@Sam26

What are we to make of "I know how to ride a bike"?

The justification here, if there is one, is in riding the bike. The doing makes the knowing so.

I haven't ridden one for a few years - perhaps I've forgotten how...

Or I suffer an inner ear infection that makes balance impossible, and so cannot demonstrate my skill; do I still know how to ride?

What are we to make of "I know how to ride a bike"?

The justification here, if there is one, is in riding the bike. The doing makes the knowing so.

I haven't ridden one for a few years - perhaps I've forgotten how...

Or I suffer an inner ear infection that makes balance impossible, and so cannot demonstrate my skill; do I still know how to ride? — Banno

Well, it's similar to knowing how to count to ten, it's knowledge as a skill. The evidence or the justification is in the doing. If you say you can ride a bike, then get on and fall on your butt, then you don't have the skill. It doesn't matter that you once had the skill. The point is that your claim is no longer true.

But despite there not being a something, the game takes place; and has a role. We do things with our talk of pain. — Banno

I don't remember the context of this quote. I believe the point was, that if there was no pain behavior, the word pain would be practically meaningless. The pain behavior in social settings is what gives meaning to the word pain. The pain behavior also reflects a mental state, although the mental state in itself doesn't confer meaning. It's the mental state along with the behavior in social settings. Without the mental phenomena there would be no behavior in social settings. I'm not saying that mental states are objects that the word latches onto. So it goes something like this: mental states - behavior - words in social contexts - meaning - but it doesn't work in reverse, that is, you can't point back to the mental state to give the word meaning. The mental state is not an object that confers meaning. Repeating for emphasis.

I'm thinking about this in relation to the following from @Snakes Alive:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/214348

I'm thinking about this in relation to the following from Snakes Alive:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/214348 — Banno

He's relearning the use of a word, just as a child would learn to use a word. I don't see the connection between what you said above and this video.

It's not just a matter of doing things in a language-game, it's doing things correctly.

If you knew how to use "60" but lost the capacity to say the word...

If you knew how to ride but lost the capacity to balance...

Do you maintain the concept of "60"? Do you maintain the concept of bike riding?

I am not as happy as you might be, to admit mental states into

mental states - behavior - words in social contexts - meaning — Sam26

because it is made distinct from behaviour. I suspect a consequence of the approach Wittgenstein takes is to join mental states and behaviour - but that becomes a clumsy wording and leads to my (and his?) being accused of behaviourism.

It's more that the state of a brain and the performance of some act, or better, group of similar acts, are related.

because it is made distinct from behaviour. I suspect a consequence of the approach Wittgenstein takes is to join mental states and behaviour - but that becomes a clumsy wording and leads to my (and his?) being accused of behaviourism. — Banno

Ya, it may lead to people accuse you of behaviorism, but I'm surely not going to let accusations dictate my beliefs. People will always misunderstand things, including myself, but all I'm doing is letting Wittgenstein's thoughts, as I interpret them, lead me to new avenues of thinking.

People also think that Wittgenstein promoted the idea that meaning is equivalent to use, or that language-games are what determine meaning. These are just misunderstandings.

Anyway, on with your tale...

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It's more that the state of a brain and the performance of some act, or better, group of similar acts, are related. — Banno

Causally, no less...

So Sam...

With Witt's strict application of the phrase "I know", aren't there things that we can surmise about his thoughts on the matter that perhaps he had not written down, but was still in process, or some such?

Doesn't Witt claim that knowledge must be dubitable? Wouldn't that condition disqualify Moore's claim all by itself?

Why think that? Causality in not the only relation.

With Witt's strict application of the phrase "I know", aren't there things that we can surmise about his thoughts on the matter that perhaps he had not written down, but was still in process, or some such? — creativesoul

Yes, in fact I've done this with my foundationalist idea's based on Witt's hinge-propositions. I also think there is much more that can be surmised, namely, that there is a causal link between our sensory perceptions and many of these hinge-propositions or bedrock beliefs. Whether or not this causal link will hold up to scrutiny I'm not sure.

Doesn't Witt claim that knowledge must be dubitable? Wouldn't that condition disqualify Moore's claim all by itself? — creativesoul

Yes, isn't that his point? All knowledge claim are doubtable, and if they're not, like Moore's claims, then there not knowledge claims, they're beliefs of a different sort (bedrock).

Yes, the causality link hasn't been clearly established. Although I do think it's certainly something to consider.

I'm a strict determinist...

:wink:

You're right though. There are more than one legitimate relation between the brain state and groups of similar activities. The attribution of meaning being one. Showing meaning when there's more than one person involved... "Block!"...

What do you have in mind though? I'm certain it's different than what I've said...

:smile:

I watched a pharmacist sort through shelves as she spoke on the phone, looking at this and that, walking around the room, asking questions and listening as she suggested, remembered, discovered...

Her thinking was not seperate from this bodily activity; nor from the items on the shelf, or the phone. Thinking is not just something that happens in minds.

Doesn't Witt claim that knowledge must be dubitable? Wouldn't that condition disqualify Moore's claim all by itself?
— creativesoul

Yes, isn't that his point? All knowledge claim are doubtable, and if they're not, like Moore's claims, then there not knowledge claims, they're beliefs of a different sort (bedrock). — Sam26

Yeah. Sorry, I was more hesitant than was warranted. I wasn't certain about the accuracy of my recollection. It's been a while since I seriously read OC, aside from a bit here and there in order to refresh for discussion with you, Banno, and a few other Witt fans...

