I ask this sincerely. it seems like a virus of the mind, one with which I've been infected, and im really just tired of it. It doesnt care for its host, or others, and seems to have no raison d'etre of its own.

So what's going on here? What is happening? Why can't we stop? — csalisbury

Could it be - done right - that it is following the principle that ideas must be stated definitely enough so that they could be found wrong?

The worst thing of all is a mumbling, opaque, vagueness - an assertion which couldn't even be wrong as it does not put forward a clear enough claim. But if a claim is bold, then it makes itself open to the most direct counter-attack. Which is what you want if the aim of the game is intelligible discourse.

Well no. You're mixing up levels. You're casting the debate in implicitly gladitorial terms. Tho thats not a bad image: the gladiator who thinks he can bring even the ampitheater into his control - drops the sword, says Truths etc.

You're making all the world a falsifiable chess game. that sounds good for chess players who like science.

But that's not what i was asking about!

the point, @apokrisis, is that -

Isn't it the case that in so far as a philosopher has a coherent body of work, a coherent philosophy, he/she is attached to a theme? And that theme, being the current around which his/her individual ideas (little truths) flow, must, in order to be taken seriously, be their (big) "Truth". So pronouncing the truth becomes something like just asserting identity? Or do you mean a more explicit proselytizing that we fall into when we can't see beyond the boundaries of our own world view?

So what's going on here? What is happening? Why can't we stop? — csalisbury

Human beings have the habit of creating models of the world, because it's useful. However, once established, the habit can go off on its own, with its own internal logic, not necessarily tethered to matters of survival (art for art's sake). But because it's a habit, it can be done blindly, obsessively, etc.

Why can't we stop? — csalisbury

Indeed; all that is needed is that one stop.

Nietzsche already more or less said that but kept doing it anyway. — csalisbury

I ask this sincerely. it seems like a virus of the mind, one with which I've been infected, and im really just tired of it. It doesnt care for its host, or others, and seems to have no raison d'etre of its own. — csalisbury

I disagree with Banno. If I've understood csalisbury rightly, then "just stop" as advice is akin to "be less depressed" when one is overtaken by a deep sense of pessimism.

I hope you'll forgive the obscene gesture of portentously quoting Nietzsche but I've had the feeling you seem to be describing quite often and it always triggers me reflecting on the following aphorism:

"Can an ass be tragic? - Can someone be destroyed by a weight he cannot carry or throw off? . . . The case of the philosopher." — Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols

So the disease of philosophy is the need to, combined with the impossibility of, stating the Truth...

And the cure is...

Because we all live in a fantasy world, of our own creation constructed by our preferences, and it is distasteful and upsetting that others should not occupy it along with us. They pose challenges to it, insult it. One behaves on the truth, on reasons. To truly believe something is to act in congruence with it.

We wish to rob everyone of their autonomy, by speaking magic words.

You're making all the world a falsifiable chess game. — csalisbury

So pronouncing the truth becomes something like just asserting identity? — Baden

My approach is semiotic. So as Baden notes, I wouldn't be defending naive realism. The self would be "revealed", as much as its world, by the process of inquiry.

Of course you could then see the self at the centre of my own inquiry as some kind of ideally rational self ... that you don't like ... for reasons of your own. Or of your "own". Ie: whatever ideal self you have in mind as articulating the proper worldview from "your" point of view.

Be that as it may, my response was simply that the right way to go about things is to "pronounce truth" - as that is then inviting falsification head on. It is saying, come have a go.

Problems only arise if claims are made in ways that are vague or otherwise unfalsifiable. So I am saying the philosophical inquiry has to take the form of a falsifiable chess game. Pronouncing truth is not in itself some kind of psychological flaw.

But Baden is right that people have to be wary about the degree to which they are also forming "a self" in coming to some clearly articulated world view.

(But isn't that a good thing - to actually also become some sort of definite self in life?)

Truth, facts, untrue statements are only the most immediate components of a popular epistemology everyone uses to establish the framework of everyday intersubjectivity. As a whole, this epistemology offers us a pragmatic but highly problematic model which in turn allows us to simply state things and examine the things stated.

The tension you describe is inevitable, it only shows that philosophy, as a somewhat-historical entity, has finally begun the audacious work of truly making a critique of rationality. This will uncover more than a few paradoxical aspects of our relation to reality, including that the popular epistemology is both absolutely indispensible and phenomenologically erroneous.

