Is it rather the case that one can have a preference for taking on the roll of a man, or the roll of a woman, despite one's physique? — Banno

This is the case.

The crux of this thread's issue results from direct equivocation between terms (is and ought mostly)

Depending on how we use the term "gender" in any specific context, it points to different things: Sometimes it's the sociosexual role that an individual believes they ought to be, and therefore "are/is" deep down. Other times gender refers only to appearance (e.g: a drag queen in drag is a she when in drag). Still other times "gender" refers strictly to genitalia, and in the most rigid possible sense refers to one's chromosomes.

One side of this discussion is perpetually focused on gender as a kind of objective teleological/ontic category with necessary attributes, the objectively common causes of gender; the is' (chromosomes or genitals), while the other is focused on how gender expresses itself dynamically and with variability (social roles, hormonal disposition, and self-identification).

If none of us used the word gender and instead just said what we meant in that instance, there would be no disagreements:

A person with XX chromosomes will never know for certain exactly what life would have been like with XY chromosomes instead, but people want what they want regardless of how well informed they can be on the subject of their desires. A person with XX chromosomes can however experience the ramifications of hormones at levels typically found in individuals with XY chromosomes (some people are genetic/epigenetic/natural outliers and hormone therapy is available). A person with XX chromosomes can also have a good understanding of what the social/sexual roles typically associated with XY chromosomes are: they can observe them readily and try them out for themselves. A person with XX chromosomes can have an idea of what it would be like to have the genitalia associated with XY chromosomes, and they can be displeased with their own genitals, which doesn't make it completely unreasonable that a sex change operation could help treat associated dysphoria. A person with XX chromosomes can have a fairly informed desire to adopt the roles and attributes typically associated with XY chromosomes (and vice versa), and so if we go by a holistic definition of "gender", which would include genitals, social roles, physical attributes, and intent/self-identification (and perhaps chromosomes) then we wind up with a confusing spectra of many variables.

If we go by physical attributes (including genitalia) and sociosexual roles then people can objectively transition between genders (even against their will I should say). If we go by chromosomes alone then nobody has ever transitioned, and if we include it in a holistic definition, transgender individuals can be said to have the chromosomes of one gender, and the perhaps everything else of the (an?) other.

To show how breakable the present level of care given to these distinctions is, consider the following:

If absolutely everything about someone conformed to the opposite gender except for their chromosomes, how meaningful is it to base the definition of gender upon only chromosomes?

If we invented genetic therapy that could rewrite all of our cells to conform to the opposite gender, would there be any meaningful distinction left?

If I surreptitiously inject you with a vial of chromosome altering enzymes, but you for the most part retain your physique and attributes, would you actually be the opposite gender despite believing and living as though you are still the same?

One side derives an ought from an is (you were born X, are chromosomally X, therefore you ought to be X).

The other side derives an is from an ought (a want) (you ought to be X, are behaviorally/hormonally X, therefore you is X.

The solution is to realize that X means different things.

That's helpful. Thanks.

Especially the last two paragraphs. Thinking...

From a Jungian approach, I say it is absolutely correct that all people withold the same psychical capacities and constitutions. We receieve our genetics from both xy and xx organisms, thus our psyche is constituted of what is androgynous.

Gender is an objective demarcation, but consciousness is impoverished in these concepts; the richness is within the unconscious, in making oneself conscious of who or what they want to be, and what they themselves think something is--not with regard to impersonal definitions.

"The only truth is the individual." C G Jung
@Banno

One might consider it crucially important to one's world-view that proper names are bestowed by parents, not the person themselves. In that case, it would be imposing on that person's world-view for Mary to demand of them that they now refer to her as Molly. — Pseudonym

Sure, and it might be part of someone's worldview that black people are lesser than white people, should fulfil an appropriate role in society as slaves, and should be addressed as "nigger" - but we don't always accede to the worldviews of others. I think that your line of thinking justifies all sorts of hateful or bigoted forms of address, whether that was your intention or not.

There are cases of forms of address that are inappropriate, and there are also cases where it is wildly inaccurate, and there are other cases that are neither. Picking them apart is a big part of the question we're discussing. But it is not as simple as saying, "Here is an example of a worldview that justifies x" because not all arguments are on the same footing here.

Part of this question might be about respect for others - both in a general, politeness sense, as well as more fundamental empathetic sense. When we treat others as objects, we can treat them exactly how we perceive them with an ignorance of their personhood - an assertion that who they is totally defined by us and not by them, and that our interiority is superior to theirs, so that our definitions of who they are is total. When we treat others as objects, then, we can justify referring to them any way we please that suits our worldview. But when we treat others as people, we are compelled to take into account their own interiority, and the smallest acknowledgement of that is respect for how they wish to be treated in forms of address.

I feel like there is a "slippery slope" here somewhere that you are angling towards, where we might have to acknowledge other types of claims apart from gender? And that perhaps we will not be able to reasonably assess the authenticity or potential future harm of all these claims?

Maybe by discussion, maybe by some compromise. What it wouldn't be resolved by is making it an act of violent bigotry against Mary simply to have (and wish to express in one's language) the world-view that names should be given by parents. — Pseudonym

I think this confuses the type of discussion we are having now with the practicalities of everyday life - we expect that murder is wrong without requiring that assailant and victim have a philosophical discussion and some sort of compromise first, but we are fully accepting of philosophical discussions such as this one here to occur regarding the justification of murder in various circumstances.

Also, in the manner you are describing here -- in the hypothetical -- you're making the dispute about meaning, it seems to me. Where the argument is over the proper, right, or true meaning of the term "woman". So what we have is two people talking past one another. — Moliere

No, that's not really what I'm saying. I don't think there is a right meaning of the term "woman". It means different things to different people, and probably different things in different contexts too. What I'm arguing about is very simply that the effect on your identity of having a word used about you (which is what the trans movement are broadly concerned about in this regard), is no greater than the effect of using a word about someone on the identity of the speaker. They both mean something about the identity of both the speaker and the one being addressed, and there's no acknowledgement of this in the debate at all, it's all about the feelings of the person being addressed as if the act of speaking had no effect at all. Since our entire world-view is constructed from (or at least contained within) the language we use, I find that position disingenuous.

So I'd say the question here turns on one, how do we determine the personal identity, like the case of the pluviophile, of others?, and two, what is appropriate in such determinations? In short form my answer is: by asking to the former question and listening to the latter question. And that naturally leads me to say that Jane, formally called John, is in the right above, whereas Mary is in the wrong. Mary can say "I am a woman", just as Jane can say "I am a woman" -- and if they listened to one another they would both be able to express their identity and understand where they are coming from. — Moliere

Again, this misses the point of language. No-one is denying John/Jane's feelings that they are "something he refers to as a 'woman'. The feelings are not in question. What's in question is the use of the word to describe them. Mary's meaning of the word 'Woman' does not describe feelings of any sort, it describe a chromosomal arrangement. It would be like if John said "I feel like 16 centimetres". 16 centimetres is a unit of measurement, not a thing one can feel like, but John can't be mistaken about his feelings, we must take them as being true (for him) so the only conclusion we can draw is that he feels like something which he describes as 16cm, but which we wouldn't describe that way.

