I guess I would say to this proverbial Mary that there's nothing lost in including Jane. — Moliere

I can't really lay out Mary's concerns any more clearly than I have, so if you still think they amount to "nothing" then I guess we'll have to just agree to differ.

Well, I was using both the contexts of references to bodies in earlier discussion and the examples of both anorexia and phobias you raised. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The vague 'references' to bodies is materially different to characterising a claim as being bigoted because it presumes trans people are hallucinating a body which isn't there. Where is the actual claim you're basing this hugely significant judgement on?

The use of delusion I was referring to also differs from hallucination. It doesn't necessarily pose a phenomenalogical appearance. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Delusion usually implies some sort or misread phenomenological presence in the world. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Can you see why I got a bit confused?

Firstly, the truth of an identity isn't defined by a feeling. — TheWillowOfDarkness

OK, so what does determine the truth of an identity? In what way is that truth publicly available?

Secondly, the point I was making about the individual was descriptive of a state of a person feelings, not a claim about if their feelings were right. It's point about who their feeling is about about, not whether it's accurate or not. — TheWillowOfDarkness

So how does this relate to the public meaning of the term "woman"?

A persons feelings about their identity reference them, not other people. In any case a person's feelings about their own identity only reference them. The feeling in question is only about them. — TheWillowOfDarkness

OK, so the feeling is about them and them alone. I don't disagree with that point. So if I feel feel a thing which makes me cry, makes me want to remove the cause, makes me want to seek the comfort of my friends or just curl up into a ball, I lose my appetite, can't be bothered to do anything, lose interest in the world etc. Those feelings are just about me and no-one else but me, right?

So does that make me correct to describe my state as "joyfully happy"? No. Because the fact that the feelings are about me doesn't make a jot of difference to the fact that any words I use to describe them are part of public language and so must have a public meaning. If I use the word "happy" to describe feelings which make me act that way, I am misusing the word "happy" because the word "happy" does not publicly define a set of feelings which typically cause such behaviours. Still, no-one can see inside my head, no-one can determine the truth of how I'm feeling, but as soon as I decide to talk about it, I've agreed to the terms of the language game I want to play with the other people to whom I'm speaking, and rule number one is that the meanings of the words I'm using are publicly available.

They are feeling they are a woman , — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, they are feeling like something. When they want to describe that something to other people, they must chose words whose meanings are publicly available otherwise the description is literally nonsense. I'll ask again (since you've chosen to avoid the difficult questions (a common theme here), what is the meaning of the expression "I am an woman", or "I feel like a woman". What information does is convey to the person being spoken to?

Except, as has been pointed out, your argument is incompatible with trans claims. So it doesn't seem to be based on trans claims at all. — angslan

So what is the trans claim then? What is wrong with the definition of it that I provided in my last post. "it is proper courtesy for you to address me as a man because I feel like a man"?

The only problem I can see is determining which definition to restrict the existing words to (this may or may not be a similar debate to whether gay marriage is 'marriage'). But at the moment we don't have two different words, and I don't see that being problematic either. — angslan

You've completely lost me here I'm afraid. The first part of the paragraph opens "the only problem I see..." and the second part concludes "...I don't see that as being problematic either" suggesting that neither this, nor some other thing are problem. Yet there are only two subjects within the paragraph, one of which you've identified as a 'problem'.

No. This is a continual confusion of sex and gender. I'm not advocating people use physiological or psychological features, I'm advocating that people address others according to their own wishes on the subject, regardless of whether they even consider a distinction between the two. — angslan

So how are people's wishes not a psychological feature? Where are wishes contained if not in the psychology?

Because you have provided so much evidence that the term was only applied to outward secondary sex characteristics historically? At least if you are going to ask for evidence you would think that you would also provide some information on the historical use of the term. — angslan

The burden of proof is usually carried by the person wishing to prove the positive, not the negative. It's basic courtesy (which I thought you were fairly au fait with). All you have to do to prove your assertion that the term woman has been in use for "a few hundred years" as a term to describe something other than physiological appearance, is provide a single reference (but preferably a few). In order to prove my assertion that it hasn't, I'd have to provide hundreds and hundreds. Providing one single reference of the word being used to describe someone according to their physical appearance would be trivial matter even now, but could not count as evidence of a negative assertion.

