OK, perhaps you can, but will it account for the human experience I have described? The feel of the water as my hand passes through it. The trees on the bank, and the rustling sound of their leaves blowing in the wind? ... In other words, the whole experience, as a human experiences it. Can you describe that adequately and usefully in terms of neural activity? I don't think that's possible, is it? — Pattern-chaser

>I think it is possible. I dont see why a physical process involving the laws of physics should be impossible to describe. How to describe it may depend on your definition of "describe".
It should be quite plausible to describe every step of the mechanical function involved with the sensory input, neural activity, and instinctual triggers of emotion. Objectively, this is "describing".
I think describing the mechanical function of these processes seems inadequate, but I think that is just a subjective perspective from humans who experience it, because it "seems" so significant.
Realistically, I think that is all that it takes to describe any human experience.

Another type of "describing" could be using vocabulary which we've made up to represent different types of different sensory experiences. This type of description is only as effective as the knowledge of the terms, and past experiences involving the relevant terms, by the people involved in the communication for description.

I am not aware of any human experience that is not a "conscious aware" experience. Perception precedes experience, as it must, but the human does not experience the experience (sorry! :wink:) until it reaches our conscious minds, and then we become aware of it. — Pattern-chaser

>Fair enough, if thats what you consider to be an experience. So does that mean you agree that humans perceive many things daily, subconsciously, which don't count as an experience, because we are not consciously aware of them? Basically, the majority of data that your senses percieve, but you are not consciously aware of.
And would you agree then, that most of what animals percieve is not an experience, if they are not consciously aware of it?

I think you're saying here that an experience that barely (or doesn't?) registers in our awareness is closer to "neural activity" than one which engages our attention thoroughly?... I refer to the whole process of human perception, followed by the thoughts and feelings that come with the experience once it enters our conscious awareness. The whole thing. — Pattern-chaser

>I'm not saying less aware experiences are closer to neural activity, but more that those experiences are more simply explained by neural activity, as I believe they mostly are explained already. So since those experiences are basically neural activity, and the gradual adjustment to more aware experiences theoretically only involves more neural activity, there seems to be no big gap between experience and neural activity.

I refer to the whole process of human perception, followed by the thoughts and feelings that come with the experience once it enters our conscious awareness. The whole thing. — Pattern-chaser

>But are thoughts anything more than neural activity, accessing memories of words which represent objects and concepts saved in memory?
And emotion, anything more than feedback triggers connected to memories, to signal "repeat this scenario" or "do not repeat"?

These bytes don't change with the screen display. They are the instructions that cause the computer to execute word processing functions. — Pattern-chaser

>But once the instructions causes word processing functions, this would then cause the screen display to change, as word functions are executed, wouldn't they?

And I contest your assertion that neuroscience is "detailed". The problem here, with the abstract distance between neural activity and human experience, is that the gap between the two is huge, and not yet understood or "detailed". — Pattern-chaser

What combination of neurons fire in these circumstances? What are the weightings that cause them to fire in this way, not another? And what is your detailed description of how the firing of these particular neurons gives rise to these experiences? — Pattern-chaser

>I didnt say that neural science is necessarily significantly detailed, but that "If the stream of bytes was measurable and detailed to the same degree". Basically, that neural activity is detailed to the degree that is sufficient to determine general functions. So detail to those extents that you mentioned, is not necessary for determining general functions, I think.
There is currently neural mapping which can record neural activity correlated with different actions and thoughts of an individual, which can then make predictions to a reasonable degree though.

How does my experience of joy, fear or grief affect my neural activity (or vice versa, if you prefer :wink:)? — Pattern-chaser

>I believe the basic connection between the 2 is generally understood, at least to the degree of function. Joy or happiness, are basically positive feedback triggers, connected to memories (and therein neural activity) of scenarios which have been triggered as positive, to cause the individual to repeat the circumstances in the future. Fear and grief are more like negative feedback, linked with memories, intended to cause the person to avoid those circumstances. Of course each emotion is more complicated than that in detail, but that is the basics.

There is much more to it than mere sensation. — Pattern-chaser

>I dont think I grasp your explanation which argues this point. Other than sensation, there is neural activity and emotion, but what more?

Yes, we could reasonably see the eye as measuring light, but it does not code "it into neurons". The optic nerve itself begins the neural processing, even before the data reaches the brain proper. — Pattern-chaser

>What is the difference in concept, between [the optic nerve beginning neural processing for data to reach the brain], and [coding into neurons]?