To use your pluviophile example, it would not have anything to do with the validity of you experience of rain, and yes, we might well treat you differently on knowing your affinity for it. It would be the equivalent of you saying that you were rain, and we thinking well 'rain' to me is the wet stuff that comes from the clouds so you can't actually be 'rain' to me, you must in my language mean that you are like rain, or that you feel a great affinity for it, or something like that. I could ask you more about your feelings and get a closer picture, then re-describe it in my language as best I can.

Transgender individuals being treated in accord with their gender-identity does not erase the very real struggles of women, or the identities of women. — Moliere

Many feminists disagree strongly, and I understand their arguments. Women have been oppressed for hundreds of years on basis of nothing else but having been born a woman. Not on the basis of feeling like a woman, not on the basis of wearing dresses and having long hair, not even on the basis of sexual organs (since having them removed does not automatically confer equal treatment with men). On the basis of being born a woman. So what other people who are born a woman feel solidarity for and identify with are the group {people who are born a woman} and they have a name for members of that group - "women". It's important to them that they get to identify this group somehow, that they are allowed to give it a name. I don't suppose they much care what name they give it, just a name. Someone who would describe their psychological state as "feeling like a woman" is not a member of this group. A person born a man can secretly "feel like a woman" and still be treated as equal with other men. A person born a woman cannot secretly (or otherwise) "feel like a man" and be treated equally to other men. She is discriminated against solely because she was born a woman. I don't know how much you know about the psychology of surviving discrimination, but (I'll put this in bold so that it might finally get noticed) it is vitally important to the mental health of discriminated groups that they are able to identify with and show solidarity with other members of the same group. The group that is being discriminated against in this case is {people who are born a woman} and requiring that Mary use the term "woman" to describe anyone who "feels like" they're a woman, is taking away her ability to identify the group she feels most solidarity for. It really damaging to her mental health.

Not only that (although that would be enough). A massive part of the feminist struggle has been to have it recognised that being born a woman carries with it absolutely no further constraints or identifying features. That there is nothing more to being a woman that your chromosomes. Again, asking her to use the same term that is used to describe her to describe someone who "feels like a woman" is asking her to acknowledge that they belong in the same group, that's what nouns do, they identify groups by similarities. All things in the group "woman" must have similar features which define them. Mary does not want to be defined by anything that someone could feel, so why should she be forced to change her definition for the group she's naming "women". Her definition of that group is people born a woman (as in people born with XX chromosomes, or more likely those whose outward appearance would suggest such). John does not belong in that group, by her definition, and her definition is very important to her because it means no-one can tell her how she feels just because of the sex she was born. Calling John a "woman" deprives her of her term for this group, and so deprives her of a vitally important part of who she is.

Sure, and it might be part of someone's worldview that black people are lesser than white people, should fulfil an appropriate role in society as slaves, and should be addressed as "nigger" - but we don't always accede to the worldviews of others. I think that your line of thinking justifies all sorts of hateful or bigoted forms of address, whether that was your intention or not. — angslan

No, we assess the harms that such a worldview might cause and come to some appropriate social consensus on their expression. So can you point to the assessment that's being carried out here of the harms? Because all I read is an assertion that trans people must be called by their preferred terms, not a discussion about the relative harms. No-one has written a single word in answer to the issue I raised about the meaning of the term 'woman' to some feminists and the harm that taking away that meaning might cause them.

Calling someone a "nigger" is actively designed to insult them. It's not a noun passively describing a group, there's already several terms for that group "Black people", "Afro-Caribbeans". The term "nigger" is an insult and always has been. To liken it to feminists wishing to reserve the term "woman" to define that set of people who were born with two x chromosomes, is utterly ridiculous. "woman" is not intended to be an insult.

When we treat others as objects, we can treat them exactly how we perceive them with an ignorance of their personhood - an assertion that who they is totally defined by us and not by them, and that our interiority is superior to theirs, so that our definitions of who they are is total. — angslan

This does not follow at all. What trans men (for example) are asking is that the same term applied to people born with two x chromosomes is applied to people who feel a way they would describe as "like a woman". It is exactly "an assertion that who they is totally defined by us and not by them". It is an assertion that the sets {those born with two x chromosomes} and {those who have a feeling they would describe as "like a woman"} are the same, or similar enough to share the same defining term and most importantly, are so similar that they do not even need their own individual defining terms. How is that not imposing a definition on who women are? It is literally saying that all people born with two x chromosomes are in some significant way the same as all people who have a feeling they would describe as "like a woman". That is imposing a definition on all people who are born with two x chromosomes.

I think this confuses the type of discussion we are having now with the practicalities of everyday life - we expect that murder is wrong without requiring that assailant and victim have a philosophical discussion and some sort of compromise first, but we are fully accepting of philosophical discussions such as this one here to occur regarding the justification of murder in various circumstances. — angslan

I don't understand the point you're making here. We expect that murder is wrong because we all already agree that it is. All we might be interested in, from an ethical point of view, is why it's wrong. It is evident that we do not yet all agree that using a person's preferred terms is right or wrong, so that discussion needs to be had.

No, we assess the harms that such a worldview might cause and come to some appropriate social consensus on their expression. So can you point to the assessment that's being carried out here of the harms? Because all I read is an assertion that trans people must be called by their preferred terms, not a discussion about the relative harms. No-one has written a single word in answer to the issue I raised about the meaning of the term 'woman' to some feminists and the harm that taking away that meaning might cause them.

Calling someone a "nigger" is actively designed to insult them. It's not a noun passively describing a group — Pseudonym

I just want to try and unpick some of the context of the argument here. If Mary prefers to be called Molly, you assert that there are potentially people who might find it crucially important to their world-view to call someone by the name that their parents have given them. I suggested that this was not a universal argument, as do not accept that it is universally appropriate to call someone "nigger" (or "bitch" or anything else). I think that part of your counterpoint here is that these terms might be "actively designed to insult" - but I can't help but note that this is a value-judgement that may not be shared by those using them, who might believe them appropriate terms. So I'm not convinced that this response is on target. It ignores, too, the fact that if someone addresses someone by a term that they know will cause upset or distress, then they are actively insulting them. So in either case, this does not seem to be a valid argument.

