In accepting pain, do I think, 'alright, I'm in pain?' But how does that help? — The Great Whatever

Yes. Realizing you are suffering is the first step to mindful living. The next step is to locate the source of suffering. I think you might be surprised at just how much suffering is self-caused and not out of our control.

So one can be happy without feeling any pleasure whatsoever? What sort of feeling is happiness, then? If it is not a feeling, why is it worth pursuing, since it seems that feelings are all that can possibly matter to us? And since if a feeling is good in its own right, it seems just to be pleasure, in what sense can we say happiness is worthwhile insofar as it is not pleasant or identical with pleasure? — The Great Whatever

What I meant by pleasure is any strictly sensual experiences. Like eating a cookie. A cookie will not bring you happiness, only temporary relief from the burden of desire.

Eudaimonia, or flourishing, is the "goodness" that is focused on in several philosophies, including Epicureanism, Buddhism, and Utilitarianism. You cannot achieve eudaimonia by eating a cookie. Eudaimonia, happiness, contentedness, these are separate from sensual pleasures, although most often they are accompanied by sensual pleasures. Without trying to be vague, eudaimonia is a different kind of pleasure. It is something that makes your life worth living instead of something that must be relieved. It is difficult to explain, but you will know when you experience it. Think about when something "clicks" and you just "get it", and suddenly love doing whatever you are doing. You finally learned to do a layup with ease. You can point out all the constellations in the sky and navigate around the night sky. You have found someone that appreciates you almost as much as you appreciate them. You are in a process, a journey, in which the result is simply a continuation of the journey, and you are perfectly okay with that.

This is what I feel is truly tragic about the human condition. It's not that we are suffering, but rather we are suffering when there are alternatives. We pursue excessive hedonism and build vast structures of ambition, only to see the hedonism disappointing and our structures crashing down.

In a way you are right, but reason that is misleading is that it might cause someone to think, say, because moderation leads to the pleasure that attends self-restraint and avoids the pain of overindulgence and hangovers, that therefore moderation itself is good, which leads to the confusion that moderation itself is somehow intrinsically worthwhile. Of course, it isn't; there are possible situations in which moderation is extrinsically bad, and leads to painful consequences.

If you stick to the very situation, some action may actually be not divorceable from the pleasure. But then I would just say in that one case, the two are identical; there is no pleasure apart from the pleasant thing or action. But that doesn't mean the action itself, as a species, is intrinsically worthwhile, whereas pleasure is.

This very point is often my visceral reaction to the idea that being in a constant state of happiness is desireable, because if loved ones suffered or died, it would be inappropriate, and distasteful to feel anything but misery, that's what empathy and sympathy is, to understand what someone has went through, and feel the appropriate emotional response to it. I'm not one to engage in such self-protection that I'd sever empathic ties in order to not feel too bad about anything. — Wosret

The worry is that it is unappreciative of a person, or shows a lack of empathy for them, if one isn't pained by their death. That is understandable. However, I think it's wrong on that basis then to suggest that the only way one could show such qualities is by being miserable. Certainly a much better world would be one in which we empathized with, and showed appreciation for, our loved ones when they died by celebrating them and feeling happy for the life they lived, rather than miserable. In other words, you are confused; you think that because you feel miserable when someone dies, this is the only way you ever ought to feel, or else you re somehow betraying them. I should be much happier not only for others' death, but also for my own, if I knew it would be met with joy and celebration of the dead person's life (and the claim is, this is how it actually goes in some cultures -- what you think is a visceral, natural reaction may in fact be a cultural contingency).

Yes. Realizing you are suffering is the first step to mindful living. The next step is to locate the source of suffering. I think you might be surprised at just how much suffering is self-caused and not out of our control. — darthbarracuda

I think a lot of it is, but there's just so much suffering in life that even removing that leaves you with too much to be acceptable, and of course still vulnerable to contingencies of suffering beyond your control.

What I meant by pleasure is any strictly sensual experiences. Like eating a cookie. A cookie will not bring you happiness, only temporary relief from the burden of desire. — darthbarracuda

Certainly eating a cookie can make you happy -- true, only for a little bit, but why is a little bit not better than not at all?