It is not sense - store - recall - review. It is more like sense - perceive - associate - interpret - integrate into worldview - conscious awareness. — Pattern-chaser

>But the steps of "associate - interpret - integrate into worldview" are all neural activity, of relative memories (and could be summarized as "store"), wouldnt you agree?
So how does this suggest that conscious experience is still any more than sensory perception + neural activity?

Note in particular that only at the final stage, when perception is effectively complete, is the information passed to our conscious awareness. Prior to that, there is no conscious input to the process whatever. Not even the tiniest bit. Perception is pre-conscious. And it is much more than detecting light, and storing the fact that we detected it. — Pattern-chaser

>I think I can agree that conscious awareness can be only the final stage. But how does that suggest that the process is anything more than senses and neural activity? Those middle stages are still neural activity (subconscious), to my knowledge, just not extensive and complex neural activity of the final stage of conscious awareness.
As far as I see it being more than, detecting light and storing the data, it seems to be only the additional concept of accessing corresponding memory data, connected to that similar pattern of light.

Science does not acknowledge or detect (using the red snooker ball example) the wealth of meaning contained within the human concepts of "red" "snooker" and "ball", — Pattern-chaser

>I think I disagree. Science does acknowledge and detect the meaning, as science acknowledges the concept that those terms are meaningful based on alternate memories of similar objects or concepts. I see no more meaning to the terms than, memories of the concepts, + comprehension of the interaction of the objects (ie memories of outcomes of the concepts interacting with variables). I think science acknowledges that (or at least is should ha ha)

It's a complicated subject, of which we know only the most basic details, as yet. — Pattern-chaser

>I believe for a lot of concepts, all that is necessary to comprehend the function, is basic details. Basic details provide patterns of cause and effect (which I think is also the basic cause of conscious comprehension :)), which provides the answer of function.

But current knowledge definitely indicates that you underestimate or misunderstand what human perception involves. — Pattern-chaser

>Perhaps I do underestimate or misunderstand, but then I must also misunderstand your reasoning which suggests this. Maybe it is regarding those middle steps of "associate - interpret - integrate into worldview -" which I suppose you believe involve more than neural activity, but I believe are simply neural activity of linked relative memories.

OK, perhaps you can, but will it account for the human experience I have described? The feel of the water as my hand passes through it. The trees on the bank, and the rustling sound of their leaves blowing in the wind? The smell of a local brewery nearby, and the imagined pleasure of drinking a pint of beer, that might soon follow...? In other words, the whole experience, as a human experiences it. Can you describe that adequately and usefully in terms of neural activity? I don't think that's possible, is it? — Pattern-chaser

I think it is possible. I don't see why a physical process involving the laws of physics should be impossible to describe. How to describe it may depend on your definition of "describe".
It should be quite plausible to describe every step of the mechanical function involved with the sensory input, neural activity, and instinctual triggers of emotion. — Tyler

I never thought it impossible to describe, I thought (and still think) it impossible-to-describe-adequately-and-usefully. By this I mean to be clear: adequately and usefully to a normal human being, living a real life in the real world. Oh, and I'm not trying to describe "a physical process involving the laws of physics". Look what I said:

...will it account for the human experience I have described? The feel of the water as my hand passes through it. The trees on the bank, and the rustling sound of their leaves blowing in the wind? The smell of a local brewery nearby, and the imagined pleasure of drinking a pint of beer, that might soon follow...? In other words, the whole experience, as a human experiences it. — Pattern-chaser

I'm suggesting that your perspective does not meet the needs of humans living their everyday lives. And so your philosophy is not useful to them, despite the benefits you see in it for other reasons. You are not wrong. That's not what I'm saying. But your approach is less than useful. That's what I'm saying. :up:

So does that mean you agree that humans perceive many things daily, subconsciously, which don't count as an experience, because we are not consciously aware of them? Basically, the majority of data that your senses perceive, but you are not consciously aware of.
And would you agree then, that most of what animals perceive is not an experience, if they are not consciously aware of it? — Tyler

No, I would say the opposite, that all of the experiences you describe are valid experiences. All of them. ... Oh, wait. I see what you're getting at. :wink: Thanks for picking up my inconsistency. :up: :smile:

My newly-clarified view is that there are three types of event, in this context. The first type is not detected by our senses, or is discarded during perception; the event is not experienced. The second type is experienced consciously. The third is experienced, but outside of conscious awareness, by our nonconscious minds.

These bytes don't change with the screen display. They are the instructions that cause the computer to execute word processing functions. — Pattern-chaser


>But once the instructions causes word processing functions, this would then cause the screen display to change, as word functions are executed, wouldn't they? — Tyler

You misunderstand me. I note that the program bytes are read, and executed, but they are not changed by this. Stored data are changed, but stored instructions are not. Note also that I refer to the analogy of a computer program, not directly to that which the analogy refers.