In terms of harms - this has definitely been raised. But perhaps no one has quantified the harm of being called by an inappropriate pronoun compared to the harm of "taking away" the definition of a word for some groups of feminists. (Not, of course, that the definition of a word can be "taken away" - if there is nonsense in this thread, this is it.) I am not sure how you would go about quantifying that harm. Would you add up the number of feminists who adhere to this definition and compare it to the number of people who do not, or what? Within feminist academia there is disagreement on this, so it hardly seems as if, at least on a level of theory, we are suggesting that we close off this set of terms to a strict set of definitions on the grounds of harm, lest we shut down the potential for discussion on this very issue.

I did raise the harm of denying personhood and interiority and treating people as objects - I may not have described this as a harm (which I hope has not confused you) because it seems self-evident to me that this is a harm.

What trans men (for example) are asking is that the same term applied to people born with two x chromosomes is applied to people who feel a way they would describe as "like a woman". It is exactly "an assertion that who they is totally defined by us and not by them". It is an assertion that the sets {those born with two x chromosomes} and {those who have a feeling they would describe as "like a woman"} are the same, or similar enough to share the same defining term and most importantly, are so similar that they do not even need their own individual defining terms. How is that not imposing a definition on who women are? It is literally saying that all people born with two x chromosomes are in some significant way the same as all people who have a feeling they would describe as "like a woman". — Pseudonym

I assume by trans-man you mean male-to-female? Of course this is nonsense - such a suggestion obliterates the logical possibility of female-to-male. And that is only within a narrow scope that is causes such problems; any theory of non-binary genders beyond this is also rendered impossible by your argument. And yet, of course, you recognise that these claims exist (thus our participation in this thread). So I think you would have to note that this formulation is wrong.

I don't understand the point you're making here. — Pseudonym

I'm simply saying that an appeal to discourse as a resolution is redundant, because that is what we are participating in. I am hoping you are not asserting that each and every time we encounter a trans person in the world we need to start the discourse afresh.

I can't help but note that this is a value-judgement that may not be shared by those using them, who might them appropriate terms. So I'm not convinced that this response is on target. It ignores, too, the fact that if someone addresses someone by a term that they know will cause upset or distress, then they are actively insulting them. So in either case, this does not seem to be a valid argument. — angslan

I've not denied its a value judgement, I've expressly said that society reaches some general consensus on the matter entirely because it is a value judgement. The point of labelling it an insult is to point out that it is an alternative term for a group already defined. No one is disagreeing about what defines that group. So, if the additional term is not necessary, and is used almost exclusively by people who have a negative view of the group it describes, is it really too much of leap to suggest that in the vast majority of cases it's being used as an insult?

None of these factors are true of calling a biological man a "man" as opposed to his preferred term "woman". There is no available alternative term to describe those born with two X chromosomes, so people using the term that way aren't obviously doing so with the intention to insult, they have no choice, there's no other term to use. The term "woman" to describe those born with two X chromosomes is also not used by a group with universally negative views of transgender people.

So,in the case of "nigger" there is a clear alternative word and the term is used almost exclusively by those who hold negative views about the group it defines. Maybe not 100% proof, but certainly enough evidence to go on that it's probably an insult.
In the case of using the term "woman" to describe those born with two X chromosomes, even if the person being addressed feels like they are a man, has no alternative word and is not used exclusively by those with a negative view of people who feel like they are a man. So there's very little reason to think its an insult.

Hence, there's good reason to ban the use of the term "nigger" (its most likely to be meant as an insult, and there are alternatives available to describe that group). There's not similar good reason to ban the use of the term "woman" to describe those born with two X chromosomes (its not most likely meant as an insult, and there are no alternative words available to describe that group)

I am not sure how you would go about quantifying that harm. — angslan

If you're not sure how to quantify harms, then how have you reached the conclusion that people ought to be called by their preferred term? If you've not derived the 'ought' from minimising harm, where have you got it from?

I did raise the harm of denying personhood and interiority and treating people as objects - I may not have described this as a harm (which I hope has not confused you) because it seems self-evident to me that this is a harm. — angslan

Yes, and you seem to have ignored my arguments that insisting on the agreement (by language use) that there is such a thing as something it 'feels like' to be woman is equally imposing properties of personhood on someone born a women who may not wish to have herself defined that way.

I assume by trans-man you mean male-to-female? Of course this is nonsense - such a suggestion obliterates the logical possibility of female-to-male. And that is only within a narrow scope that is causes such problems; any theory of non-binary genders beyond this is also rendered impossible by your argument. And yet, of course, you recognise that these claims exist (thus our participation in this thread). So I think you would have to note that this formulation is wrong. — angslan

I don't understand what you are saying here at all. I may have got the terminology wrong. By 'trans man' in the quote you cited I meant someone who is born a man but has a feeling they would describe as 'like woman'. Is that the wrong way round. If so, my apologies, please re-read the section with whatever the correct term is.

I'm simply saying that an appeal to discourse as a resolution is redundant, because that is what we are participating in. — angslan

You and I have different definitions of discourse. Mine involves a to-and-fro analysis of arguments. What we had here was one side declaring what is 'right' and dismissing anything the other side had to say as intolerant bigotry. That's not what I call 'discourse'. Fortunately we seem to be past that now, so yes, what we are currently doing is exactly what I mean, not that we replicate this with each individual.

The point of labelling it an insult is to point out that it is an alternative term for a group already defined. — Pseudonym

That's a strange, narrow way to think about insults - usually insults are used when they are going to be taken negatively by the recipient, not just because they are "alternative".

If you're not sure how to quantify harms, then how have you reached the conclusion that people ought to be called by their preferred term? If you've not derived the 'ought' from minimising harm, where have you got it from? — Pseudonym

There's a difference between "relative harm" (as you have framed it) and other principles regarding harm. I've definitely suggested that treating others as having interiority avoids certain principles of harm. What I haven't done is compare the relative amounts of harm.

Yes, and you seem to have ignored my arguments that insisting on the agreement (by language use) that there is such a thing as something it 'feels like' to be woman is equally imposing properties of personhood on someone born a women who may not wish to have herself defined that way. — Pseudonym

If a woman calls someone a "she", in no way does it define the speaker. This is akin to the argument that gay marriage somehow substantively affects straight marriage, even though none of the qualities of the marriage have changed at all. Moreover, respect of address doesn't even imply that the speaker has to agree that it is not some other category.

I don't understand what you are saying here at all. I may have got the terminology wrong. By 'trans man' in the quote you cited I meant someone who is born a man but has a feeling they would describe as 'like woman'. Is that the wrong way round. If so, my apologies, please re-read the section with whatever the correct term is. — Pseudonym

The point is this - male-to-females do not say that

the sets {those born with two x chromosomes} and {those who have a feeling they would describe as "like a woman"} are the same — Pseudonym

You need to throw out this line of thinking and this assertion. Transgender people are specifically suggesting that chromosomes and gender-identity are not correlated in such a way. If they were, no one could be transgender! Your basis for the claims of transgender people is one that is incompatible with the fundamental point of their claims. In fact, their claim is specifically the opposite.