Without trying to be vague, eudaimonia is a different kind of pleasure. — darthbarracuda

So, it is pleasure, then?

The question that was put to me was about a miserable death, and my response was within that context. Not all deaths are miserable, some are surely glorious.

All lose of loved ones, and even things bring about mourning, and grief, but this is the feeling of lose, lose for something one is attached to, and which was partly integrated into their very being. The feeling of lose isn't fun, but it isn't about empathy, or concern for the thing that was lost's feelings per se, it is the feeling of getting over a significant relationship that has become no more.

I don't have any particular goal here except to discuss philosophy, which I assume is what everyone's goal here is. — The Great Whatever

Over on the other site in the unmoderated section, you started a thread raising the question of how antinatalists can go about convincing the world to stop procreating. When I reply to posters I'm familiar with, I do so in context of what I recall them posting about previously. But perhaps I misunderstood your intention in those antinatalist threads.

The only odd question is why I'm the only one that has to justify myself (worth thinking about why that is) — The Great Whatever

Because you're defending two controversial positions here. One is that pleasure is the only true good. Most ethical systems disagree. But more controversially, you argue the pessimistic view that life isn't worth living, and anyone who claims otherwise is mistaken. Most people are going to disagree.

In addition, you claimed that the pessimistic view is liberating, while I find it debilitating, which I suspect a lot of others do too. Now maybe it's because I'm psychologically unable to handle the truth, or maybe because I don't stay depressed for long. However, that's what makes me think it's a matter of 'interpretation', or mood.

I think a lot of it is, but there's just so much suffering in life that even removing that leaves you with too much to be acceptable, and of course still vulnerable to contingencies of suffering beyond your control. — The Great Whatever

Of course there is suffering, that is part of the nature of conscious life. But I disagree that there is necessarily an overwhelming amount of suffering, though. It certainly is not worth it to take the chance and have a child, but if you are already here then you have the chance of having some really cool experiences. Yes, tomorrow I could get in a car accident and have a pole rammed through my abdomen, impaling me. But tomorrow is also supposed to be a clear night sky, at least where I live. And I rather like looking at the stars.

Suffering is going to happen. It is inevitable. How you deal with the suffering is a different question altogether.

Certainly eating a cookie can make you happy -- true, only for a little bit, but why is a little bit not better than not at all? — The Great Whatever

Consuming a cookie will give you a temporary relief from that specific tanha. This is not happiness. I would go as far as to say that eating this cookie is a form of learnt self-torture. Happiness occurs when tanha is extinguished, when you are perfectly okay with your current situation.

There is a difference between experiencing pain, and experiencing misery. That's why I brought up the sports analogy. Some people voluntarily choose to endure pain, when they don't have to. It could be quite a bit as well, but I don't think it makes them miserable. Rather, it's a challenge for them, one that's rewarding.

I've certainly experienced pain and obstacles without being miserable about them. And of course I've experienced misery at other times, sometimes just because that was my mood or focus, and not because of anything external or a physical ailment.

Over on the other site in the unmoderated section, you started a thread raising the question of how antinatalists can go about convincing the world to stop procreating. When I reply to posters I'm familiar with, I do so in context of what I recall them posting about previously. But perhaps I misunderstood your intention in those antinatalist threads. — Marchesk

I saw it as more of a, 'what would an antinatalist even do?' I share the opinion that there is no reasonable expectation that antinatalism will ever be successful.

Because you're defending two controversial positions here. One is that pleasure is the only true good. Most ethical systems disagree. But more controversially, you argue the pessimistic view that life isn't worth living, and anyone who claims otherwise is mistaken. Most people are going to disagree. — Marchesk

Hedonism is one of the oldest, most persistent, and best-founded ethical positions that I'm aware of. I certainly don't think it's any more controversial than any other major option. Of course, it has the virtue of being right, but that is not always the deciding factor in adopting moral/ethical opinions.

As for pessimism, I don't know. I think if you get people alone and drunk, a lot more admit to it. Of course you can't say it in the daylight, just like you can't say plenty of things.