How does my experience of joy, fear or grief affect my neural activity (or vice versa, if you prefer :wink:)? — Pattern-chaser


>I believe the basic connection between the 2 is generally understood, at least to the degree of function. — Tyler

And this is where we diverge, I think. This has nothing to do with 'function'. Experience is not function.

There is much more to it than mere sensation. — Pattern-chaser


>I dont think I grasp your explanation which argues this point. Other than sensation, there is neural activity and emotion, but what more? — Tyler

Perception. Oh, and please let me be clear on this: I do not argue against your view that the mind is based upon neural activity. I don't argue for it either, but it's probably a good guess. :wink: My point is limited to what I have already said: that the abstract gap between neural activity and the human mind - or consciousness, if you prefer - is just too wide for us to conveniently and usefully bridge.

It is not sense - store - recall - review. It is more like sense - perceive - associate - interpret - integrate into worldview - conscious awareness. — Pattern-chaser


>But the steps of "associate - interpret - integrate into worldview" are all neural activity, of relative memories (and could be summarized as "store"), wouldn't you agree? — Tyler

I would definitely not agree that the above could be summarised as 'store'. You are ignoring the analysis, interpretation and understanding of what has been detected by our senses. Which is to say, you are ignoring perception, as we humans do it. We cannot and do not simply store data gathered by our senses. We interpret it first, and fit it to our needs and our dynamic worldview.

Your thesis, that you have repeated a number of times, is that the human mind, or consciousness, can be reduced to neural activity. I do not dispute your belief, I challenge only its usefulness. For you are not asserting a property or attribute of mind, brain or consciousness, you are only saying "this problem should be addressed using the scientific technique known as reductionism". And this I strongly dispute. Reductionism, and even science itself, are inappropriate tools to use on this particular problem. [I.e. a consideration of the human mind, or consciousness.] There are many reasons why this should be so; here is one of them.

Reductionism splits a problem into simpler sub-problems, again and again, until the sub-sub-problems are small and simple enough to be solved in isolation. Later, if we're lucky and the scientist in question is sufficiently thorough, we will make some attempt to reassemble the parts of the original issue, and maybe try to reach a holistic understanding of the whole, by combining the tiny explanations that we found via reductionism.

But the mind and the brain, as problems, or subjects for investigation, are defined by their connections more than by their components. A neuron alone does nothing useful. A neuron connected to a (very) large network of other neurons can participate in the operation of a whole brain. It's the connections that define it, mostly. And, if we approach it via reductionism, the first thing we do is to (unknowingly, one assumes) discard nearly all of the relevant data (the connections), and investigate the remnants, which are the disconnected (i.e. maimed) components of the object of interest. Such an approach cannot succeed, for the brain, mind, and all similar things. I.e. things whose interconnections are a significant part of what they are, and how they function.

I am always trying to emphasize the difference between the external Physical Phenomenon and the internal Conscious Phenomenon. When I say Conscious Sound I am referring to the internal Experience. Doesn't matter if someone is mentally focusing on it or not. — SteveKlinko

> Fair enough, if that is your intent of the term "conscious sound", but that would mean conscious sound includes the simple (compared to conscious awareness) process of hearing, which is pretty much explained by science. By that definition of conscious sound, it could include any animal receiving audio, or human hearing without even noticing they heard (often saved to subconscious). So, i think my point was, if this simple "conscious sound" is explained by science, then there is not such a big gap from that to a gradual increase of mental attentiveness to the sound, where it would become consciousness of the sound.

The sensation of Tone-ness is only in the Conscious Sound which the Brain creates as a Surrogate for the 440Hz. The Tone sensation that you hear seems so appropriate for the Physical Phenomenon because it is the only way you have ever experienced Physical Sound. That is through the Surrogate which has nothing to do with the 440Hz itself. — SteveKlinko

> I agree with most of what you said, except that the surrogate has nothing to do with the 440Hz. The surrogate does have something to do with the 440Hz, because the surrogate used a (rough) measurement of the 440Hz to create the surrogate.

But what is the Surrogate? That is the Hard Problem of Consciousness. — SteveKlinko

> The surrogate is simply the mechanical function described.
I think this is similar to my previous attempted explanation of consciousness in general. I believe the mechanical function IS the explanation. I don't see what more needs to be explained.
Sound and toneness seems weird to us, when you think about it, that is only the physical process, and interpreted by our ears and brain to turn into the sound we hear. But I think the surrogate of sound only SEEMS like something more, when we use consciousness to be aware of it.

