If you want to be constructive here instead of randomly saying "you don't know what you're talking about" then go ahead but I don't have much to reply to if that's all you're going to say.

One can know what "the cup is on the table" means without knowing what the word "premiss" means. — creativesoul

One may not know what the word premise means but one always knows what a premise is. People naturally think in syllogisms. It is like how kids know what anger is despite never learning the word. You haven't actually shown any inconsistencies yet

Ok forget about that whole argument, I remember we were arguing about this:

If there is an infinity of possible premises, and any premise can be used to validate another premise, then there is an infinity if possible premises by which to validate premises — tim wood

I believe this is true, you believe it is false. Why do you think it is false

and any premise can be used to validate another premise, — tim wood

This isn't true. If you define it as true, define it in, so to speak, then you can prove anything. Systems within which you can prove anything are generally felt, for cause, to be uninteresting.

Besides, you have left "validate" undefined. I don't know what that means. You may have defined it above, but you really need more accurate terminology. In essence what you've said is every premise is provable, and that ain't so.

A review...

P3: There is no way for a premise to be determined true or false except relative to another premise... — khaled

Show me a premise that can be known to be true without referring to any other premises... — khaled

One can know that "there is a cup on the table" is true by virtue of knowing what the statement is talking about, and then looking to see if the cup is on the table... — creativesoul

Does "there is a cup on the table" count as a premiss? On my view it can if and when one is using it as such. Use is what makes it a premiss, instead of just any ole' statement. Such usage doesn't change the meaning of the statement. We can know this solely by virtue of knowing that the truth conditions of the statement remain unchanged. This remains the case regardless of it's use.

One can say "there is a cup on the table" in normal everyday parlance and believe it or not. This would be to use the statement as a means to report one's belief, or perhaps even as a means to report an other's, or it can also be used as a means to deliberately misrepresent one's own or another's belief.

One can also report upon the meaning of the statement.

One could use the statement as a premiss to prove some other statement.

The truth conditions of the statement remain unchanged in each and every case.

Do we agree thus far?

:brow:

We can say "there is a cup on the table" around an other who knows exactly what we're saying, but has no clue how to use that statement as a premiss. S/he knows exactly how to determine if it's true or false. They look and see for themselves.

All of this clearly shows that "the cup is on the table" can be determined true or false without it's being used relative to another premiss.

If knowledge requires reason, and reason requires thinking about one's own thought and belief, then knowledge requires thinking about one's own thought and belief.

Thinking about one's own though and belief requires complex language use. If knowledge requires thinking about one's own thought and belief, then it requires complex language use.

Complex language use requires knowing what certain statements mean. If knowledge requires complex language use, and that requires knowing what certain statements mean, then we've arrived at a big problem...

Either there is more than one kind of knowledge, or knowledge does not require thinking about one's own thought and belief.

One has to first know what certain statements mean before one can begin reasoning about them.

Get it yet?

My apologies...

:confused:

for premise A to validate premise B means that premise B logically follows from A
Logically follows: For B to logically follow A means that there is a syllogism formable such that A is a premise and B is a conclusion that does not commit any logical fallacies

My basic point is if A validates B and B validates C, etc then nothing can possibly validate A or else that would be using circular reasoning. P6 is that there is an infinity of possible As from which you can start this logical validation chain and I find this a problem

ok I'm not sure I see the problem here because I agree with everything you said

Complex language use requires knowing what certain statements mean. If knowledge requires complex language use, and that requires knowing what certain statements mean, then we've arrived at a big problem — creativesoul

Yes. Exactly. That's the point this post is trying to highlight (although not specific to language). Ok let me rephrase this problem like this

A (complex language use) validates (def in the comment above) B (knowledge) and B then goes on validating C, D, E, F, G, etc. Now, what validates A? The main point of this argument is to highlight this issue that any logical chain of premises and conclusions must start from an arbitrary point as there is no logic to determine where that point should be that does not itself assume arbitrary premises. What you would call "different kinds of knowledge" does not solve the issue for if you do not define knowledge as: The result of a valid syllogism (my definition) then potentially every strong belief is knowledge.

All of this clearly shows that "the cup is on the table" can be determined true or false without it's being used relative to another premiss. — creativesoul

Ok, let me address something I think is a big issue here. I do not mean when I say that "Knowledge is the result of a valid syllogism" that the cup is not on the table. Since "the cup is on the table" CAN be made as a conclusion to a valid syllogism that accepts premises like "visual perception is reliable" then it still counts as knowledge. If it is the result of a valid syllogism, then it is knowledge assuming its premises are true. Your definition of "different kinds of knowledge" still fits in my definition of knowledge unless you can give an example of knowledge that CANNOT be put in the form of a valid syllogism. "the cup is on the table" can be put in a valid syllogism and is thus knowledge ASSUMING THE PREMISES OF SAID SYLLOGISM ARE TRUE. I take "visual perception is reliable" to be a true premise so yes I believe the cup is indeed on the table. The reason I said that what the kid has is a belief not knowledge is because the kid (I'm assuming) has never carefully reasoned WHY he thinks a cup is on the table. Once he discovers it is because "visual perception is reliable" is true, then you could say he has knowledge. Otherwise, if this step is not taken, then any strong belief could be accounted as knowledge without validation. I believe that if A is knowledge, it must be validated by B.