Of course there is suffering, that is part of the nature of conscious life. But I disagree that there is necessarily an overwhelming amount of suffering, though. It certainly is not worth it to take the chance and have a child, but if you are already here then you have the chance of having some really cool experiences. Yes, tomorrow I could get in a car accident and have a pole rammed through my abdomen, impaling me. But tomorrow is also supposed to be a clear night sky, at least where I live. And I rather like looking at the stars. — darthbarracuda

I like how your example of a positive thing is pathetic compared to how utterly terrible the negative one is. Even in your own constructed examples, you can't win. Who in their right mind would be thrilled by those chances? Oh, boy, looking at the stars!

Consuming a cookie will give you a temporary relief from that specific tanha. This is not happiness. I would go as far as to say that eating this cookie is a form of learnt self-torture. Happiness occurs when tanha is extinguished, when you are perfectly okay with your current situation. — darthbarracuda

It seems to me that any philosophical position that must claim that eating a cookie is torture has gone wrong somewhere.

No, its value is relative to its actual usefulness. We can be wrong about something's usefulness, which may make us value facts that are useless, but we value them mistakenly believing them to be useful. — Wosret

Value, much like truth, is not "out there" to be found(IMO). Something could be potentially useful but unknown, and therefore not valued. It would only attain a value by us or some other being deciding so.

The truth about what happened to your loved one is indeed desireable, in order to feel the appropriate emotional reaction, which I think at least honours their memory and what they went through. Would you like to have suffered a great trial, and have everyone think that it was a walk in the park? — Wosret

Firstly, I would be dead and therefore I imagine I wouldn't be able to care.

Secondly, how much truth or how many truths about the loved one's demise is sufficient enough to honor their memory and amount "the appropriate emotional response"? Do you need to know every detail of their suffering, lest you not understand the significance of the ordeal?

You value truth in all cases because you think truth is desirable in all cases. I think that truth is undesirable in some cases, and therefore has no use for the living or the dead(in those cases*).

I feel the philosophical position one takes in a discussion like this hinges on their psychological state.
How can you quantify suffering or pleasure? Even if you could it wouldn't mean they're equivalent to each other. Humans trade suffering for pleasure all the time, so I'm inclined to think pleasure has a better exchange rate.
The long-term outlook is bleak though..

I like how your example of a positive thing is pathetic compared to how utterly terrible the negative one is. Even in your own constructed examples, you can't win. Who in their right mind would be thrilled by those chances? Oh, boy, looking at the stars! — The Great Whatever

What you fail to realize is the probability of these happening. The probability of me getting impaled in a car crash? So negligible that it's not worth worrying about. The probability of me being able to enjoy a clear night sky? High enough that I should expect to have a good time.

Should I climb a mountain during a thunderstorm? Of course not, even if the view is spectacular. The probability of me getting struck by lightning is non-negligible. I would rather not be killed or permanently maimed by a thunderbolt.

It seems to me that any philosophical position that must claim that eating a cookie is torture has gone wrong somewhere. — The Great Whatever

Not the actual act of eating a cookie, but rather the continuation of tanha. Too much sensual pleasure leads to an addiction. Unfortunately, the vast majority of people seem to have an addiction to sensual pleasures, pleasures that are almost always disappointing and merely prolong the addiction.

Value, much like truth, is not "out there" to be found(IMO). Something could be potentially useful but unknown, and therefore not valued. It would only attain a value by us or some other being deciding so. — ProbablyTrue

You misunderstand. If someone values something based on its usefulness, but is wrong about its usefulness, then their placing value in it was a mistake by their own standards and intentions. The very notion of a neutral objective "usefulness" is of course absurd.

Firstly, I would be dead and therefore I imagine I wouldn't be able to care. — ProbablyTrue

Obviously, but I would be able to, and would rather feel emotions appropriately than just the ones I like regardless of context, or appropriateness.

Secondly, how much truth or how many truths about the loved one's demise is sufficient enough to honor their memory and amount "the appropriate emotional response"? Do you need to know every detail of their suffering, lest you not understand the significance of the ordeal? — ProbablyTrue

Between not knowing anything at all, and knowing every conceivable detail? Since I cared about them deeply, probably as much as I could find out in order to get a sense of what happened to them, like most anyone else, I figure. Try asking these questions to the family of a missing person. Advocate just forgetting about it, and not worrying about what happened to them, and sing the virtues of just feeling good all the time, regardless of what happens to you or those around you.