I See Places and People in my Dreams all the time that I have never Seen. Why not a Sound that I have never heard? — SteveKlinko

In your dreams, you see new combinations of images that you have seen before, but you never see an entirely new color or pixel, which you have never seen before. Dreams are just like imagination, how they only use what your senses have recorded previously, and take tiny portions (to the smallest size that your senses and memory recorded) to make new combinations, whether pixels/colors, or pitches of sound.

This is all at the Front End of the processing. It is all Neural Correlates of Consciousness. — SteveKlinko

> It may be the front end of processing, but is basically how the brain records. The next steps would be accessing memories. True they are neural correlates of consciousness, which makes them more likely to be involved in the cause of consciousness.

Then, for the Conscious Experience, it just has to be explained how the correct combination of accessing these memories, with relevant alternate memories, causes a conscious experience
— Tyler
Yes, huge Explanatory Gap is still there. This is the Hard Problem of Consciousness. — SteveKlinko

>But it doesnt seem so huge of a gap. Simultaneous memory access of a factor, plus its relative cause and effect. There, no problem :)

Husserl had all of this way before Chalmers and everyone else. He called it the hyle.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/#EpoPerNoeHylTimConPheRed

"In the case of perceptual experience one cannot, of course, both fall victim to and at the same time discover a particular perceptual error; it is always possible that one is subject to an illusion or even a hallucination, so that one's perceptual experience is not veridical. If one is hallucinating, there is really no object of perception. However, phenomenologically the experience one undergoes is exactly the same as if one were successfully perceiving an external object.

Therefore, the (adequacy of a) phenomenological description of a perceptual experience should be independent of whether for the experience under investigation there is an object it represents or not. Either way, there will at least be a perceptual content (if not the same content on both sides, though). It is this content that Husserl calls the perceptual noema. Thanks to its noema, even a hallucination is an intentional act, an experience “as of” an object. Phenomenological description is concerned with those aspects of the noema that remain the same irrespective of whether the experience in question is veridical or not. Thus, our phenomenologist must not employ—he (or she) must “bracket”—his belief in the existence of the perceptual object."

Actually, Nietzsche thought it this in the 1800s...

"What is a word? The copy of a nerve stimulus in sounds. To go on to infer from the nerve stimulus to a cause outside of us, however, is already the result of a false and unjustified application of the principle of sufficient reason (kant). If truth alone had been decisive in the genesis of language, and the standpoint of certainty in the genesis of the designations of things, how would we be entitled to say, "The stone is hard," as if hard we're something otherwise known to us and not a wholly subjective impression? We divide things according to genders: we call the tree (der Baum) masculine and the plant (die Pflanze) feminine--whag arbitrary transferences! How far-flung beyond the canon of certainty! We speak of a snake: the designation pertains only to it's slithering movement and so could as easily apply to a worm. What arbitrary demarcations, what one-sided preferences for now this, now that property of a thing! All the different languages, set along side one another, show that when it comes to words, truth--full and adequate expression--is never what matters; otherwise there wouldn't be so many languages. The "thing in itself" (which would be, precisely, pure truth without consequences) is utterly unintelligible, even for the creator of a language, and certainly nothing to strive for, for he designates only the relations of things to human beings and helps himself to the boldest metaphors. First, to transfer a nerve stimulus into an image--first metaphor! The image again copied into a sound--second metaphor! And each time a complete leap out of one sphere into an entirely new and different one. . . We think we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow and flowers, yet we possess only metaphors of the things, which in no way correspond to the original essences. . . In any case, the emergence of language did not come about logically, and the very material in which and with which the man of truth--the scientist, the philosopher--later works and builds derives, if not from Cloud Cuckoo Land, then at least not from the essence of things either.

Let us contemplate in a particular the formation of concepts: every word becomes a concept, not just when it is meant to serve as a kind of reminder of the single, absolutely individualized original experience to which it owes its emergence, but when it has to fit countless more or less similar--that is, strictly speaking, never equal, hence blatantly unequal--cases. Every concept arises by means of the equating of the unequal. Just as certain as it is that no one leaf is exactly the same as any other, so, too, it is certain that the concept LEAF is formed by arbitrarily ignoring these individual differences, by forgetting what distinguishes one from the other, thus giving rise to the notion that there is in nature something other than leaves, something like "The Leaf," a kind of prototype according to which all leaves we're woven, drawn, delineated, colored, crimped, painted, but by unskilled hands, so that no specimen turned out correctly or reliably as a true copy of the prototype. We call a man honest. We ask, "Why did he act so honestly today?" Our answer is, usually, "Because of his honesty." Honesty! Which is again like saying, "Leaf is the cause of leaves." We really have no knowledge at all of an essential quality called Honesty, but we do know countless individualized, hence unequal, actions, which we equate by leaving aside the unequal and henceforth designate as honest actions; finally, from them we formulate a qualitas occulta with the name Honesty.