And since I usually poke Apokrisis for his vague walls of text, I have to say, Bravo. Two brilliant posts under 5000 characters. Sorry I was mean. :heart:

I think philosophy is more complex than simply seeking Truth. The idea of Truth in philosophy has become stale and outmoded.

Philosophers are no longer seeking Truth as such but are more interested in different perspectives on stuff.

There are no Truths, just different views.

"There are no Truths, just different views."

But an aggregate of different views can be more accurate than a single one, which once again throws us back at the idea of an at least theoritically obtainable truth.

There are no Truths, just different views. — TheMadFool

Is that so?

How odd.

I think philosophy is more complex than simply seeking Truth. — TheMadFool

Perhaps truth is much simpler than philosophers tend to claim. Perhaps there is nothing to say about Truth.

This will uncover more than a few paradoxical aspects of our relation to reality... — Akanthinos

How could you possibly be so sure, if it is a work in process?

Perhaps truth is much simpler than philosophers tend to claim. Perhaps there is nothing to say about Truth. — Banno

Even if this is so, we might still want to ask whether a particular philosopher got it right. For example, Was Meillassoux correct that post-Kantian philosophy left philosophy (at least the continental side) in a state of correlationism where the world appears to us as if there were dinosaurs living millions of years before humans evolved?

Was Kant right that what gives rise to our sensations is unknowable? Is it true that what we perceive is not what is the case?

At which point we're asking for a metaphysical truth about the world. If it's not the world, then it could be a truth about our condition or language use. Is it true that meaning is use? Is existentialism true? Is morality objective? Is consciousness subjective? We want to know the truths about these things, even if philosophers fail to convince us they got it entirely right.

At which point we're asking for a metaphysical truth about the world. If it's not the world, then it could be a truth about our condition or language use. Is it true that meaning is use? Is existentialism true? Is morality objective? Is consciousness subjective? We want to know the truths about these things, even if philosophers fail to convince us they got it entirely right. — Marchesk

But which, if any, of these are the Truth, as opposed to true?

But which, if any, of these are the Truth, as opposed to true? — Banno

Because the criteria would be different for each one? There is no one standard of justification that applies to all statements.

What has justification to do with truth?

What has justification to do with truth? — Banno

Well, it's how you determine whether a statement is true or not. Or, it's what makes a statement true.

The snow is white. Okay, so something makes that true or false.

Well, it's how you determine whether a statement is true or not. — Marchesk

"Determine"? "Decide" would be better. As in, the justification is why you decided to believe the statement.

But notice that both belief and justification are quite distinct from truth.

But not...

Or, it's what makes a statement true. — Marchesk

What makes "The snow is white" true is the snow being white. That's not a justification.

A justification would be "I see the snow, and it is white, therefore I believe "the snow is white" is true.

What makes "The snow is white" true is the snow being white. That's not a justification. — Banno

But this seems odd. You have a statement and then you have a state of affairs. The statement is true if the state of affairs is what the statement says it is.

State of affairs might be controversial, so substitute in actual, non-linquistic, intersubjective, empirical snow. That cold stuff that falls out of the sky on winter days that we ball up and throw at people which is usually white.

I'd say it's wise to not presume to know The Truth, but foolhardy to assume you know nothing of it.

But this seems odd. — Marchesk

I don;t see why. That is, I don't follow your comment. After all, I know what white is, and what snow is, and that s\now is indeed usually white, and if we both looked at some snow we may agree that it is white.

But what is a "state of affairs"? And why bother to introduce it?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth

Thought I'd look at wikipedia, and look at that illustration on the right. Time saving truth from falsehood and envy. All the answers in time, I think I'll reiterate.

But what is a "state of affairs"? And why bother to introduce it? — Banno

Because statements about things like the color of snow or the location of cats is about things which aren't statements. And if those things are what the statements say they are, then the statements are true. So you have a condition in the world referenced correctly by the statement.

It's a general form of what constitutes a true empirical statement.

So a state of affairs is not a statement.

If I ask "what it the state of affairs that makes the statement "Snow is white" true?', is your answer that snow is white?

So "Snow is white" is a statement, and not a state of affairs, but that snow is white is a state of affairs, but not a statement?

This line of thinking is quite confused.

Can we get by without it? I think we can.

Can we get by without it? I think we can. — Banno

If so, then this would be a case where Wittgenstein was right about philosophers abusing language.