Basically, I think my definition of knowledge is unproblematic because any form of knowledge must rely on a validation (or else it is not knowledge) and that validation can always be abstracted into a premise in a syllogism to give an accurate model of knowledge. I haven't come across any knowledge that cannot be put as the conclusion to a syllogism yet (as that would imply that there exists knowledge that does not need validation)

My apologies...

:confused: — creativesoul

No problem dude, I was having a bad day yesterday and got triggered for no reason, sorry about that.

My basic point is if A validates B and B validates C, etc then nothing can possibly validate A or else that would be using circular reasoning. P6 is that there is an infinity of possible As from which you can start this logical validation chain and I find this a problem — khaled

Axioms. You start with axioms. No there are not a lot of As if the As are the starting axioms. Your Bs and Cs are premises or theorems or propositions. For a particular argument there are not a lot of theorems available, only those that work. If the proposition you wish to prove is unprovable, then there are no premises available that work.

No there are not a lot of As if the As are the starting axioms — tim wood

You mean, there are not a lot of As that WORK (are practically useful) if the As are the starting axiom. I agree, however picking axioms because they work is just another axiom "One ought to start with axioms that work". There is no reason to pick THAT over "One ought to treat all starting axioms equally"

For a particular argument there are not a lot of theorems available, only those that work — tim wood

This is where I knew you were using the pragmatic axiom highlited above (which I use too, but I think it's not justified)

You mean, there are not a lot of As that WORK (are practically useful) if the As are the starting axiom. I agree, however picking axioms because they work is just another axiom "One ought to start with axioms that work". There is no reason to pick THAT over "One ought to treat all starting axioms equally" — khaled

You really aren't getting it. You tell me what you think an axiom is.

an axiom is statement taken to be true even though there is no proof to show it is and by proof I mean a sound syllogism

Pretty close. In any system there are propositions/theorems which are provably true or false, and axioms which are true but for which no proof is found. Godel showed that there are also propositions/theorems that are true, but unprovable; these are a special case and of almost zero use. For ordinary purposes they can be, and are, disregarded. We right here seem to be calling "A" axioms, in distinction to all the Bs, Cs,.., that are theorems/propositions.

Arithmetic is such a system. Five axioms, but many theorems/propositions. You build arguments using the axioms and proved (provable) theorems. So there are not a lot As, period. The idea that somehow there are many and you choose and all of that is simply confusion on your part.

Constructing the proof itself is a creative act. So far as I know, there are multiple proofs for lots of things. But this is all straightforward. Now is the time for you to make a more explicit statement of what you think is a problem, here, and maybe we move further into it.

P3: There is no way for a premise to be determined true or false except relative to another premise — khaled

This is false. I've just argued for how that's the case. I also argued that reason is not necessary for knowledge. If you agree with everything I just wrote in the last post, then you have some self-contradiction going on if you still maintain that the premiss quoted above is true. It's not.

Understanding is not found within the bracket of language.

Thinking about one's own though and belief requires complex language use. If knowledge requires thinking about one's own thought and belief, then it requires complex language use.

Complex language use requires knowing what certain statements mean. If knowledge requires complex language use, and that requires knowing what certain statements mean, then we've arrived at a big problem... — creativesoul

What a statement means involves not the statement but the sensations that are the metabolites of the statement, and the associations. Complex language use is not 'required,' as it is already there, utilized, a part of the whole of human knowledge. Such a thing is as meaningful as saying "Air is required to live."

What a statement means involves not the statement... — Blue Lux

Rubbish.

Arithmetic is such a system. Five axioms, but many theorems/propositions. You build arguments using the axioms and proved (provable) theorems. So there are not a lot As, period. The idea that somehow there are many and you choose and all of that is simply confusion on your part. — tim wood

But... This is clearly false. Look at non eucledian geometry. Beforehand there were 5 postulates but then people started removing some and adding some and getting systems THAT STILL WORKED and WERE USEFUL (non euclidean geometry). There is no saying this cannot be done with arithmetic (it probably already has but I haven't found anything in a 2 minute Google search). People DO pick and choose their axioms out of a potentially infinite set. You keep saying "there are not many As, just look at this system, it has 5 As" but that's obviously not proof because there are systems that remove some of those As and add new As. Heck even for logic, there is fuzzy logic which is useful, there is certain logics that remove the axiom "everything is either true or false" and add a few extra axioms and are incredibly useful, etc.... The idea that there is many As to pick from has been undoubtedly shown throughout history but since As are axioms then by definition there is no answer to the question "which A should I pick' that does not itself rely on arbitrary As. THAT is the problem. Human knowledge is like a castle built on air. And there is a lot of air to choose from

have you actually read my comment or just the first line? If you've read the comment please address it

What a statement means involves not the statement. — Blue Lux

Why exactly is this rubbish? I agree with that guy. Obviously understanding does not involve the language itself or else how do you explain that there are multiple languages but the same understanding?