You and I have different definitions of discourse. Mine involves a to-and-fro analysis of arguments. — Pseudonym

You don't think people have provided an analysis of your arguments?

That's a strange, narrow way to think about insults - usually insults are used when they are going to be taken negatively by the recipient, not just because they are "alternative". — angslan

Why have you cherry-picked this one property of terms used as an insult and argued against it as if it were the only property I ascribe? I've talked about a number of other properties shared by terms used as insults (they're usually used by groups who hold a negative opinion of the group they're describing, for example). At no point did I even imply that this was the only, or indeed, most important property of insulting terms. I'm simply saying that that in order to constitute an insulting term there must be an alternative term available to describe that group. If there's no alternative how can the person using the term possibly be accused of doing so with the intent to insult. If the term "woman" is going to mean {anyone who has feelings they personally would describe as being "like a woman"}, then what alternative term is available to somebody wishing to define the group {people who were born with two X chromosomes}? If there is no alternative, then how can it be an insult to use the term that way?

What I haven't done is compare the relative amounts of harm. — angslan

You may not have done, but my original comments were not directed at you, they were directed at those who considered the matter settled, that we should definitely address people by the gender terms they prefer. That implies that the weighing has already taken place (or they just don't care about the harms to others).

If a woman calls someone a "she", in no way does it define the speaker. — angslan

How are you so sure on this? The way we use language defines us. As I said in an earlier post, many intelligent thinkers have concluded that it is not even possible to have advanced thought like identity and personhood without language, so it's completely unwarranted for you to simply assert that it has no impact on defining the user. Words 'mean' something, that's their whole point. That means they 'mean' something to the speaker, not just the listener.

This is akin to the argument that gay marriage somehow substantively affects straight marriage, even though none of the qualities of the marriage have changed at all. — angslan

Gay marriage does affect straight marriage. It means that 'marriage' no longer refers to an act of union under God between a man and a woman. That's a positive change in my opinion but its ludicrous to suggest it didn't change anything.

Transgender people are specifically suggesting that chromosomes and gender-identity are not correlated in such a way. — angslan

So why are they asking that a term previously used to describe {people who, by appearances, were born with two X chromosomes} now also describe {people who have a feeling they describe as being "like a woman"}. If they're not making a claim that the two are the same, then why would they want to use the same word to describe both. This is not common language use. We commonly group thing under the same defining word because they share characteristics. Or are they simply wanting to appropriate the word entirely to only mean {people who have a feeling they describe as being "like a woman"}? If so, how are we to describe babies or toddlers, are we to ask them how they feel before addressing them? And what alternative word is being proposed to describe {people born with two X chromosomes}?

Trans people may believe they're not making this assertion, that doesn't mean they're not.

You don't think people have provided an analysis of your arguments? — angslan

Not really no, I think people have just ignored the bits they don't have an answer to, stopped responding altogether when faced with a difficult questions and maintained their belief entirely without modification regardless of the arguments to the contrary, but I wasn't really expecting anything else. Some discussions I engage in to be part of the debate, but most I engage in to help sort my own ideas out (or just for fun) neither of the last two require anything of the other participants.

There may not be a point to you -- but it would be foolish to believe that there is no such distinction. And, in fact, the distinction is very important to some people. — Moliere

I never said there wasn't a distinction. I said that the distinction lies in the boundaries between cultures, not between sex/gender.

I conflate sex/gender precisely because you have yet to establish a real, objective distinction between them. All you do is keep going around in circles.

Well, this is where I pointed out that there are facts to the matter with Jesus, and you then said there are facts of the matter to gender -- but then proceeded to conflate sex with gender with gender-identity on the basis of, what I take from your above, that there was "no point" to these distinctions, and that I was offering something too vague for your taste -- that my view was "incoherent" on that basis. — Moliere

Come on, Moliere. It is really difficult to have a discussion with someone who can't stay focused.

You said :

Just to highlight -- feelings are the arbiters of truth with respect to identity, not all beliefs. — Moliere

The point I made about the person who believes that they are Jesus is that feelings are the arbiters of truth with respect to identity. Obviously, feelings with respect to identity can be wrong. So, feelings cannot be the arbiters of truth with respect to identity. Logic and reason are the only arbiters of truth, and you have yet to be reasonable or logical in this discussion.

Not only that, but in the same post, you said:

It seems to me that you don't see a difference between feelings and beliefs. Before I said there is a difference between feelings and claims. There is a difference between feelings and beliefs as well. — Moliere

So, at first you said that there is a difference between feelings and beliefs, yet when you added your highlight, you conflated them - a contradiction. Stop contradicting yourself so that we can actually have a meaningful conversation.

If a man claims to feel like a woman, how does he know what being a a woman feels like, and why would they need hormone therapy to feel like a woman? It all comes down to what Nagel described as "what it feels like". It is strange to see this well-known philosophical explanation of Nagel's is not being used in this discussion.

In his article, “What is it like to be a bat?” Thomas Nagel argues that there are facts about the conscious experience that are subjective and can only be known from that subjective perspective. Even if we know all the objective facts about bats, we may not actually know what it would really be like to be a bat. We might be able to imagine what it would be like to hang upside down, fly through the night, or use echolocation to track prey, but Nagel argues that we really couldn’t know what a bat’s experience is really like.

So, do transgenders actually feel like the opposite sex, or are they simply imagining what it is like, and want that and then go through the steps to acquire it (hormone therapy), so that they actually get some sense of what it does feel like, rather than just imagine what it feels like?

Not only that, but many of the people in this thread have argued FOR Nagel's idea in other threads, yet reject that in this thread. Take a long hard look at your worldview, people. It needs to be consistent across the board.

Why have you cherry-picked this one property of terms used as an insult and argued against it as if it were the only property I ascribe? — Pseudonym

I didn't say it was the only property you ascribed, but I thought you made it sound like a necessary property, as you have repeated:

If there's no alternative how can the person using the term possibly be accused of doing so with the intent to insult. — Pseudonym

I don't think it needs to be part of the definition. Anyone can invent any category of people and make an insulting term for them, without regard to whether it is necessary to have such a category - it need not be an alternative term to a proper category. But this part of the conversation is getting pedantic and beside the point - let's stick to the interesting stuff.

How are you so sure on this? The way we use language defines us. As I said in an earlier post, many intelligent thinkers have concluded that it is not even possible to have advanced thought like identity and personhood without language, so it's completely unwarranted for you to simply assert that it has no impact on defining the user. Words 'mean' something, that's their whole point. That means they 'mean' something to the speaker, not just the listener. — Pseudonym

I don't think that someone who is confident in their identity is going to be confused about who they are by how they address someone else.

