But, I suppose there are hinge propositions or a priori truth that we must deal with first, and guarantee the intersubjectivity of meaning. — Posty McPostface

But there is no private language. We start with a profound sense of the inter-subjectivity of meaning.

We are already where some of us think we need to prove we are. And those who want to prove we really are there are already assuming we are as they try to prove it, in the mere concern with proof (which is implicitly for others in a shared world.)

What troubles people is that our experience of being there is inexact, receding, automatic. The fantasy is to make it explicit. But we end up betraying the living system of language by grabbing at 'atomic meanings' for the bricks of the castle we didn't need in the first place. Except that we conceived the philosopher as a kind of knowledge knower, or scientist of science itself, with perfect certainty and clarity as replacements for God. (In short, it's an implicitly theological project.)

Well, I'm lost on what we disagree on here. We seem to be saying the same thing to some degree.

Most of my wants are independent of what my needs are. — Posty McPostface

You're never going to get everything you want, but your wants and needs are not independent of each other. They can't be. Rather, it would be that some wants you just don't value very highly, or maybe some you know are unrealistic/not practical, if not unattainable because they're pure fantasy, or maybe some you're relatively too lazy to pursue (that's the case for me, for example). But all of those wants would imply needs. They can't be independent of needs. For any want, there are going to be things that have to be the case (even if just hypothetically--for example, for fantasy wants) to make the want be the case.

You're never going to get everything you want need, but your wants and needs are not independent of each other. They can't be. Rather, it would be that some wants you just don't value very highly, or maybe some you know are unrealistic/not practical, if not unattainable because they're pure fantasy, or maybe some you're relatively too lazy to pursue (that's the case for me, for example). But all of those wants would imply needs. They can't be independent of needs. For any want, there are going to be things that have to be the case (even if just hypothetically--for example, for fantasy wants) to make the want be the case. — Terrapin Station

I figure that @macrosoft would disagree here.

Well, I'm lost on what we disagree on here. We seem to be saying the same thing to some degree. — Posty McPostface

Perhaps. But if I'm honest, I'm not getting a clear picture of your perspective.

But there is no private language. — macrosoft

On my view there is ONLY private language.

(I'm not a Wittgenstein fan. At all.)

People unnecessarily make trouble for themselves. — Michael Ossipoff

What do you mean by that Michael? — Posty McPostface

People make trouble for themselves by calling likes or preferences "wants", or even taking them to be needs.

Did we need to be conceived? Did Schopenhauer think so?

So, if, ultimately, nothing was really needed, then any likes that are there for us are extra and positive.

From the physical standpoint, we're purposefully-responsive devices designed by natural-selection to pursue preferences and likes.

In other words, we're here to do our best (toward our likes and preferences), as opposed to being here for things to happen to.

In other words, what can happen really matters at (only) the time when we have a choice to make (...such as a choice about how to avoid a less-preferred outcome). What we're about isn't outcomes that have already happened. ...or, in general, things that we can't influence.

That we aren't about outcomes after they happen is suggested by something similar said in the Bhagadvita.

Similar things are found in Buddhist writing.

Regarding the above, remember the "Desiderata" saying, which says to do our best about what we can, and accept (disregard) what we can't.

...and, as for our choices, they're determined, are made for us, by our preferences and our surrounding-circumstances, and therefore aren't even really our choices. Our role in those choices is merely to make a best-guess about what will best serve our preferences, given the surrounding-circumstances.

I don't know what your metaphysics is, but the above is all applicable even under Materialism.

Michael Ossipoff

On my view there is ONLY private language.

(I'm not a Wittgenstein fan. At all.) — Terrapin Station

I'd say it's a terminological dispute, because here we are talking, pretty much intelligible to one another. And I'm guessing you think in English that I could pretty much sense of.

I'd say it's a terminological dispute, because he we are talking, pretty much intelligible to one another. — macrosoft

Again, that's it's a terminological dispute is what Wittgenstein would probably say,but he's wrong.

Meaning occurs only in individual's heads. It can't be shared in any manner. It's something inherently mental.

Communication does not at all require literally sharing meanings. That's not how it works.

Yes, but succinctly what's your point here?

Meaning occurs only in individual's heads. It can't be shared in any manner. It's something inherently mental.