Overlooking the individual and the actual yields concepts, just as it yields forms, whereas nature knows neither forms nor concepts, hence no species, but only what remains for us an inaccessible and indefinable X. For even the distinction we draw between the individual and the species is anthropomorphic and does not stem from the essence of things, though neither can we say that it does not correspond to the essence of things, for that would be a dogmatic assertion and as such just as indemonstrable as it its counterpart.

What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms--in short, a sum of human relations that have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, translated, and embellished, and that after long use strike people as fixed, canonical, and binding: truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions, metaphors that have become worn-out and deprived of their sensuous force, coins that have lost their imprint and are now no longer seen as coins but as metal. . .

As a rational being he now submits his actions to the rule of abstractions: no longer does he let himself be swept away by sudden impression, by intuitions, he first generalizes all these impressions into paler, cooler concepts in order to hitch the wagon of his life and his action to them. Everything that distinguishes man from beast hinges on this capacity to dispel intuitive metaphors in a schema, hence to dissolve an image into a concept. For in the realm of those schemata something becomes possible that could never be achieved by intuitive first impressions, namely, the construction of a pyrimidal order of castes and degrees, creating a new world of laws privileges, subordination, and boundary demarcations, which now stands over against the other intuitive world of first impressions as the more fixed, more universal, more familiar, more human, hence something regatory and imperative. Whereas every metaphor of intuition is individual and without equal and so always knows how to escape all classification, the great edifice of concepts exhibits the rigid regularity of a Roman columbarium and in logic exhales the severity and coolness proper to mathematics. Whoever has felt that breath will scarcely believe that concepts, too, as bony and eight cornered as dice, and just as moveable, are but the lingering RESIDUES OF METAPHORS, and that the illusion of the artistic rendering of a nerve stimulus into images is, if not the mother, then at least the grandmother of every concept."

Friedrich Nietzsche - On Truth and Lie in a Nonmoral Sense (1873)

And then he goes on and on to destroy knowledge.

@Pattern-chaser @SteveKlinko

I thought (and still think) it impossible-to-describe-adequately-and-usefully. By this I mean to be clear: adequately and usefully to a normal human being, living a real life in the real world. — Pattern-chaser

> I still dont think it would be impossible to describe clearly to the average person. If it is possible to describe the technicalities, then it should also likely be possible to describe clearly to an average person. At this point of common knowledge and understanding, it may take a lot of information, and a lot of time for the description (like maybe even a multiple year university course), but eventually an average person could understand it clearly, I think. If so, then its still possible to describe. Perhaps it cant be described quickly or easily, if described thoroughly.

Oh, and I'm not trying to describe "a physical process involving the laws of physics". Look what I said:
...will it account for the human experience I have described? The feel of the water as my hand passes through it. The trees on the bank, and the rustling sound of their leaves blowing in the wind? — Pattern-chaser

> So, do you not consider human experience to be a physical process, and involve the laws of physics?
Even though it involves the brain, I would still consider experience to be technically a physical process, involving the laws of physics. Every process involved in the brain, to create a human experience, should be a physical, material process, I think. Otherwise, its immaterial, defying the laws of physics, as we know it?

I'm suggesting that your perspective does not meet the needs of humans living their everyday lives. And so your philosophy is not useful to them, despite the benefits you see in it for other reasons. You are not wrong. That's not what I'm saying. But your approach is less than useful. That's what I'm saying. :up: — Pattern-chaser

> Is it necessary for an explanation or description to be understandable by every day people? I think a lot of science is not easily understood by most people, yet it is still useful. As long as an explanation or description of the function of a process is understood by some (relevant experts), they can interpret the relevancy of the cause and effect of the function of that concept.

The first type is not detected by our senses, or is discarded during perception; the event is not experienced. The second type is experienced consciously. The third is experienced, but outside of conscious awareness, by our nonconscious minds. — Pattern-chaser

> Agreed

And this is where we diverge, I think. This has nothing to do with 'function'. Experience is not function. — Pattern-chaser

> Yes, I think this is where we disagree. Which sort of explains some of the disagreements with the previous post, regarding explanation of experience being a physical process.
I think that experience is a function of humans, and animals (if non-conscious experience is included). I believe experience is the effect, caused by the function of brain activity. I believe the mechanical, physical process of the brain, is the function of experience.