Yes you can. Not all women feel the same. Not all women are the same. This is fundamentally, and trivially, true.

To use your example, if I say "she is an idiot", I am not calling all women idiots. — angslan

Why have you changed the word "woman" to the word "she" and then suggested that this proves something about the term "woman"? You do know they're two different words? You can't prove something about the word "woman" by showing how the word "she" can be used in a sentence. Substitute the word 2she" in your example sentence for the word "woman" (the word I'm actually talking about), and you have exactly what I just said. "women are idiots" makes a claim about all women. Honestly, this level of argumentation is really poor.

If "not all women feel the same" as you claim. Then how can someone 'feel like a woman'? There is not a feeling which being a woman is. There is not a small collection of feelings which, if you feel one of them, makes you a woman. There is not even a very large collection of feelings the sum total of which constitutes "womanhood". Women are not constrained in any way by feeling a certain way or a certain collection of ways. Absolutely any feeling at all could be constituted as 'feeling like a woman', and absolutely any feeling at all could be constituted as 'feeling like a man'. Which means that if someone currently a man says they 'feel like a woman' (and would be upset if other people did not acknowledge this) they have made an error. What they feel like cannot be necessarily 'a woman' because there is no cause to remove their feelings from those suitable for a man. They have no rational cause to be upset if others don't acknowledge this because it is not a necessary condition, so others are free to consider it one or not. Having an emotional response to something for which there is no rational reason to have that response is basically the definition of a delusion.

Let me try to simplify this on the off-chance that people are just not understanding what I'm saying (as opposed to simply ignoring it). Let me break it down into some individual propositions and maybe people could raise which part they disagree with.

1. Any statement which begins "I am a..." is a statement which claims membership of a set. It is, by necessity, claiming that whatever properties you have, they are not inconsistent with those of the set you are claiming to be a member of. A simple counter-example to this would be a statement of the sort "I am a..." which somehow does not make such a claim, but I cannot think what such a statement might otherwise mean.

2. Sets must exclude something in order to be meaningful. A set which contains all things, or one which contains all things already described by an existing set is not doing any job of definition. It has no more meaning that the other set which also describes it. The set {homo sapiens} had exactly the same definition as the set {humans} and as such the terms are interchangeable and one has no more or less meaning than the other (in terms of sets). The set {women} must therefore exclude something in order to be a meaningful set. In addition here, it is currently understood that men/women is a binomial set pair. One cannot be both a man and a woman. Maybe this is part of the trans claim, but I've not heard it expressed that way.

3. Words must have public meanings in order to be useful in discourse. If I use a word which only I know the meaning of, then no communication event can take place.

4. From 1), the term "woman" in common language is the name of a set since it is used in a sentence of the form "I am a..." and all such sentences are declarations of set membership.

5. From 2), the expression "I am a woman" must be making an exclusory claim about the membership criteria of the set {women} because all sets must have exclusory criteria in order to be meaningful and the claim "I am a woman" is logically identical to the claim "I am not a man" since the sets are mutually exclusive. It is therefore, by necessity, a claim that at least some properties possessed by the speaker do not belong (are excluded from membership of) the set {men}.

6. From 3), the term "woman" being a word, must have a public definition in order to be of use in discourse, since without a public meaning it conveys no information.

7. From 5) and 6) the statement "I am a woman" makes a public claim about the membership criteria of the set {men} and likewise the statement "I am a man" makes a public claim about the membership criteria of the set {women}.

Now, if you disagree with 7), could you please explain which of 1) to 6) you disagree with and why?

What is wrong with the definition of it that I provided in my last post. "it is proper courtesy for you to address me as a man because I feel like a man"? — Pseudonym

The problematic definition you have been arguing - or, at least, the continued problematic claim that you have been drawing from this - is that there is a connection between outward sex characteristics and/or chromosomes and how one feels inherent in the claim. You have repeated this several times. If you have withdrawn this and I missed it, I apologise. If you have not, then let me refresh you on the problem: if someone with XY chromosomes and a penis claims that they feel like a woman, it is inherent in this claim that these chromosomes and outward sex characteristics are not necessarily correlated with how people feel about their gender. If they did, then the claim would be impossible to make in the first place. So any part of your argument that attributes this to the transgender claim is incorrect.