I watched a pharmacist sort through shelves as she spoke on the phone, looking at this and that, walking around the room, asking questions and listening as she suggested, remembered, discovered...

Her thinking was not seperate from this bodily activity; nor from the items on the shelf, or the phone. Thinking is not just something that happens in minds. — Banno

I would readily agree. Give me another few years, and I'll have you on board before you know it!

:wink:

So...

On what ground would one base such a condition for knowledge?

Why must all knowledge claims(I'm assuming empirical claims) be able to be doubted?

Her thinking was not seperate from this bodily activity; nor from the items on the shelf, or the phone. Thinking is not just something that happens in minds. — Banno

Where else would it happen? In other words, if we're talking about the concept, the concept thinking gets its life from the actions you pointed out, but it's not as if thinking can be generated apart from minds. Minds are necessary. It's as if you want to say the actions in themselves are the thinking, but my disagreement with you, I think, lies in the difference between how a concept gets its life and what's going on in the brain. The two are inseparable.

Why must all knowledge claims(I'm assuming empirical claims) be able to be doubted? — creativesoul

If this wasn't so, then one could infer knowledge from a simple claim that one knows. It has to be more than reasonable that in many situations the knowledge claim is something to be demonstrated.

Why must all knowledge claims(I'm assuming empirical claims) be able to be doubted?
— creativesoul

If this wasn't so, then one could infer knowledge from a simple claim that one knows. It has to be more than reasonable that in many situations the knowledge claim is something to be demonstrated. — Sam26

So, it's about the justification aspect?

Yes, by definition, knowledge is something that is justified. As Wittgenstein says, satisfying oneself is part of the language-game of knowledge.

Many empirical claims are bedrock, i.e., they are outside our epistemological language-games.

There seems, though, to be something much deeper here, namely, how our mental states are connected with these kinds of beliefs (hinge-propositions or bedrock beliefs). The strength of these beliefs does cause us to act from conviction, and they do give us something fundamental to our language-games. The strength of these beliefs (hinge-propositions or bedrock beliefs) are such that we want to say or make the claim that “We know…,” but, again, Wittgenstein attacks this use of the word know. Moore's claim to knowledge seems to be more in line with his subjective state of certainty, than with real knowledge claims. — Sam26

Now I need to go back to Moore, and have a re-read. Does he mention certainty in his text? I don't recall his doing so. The introduction of certainty into he discussion is I think down to Wittgenstein.

I know how to ride a bike - and can demonstrate my knowledge by riding a bike. I know I have a hand - and can demonstrate my knowledge by waving my hand. Bikes and hands form the world in which such language takes place.

...my disagreement with you, I think, lies in the difference between how a concept gets its life and what's going on in the brain. The two are inseparable. — Sam26

That's close. I don't see how knowing I have a hand could be purely what's going on in the brain; it must, at the least, also involve a hand.

You have posited that the connection between hinge propositions and the world is somehow causal. I picture this as that somehow having a hand causes the hinge belief that I have a hand. I don't agree with that line of thinking. I think it would be better to think something like, that having a hand and believing one has a hand are much the same thing - "inseparable", as you say. After all, to believe on has a hand, one has to understand ownership in some way, and what hands are in some other.

Yes, by definition, knowledge is something that is justified. As Wittgenstein says, satisfying oneself is part of the language-game of knowledge. — Sam26

Surely everyone knows that self-satisfaction plays no crucial role in being justified...

I know how to ride a bike - and can demonstrate my knowledge by riding a bike. I know I have a hand - and can demonstrate my knowledge by waving my hand. Bikes and hands form the world in which such language takes place. — Banno

This lets me know what Moore and I have always had in common that I had yet to have ascertained...

Moore is also getting beneath language in the sense of setting out what language creation and/or acquisition is existentially dependent upon.

Now I need to go back to Moore, and have a re-read. Does he mention certainty in his text? I don't recall his doing so. The introduction of certainty into he discussion is I think down to Wittgenstein. — Banno

Wittgenstein points out that Moore's use of the word know is more an expression of subjective certainty (OC, 21 and 42). He says this because Moore's use of the word seems to reflect something indubitable, which if the case, would imply that we can infer from Moore's propositions that we too know.

Wittgenstein, wants us to consider the proposition's negation, namely, "I don't know this is a hand," which helps us understand how out of place Moore's use of know is.

That's close. I don't see how knowing I have a hand could be purely what's going on in the brain; it must, at the least, also involve a hand. — Banno

If I believe I have a hand, then yes, the belief involves the hand. I'm not saying otherwise. Only that it's both, the mind and the hand. I'm not stressing one over the other, but you seem to want to stress the hand and the action as somehow superior. They work together. If anything the belief is dependent on the mind, not the other way around. The mind is not dependent on the actions or the belief being expressed. Without the mind there would be no actions or beliefs. No cultural setting for your belief to manifest.

In order for us to attribute a mind to something, it does require actions of some kind, otherwise how would we know we have minds. However, this is a language point, that is, the concept mind would be senseless apart from the actions of minds. My point is partly linguistic, but also partly non-linguistic.

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I think that Moore is separating the fools of the audience. Who - in that situation - would deny that Moore's hand is external to them?