Gay marriage does affect straight marriage. It means that 'marriage' no longer refers to an act of union under God between a man and a woman. — Pseudonym

It didn't mean that beforehand. And your description contains absolutely no change in straight marriage. A man and a woman who were in a union under God before gay marriage are still a man and a woman in a union under God after gay marriage - unless one of them changed sex or gender or the change in definition literally obliterated God.

So why are they asking that a term previously used to describe {people who, by appearances, were born with two X chromosomes} now also describe {people who have a feeling they describe as being "like a woman"}. If they're not making a claim that the two are the same, then why would they want to use the same word to describe both. — Pseudonym

I want to point out that there are two different points here, and they are somewhat distinct. There is the original point about the connection between feeling and chromosomes, and now there is a second point about language.

As to the first point, the claim is not that chromosomes have a connection to the feeling. Such a claim, as I have said, is counter to the claims people with one set of chromosomes may feel the way that people with another set of chromosomes may feel. Clearly, then, the premise is that chromosomes and gender identity are distinct, and many of the problematic arguments you are raising become, as you note in this quoted text above, language issues.

Historically, sex and gender have been considered by many cultures as fused, and so one set of words only have persisted in language. This is also the state now. However, every day we are faced with words that have multiple, related or interrelated meanings, and yet we do just fine, so I don't think that this is primarily a language issue for you.

If I asked you to refer to me as "he" or "she" - would you need to check out my physiology before you felt it appropriate to use the term?

I don't think that someone who is confident in their identity is going to be confused about who they are by how they address someone else. — angslan

Yet you think someone who is confident in their identity will be upset by how they are addressed. This seems like an oddly arbitrary distinction to draw, especially considering I've already referenced parts of the feminist movement who quite evidently do feel like their identity is under threat by using words in certain ways, and there would clearly not even be a debate here if no one felt upset about having to use words in certain ways.

your description contains absolutely no change in straight marriage. A man and a woman who were in a union under God before gay marriage are still a man and a woman in a union under God after gay marriage - unless one of them changed sex or gender or the change in definition literally obliterated God. — angslan

It's not the people who have changed (or not) it's the meaning of the word. The word "marriage" used to mean (to some) {the state of Union between a man and a woman as specified in the bible}. Those people now find it much harder to use the term that way and still be understood. In 50 year's time I think it will be almost impossible to use the term that way. I think that is a good thing because the term set up an institution unavailable to gay couples, and the world-view it preserved was one where God ordained things and I don't think that's morally helpful. In the case of the word "woman" however, I'm more persuaded by the feminist argument that its current use causes less harm than an expansion/alterations might. I'm at least persuaded to the extent that I think people should have the autonomy to use it as they see fit without undue social pressure.

, the claim is not that chromosomes have a connection to the feeling. Such a claim, as I have said, is counter to the claims people with one set of chromosomes may feel the way that people with another set of chromosomes may feel. Clearly, then, the premise is that chromosomes and gender identity are distinct, and many of the problematic arguments you are raising become, as you note in this quoted text above, language issues. — angslan

Absolutely. I never have said that there is some connection between chromosomes and feeling. People with either set of chromosomes may feel any way. There are obviously general trends, some of which are mediated by biology (like hormones) and some of which are mediated by culture (like dress-wearing). But the very existence of the trans community (and the transvestite community), prove that these are only trends, not universal facts.

This is, however, the opposite of what is being claimed by the conflation of the term "woman". What this conflation implies is that there are some properties of having two X chromosomes which are intrinsically shared by those who feel like something they would describe as a woman. Deliberately asking that they be called the same thing is fundamentally making the claim that they share some properties. If I asked that tortoises were also referred to as 'cats' (in addition to lions and tigers and so forth) the very first question would be "Why? What have they got in common?".

Yes, there may be words which incidentally are used to describe two completely different things, but that's not what's happening here. The word 'woman' is being deliberately used to define both groups (chromosomes and feelings) which is making the strong claim that they are, in fact, related. That's the problem feminists have with it. They don't want the fact that they happen to have two X chromosomes to tie them to feeling a certain way. Yet if the term used to describe having two X chromosomes is deliberately also used to describe feeling a certain way, that's exactly what it implies.

Historically, sex and gender have been considered by many cultures as fused, and so one set of words only have persisted in language. This is also the state now. However, every day we are faced with words that have multiple, related or interrelated meanings, and yet we do just fine, so I don't think that this is primarily a language issue for you. — angslan

As I said above, words might be incidentally used for different purposes but that's not what's happening here. The word "woman" is being deliberately used to make a link between the sex and the gender, to validate the claim that what transgender people feel like is actually the opposite sex and not simply something which they think the opposite sex is like. This necessarily makes the claim that there is something it is like to be a "woman", which necessarily implies that someone who doesn't feel that way isn't a proper woman (despite having two X chromosomes).

If I asked you to refer to me as "he" or "she" - would you need to check out my physiology before you felt it appropriate to use the term? — angslan

Of course not, what I don't know won't hurt me. The harm is if you (as an obvious man) told me (a woman, (for the sake of this example)) that you feel sufficiently like me and everyone else with my biological sex to be addressed in the same way because we're basing terms of address on feelings not observed facts.

Yet you think someone who is confident in their identity will be upset by how they are addressed. — Pseudonym

This is true of all types of people - this is in no way exclusive to trans people. The principle of respecting other people's interiority is that we respect them in the way we address and treat them. This doesn't mean we compromise the way in which we treat ourselves.

The word "marriage" used to mean (to some) — Pseudonym

To some. Is that the point that we were talking about earlier? I don't think so.

In the case of the word "woman" however, I'm more persuaded by the feminist argument that its current use causes less harm than an expansion/alterations might. — Pseudonym

I feel like I haven't heard the actual argument that you find convincing - just that you know that there is such an argument.

I never have said that there is some connection between chromosomes and feeling. — Pseudonym

Nor did I say you did - I said that you claimed trans people made such a claim. To wit:

This is, however, the opposite of what is being claimed by the conflation of the term "woman". What this conflation implies is that there are some properties of having two X chromosomes which are intrinsically shared by those who feel like something they would describe as a woman. — Pseudonym

I would be very surprised to find out that the definition of "woman" popped into existence when humans discovered chromosomes and was not in use beforehand. If it was in use beforehand, then this definition you are supplying is a cherry-picked one for the purposes of your position. Why are you so focussed on chromosomes?

The harm is if you (as an obvious man) told me (a woman, (for the sake of this example)) that you feel sufficiently like me and everyone else with my biological sex to be addressed in the same way because we're basing terms of address on feelings not observed facts. — Pseudonym

I'm again not sure where you're getting your sense of these concepts from. Why would I have to "feel like you"? And why would the gendered term of address necessarily be based upon "observed facts"?