You value truth in all cases because you think truth is desirable in all cases. I think that truth is undesirable in some cases, and therefore has no use for the living or the dead(in those cases*). — ProbablyTrue

Kind of undercuts your credibility, if, as you suggest, truth is not undesirable for being useless, or irrelevant, but because it might make you feel bad?

You misunderstand. — Wosret

Yes, I think I did.

Advocate just forgetting about it, and not worrying about what happened to them, and sing the virtues of just feeling good all the time, regardless of what happens to you or those around you. — Wosret

Kind of undercuts your credibility, if, as you suggest, truth is not undesirable for being useless, or irrelevant, but because it might make you feel bad? — Wosret

My argument wasn't that feeling bad is always useless or that ignorance should be our bliss, but that sometimes the truth only serves to cause suffering and nothing else, making it undesirable. What good does it do a mother or father of someone who died in a car accident to tell them their loved one not only died, but was trapped and awake in the vehicle and slowly burned to death in front of desperate onlookers?
I don't see suffering as an end in itself. It's certainly inevitable that at times it will be, but it doesn't have to be desirable.

The evil falsehoods do in both cases, is firstly by big brothering people, and deciding what kind of information they can and cannot handle, or should and shouldn't be privy to, which makes you an unreliable, patronizing person. The evil it does in the second case, is that anyone that would rather believe pleasant falsehoods than terrible truths is also not trustworthy, or credible, and weak of heart and mind.

In the first case, I wouldn't be so patronizing to decide what people should and shouldn't know, though I would respect anyone's decision not to know, and of course wouldn't force any information down anyone's throat that they preferred not to know, but if they preferred not to know (and not like terrible irrelevant facts, about people that I have no ties with, in circumstances I have no control over, involvement with, and cannot learn from -- then of course I wouldn't care to know a string of terrible details for no reason at all, I'm not a masochist), then I would respect and trust them less as a result.

The evil falsehoods do in both cases, is firstly by big brothering people, and deciding what kind of information they can and cannot handle, or should and shouldn't be privy to, which makes you an unreliable, patronizing person. The evil it does in the second case, is that anyone that would rather believe pleasant falsehoods than terrible truths is also not trustworthy, or credible, and weak of heart and mind — Wosret

No this is not the case. I'm not talking about a fools paradise and I'm not talking about withholding all relevant facts that would cause someone suffering. I'm saying there is a level of detail about certain things, such as the gruesome demise of someone's loved one, that giving said detail unsolicited under the pretense that "all truth is desirable" is ridiculous. If it's solicited that's a different story.

I personally would want to know details; that's how I am. However, I can see why other people might not.
It's not a matter of yes or no, but how much.

I think you've just moved the goal post.

Certainly eating a cookie can make you happy -- true, only for a little bit, but why is a little bit not better than not at all? — The Great Whatever

Being satisfied or content with, or accepting of, your life is a state that relates not merely to the moment but to your overall passions and commitments. You have said that pleasure is the only intrinsic good; but I would contest this. Using you cookie example: sure, eating a cookie may give you momentary pleasure and on the basis of your belief in the intrinsic goodness of that experience you may be led to repeat it very often, which may lead to obesity and the various attendant sufferings that far outweigh the intrinsic goodness of the .momentary pleasure.

Is it really intrinsically good to abide in a disposition such that your satisfaction or dissatisfaction with life is dependent on momentary pleasures?

Being satisfied or content with, or accepting of, your life is a state that relates not merely to the moment but to your overall passions and commitments. You have said that pleasure is the only intrinsic good; but I would contest this. Using you cookie example: sure, eating a cookie may give you momentary pleasure and on the basis of your belief in the intrinsic goodness of that experience you may be led to repeat it very often, which may lead to obesity and the various attendant sufferings that far outweigh the intrinsic goodness of the .momentary pleasure. — John

That only shows that pleasure can be an extrinsic bad, or the efficient cause of a bad. It is nonetheless intrinsically good, i.e. worthwhile for its own sake, even if it might lead to something bad (i.e. pain).

Is it really intrinsically good to abide in a disposition such that your satisfaction or dissatisfaction with life is dependent on momentary pleasures? — John

No dispositions are intrinsically good or bad.