Other than sensation, there is neural activity and emotion, but what more?
— Tyler

Perception. — Pattern-chaser

> I would argue that perception is neural activity, and therefore not anything additional. I think my argument here is related to my theory of the explanation of consciousness though, so there is likely no distinct evidence that perception is only neural activity. Just conceptual theory.

:wink: My point is limited to what I have already said: that the abstract gap between neural activity and the human mind - or consciousness, if you prefer - is just too wide for us to conveniently and usefully bridge. — Pattern-chaser

> And I think this brings me back to my point that humans have experiences lacking in conscious awareness. I think this point is relevant because, if humans have those simpler experiences, and if its agreed that those simpler experiences are explainable, then the gap is not large between the explanation of those simpler experiences and more complex experiences, involving conscious awareness. The gap should not be large, because the spectrum of experiences from simple (non-conscious aware) to complex (conscious aware), should be gradual. If it is a gradual change from non-conscious to conscious (since there is varying degrees of conscious awareness relative to the experience), then it is a gradual gap. We just have to explain the experiences, starting from simple, as they increase in degree of conscious awareness.

You are ignoring the analysis, interpretation and understanding of what has been detected by our senses. Which is to say, you are ignoring perception, as we humans do it. — Pattern-chaser

> I see. this comes back again to differing understanding of: perception, as well as analysis, interpretation and understanding. I think I would consider these processes to be neural activity and memory access. I believe interpretation and analysis function by relating relevant memories. Basically, its active memory access of concepts and cause and effect of the factors involved. So attempted understanding, would involve actively accessing memories of the factors of which are being attempted to be understood. The brain accesses memories of each factor, and the relative cause and effect that that factor has in varying circumstances. The more accurate the comprehension and understanding, the more accurate each factor is analysed and compared to memory for the most accurate cause and effect of that factor.

But the mind and the brain, as problems, or subjects for investigation, are defined by their connections more than by their components. A neuron alone does nothing useful. A neuron connected to a (very) large network of other neurons can participate in the operation of a whole brain. It's the connections that define it, mostly. And, if we approach it via reductionism, the first thing we do is to (unknowingly, one assumes) discard nearly all of the relevant data (the connections), and investigate the remnants, which are the disconnected (i.e. maimed) components of the object of interest. Such an approach cannot succeed, for the brain, mind, and all similar things. I.e. things whose interconnections are a significant part of what they are, and how they function. — Pattern-chaser

> I think I mostly understand your point, and agree that it cannot be explained by only reductionism. But I think reductionism is a very effective step. I think explaining each portion is good evidence, to then take a next step, to use those portions in an explanation of the overall function of a concept. If all the portions are explained, and then further more, the connections of the portions are explained, to overlap all portions, then the overview of the entire combination of the concept can be put together like a puzzle.
So, true that the explanations of portional components of experience and neural activity doesnt explain consciousness overall. But it is evidence pointing toward the overall explanation. I believe that overall function of consciousness is explainable using those components.

[T]his brings me back to my point that humans have experiences lacking in conscious awareness. I think this point is relevant because, if humans have those simpler experiences, and if it's agreed that those simpler experiences are explainable, then the gap is not large between the explanation of those simpler experiences and more complex experiences, involving conscious awareness. — Tyler

First, it is not clear to me that "experiences lacking in conscious awareness" are "simpler". Do you offer any justification for this assumption? [I do not challenge your assumption, but I point out that it is one, and wonder if you can justify what you have claimed? :chin: ]

"if it's agreed that those simpler experiences are explainable" - again, this has not been established. You have asserted so, but offered no justification. Please explain these 'simpler' experiences, in terms of neural activity. You keep asserting that these explanations can be provided, so please do. I look forward to reading them, and learning. :chin: :wink:

We just have to explain the experiences, starting from simple, as they increase in degree of conscious awareness. — Tyler

Go on then....

I am confused. First you agree that reductionism cannot properly investigate something whose function is primarily related to the connections between its components:

I think I mostly understand your point, and agree that it cannot be explained by only reductionism. — Tyler

Then you ignore this, and repeat your previous (unjustified) assertion:

If all the portions are explained, and then further more, the connections of the portions are explained, to overlap all portions, then the overview of the entire combination of the concept can be put together like a puzzle. — Tyler

But how will you explain the connections when you have used a reductionist approach? Let's just remind ourselves, again, how reductionism works. Divide and conquer. The components are disconnected - and further disassembled themselves, if necessary - until the remaining fragments are simple enough to be analysed and understood in isolation. Where significant functionality lies in the connections, it is necessarily lost in the reductive dismembering!