I feel like this argument is based upon some assumptions that need some real criticism:

(a) chromosomes are some fundamental component of gender or gendered words (such as "woman"). Criticism: Gender is separate, and the language-use of gendered words predates chromosomes - there is no primacy to the chromosomal definition as some etymological or factual truth.
(b) observable physiology has primacy over gender identity in forms of address. Criticism: If we consider that we are addressing a person (say, the inhabitant of a body) and not the body, then this seems odd.
(c) there is only one way to "feel like a woman", which means that any use of gendered words implies the addressees necessarily feel the same as each other. Criticism: there is more than one way to feel like a woman. We admit as such when we talk about "trends" and look at the varied cultural mediation across not only the present, but also the past.

This is what I feel is drawn out from your writing - how far off am I?

Social pressure is not reasonable or rational. It's red in tooth and claw, if I can steal a phrase from elsewhere. :wink: If we approve of it, we call it one thing, and if we don't, we call it another. In your case, mandation (??? :smile:) "by threat of ostracisation and insult". If we disapprove of the way our children are raised, we call it brainwashing, but if not, we call it education. It's the same thing. And social pressure is not subject to courtesy, sadly. :meh: — Pattern-chaser

Now you seem to be throwing up your hands to ethics. Which is it to be? Are we talking about they way people should behave, or they way they do? You can't argue that people should use the preferred terms of reference and then respond to my concerns about inappropriate social pressure with a shrug. — Pseudonym

I am attempting, in my own small way, to encourage courtesy. But I can't force someone else to be courteous, and I can't force anyone else to think courtesy is as important as I believe it to be. I observe that humans en masse act as they see fit, perhaps as lions (say) might do? What should people do? Well you know my opinion, because I've been stating it here, but there are plenty of other opinions, mostly different. What do people do? You don't need me to tell you that, you only need to look at the TV or Twitter or.... I argue that people should (IMO) be courteous, but I observe that they aren't, especially en masse. :sad: So I see no contradiction. :chin:

Now that is a creative way of stating it! Harry has repeatedly denounced and condemned (I use those terms after careful consideration) trans-gender people as "deluded", and their feelings as "delusions". He has stated over and over his outrage at being 'forced' to pander to the delusions of others. I rather think it's this that brands him a bigot, don't you? :chin: :razz: — Pattern-chaser

No, not really. I've certainly no sympathy for his views in this regard — Pseudonym

:up:

...but I don't think anyone should be labelled a bigot for theorising that believing yourself to be a woman (despite being born a man) might be a delusion in the same vein as believing yourself to be fat when in fact you are thin. — Pseudonym

[My highlighting.]

When you put it that way, it sounds quite reasonable. But Harry didn't (put it that way). He did not and does not wonder if gender dysphoria might be a delusion, he asserts that it is, and that TG people are "deluded", which is used (as you know :up:) as a demeaning and contemptuous insult more often than it is used as a factual medical description.

What concerns some people is that the conviction one 'is' something which requires surgery to realise might be a harmful delusion. I don't share that belief, but I don't see how it's bigotry. — Pseudonym

It's the words chosen that are bigoted, I think. Harry is not sympathetic, or any other friendly-type thing, he is offended and angry. His words do not betray philosophical curiosity, they seem hateful, ill-meaning and contemptuous. What word(s) would you use to describe such sentiments? :chin:

This is true of all types of people - this is in no way exclusive to trans people. The principle of respecting other people's interiority is that we respect them in the way we address and treat them. This doesn't mean we compromise the way in which we treat ourselves. — angslan

Yes, you keep restating this as if it were fact, but I don't agree. I've written in every post in every different way I can think of how the words you speak define who you are (your interiority, as you put it) as much as, if not more than, the words you hear spoken about you. Your response to this argument just seems to be "no it doesn't" without any reason why you think that way. That's absolutely fine, you're under no obligation to give me a reason, but there's not really anything more to say on the matter if you don't. So, if you can state relatively succinctly - why do you think that the words spoken to you can insult, and must be chosen carefully as a matter of respect, but the words you ask others to use have absolutely no emotional content at all and have no implications regarding respect?

To some. Is that the point that we were talking about earlier? I don't think so. — angslan

Well, it was the point I was talking about. Evidently not clearly enough.

I feel like I haven't heard the actual argument that you find convincing - just that you know that there is such an argument. — angslan

Really? I don't know how many more ways I can put it. Some feminists believe that to call someone a "woman" on the grounds that they feel like something they think is a woman and also call someone a "woman" if they have a the physiology associated with having two X chromosomes, it implies that those two things are related, they're in the same group. Obviously some people born with the physiology associated with having two X chromosomes do not want to feel like there's also a feeling which in some way defines them. They also feel solidarity with other people who have the physiology associated with having two X chromosomes because that group, not the group that 'feels like a woman' have been oppressed and to a great extent still are, in a particular way.

But I've said all this before, more than once, to have you still suggest that I haven't put forward my argument yet makes me feel like I'm wasting my time.

I would be very surprised to find out that the definition of "woman" popped into existence when humans discovered chromosomes and was not in use beforehand. If it was in use beforehand, then this definition you are supplying is a cherry-picked one for the purposes of your position. Why are you so focussed on chromosomes? — angslan

It's very difficult in a discussion over disputed terms to write out in full what you mean by the term you're trying to avoid using. I started out with 'appears to possess the features associated with having two X chromosomes' but got lazy typing the whole thing out each time I mentioned it. The point is that definitions are never clear, they're slightly fuzzy around the edges. I'm trying to get at the observable physiological features which, without a shadow of a doubt have been the properties used to define the category "woman" since the word began. The problem with simply using a list of physiological features is capturing the fuzziness. Someone with a penis would not be called a woman, but someone born, for some genetic reasons, without a uterus, but with breasts and a vagina would be. It's not that anything goes, just that the definition is not a simple list. Hence I went with the feature that underlies it all (having two X chromosomes) even though all categorisation is actually carried out by observing the features resulting from that basis. If I must, I could in future do as I have above 'physiological features associated with having two X chromosomes, but if I forget, you know what I mean.

(a) chromosomes are some fundamental component of gender or gendered words (such as "woman"). Criticism: Gender is separate, and the language-use of gendered words predates chromosomes - there is no primacy to the chromosomal definition as some etymological or factual truth. — angslan

See above. I really don't think there's an argument against the fact that physiological features have been the sole factor determing the use of the term "woman" for everything except the last fifty years. But I'm not hung up on primacy. It's just that at the moment "woman" is used to describe them too and some of them are upset about the association with a certain group of feelings. The solution to this problem you're advising seems to be just "put up with it".