So how are people's wishes not a psychological feature? — Pseudonym

Oh, I see - if that is way you are perceiving it, then yes, this is the way I am suggesting to address people.

Why have you changed the word "woman" to the word "she" — Pseudonym

I didn't know we were stuck on one over the other. We were talking about forms of address - that was the part of my post you were responding to when you mentioned the private language argument. I don't normally address anyone as "woman". But you can rephrase it - saying, "This woman is an idiot" doesn't say something about all women.

Of course if you say, "Women are idiots" you are going to be talking about all women - but the same is true of you say, "All Bills are idiots" about Bills.

If "not all women feel the same" as you claim. Then how can someone 'feel like a woman'? — Pseudonym

You think someone can only feel some way if there is a strict categorisation?

Anyway, I'm going to read what I think is your more thorough post and treat it as a bit of a reset, maybe.

1. Any statement which begins "I am a..." is a statement which claims membership of a set. — Pseudonym

I'm not 100% sure about this, but it might be determined by how you define sets. One alternative is the idea of a family resemblance, in which

things which could be thought to be connected by one essential common feature may in fact be connected by a series of overlapping similarities, where no one feature is common to all of the things.

2. Sets must exclude something in order to be meaningful. — Pseudonym

This relates to (1).

3. Words must have public meanings in order to be useful in discourse. — Pseudonym

True. But again, whether these public meanings are very strict or more fuzzy/family resemblance style definitions will affect the argument.

4. From 1), the term "woman" in common language is the name of a set since it is used in a sentence of the form "I am a..." and all such sentences are declarations of set membership. — Pseudonym

Again, I can see where you are coming from, but as you note, this relates to claim (1).

5. From 2), the expression "I am a woman" must be making an exclusory claim about the membership criteria of the set {women} because all sets must have exclusory criteria in order to be meaningful and the claim "I am a woman" is logically identical to the claim "I am not a man" since the sets are mutually exclusive. — Pseudonym

This is contested depending upon which conceptual framework of gender you subscribe to - there are binary, non-binary, and spectrum-based concepts of gender and sex,

6. From 3), the term "woman" being a word, must have a public definition in order to be of use in discourse, since without a public meaning it conveys no information. — Pseudonym

I mean, sure - but just as with a whole host of words, there is not one set definition is usage that all speakers agree upon at any one time. Language is constantly in evolution. There can be agreed upon meanings in certain circumstances that are strict (e.g. legal or academic definitions) but outside of that it is a bit fuzzy. I've seen a very elongated argument regarding whether a hotdog classifies as a sandwich or not, and a poll in which about half of respondents thought it was.

7. From 5) and 6) the statement "I am a woman" makes a public claim about the membership criteria of the set {men} and likewise the statement "I am a man" makes a public claim about the membership criteria of the set {women}. — Pseudonym

So I think you might follow where I disagree about this strict set membership concept that you set up early in point (1).

if someone with XY chromosomes and a penis claims that they feel like a woman, it is inherent in this claim that these chromosomes and outward sex characteristics are not necessarily correlated with how people feel about their gender. If they did, then the claim would be impossible to make in the first place. So any part of your argument that attributes this to the transgender claim is incorrect. — angslan

This suffers from the problem that most replies here seem to me to suffer from in that it begs the question. You're starting from a presumption that the trans claim must be coherent and then arguing that because my conclusions do not match the trans claim I must be wrong. But this relies on the unproven assumption that the trans claims are coherent. If they're not (as I believe they're not) then it is perfectly possible for me to start with a claim they would agree with, end up with a claim they would not agree with and yet still be correct about their claim. If my logic is valid and yet reaches a conclusion they would not agree with, then the original claim is at fault, not my conclusion.

Oh, I see - if that is way you are perceiving it, then yes, this is the way I am suggesting to address people. — angslan

So how does the midwife address the baby then, or the parent address the toddler? If you're suggesting we address people on the basis of psychological traits, then how do we address those whose psychological state we do not have access to (for lack of complex language, for example)? Or whose report of their psychological state we do not believe?

- saying, "This woman is an idiot" doesn't say something about all women.