Obviously understanding does not involve the language itself or else how do you explain that there are multiple languages but the same understanding? — khaled

Example?

getting systems — khaled

Yes. Different systems.

People DO pick and choose their axioms out of a potentially infinite set. — khaled

Potentially infinite? If you want to add axioms to arithmetic, good luck. And if you do, it won't be arithmetic any more, but something else. Here's in essence what you're claiming: it's possible now or in the future that you owe or will owe me a lot of money. So pay up! Do you see a problem with that?

What infinite set of axioms do people pick and choose their axioms from? Is there anything you can say about that set? Potentially infinite? What does that mean?

Look, it could be that 2+2=7. Could be, you never know, someone might discover a proof....

Here's in essence what you're claiming: it's possible now or in the future that you owe or will owe me a lot of money. So pay up! Do you see a problem with that? — tim wood

I never claimed anything as a result of there being a potentially infinite set of starting axioms so there is no problem like that. All I'm saying is that there are many many axioms (maybe infinite) one could pick from and get a perfectly coherent system of knowledge. As a result, the only thing making our systems of knowledge lasting is their practical utility

What infinite set of axioms do people pick and choose their axioms from? Is there anything you can say about that set? — tim wood

What do you mean "say about that set"

Look, it could be that 2+2=7. Could be, you never know, someone might discover a proof. — tim wood

I think you are misunderstanding the implications of what I'm saying. I'm not saying we should believe 2+2=7, I'm saying there is no justification for us believing that 2+2=4 and not 7 except survival value

"two plus two equals four"
"2プラス2は4"
"dos más dos son cuatro"

Obviously understanding does not involve the language itself or else how do you explain that there are multiple languages but the same understanding? — khaled

Example? — creativesoul

"two plus two equals four"
"2プラス2は4"
"dos más dos son cuatro" — khaled

Are these examples of the same understanding in different languages? How does understanding not involve language seeing how in each case it is set out with language? Seems obvious to me that understanding has to do with language. Remove the language, remove the understanding.

What I see here is three ways of saying the same thing. That doesn't support the idea that understanding does not involve language. It supports the idea that different languages can say the same thing.

What a statement means involves not the statement.
— Blue Lux

Why exactly is this rubbish? — khaled

A statement's meaning is about the statement. Being about the statement involves the statement.

Basically, I think my definition of knowledge is unproblematic because any form of knowledge must rely on a validation (or else it is not knowledge) and that validation can always be abstracted into a premise in a syllogism to give an accurate model of knowledge. I haven't come across any knowledge that cannot be put as the conclusion to a syllogism yet (as that would imply that there exists knowledge that does not need validation) — khaled

This conflates things. For one, you've offered a definition of knowledge that says that all knowledge must be the result of a syllogism. That's false, and I've already argued how. P3 in the OP is false, and I've shown how. Arguing by definitional fiat doesn't work here.

You're claiming that reason is required for knowledge. That's false. Knowing what certain statements mean is required for reason. So, either knowing what certain statements mean is not knowledge(which is absurd), or reason is not required for all knowledge.

You're claiming that reason is required for knowledge. That's false — creativesoul

I bet 99% of the people in the civilized world would staunchly disagree with that statement. If you are willing to accept illogical or unproven statements as knowledge then arguing with you is futile.

Knowing what certain statements mean is required for reason — creativesoul

I never agreed to this. Knowing what certain statements mean makes transmitting knowledge much easier but young kids are obviously also capable of thought even though they don't know a language. Language is not necessary for thought, I think that proposition is absurd. It would even imply that cavemen were incapable of thinking but had that been the case we wouldn't have survived. You don't need a personal monologue running 24/7 to think

Reason is required for knowledge. Language is not required for reason. Language is a form of knowledge. You cannot define knowledge without having the word "justified" or "validated" in the definition or else arguing with you is futile because if you don't have something like that in your definition then literally any statement is knowledge if one believes in it strongly which defeats the purpose of having the word "knowledge" when it just means "strong belief"

What, I think, means does not involve MERELY the statement itself, as if it has some sort of objectified meaning. It has meaning when it is read, when it is spoken, when it is deciphered.

if I look into another's eyes and understand that they exist, does this require language?

it involves the statement as far as the statement is intentionalized. The statement is subsidiary to the meaning of the statement, which has little to do with the statement itself but is what is manifest for the the statement, for the person who's intention is absorbed with the statement.

I bet 99% of the people in the civilized world would staunchly disagree with that statement. — khaled

No true scotsman