(b) observable physiology has primacy over gender identity in forms of address. Criticism: If we consider that we are addressing a person (say, the inhabitant of a body) and not the body, then this seems odd. — angslan

I'm not saying that. I'm saying that people should be free to apply whatever primacy they feel comfortable with (which freedom includes freedom from undue social pressure). It's impossible to just address the inhabitant of a body that way. We are all different, the only way you could address the inhabitant of a body alone is to have a different term for each person. As soon as you use collective terms you are making a statement within your language community that you are more like the others in that group than you are like those outside of it. People wishing to be called "woman" are saying that in some way they are more like other people called "women" than they are like people called "men". If they're not saying this then the terms are meaningless as they don't define anything. Saying you are more like other people in a group than you are like those outside it is not only making a statement about you, it is also making a statement about the others in that group. It is disrespectful to ignore the effect one's requests have on others.

(c) there is only one way to "feel like a woman", which means that any use of gendered words implies the addressees necessarily feel the same as each other. Criticism: there is more than one way to feel like a woman. We admit as such when we talk about "trends" and look at the varied cultural mediation across not only the present, but also the past. — angslan

It doesn't make much difference to the argument if there is one thing it's like to be a woman or several things. The point is that it is a limited group. If it was not a limited group (and so neither was being a man) then there would be no problem with calling anyone a man no matter what they feel like because any set of feelings would be entirely consistent with either term. The claim that's implicit in a man demanding* to be called a woman is that the feeling they have is not one properly associated with the term "man". This necessarily means that a man who has those feelings is not a real man.

What word(s) would you use to describe such sentiments? :chin: — Pattern-chaser

I simply would not try to assume someone's motives from something as vague as the tone of a few short thread posts. I get the sense from Harry's other posts that he's quite, shall we say, self-assured. But I think it's important in philosophical discussions to try and respond to the arguments as they are put, not the possible motive behind them. Most people do not remember each time to preface their arguments with "I think...", or "in my opinion..." sometimes that can come across as assertion (sometimes it actually is assertion) but it is the point that is being asserted that should we argue, not the fact of its assertion.

I'm far from perfect myself in that regard, so don't take it as criticism, just an explanation of why I took the position I did on the matter.

But I'm not hung up on primacy. It's just that at the moment "woman" is used to describe them too and some of them are upset about the association with a certain group of feelings. — Pseudonym

I'm saying that people should be free to apply whatever primacy they feel comfortable with (which freedom includes freedom from undue social pressure). — Pseudonym

I know that you feel that I am just saying "no, you're wrong" to you, but this is, I think, the core of your argument, and I believe it to be wrong. I believe it to be wrong on the grounds of respecting the interiority of others without compromising your own - or if you want to put it in terms of harm, that treating people like objects is inherently harmful. You put the harm in the treatment of others potentially on par with the harm of compromising your own identity through language-use. But my argument, as I have put it forward, is that nothing actually changes in the treatment of oneself, so this perspective is flawed. Yes, people hold the position, but people hold incorrect positions all the time - I believe you accuse me of this.

We don't make concessions to neo-Nazis who want a purely white state, as an example, because their feelings about their own identity. We judge them on their treatment of others. You accept that marriage equality is good progress because it expands equal, respectful treatment to others even if it makes people feel less secure about their own identity. This respectful treatment takes into account the interiority of others. However, you feel that there are special conditions for gender (or, perhaps, by calling people by the name their parents gave them) that gives these groups who ask to treat people as objects more credence. I am not sure why. You can point to as many "some feminists" as you want, but that doesn't mean their argument is any better.

We are all different, the only way you could address the inhabitant of a body alone is to have a different term for each person. — Pseudonym

You could use whatever term they feel is appropriate.

The solution to this problem you're advising seems to be just "put up with it". — Pseudonym

Of course not. Just because I don't think that there is a completely valid argument here does not mean that I would say to people, "Put up with it."

It doesn't make much difference to the argument if there is one thing it's like to be a woman or several things. The point is that it is a limited group. If it was not a limited group (and so neither was being a man) then there would be no problem with calling anyone a man no matter what they feel like because any set of feelings would be entirely consistent with either term. — Pseudonym

I think you are very much too hung up on categorisation of a certain sort here. Unless you can drop into the interiority of each person, how would you ever know? Authentic expression is the best tool we have for how someone is feeling. Obviously there are many strains of feminism that reject utterly such strict categorisation, but it seems that you, personally, don't subscribe to this when making an argument, even though much of your point about avoiding primacy is avoiding taking particular sides to resolve the issue. I think you are having your cake and eating it too.

I have to go, but I will respond to one more point when I have time.

I find myself dismissive of your posts. Their discursive nature does not sit well with my preference for analysis.

Which is to say I don't find them very revealing; not useful.

That in itself is interesting.

(Edit: Even so, I prefer your posts to the long-winded dialogue that followed)

So I just want to try and clarify and cover what I believe to be your argument without this quoting back and forth, which sometimes gets me confused about whether we have sufficiently covered the ground we were aiming for or got stuck responding to particulars.

Some points we have covered

1 - The trans claim is not that there is a definitive or necessary connection between chromosomes and gender-identity. The trans claim is not that there is a definitive or necessary connection between outward appearance and gender-identity. If it were, the claim would insinuate that there are no trans people - a self-defeating claim. I think we might both agree on this issue - I am not sure.

2 - The use of gendered language predates critical interrogation of the distinctions between sex, gender identity, gender roles, and the like. There is not one true, physiological etymology or definition of "woman" and "man" in use over the past few hundred years - this word is bound up in the fusing of sex, gender identity and gender roles. Thus, the word today is the child of this "de-fusing". The claim that it historically denoted physical appearance and that this is the "true, correct" or "objective" use of the term is a little blind to the history of sex and gender (and falls foul of the etymological fallacy anyway). I think we might be able to both agree on this - but perhaps we are not there yet.

3 - Here, I think, is the point of divergence between us, so perhaps this is the point to interrogate the most in any further discussion we might have. We might call this the "other-treatment" and "self-treatment" issue.

I am going to try and be a little pedantic about this to see where it goes.

Theorising about addressing people

We have a speaker S and an addressee A. Both have some conceptual framework of identity, f(S) and f(A).

Where S follows f(A) when addressing A, they are acknowledging the interiority and self-identity of A in their address.

Where S follows f(S) when addressing A, they are not.

Now to see if there are any issues here. First, is whether the use of f(A) by S denies the interiority and self-identity of S. There are a few potential answers:

(a) Yes it does, because any utterance is a universal application of a framework and therefore S is also addressing S with the same framework.
(b) No it doesn't, because such a framework is oriented toward the addressee and does not necessarily apply universally. For example, even if S uses f(A) to address A, they use f(S) to address themselves (even just internally).

A second question is whether the use of f(S) by S denies the interiority and self-identity of A.

(c) Yes it does, because S is applying an identity to A that A does not identify as.
(d) No it doesn't, because A is mistaken about their own identity.