Of course if you say, "Women are idiots" you are going to be talking about all women - but the same is true of you say, "All Bills are idiots" about Bills. — angslan

No, this is just ignoring grammar. The claim in the expression "I am a woman" is not "I am this woman" so the equivalent use is not "this woman is an idiot" it is "women are idiots". Likewise, you don't say "I am a Bill", you say "I am Bill" so the equivalent claim is "Bill is an idiot" not "all Bills are idiots". You can't just ignore the grammar and claim that an attribute of the statement "I am a woman" applies to the statement "this woman is..." because the word 'this' changes the whole meaning of the sentence.

You think someone can only feel some way if there is a strict categorisation? — angslan

No, someone can feel whatever way they want. This is about language. It's about how they correctly describe how they feel, not how they actually feel. Maybe this is another fundamental point of disagreement, but I think there are 'correct' ways to use words. Using the word 'thin' to describe something wider than average is an incorrect use of the word. You seem to be arguing that "woman" is a special word which has no incorrect use, which anyone (when applying it to themselves) is simply automatically using the term correctly. I don't understand how a word can be of any use at all if it's correct meaning is held privately.

So I think you might follow where I disagree about this strict set membership concept that you set up early in point (1). — angslan

Great, thanks for looking through all that. It does seem like the whole thing hinges on 1) as everything else stems from there. I have to go out for a while and so will post a response to your comment on 1) when I get back.

The statement does claim membership of a set.

What the statement does not claim is that others belong or are excluded from that set. In a person's feeling they are a women, they only have a sense they have their own womanhood. It doesn't suppose anyone else is (or is not) a woman.

Within this claim, there is nothing exclusionary because the womanhood they are referencing (if they have one/their feelings are accurate) is only their own. In declaring themselves to be a women, they don't suppose any restriction or exclusion about who is a woman. All they are sensing is they are a woman. It it is only an affirmation they belong to the set women. No definition or action or exclusion has been applied. They aren't claiming other people aren't women or cannot be women.

I'll have to get to the your long responses to me another time because I've got to get to bed.

Fair enough. I appreciate the exchange all the same.

Firstly, the truth of an identity isn't defined by a feeling. Feelings just report or do not report a turth of identity. Someone doesn't belong to an identity because they feel something, they have an identity and have feelings which reflect it or not. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I like how you put this here.

I suppose my focus on feelings was mostly due to the epistemological questions on identity, but I think it's fair to say one's identity isn't identical to feelings.

'm not 100% sure about this, but it might be determined by how you define sets. One alternative is the idea of a family resemblance, in which

things which could be thought to be connected by one essential common feature may in fact be connected by a series of overlapping similarities, where no one feature is common to all of the things. — angslan

Two things, firstly, the series of overlapping similarities is, crucially, a finite series. Wittgenstein is saying that no one feature is shared by all members of a set, but that all members will have one or more properties from a finite list of properties associated with the term. Secondly, the list of properties from which members need have only one must still be publicly available.

This is why I described the claim inherent in the expression "I am a..." as being only that your full set of properties are not incompatible with the set, not that you possess some property which is the essence of the set. Because the list of possible properties must be finite (in order for it to be a set at all (see 2)), a claim of set membership must imply the presence of properties for which it is possible to be absent and the absence of which would negate membership.

Basically, skip straight to 2) a set must exclude some properties which it is possible to posess otherwise it is not defining anything.

This is contested depending upon which conceptual framework of gender you subscribe to - there are binary, non-binary, and spectrum-based concepts of gender and sex, — angslan

OK, fair enough. If it is possible to be both a man and a woman, then it would be the case that claiming to be a woman would not (on its own) constitute a claim that such features as were being used to support such a claim could not also be the features of a man. But anyone who really genuinely believes that would have no cause to claim either and no cause to take offense if either term were used. Remember, taking offence (or any other strong emotional response) without rational cause is one of the psychological definitions of a delusion.

I mean, sure - but just as with a whole host of words, there is not one set definition is usage that all speakers agree upon at any one time. Language is constantly in evolution. There can be agreed upon meanings in certain circumstances that are strict (e.g. legal or academic definitions) but outside of that it is a bit fuzzy. I've seen a very elongated argument regarding whether a hotdog classifies as a sandwich or not, and a poll in which about half of respondents thought it was. — angslan

Absolutely. I completely agree, and this is the position that I've held all along. There are some language users who will define "woman" by physiological features, some who define it by psychological features and this is a normal part of language. The problem, for me, arises when one group tries to tell the other it's using the word 'wrong' and must change, or when one group has an inconsistent definition that it is impossible to use.