Please explain how "the connections of the portions are explained", when those connections were ignored and destroyed by your reductionist approach. :chin:

Following from the OP, please allow me to give my take on this topic using what I believe are the basic mental processes preceding the idea of 'knowing something'.

Sensation - The recognition of neural impacts by the 'mind' or 'mental process'. This means that the 'mental process' has determined that the brain has registered (recorded and categorized) an impulse which has come through any of its neural pathways.

The brain and the neural pathways act as both recording and filtering instruments. The vibrations from an external object (red light - light whose wavelength and frequency is within the range we identify as red.) reaches the nerve fibres through the specialized organs (in this case, the eyes, others sensory organs include the nose, tongue, etc.). Upon impact that vibration induces a nerve signal in the nerve fibres which is then carried to the brain. Each nerve signal is received as a unique impression and graded in accordance with its characteristics such that even minute changes produce minute differences in the nerve signal induced. The signals are then recorded in the brain, each signal in its own domain. (Signals from the nerves in the eyes are recorded separately from those in the nose or skin.) In this way the neural organization is the first filter. From there, the 'mind' applies its own processing towards identifying the impulse and determining a channel of response.

A major part of the mind's process is what we refer to as attention.

Attention - The focus or distinct application of concentrated awareness towards an object/subject.

"The real truth is that we become conscious of the report of these senses only when the attention is directed toward the sensation, voluntarily or involuntarily. That is to say, that in many cases although the sense nerves and organs report a disturbance, the mind does not become consciously aware of the report unless the attention is directed toward it either by an act of will or else by reflex action. For instance, the clock may strike loudly, and yet we may not be conscious of the fact, for we are concentrating our attention upon a book; or we may eat the choicest food without tasting it, for we are listening intently to the conversation of our charming neighbor." -
From Your Mind and How to Use It by William Walker Atkinson.

Perception - The interpretation or characterization of the acquired sensation by the mind. This process relies heavily upon memory and, sometimes, a little upon the imagination.

"While perception depends upon the reports of the senses for its raw material, it depends entirely upon the application of the mind for its complete manifestation."
"A sensation is a simple report of the senses, which is received in consciousness. Perception is the thought arising from the feeling of the sensation. Perception usually combines several sensations into one thought or percept. By sensation the mind feels; by perception it knows that it feels, and recognizes the object causing the sensation."
"Sensation merely brings a report from outside objects, while perception identifies the report with the object which caused it. Perception interprets the reports of sensation. Sensation reports a flash of light from above; perception interprets the light as starlight, or moonlight, or sunlight. Sensation reports a sharp, pricking, painful contact; perception interprets it as the prick of a pin. Sensation reports a red spot on a green background; perception interprets it as a berry on a bush."
"Moreover, while we may perceive a simple single sensation, our perceptions are usually of a group of sensations. Perception is usually employed in grouping sensations and identifying them with the object or objects causing them. In its identification it draws upon whatever memory of past experiences the mind may possess. Memory, imagination, feeling, and thought are called into play, to some extent, in every clear perception."
"The infant has but feeble perception, but as it gains experience it begins to manifest perceptions and form percepts. Sensations resemble the letters of the alphabet, and perception the forming of words and sentences from the letters. Thus c, a, and t symbolize sensations, while the word “cat,” formed from them, symbolizes the perception of the object." - From Your Mind and How to Use It by William Walker Atkinson.

Conception - The process by which we create or develop objects/subjects in our minds in relation to the external objects and subjects perceived.

From perception, through processes such as reference to memory, abstraction, comparison, classification, generalization, imagination, etc., we create, build or develop an object/subject in our minds which bear characteristics which are similar or relatable to the external objects/subjects.

Therefore, that relationship between the concept and the external object/subject is what I refer to (not conclusively) as 'knowing'.

(Sorry, it turned out to be reeeaaally long.)

:gasp:

I have altered the definition of perception. Please bear with me.

I am always trying to emphasize the difference between the external Physical Phenomenon and the internal Conscious Phenomenon. When I say Conscious Sound I am referring to the internal Experience. Doesn't matter if someone is mentally focusing on it or not. — SteveKlinko> Fair enough, if that is your intent of the term "conscious sound", but that would mean conscious sound includes the simple (compared to conscious awareness) process of hearing, which is pretty much explained by science. By that definition of conscious sound, it could include any animal receiving audio, or human hearing without even noticing they heard (often saved to subconscious). So, i think my point was, if this simple "conscious sound" is explained by science, then there is not such a big gap from that to a gradual increase of mental attentiveness to the sound, where it would become consciousness of the sound.