That only shows that pleasure can be an extrinsic bad, or the efficient cause of a bad. It is nonetheless intrinsically good, i.e. worthwhile for its own sake, even if it might lead to something bad (i.e. pain). — The Great Whatever

How do you justify the claim that something that may lead to an "extrinsic bad" should nonetheless be considered to be intrinsically good?

No dispositions are intrinsically good or bad. — The Great Whatever

Would you not agree that a disposition that reliably leads to satisfaction, happiness and flourishing should be considered intrinsically better than a disposition that consistently leads to dissatisfaction, unhappiness and stultification?

How do you justify the claim that something that may lead to an "extrinsic bad" should nonetheless be considered to be intrinsically good? — John

It does not lead to an extrinsic bad, but rather is one. An extrinsic bad is something that is bad, not for its own sake, but because it leads to something intrinsically bad. Or, if you like, it is simply the efficient cause of something bad (not bad in of itself).

Would you not agree that a disposition that reliably leads to satisfaction, happiness and flourishing should be considered intrinsically better than a disposition that consistently leads to dissatisfaction, unhappiness and stultification? — John

It can be extrinsically better, in that it might happen to lead to something good; but it is not intrinsically better, because no disposition is intrinsically better than any other (since there would also be situations in which those very dispositions lead to bad things, rather than good -- that is, they are not good in of themselves at all, but only insofar as they lead to good things).

It does not lead to an extrinsic bad, but rather is one. An extrinsic bad is something that is bad, not for its own sake, but because it leads to something intrinsically bad. Or, if you like, it is simply the efficient cause of something bad (not bad in of itself).

It can be extrinsically better, in that it might happen to lead to something good; but it is not intrinsically better, because no disposition is intrinsically better than any other (since there would also be situations in which those very dispositions lead to bad things, rather than good -- that is, they are not good in of themselves at all, but only insofar as they lead to good things). — The Great Whatever

So, you seem to be saying that only suffering is intrinsically bad and only pleasure is intrinsically good?

If so, then why would should we not say that something that inevitably leads to suffering is, at least in that dimension, intrinsically bad, or that something that inevitably leads to pleasure is, at least in that dimension, intrinsically good.

Personally I think the intrinsic/extrinsic talk smacks of 'essentialism', and is misleading and unnecessary anyway.

If it were possible for example to be hooked up to a machine that stimulated your brain giving you an indescribable and unprecedented level of pure pleasure that you never tired of, while still allowing you to live a normal lifespan (by feeding you with nutrients and even stimulating your nerves and muscles to substitute for exercise) would you say that would be a desirable way to spend your life?

Or again, if you were given a choice between losing the ability for your remaining life to enjoy some favorite indulgence that gives you great pleasure, or losing the intellectual capacity to pursue philosophy; which would you choose and why?

So, you seem to be saying that only suffering is intrinsically bad and only pleasure is intrinsically good? — John

Yes.

If so, then why would should we not say that something that inevitably leads to suffering is, at least in that dimension, intrinsically bad, or that something that inevitably leads to pleasure is, at least in that dimension, intrinsically good. — John

Because in that case, it would not be good or bad for its own sake, but only insofar as it led to something else.

I think you've just moved the goal post. — Wosret

How so?

Because details beyond what is necessary to establish the case, are not useful, and thus their relevant factor in their undesirability would be their lack of importance, or usefulness, and not how terrible they are. You need to make the case based on how terrible they are, not based on how irrelevant, or useless. I long long long suggested (even back on another thread before this one) that inconsequential facts don't matter, and who cares if you know them or not? You suggested, however, that it would be their awfulness that would render them undesirable to know, so you have to make the point on this basis, and not some other basis while attempting to sneak in that they're also awful through the back door.

Well you didn't answer the more pertinent questions, but I will go with what you have responded to anyway,

If pleasure is intrinsically good and pain is intrinsically bad, and if there is, as the song would have it, and, I think experience confirms, "A fine line between pleasure and pain" then it would seem to follow that there is a fine line between good and bad. The problem is that the claim that something could be intrinsically good or bad seems to rely on a position of the purity of goodness and badness.

