about the state of some mind wouldn't be value statements. They would be objective statements about the state of some mind. Only when you attempt to project value (as it relates to how it affects your goals) onto some state of affairs do you become subjective.

Also, why would you think that some people are saying that minds are not part of the world? — Terrapin Station

Just look at the questions you posed.

"Daydreaming that you are flying is a waste of time." is a subjective statement because it might not be a waste of time outside of your mind. Now, if you were to say that "I believe that daydreaming is a waste of time." — Harry Hindu

But "Daydreaming that you are flying is a waste of time" is the same thing as "I believe that daydreaming that you are flying is a waste of time."

It's not that the person saying that necessarily thinks abiout them as the same thing, but re what's actually going on, they are the same thing.

The person might have a mistaken belief that by saying "Daydreaming that you are flying is a waste of time," they're saying something different than "I believe that daydreaming that you are flying is a waste of time," but the person would simply have a mistaken belief. What they're really doing is the same thing in both cases.

No. Statements about the state of some mind wouldn't be value statements. — Harry Hindu

You're wrong about that. Value statements are telling us how an individual feels about the thing in question. Thus, they're about their state of mind.

Just look at the questions you posed. — Harry Hindu

Doesn't make any sense as a resposne.

The person might have a mistaken belief that by saying "Daydreaming that you are flying is a waste of time," they're saying something different than "I believe that daydreaming that you are flying is a waste of time," but the person would simply have a mistaken belief. What they're really doing is the same thing in both cases. — Terrapin Station

No. Go back and read my post.

Is the person mistaken that they have a belief? Whether the belief is right or wrong is a different question.

False beliefs can be a cause of some effect in the world as much as a true belief (false beliefs are just as real as true beliefs). The fact that one has beliefs is objective. Whether or not the belief is true or not is discovered by using the belief to make decisions and then observing the effects.

Is the person mistaken that they have a belief? — Harry Hindu

Whether they have a belief would be irrelevant to the distinction. You can't statement something that isn't a belief.

Hmmm. So you can't make a distinction between a belief and some actual state-of-affairs? So, "Donald Trump is the President of the United States" is a belief, and not an actual state-of-affairs? Do you believe that there are states-of-affairs external to your mind? How did you arrive at the "belief" that "Donald Trump is the President of the United States"?

So you can't make a distinction between a belief and some actual state-of-affairs? — Harry Hindu

I said "You can't state something that isn't a belief."

You're not saying that actual states of affairs consist solely of statements we make, are you?

If actual states of affairs are not only statements we make, then a claim about statements isn't going to imply anything about making a distinction between beliefs and actual states of affairs.

"Igneous rock is formed by the cooling of lava," as a statement, which is what the quotation marks conventionally denote in philosophy, is most certainly a belief that someone has. The person who uttered the statement believes that igneous rock is formed by the cooling of lava.

That's different than the fact that igneous rock is formed by the cooling of lava. The fact isn't itself a statement. The fact obtains even if every person were to disappear, or were to never have existed. That's NOT the case for statements. Statements require individuals to make them.

I said "You can't state something that isn't a belief." — Terrapin Station

So then every statement of yours in every one of your posts isn't about some state-of-affairs - like "You can't state something that isn't a belief."? So "You can't state something that isn't a belief" really isn't some state-of-affairs. It is a belief. So that means "You can't state something that isn't a belief" isn't really true outside of your own mind.

So then every statement of yours in every one of your posts isn't about some state-of-affairs — Harry Hindu

I didn't say that satatements can't be about states of affairs.

That a statement is about some state of affairs doesn't imply that the statement isn't a belief.

It doesn't imply that the state of affairs is a belief, or a statement.

"P is about F" is different than F itself.

That a statement is about some state of affairs doesn't imply that the statement isn't a belief. — Terrapin Station

But beliefs can be wrong. States-of-affairs just are. Are you not sure that you have beliefs?

But beliefs can be wrong. States-of-affairs just are. — Harry Hindu

Sure.

Are you not sure that you have beliefs?

Yes, of course I'm sure I have beliefs.

What does any of that have to do with anything I just said?

I didn't say that satatements can't be about states of affairs. — Terrapin Station

When beliefs/statements are wrong then they necessarily can't be about some state of affairs.
When beliefs/statements are right they necessarily are about some state of affairs.

When beliefs are wrong then they necessarily can't be about some state of affairs. — Harry Hindu

Of course they can be. "Igneous rock is always polka-dotted" is wrong, but it's about igneous rock. "About" is a term that tells us what we're referring to semantically in the sentence in question, or what we're thinking of in a thought that we have. (What we're referring to semantically in a sentence is what we're thinking of, really.)

When they are right they necessarily are about some state of affairs. — Harry Hindu

I'd agree that we can't get something right or wrong if it's not a case where we can match or fail to match what the world is like..

Yes, of course I'm sure I have beliefs.

What does any of that have to do with anything I just said? — Terrapin Station

You said:

You can't statement something that isn't a belief. — Terrapin Station

I said:

But beliefs can be wrong. — Harry Hindu

Do you agree that beliefs can be wrong?

If so,

AND you can't statement something that isn't a belief (in other words, statements are beliefs that can be wrong)

then how can you be sure that you have beliefs? You could be wrong.

then how can you be sure that you have beliefs? — Harry Hindu

By being in the psychological state of strong conviction. That's what "being sure" is.

For some reason you're thinking "If it's possible to be wrong about x, then I can't be sure about x," but that's not actually how psychology works.

Of course they can be. "Igneous rock is always polka-dotted" is wrong, but it's about igneous rock. "About" is a term that tells us what we're referring to semantically in the sentence in question, or what we're thinking of in a thought that we have. (What we're referring to semantically in a sentence is what we're thinking of, really.) — Terrapin Station

But it isn't about the igneous rock if the igneous rock isn't polka-dotted. You'd be referring to the igneous rock in your head, not the one outside of it. So it's really an issue of making a category mistake.

It's how possibility works in general, by the way, unless you're a strong determinist who doesn't buy the idea of any possibles that are not actuals.

For example, take that it's possible for all igneous rock to be polka-dotted, contra the fact that not all (if any) igneous rock is polka-dotted. Unless you simply reject all possibles that are not actuals, the fact that igneous rock isn't (all) polka-dotted isn't at all affected by the fact that it was possible for igneous rock to all be polka-dotted.

"It's possible to be wrong but I'm sure of P" works similarly.

For some reason you're thinking "If it's possible to be wrong about x, then I can't be sure about x," but that's not actually how psychology works. — Terrapin Station

But we are on a philosophy forum where we are skeptical about the very nature of knowledge itself.

But it isn't about the igneous rock if the igneous rock isn't polka-dotted — Harry Hindu

Yes, it is. I just explained why, and you just quoted the explanation:

"About" is a term that tells us what we're referring to semantically in the sentence in question, or what we're thinking of in a thought that we have. (What we're referring to semantically in a sentence is what we're thinking of, really.)"

So, among other things, this is turning out that you have no comprehension of "aboutness."

But we are on a philosophy forum where we are skeptical about the very nature of knowledge itself. — Harry Hindu

lol re speaking for everyone.