Yeah... I thought by stating the argument in stages you might actually engage with it rather than just restate things you'd like to be the case as if they were actually the case.

What the statement does not claim is that anyone else belong to that set. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Of course it does. Where on earth did they pluck the word "woman" from? If it's not already defining a set what is it doing in common language use? How do they even know what the word means? Are you suggesting they've never used the word "woman" before? If not, then how did they use it without knowing what it means? This is really just wishful garbage. Trans women know exactly what the word "woman" means and they want to be in that group, that's why they're so precious about people using the right terms, because it confers on them membership of a very clearly defined group to which they wish to belong. It really is psychology 101.

Within this claim, therein nothing exclusionary because the womanhood they are referencing (if they have one/their feelings are accurate) is only their own. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I've said before, it's not about what they're referencing, it's about the correct use of the term doing the referencing. If you are referencing a feeling unique to you (your womanhood), then "I am a woman" is simply grammaticaly incorrect. "I am a..." Is a statement about membership of a set. You yourself admitted this clearly. So "I am a woman" is a statement claiming membership of a set {women}. That means;

1. That there must exist a set {women}
2. That it must be possible to not be in that set (otherwise the statement is meaningless, everyone is a woman).
3. That the set pre-exists the statement about membership of it
4. That the person making the statement has some idea of what the membership criteria are (otherwise their statement is just speculation)

So the womanhood they are referencing cannot be just their own. As you have already stated, they are making a claim about membership of a set and in order for them to do that rationally, both the set and it's membership criteria must pre-exist the claim. One cannot rationally claim membership of a set defined by the claim one is making.

In declaring themselves to be a women, they don't suppose any restriction or exclusion about who is a woman. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No. But they suppose a restriction and exclusion about who can be a man. Not them. If no such claim is being made (ie, their particular set of feeling could be those of a man) then there is no rational cause to take offence if I refer to them as such.

As for Nagel -- Eh, it's just a manner of speaking. There are more tools in the toolbox than hammers, and not everything is a nail. My world-view is not architectonic, but piece-meal and always changing. — Moliere

What does this even mean? How is what Nagel is saying not applicable to the present discussion? This is so typical of you. You disagree, but you don't offer any clear explanation of how or why you disagree.

Your world-view is always changing? You say that, but in this thread, you have yet to show it.

What ruler would you accept with respect to determining anyone's identity? — Moliere

Does not your physical relationships and your physical differences determine your identity? Does not your relationship with your family make you a parent, grandparent, sibling, etc.? Does not your relationship to others make you a friend or co-worker? Does not your relationship with others make you married or single? Does not your differences from others species make you a human being? Does not your physical differences that enable you to participate in procreating your species make you a male/female (man/woman)? Does not your physical development determine whether you are and adult or a child?

Another question:
Do you admit that others can influence someone into believing that they are someone that they are not? For instance, do you agree that there are cases where parents treat their son as a girl, which then creates an expectation of norms the child must adhere to and adopts? In this case, the child is not choosing their identity. The child is given their identity, a false one, by their misguided parents.

Children don't choose their identity. They simply acquire and understanding of how they are suppose to behave based on the rewards and punishments they receive from their care-givers, and that influences how they view themselves later in life.

Just wanted to add in case it's of any use, that there is a possibility I can see that we have a set (let's call it {X}) for which the only membership criteria were 'wanting to be in set X'. This way there could exist a set with a publicly available meaning for which the statement "I am an X" would act both as statement of fact, and as its own justification. Someone could quite truthfully say "I am an X" for no other reason than they want to be, and no one could correctly refer to them without asking them first (or hearing about their desire from some other source).

Of course, the trouble with this is that the set would have to be voluntary (currently "women/men" is not, you are assigned one or the other at birth until you state otherwise). It could also carry any name at all, and that doesn't seem to be what trans people want, they specifically want the name of the gender that already exists, hence my doubting the sincerity of the explanation for their claims.

But since this is a philosophy forum, I thought I'd put it out there that I think such a set is philosophically possible.

The bigotry isn't a question of specific intention. It's in the very concepts Harry is using. In taking a position trans people are deluded, they's taken a position trans people are mistaken, trans identities aren't real and values they ought to be rejected in favour of "telling the truth."