Communication does not at all require literally sharing meanings. That's not how it works. — Terrapin Station

@Banno, @unenlightened, what do you chaps think?

Perhaps. But if I'm honest, I'm not getting a clear picture of your perspective. — macrosoft

I mean to highlight that we both share needs and not wants. We can agree that I'm thirsty if I'm dying out of dehydration. Not so much about wants.

Meaning occurs only in individual's heads. It can't be shared in any manner. It's something inherently mental. — Terrapin Station

For me, though, 'mental' doesn't have some sharp meaning. Sure, we have a rough categorization, but I don't think it's sharp enough for what philosophy often wants to do with it. Now you can understand the mental so that meaning is trapped in heads, but to some degree that seems like a grammar preference. Because people commonly talk of sharing ideas, without all the metaphysical baggage of intending something exact, as if they are sharing some identical entity.

Communication does not at all require literally sharing meanings. That's not how it works. — Terrapin Station

I believe that if I understand the terms in exactly the way you'd prefer that I'd also agree with your point. But for me this just cuts the knot instead of untying it. Our primary situation involves interpreting words that are not used exactly to our preference, and we also are forced to use words that don't conform to others' preferences on the 'atomic' level. So I think we are constantly trying to interpret an approach as a whole to make sense of to-us-suspect uses of words, and we are constantly asking others to do the same for us.

In that sense there are only private languages (no perfect overlap).

Yes, but succinctly what's your point here? — Posty McPostface

The first brief answer that occurs to me is to quote Kentucky Buddhist Ken Keyes...his statement that we have likes, which needn't be called "wants" or "needs".

That's the short version, and you asked for a very brief concise statement.

Michael Ossipoff

I mean to highlight that we both share needs and not wants. We can agree that I'm thirsty if I'm dying out of dehydration. Not so much about wants. — Posty McPostface

Oh, I agree with that, roughly or sufficiently. (I think it's pretty much always possible to qualify, qualify, qualify --but not always appropriate, else we'd never finish one thing and start another. )

The first brief answer that occurs to me is to quote Kentucky Buddhist Ken Keyes...his statement that we have likes, which needn't be called "wants" or "needs".

That's the short version, and you asked for a very brief concise statement. — Michael Ossipoff

Oh, understood. I just meant to point out that we have shared needs, maybe not wants.

Oh, I agree with that, roughly or sufficiently. I think it's pretty much always possible to qualify, qualify, qualify --but not always appropriate, else we'd never finish one thing and start another. — macrosoft

Hmm, one cannot be certain of wants; but, needs are apparent. What does that mean to you?

Hmm, one cannot be certain of wants; but, needs are apparent. What does that mean to you? — Posty McPostface

My understanding of humans includes that they will die without water and feel pretty bad on the way to that thirsty grave. It also includes the idea that humans can individually become fixated on objects or ideas that leave others cold. One man will die for what another considers a joke or a bore. Roughly, needs are based in biology. Wants exist on upper levels of the human being (which are still maybe founded on biology, but in a more complicated way.)

My understanding of humans includes that they will die without water and feel pretty bad on the way to that thirsty grave. It also includes the idea that humans can individually become fixated on objects or ideas that leave others cold. One man will die for what another considers a joke or a bore. — macrosoft

And how does this relate to semantic holism that is an attitude? If I'm a philosophical pessimist, then what?

For me, though, 'mental' doesn't have some sharp meaning. Sure, we have a rough categorization, but I don't think it's sharp enough for what philosophy often wants to do with it. Now you can understand the mental so that meaning is trapped in heads, but to some degree that seems like a grammar preference. Because people commonly talk of sharing ideas, without all the metaphysical baggage of intending something exact, as if they are sharing some identical entity. — macrosoft

Some people think that meaning is llterally "embedded" in objective stuff.

I'd guess that you're familiar with Putnam's work on meaning, no?

My views on what meaning is ontologically are rather controversial. I'm stating an ontological claim. Not a grammatical preference claim.

Could some people agree with me but just be using language that suggests that they would think otherwise if we were to read language like an Aspie and think that everything in colloquial conversation is "literal"? Sure. But we can't know that very well unless we explain the issues to them and ask them what they think.

At any rate, when people "share ideas," they're of course not doing that literally.