Obviously there are some objections to some of these. To (a) the objection is that we don't apply such frameworks universally already. The only way this would hold is if gender is a special exception. To (d) the objection is that A has special access to knowledge about themselves. This is two-pronged objection - first, that we believe people who make authentic statements about their identity, and two, that objective comparison of internal identities is impossible. That is, two women cannot sufficiently check if they both "feel like a woman" and, indeed, there are fundamental differences in the way that women "feel like women" (or if such a thing exists). I have more trouble finding objections for (b) and (c), so maybe this is where you can step in.

I feel that if we accept (a), then we might end up multiplying the number of people whose interiority we ignore. For example, a person who feels that gender is a social construct and that gendered forms of address are therefore inaccurate or generally misleading might want to address every as "xhe", which, I have no doubt, would make a lot of people feel that they had been addressed inappropriately and their subjectivity, interiority and identity ignored or denied.

Frameworks of address

I suggest that we can formulate two types of address framework: speaker-oriented and addressee-oriented. Speaker-oriented addressing would address each person by the framework of the speaker regardless of the interiority of the addressee. Addressee-oriented addressing would address each person by the framework of the addressee.

In speaker-oriented addressing the speaker always addresses themselves with consideration of their interiority, but without consideration of others interiority. Neither the speaker nor the addressee have a guarantee that they will be addressed in a manner that they feel is appropriate.

In addressee-oriented addressing, the addressee is addressed in a manner reflective and respectful of their interiority, including the speaker, who will also address themselves appropriately. Speakers and addressees will always be addressed in a manner they feel is appropriate, both externally and internally.

Claims of strict categorisation

I think that the biggest objection to addressee-oriented addressing is if (a), the universal application of frameworks through addressing another, holds somehow.

I think that you have expressed that some feminists feel that applying the word "woman" to someone outside of their conceptual categorisation of "woman" is compromising, or inappropriate to, their identity as women. I think that to make such a claim requires a strict categorisation of "woman". It also requires a protective approach to that categorisation. Such a strict categorisation requires a conceptualisation of (i) how it feels to be a woman, (ii) the experiences and circumstances of women, (iii) the treatment of women, or some combination of more than one. The reason that categorisation needs to be strict is that there is a resistance to permitting new members to the category (in some cases, as you note, the chromosomes you were born with and not even the sexual organs that you currently have - very strict!).

However, it is clear that not all women feel this way. A clear case is the set of female academic feminists who believe that gender is not associated with sex organs, or that there are more than two genders. The same case can be made for women (including, again, many female academic feminists) who do not share the circumstances, feelings, experiences or history that other academic feminists relate to this categorisation.

If we are to be strict about this, then, what do we call women who do not believe that they share the same qualities as required by this category? Do we call them something other than women? In either case, this strict categorisation produces the same problems - people who are addressed by other incorrectly, either in the circumstance of people who identify as women who would not be addressed as women (in this case, a group of female academic feminists) or a dissolution of the strict category of experiences/history, dissolves the basis for this objection (that people are telling "real" women that they feel like them because there is a general way women feel).

Just to reiterate...

One side derives an ought from an is (you were born X, are chromosomally X, therefore you ought to be X).

The other side derives an is from an ought (a want) (you ought to be X, are behaviorally/hormonally X, therefore you is X.

The solution is to realize that X means different things. — VagabondSpectre

A sharp knife is a good knife. We use physical characteristics to evaluate.

A person with specifiable physical characteristics is considered male. But this does not imply that they ought be treated as a man, regardless of their own disposition.

And contrawise, a person who wishes to be treated as a woman, may (must?) still be counted as male because of their physical characteristics.

A person with specifiable physical characteristics is considered male. But this does not imply that they ought be treated as a man, regardless of their own disposition.

And contrawise, a person who wishes to be treated as a woman, may (must?) still be counted as male because of their physical characteristics. — Banno

Why does the physiology have primacy? Or are you restricting the latter part of this claim - the "counting" - to certain medical issues?

Firstly, this is a reiteration of Vagabond's observations.

Secondly, I am using sex, male, female; as distinct from gender, man, woman.

One cannot perform a hysterectomy on a trans woman. But that is no reason not to treat her as a woman.

Why does the physiology have primacy? — angslan

I didn't suggest that it did.

Secondly, I am using sex, male, female; as distinct from gender, man, woman. — Banno

Ah - this is the bit I was missing. Carry on.

That doesn't really help Banno's case here.

Sex isn’t the body. There is a distinction between bodies, genitals, chromosomes and the use of sex categories. Take away sex categories, the body lose nothing. We can still each body perfectly well.

Despite the common insistence otherwise, the presence of a body doesn’t equal present of a sex category. Our bodies don’t means sex. Sex is, sometimes, a particular meaning of bodies. A categorisation of some bodies, but not defined by the presence of a body. To have certain hormones genitals, chromosomes, etc. is not how someone has a sex category. Sex identity is its own feature, sure of some bodies but not of others. One’s sex made by their sex, not their body.

We no doubt often use sex to mean certain types of bodies, but such a use of language is different the mere presence of a body being the truth condition of sex.

The language we use to mean about other things is distinct from those things. When I speak about a tree, it is not how the tree exists. If I speak about sex, it is not how a body I refer to exists. “Males” and “females” are not present be a presence of genitalia, chromosomes, hormones or any other biological feature.

“Males” and “females” are not present be a presence of genitalia, chromosomes, hormones or any other biological feature. — TheWillowOfDarkness

But that's not so. There are two groups, male and female.

And distinct from that, there are the social roles of man and woman.

There is a distinction between bodies, genitals, chromosomes and the use of sex categories. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Having certain specifiable physical characteristics is being female.

But it is not being a woman.

Correct, there are two groups male and female (and many more). That's given by the definition of the identity terms.

We can even say that having certain identifying physical characteristics is being female. After all, every woman has specific physical characteristics which are here own.

The issue here, however, is supposing this group is only limited to a shallow set of specific characteristics. When we assume that being female only amounts to having XX chromosomes, a vagina, breasts, a womb, etc, we engage in a disgusting form of idealism.

We suppose we have these concepts which necessary set out the full range of female individual that might ever occur, without actually paying attention to who exists in front of us. We forget to the proper work of description (What biological features does someone how? What meaning of sex do those have in this instance? Do they even have a meaning of sex in this instance? ) and instead work only form ad hoc assumptions which demand it must be true. We forget other people not given concept/assumption of sex!

Having certain specifiable physical characteristics is being female. — Banno

It's also this very issue of meaning at stake in the case of trans people with concerns about there body.

Why do they identify with the opposite meaning then society has assigned them? Because of how those social practices and categories represent the body.

Their trans identity is about being recognised in a way which reflects they body sense/ought to have. They are seeking others to recognise the body they ought to have in how they are socially categorised, to be understood as someone who is properly, female/male, not just a woman/man.