It's simalir to if I were to say: "Anyone named Pseudonym was deluded in claiming to be a member of The Philosophy Forum. The person targeted is rejected, they are positioned as a danger to trust or respect, they are set-up as a target, etc. — TheWillowOfDarkness

That is not at all similar to what I'm saying. If you want to address what I've been saying, then READ what I've been saying.

There are cases where people are mistaken about their identity as a result of some physical defect, or psychological defect - like what results from your parents treating you like the opposite sex while they raised you. Take schizophrenics and anorexics. You don't seem to have a problem telling them that they are wrong, or mistaken about their identity or their bodies. You don't seem to have a problem questioning other's beliefs on this forum. I've been called a "hater" for questioning the beliefs of god-believers, so your tactics are no different than those who make claims and then engage in ad homimem attacks when those beliefs are questioned.

We should be able to question any claim, especially when it isn't consistent with our own experiences and especially when you cannot give a clear, consistent explanation of your argument and would rather commit ad hominem fallacies. Your line of thinking is what leads us down the road to authoritarianism.

In this topic, I don't understand why we ignore the brain and mind differences between biological male and female. By this I mean nothing complicated. A body equipped with a penis needs a brain/mind that can 'drive' it, while one with breasts and a womb needs slightly different 'drivers'. If a person is physically equipped one way, but their brain/mind is configured for the other way, there will be a mismatch. There is a real sense in which the brain/mind must match the physical configuration of the body, or the person concerned may (correctly!) feel that they are trapped in the wrong body. Is that not so? :chin:

What does this even mean? How is what Nagel is saying not applicable to the present discussion? — Harry Hindu

I see applicability, but I don't think that qualia is the best tactic for understanding identity. Nagel highlights the problem of consciousness, but I don't think the problem of consciousness elucidates interiority or identity as well as others. What I've been drawing from here is mostly Levinas's exposition on interiority in Totality and Infinity.

Does not your physical relationships and your physical differences determine your identity? Does not your relationship with your family make you a parent, grandparent, sibling, etc.? Does not your relationship to others make you a friend or co-worker? Does not your relationship with others make you married or single? Does not your differences from others species make you a human being? Does not your physical differences that enable you to participate in procreating your species make you a male/female (man/woman)? Does not your physical development determine whether you are and adult or a child? — Harry Hindu

So you'll accept something physical. That's what I'm gathering here. Yes? Some entity which, at least in principle, can be measured.

That's not what I have been proposing, so I guess my answer, in turn, is that these things do not determine identity. Physical relationships and physical differences do not determine identity. Your physical relationship in a family doesn't either. Your physical relationship with others doesn't determine identity with respect to marriage, friendship, or coworker-hood.

Species-hood, yes -- physical differences are what makes one a part of the species. And physical differences do not enable participation -- at least at the individual level -- in procreation, especially with human beings. Being a k-selected species makes it so that the purely physical facts don't stop an individual from participating in child-rearing, which is actually more prominent with humans than the mere facts of gestation.

And physical development only determines whether you are a physical child or physical adult. The transition from childhood to adulthood is determined by mental development and social structures -- so that adulthood can be gained as early as 13 or up to 18, in the legal sense. What counts as a mature person varies significantly, though the physical facts remain the same among persons.

Do you admit that others can influence someone into believing that they are someone that they are not? — Harry Hindu

Of course.

I also don't think identity is chosen. For anyone, really. The language of choice isn't appropriate here. Neither is the language of determinism. There is a mixture between creation and discovery when one sets out to know themselves. A libertarian identity just doesn't fit the facts -- we often are dealt a hand that we have to deal with, and we have to find out what that hand is. Determinism is also wrong for the simple fact that people change because they set out to change themselves. So there is a certain degree of autonomy involved, though it's not quite right to say that there is a choice involved too because we don't get to just say, hey, today I am [x] in the same manner that we might say, hey, today I'm going to the zoo.

I think that's basically what I have in mind, with the slight caveat that it would still be possible for such a statement to be false. A person could, for instance, perceive some benefit to being perceived as X without feeling like they are X, and lie about it -- to either others or themselves.

But, on the whole, I think such cases are fringe.