Re some "sharp meaning," I don't even classify anything that way, so I'm not sure what that would be saying.

I believe that if I understand the terms in exactly the way you'd prefer that I'd also agree with your point. — macrosoft

Maybe, but not everyone does.

Some people think that meaning is llterally "embedded" in objective stuff. For one, I'd guess that you're familiar with Putnam's work on meaning, no? — Terrapin Station

The world is the totality of facts not things. Comes to my mind.

The world is the totality of facts not things. — Posty McPostface

That's one of the small number of things Wittgenstein said that I agree with. ;-)'

That's one of the small number of things Wittgenstein said that I agree with. ;-)' — Terrapin Station

So, can I objectively state that you are deprived of water? If that is so, here's a glass of water.

And how does this relate to semantic holism that is an attitude? — Posty McPostface

If one wants philosophy to address the 'highest' things, then one is naturally going to be drawn to existentialism, the philosophy of religion and art, etc. One will probably think (just an example) Nietzsche is a philosopher, very much a philosopher, else philosophy is some boring technical pursuit, a kind of word math for experts, another dog trick to learn in STEM (and I have a job in STEM.)

So if one wants to think about the highest things, life and death matters, with a kind of 'religious' seriousness, then one is going to quickly get impatient with just staring at bugs in the source code. One wants to talk about the total human situation. And one pretty soon figures out that people have their own little words for this or that and nevertheless fundamentally agree somehow on their basic grasp of what it means or should mean to exist, etc. And I don't mean what it means for a hair dryer to exist: I mean what it means for you or me to exist in this world with other people, in time, mortal, full of desire and fear.

Are you a Tractarian by any chance? The world is the totality of facts not things. Therefore, we must analyze the state space we both inhabit. This can only be done through perfect asymmetric information sharing.

I also think a Rogerian agreement fits nicely into this discussion. Thoughts?

we have shared needs, maybe not wants. — Posty McPostface

Sure, there are broader requirements that people have in common (...such as survival and its requirements), to achieve their diverse likes. ...but ultimately it comes down to likes.

Michael Ossipoff

but ultimately it comes down to likes. — Michael Ossipoff

You mean preferences? I mean, there's a tale in the realm of economics that asserts that diamonds are more valuable than water; but, not at all times.

Some people think that meaning is llterally "embedded" in objective stuff. For one, I'd guess that you're familiar with Putnam's work on meaning, no? — Terrapin Station

No. But I've read lots of Rorty, if that helps. I think he's pretty great, and I also have lots of respect for instrumentalism, pragmatism, etc. Holism just happens to be the horse I'm riding at the moment. But I can feel my way into what someone might mean by that embeddedness.

At any rate, when people "share ideas," they're of course not doing that literally. — Terrapin Station

Not to be difficult, but why not? They participate in the idea at the same time. I'll agree that this isn't exactly true, but I don't think it has an exact meaning in the first place. So we can't be exactly wrong or right about it. We just get a sense of what is appropriate to say or do and say or do it, never 'completely' or 'exactly' grasping some clear and distinct essence. Meaning flows through time and sentences inexactly but 'sharp' enough so that we constantly move on with our lives. My central point would be maybe that it's distributed. It's not 'in' the words but 'between' and 'around' them. And time is crucial: as you read this sentence there is a kind of memory of what has been read and an expectation of what is to follow, so that meaning is not instantaneous.

So 'being' is temporal and historical. It's only within the unnoticed temporality that we can imagine a subset of being that is neither temporal nor historical, dead stuff that is just there. This is an extremely useful subset and way of looking at things, but it is parasitic or dependent on something more mysterious. (But I have no intention of dragging in 'supernatural' entities to bury this mystery in more entities that explain nothing really but only draw a smiley face on the mystery.)

Not to be difficult, but why not? — macrosoft

Ideas are mental phenomena. As such, they occur "in persons' heads." They're literally brain states that the person has--it's what it's like to BE that brain (or rather those parts of that brain), in those dynamic states.

Sounds that people can make with their mouths, things they can type or handwrite, body motions they can make, etc. are not at all the same as ideas they have. Those things are correlated to ideas, but they're not the same as them.

So they're not literally sharing ideas, because it's not metaphysically possible to do that..