So, can you provide an argument for why we should think that there is anything at all that is intrinsically good or bad?

So, can you provide an argument for why we should think that there is anything at all that is intrinsically good or bad? — John

To be intrinsically good or bad, something has to be good or bad by the very standards that it sets up, in such a way that it couldn't possibly not be good or bad. Pleasure and pain meet this requirement, since by their own standards they are good or bad, and not because of anything further. The very standards they set up, in being felt, are such that they feel good and feel bad, and since feeling is all that is at stake with them (since they are just feelings), this is the same as being good/bad by the very standards they set up (the only ones that matter).

That is an amoral view, however, and not conventional. Normally there is more to it than just pleasure, as it matters what one takes pleasure in. Taking pleasure in causing misery and suffering is seen as evil, and not good. Pleasure derived from an evil compounds the evil, makes it all the move evil. One causing suffering because they're coerced, or feeling remorse for it reduces how evil the act is perceived, doing it for the pleasure of it makes the act all the more evil.

You can of course maintain that pleasure is always good in all cases, regardless of how it is derived, but this would be a quite controversial opinion, in my view.

You can of course maintain that pleasure is always good in all causes, regardless of how it is derived, but this would be a quite controversial opinion, in my view. — Wosret

If it is controversial, I think it is because of confusion. If, for example, one gets pleasure out of causing others pain, then this is not a bad thing on behalf of the pleasure one receives, which is still intrinsically good; it is precisely bad because of the pain, which is intrinsically bad (notice if you take away the pain, resulting in a 'victimless crime,' the intuition that the act is bad goes away, even if the pleasure remains -- hence, it is not the pleasure that is bad).

Of course it is perfectly possible for an intrinsic good to be an extrinsic bad (or in my preferred way of speaking, an efficient cause of a bad). But notice that it is then an extrinsic bad only in virtue of causing pain.

No, that isn't the case. If it were just the pain that is caused, then whether or not pleasure was derived from the pain wouldn't effect how evil the action is perceived, but this isn't the case, as I pointed out, pleasure being derived from the action compounds the evil. This indicates that pleasure isn't absolutely good, in itself, but the circumstances by which it is derived are relevant to its determination as good or bad, and where most cases in which pleasure are derived are neutral or good, not subtracting from the pleasure as a good, it is also possible for pleasure to be seen as an evil, depending on how it is derived.

But, since the ideas of the intrinsic goodness and badness of pleasure and pain, respectively, are dependent on the (arguably) erroneous ideas of the absolute purity of pleasure and pain, I am still not satisfied that you have answered the question as to why we should think that pain and pleasure are really, as opposed to merely ideally (or by mere definition), intrinsically bad and good respectively.

To support an ethic of hedonism would be to say that pain and pleasure really are 'the good' and 'the bad' respectively, and that this fact trumps any other ethical considerations. The kinds of objections Wosret makes regarding the sources of pleasure also tell strongly against the justifiably of any ethic of hedonism.

No, that isn't the case. If it were just the pain that is caused, then whether or not pleasure was derived from the pain wouldn't effect how evil the action is perceived, but this isn't the case, as I pointed out, pleasure being derived from the action compounds the evil. This indicates that pleasure isn't absolutely good, in itself, but the circumstances by which it is derived are relevant to its determination as good or bad, and where most cases in which pleasure are derived are neutral or good, not subtracting from the pleasure as a good, it is also possible for pleasure to be seen as an evil, depending on how it is derived. — Wosret

I don't see why that 'compounds the evil.' If someone's getting hurt, then the bad thing about that is that they're getting hurt.

But, since the ideas of the intrinsic goodness and badness of pleasure and pain, respectively, are dependent on the (arguably) erroneous ideas of the absolute purity of pleasure and pain, I am still not satisfied that you have answered the question as to why we should think that pain and pleasure are really, as opposed to merely ideally (or by mere definition), intrinsically bad and good respectively. — John

I don't know what you mean by absolute purity, or by the distinction between ideal and actual pleasure and pain, but so far as I can tell nothing hinges on it or makes reference to it.

To support an ethic of hedonism would be to say that pain and pleasure really are 'the good' and 'the bad' respectively, and that this fact trumps any other ethical considerations. — John

Yes, that is the idea.