Because it's not simple and not settled. http://www.pnas.org/content/112/50/15468 is a study I came across in the google-verse. There are others I had read that argue that there is a difference, too.

↪Pattern-chaser
Because it's not simple and not settled. — Moliere

It's not settled that there are differences in the brains/minds of males and females, associated with their biological differences? I think it is. I don't assert any specific difference, only that these differences exist, yes? And if they do, the possibility exists for the brain/mind to be 'misaligned' with the rest of the body, in the particular respect of this topic, yes? :chin:

We're close then, but I don't see how to concede that one could be mistaken about a wish to be part of a group the only membership criteria for which was 'wanting to be a member of that group'. I suppose one's decision would be made mainly on how much one wanted to be associated with the other members. I could conceive of someone wanting to be part of that group but later deciding against it, but they wouldn't be mistaken (at the time) just have changed their minds. I suppose if you were to take a view that our preferences are fixed and so if you think they are one thing one day and decide against it the next, one of those feelings has to be wrong, but you still wouldn't know which one.

But the main caveat, with respect to this actual thread is that I've seen no evidence at all that this is the claim trans people are making, so it's just a theoretical possibility, rather than an actual solution. Trans people (as far as I can tell) are not saying that they want to be part of a group whose only membership criteria is wanting to be a member of the group. They're quite clearly saying that they want to be a member of that exact group and for reasons which they are indisputabley born with but refuse to actually specify.

I don't assert any specific difference, only that these differences exist, yes? — Pattern-chaser

If they exist you should be able to assert what they are. How can something biological exist but defy definition?

I guess my thinking goes like this -- because I am not a member of the group this is what it would appear to me to be a part of the group. I don't have that interior experience or need. So while it is likely there is more to it, this is about as far as the public criteria could go. The "something more" appears to me to be semi-public -- in that it requires having experienced such and such in order to be able to make reasonable inferences, theories, or conversations on such an identity.

Think about describing some mature, adult experience to a child that hasn't experienced it yet. You may be able to get a gist across, some kind of analogy or something -- but there is simply something missing from the child's knowledge that they won't have until they experience it.

If they exist you should be able to assert what they are. How can something biological exist but defy definition? — Pseudonym

I don't think these things defy definition. But I don't know enough about the biology involved even to hazard a guess. The fault is mine. I believe that human bodies are adapted to their sexual/gender differences because I can't see that one, er, configuration could adequately deal with both. Am I wrong? :chin:

Yeah, definitely. I imagine that it what the trans experience might be like, something I simply can't understand because the feelings are outside of my experience. But I don't tend to see it as mysterious so much as just like some people want to be Goths and I don't understand that either. What I don't like is the deifying of it beyond that which there is good reason to believe it to be. People state strong desires to be part of social groups. Some of the stories I've read in my research about the extents to which people will go to be part of the social group to which they wish to belong are seriously shocking. And this applies to cults and gangs as much as religion, so I see absolutely nothing to dissuade me from the simplest explanation that trans women are simply men who want to join the 'women' group. I know some have argued that they've got to be taken more seriously because they're literally prepared to undergo surgery to become a woman, but people cut their own fingers off to join gangs, they mutilate themselves to be part of religious cults, the desire to be part of a group is hellish strong.

I don't think these things defy definition. But I don't know enough about the biology involved even to hazard a guess. The fault is mine. I believe that human bodies are adapted to their sexual/gender differences because I can't see that one, er, configuration could adequately deal with both. Am I wrong? :chin: — Pattern-chaser

Well, I don't know enough about biology either. Personally I'm with you on this. My default position in the absence of evidence to the contrary is that it would require a slightly different brain to 'run' a female body than to 'run' a male one. But brains are so malleable I doubt this would do anything but provide general trends and could easily be overridden by culture, or even just other desires.

I guess part of what makes the notion of a trans identity easier for me to accept, or has made it easier to accept for me (because I didn't always think like this ,either) is my environment. I work in a pretty LGBTQ friendly workplace, and there are quite a few trans individuals that are my coworkers. I'm not presently politically active, but when I was my politics put me in direct contact with trans individuals in a similar basis -- on an equal plane, as comrades and coworkers working together. And while I think your explanation may fit for some people, I don't think it would fit for all the trans persons I've been in contact with. Additionally I tend to believe in taking people's word at face value, absent any other sort of basis of inference. So in a way safe spaces, trans identity, and all that has become something of a second nature for me just over time, and given that I trust trans people when they talk about other aspects of their identity it would be somewhat strange for myself to distrust them on something so basic as their gender-identity, at least on default, when I trust other men and women when they speak about their gender-identity without much more evidence than them saying so.

But I can't deny your possibility, either. It is possible. It's just not my default belief.

If it is possible to be both a man and a woman, then it would be the case that claiming to be a woman would not (on its own) constitute a claim that such features as were being used to support such a claim could not also be the features of a man. But anyone who really genuinely believes that would have no cause to claim either and no cause to take offense if either term were used. — Pseudonym

I am trying to grasp the grammar of your first sentence as clearly as possible, and I am having a little difficulty. I think this is unfortunate, because this seems like an important statement. Is there another way to phrase it that might help me out more?

It does make me wonder what you think of intersex people who claim male or female gender identity?

I am surprised at the claim that no offence should logically be taken - you rejected that idea for feminists who claim that addressing trans people compromises or threatens their own gender identity.

Remember, taking offence (or any other strong emotional response) without rational cause is one of the psychological definitions of a delusion. — Pseudonym

I strongly feel that you should leave this part out of your arguments for the moment - this is a whole nother can of worms to debate whether this technically constitutes a delusion or not. The DSM does not consider gender dysphoria, for example, a delusion. What it does do it start to sound like some sort of attack against trans people, which I think is going to cloud your argument.

The problem, for me, arises when one group tries to tell the other it's using the word 'wrong' and must change — Pseudonym

This is why my argument engaged with respect in forms of address and not the universal application of words. None of these words are unique in their variability across times and places and people.

or when one group has an inconsistent definition that it is impossible to use. — Pseudonym

Again, when related to forms of address, there are two consistent ways to apply this. We need not sort out the ultimate definitions of the words. Earlier you spoke about "relative harms", which is the type of subject I began engaging you with, and I proposed a framework where interiority, subjectivity and identity were respected in forms of address (and you could extend this to treatment in general). I've no particular concern to determine if there is truly cohesive, universally acceptable use of any of these words. I don't think either group uses them generally inconsistently or incoherently, though they certainly do not agree with each other. And I think that any strict definition is going to land someone in a logical quagmire where some level of coherency falls apart when using strict definitions to make claims.

Is this discussion about language? Or relative harms? How to treat each other? Or whether trans people are delusional?

And while I think your explanation may fit for some people, I don't think it would fit for all the trans persons I've been in contact with. — Moliere

I understand that you need an explanation which fits with your experience. As I say, I'm not trying to push a particular explanation, I'm trying to argue against the insistence that one particular theory is adopted wholesale whilst there are some who quite legitimately disagree with it. Personally, my experience is limited to a friend's dad who, one day, was dressed like a woman and referred to as such. No explanation was given, and just referred to 'him' as 'her' like everyone else was doing, and still do. I don't mind at all. What I do mind is the insistence of one world-view on groups who do care one way or the other, for perfectly rational reasons.

I tend to believe in taking people's word at face value, absent any other sort of basis of inference. — Moliere

You see this is part of the problem. "...absent any other sort of basis of inference" is entirely subjective, and essentially ends up meaning that you believe only those people you choose to believe. You, like anyone else, will be guided by cultural expectations and group dynamics as to what to find acceptable inferences to the contrary. If your daughter (hypothetically) came up to you and said "I really need to go to the Justin Beiber concert, you don't know how much he means to me, I really feel a deep connection to his work" I very much doubt you would take her word at face value and fork out for the concert tickets above all other calls on your finances. You'd presume that this was nothing but teenage infatuation with the latest famous singer, you'd assume you had some 'other basis of inference'. If someone said they can read your future and you should not go to work tomorrow because something bad will happen, you do not take their word at face value, again, the fact that you live in a world without future-readers means that you think you have some 'other basis of inference'. I've just expounded a perfectly rational theory, supported by at least some evidence, as to why trans people might make the claims they do. A theory which you admit is at least possible. You definitely now do have some 'other basis of inference', but you've decided it's not good enough to dismiss the claims you hear, that's fine, in itself, but one has to then allow that others might reach a different conclusion because the matter is highly subjective. It doesn't make anyone intolerant.