The sensation of Tone-ness is only in the Conscious Sound which the Brain creates as a Surrogate for the 440Hz. The Tone sensation that you hear seems so appropriate for the Physical Phenomenon because it is the only way you have ever experienced Physical Sound. That is through the Surrogate which has nothing to do with the 440Hz itself. — SteveKlinko> I agree with most of what you said, except that the surrogate has nothing to do with the 440Hz. The surrogate does have something to do with the 440Hz, because the surrogate used a (rough) measurement of the 440Hz to create the surrogate.

But what is the Surrogate? That is the Hard Problem of Consciousness. — SteveKlinko> The surrogate is simply the mechanical function described.
I think this is similar to my previous attempted explanation of consciousness in general. I believe the mechanical function IS the explanation. I don't see what more needs to be explained.
Sound and toneness seems weird to us, when you think about it, that is only the physical process, and interpreted by our ears and brain to turn into the sound we hear. But I think the surrogate of sound only SEEMS like something more, when we use consciousness to be aware of it.

I See Places and People in my Dreams all the time that I have never Seen. Why not a Sound that I have never heard? — SteveKlinkoIn your dreams, you see new combinations of images that you have seen before, but you never see an entirely new color or pixel, which you have never seen before. Dreams are just like imagination, how they only use what your senses have recorded previously, and take tiny portions (to the smallest size that your senses and memory recorded) to make new combinations, whether pixels/colors, or pitches of sound.

This is all at the Front End of the processing. It is all Neural Correlates of Consciousness. — SteveKlinko> It may be the front end of processing, but is basically how the brain records. The next steps would be accessing memories. True they are neural correlates of consciousness, which makes them more likely to be involved in the cause of consciousness.

Then, for the Conscious Experience, it just has to be explained how the correct combination of accessing these memories, with relevant alternate memories, causes a conscious experience
— Tyler
Yes, huge Explanatory Gap is still there. This is the Hard Problem of Consciousness. — SteveKlinko>But it doesnt seem so huge of a gap. Simultaneous memory access of a factor, plus its relative cause and effect. There, no problem :) — Tyler

You are still saying that the Neural Activity happens and that Explains everything. It is mind boggling to me that you cannot realize the thing that is missing in your explanation. The thing that is missing is the Red experience itself and the 440Hz Tone experience itself.

We think we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow and flowers, yet we possess only metaphors of the things, which in no way correspond to the original essences — Blue Lux

Exactly. What I want to know is How do we come into possession of those Metaphors? What are those Metaphors? We have Neural Activity that seems to produce the Metaphors but we have no Explanation of How we experience the Metaphors. This is the Explanatory Gap of Consciousness.

Following from the OP, please allow me to give my take on this topic using what I believe are the basic mental processes preceding the idea of 'knowing something'.

Sensation - The recognition of neural impacts by the 'mind' or 'mental process'. This means that the 'mental process' has determined that the brain has registered (recorded and categorized) an impulse which has come through any of its neural pathways.

The brain and the neural pathways act as both recording and filtering instruments. The vibrations from an external object (red light - light whose wavelength and frequency is within the range we identify as red.) reaches the nerve fibres through the specialized organs (in this case, the eyes, others sensory organs include the nose, tongue, etc.). Upon impact that vibration induces a nerve signal in the nerve fibres which is then carried to the brain. Each nerve signal is received as a unique impression and graded in accordance with its characteristics such that even minute changes produce minute differences in the nerve signal induced. The signals are then recorded in the brain, each signal in its own domain. (Signals from the nerves in the eyes are recorded separately from those in the nose or skin.) In this way the neural organization is the first filter. From there, the 'mind' applies its own processing towards identifying the impulse and determining a channel of response.

A major part of the mind's process is what we refer to as attention.

Attention - The focus or distinct application of concentrated awareness towards an object/subject.

"The real truth is that we become conscious of the report of these senses only when the attention is directed toward the sensation, voluntarily or involuntarily. That is to say, that in many cases although the sense nerves and organs report a disturbance, the mind does not become consciously aware of the report unless the attention is directed toward it either by an act of will or else by reflex action. For instance, the clock may strike loudly, and yet we may not be conscious of the fact, for we are concentrating our attention upon a book; or we may eat the choicest food without tasting it, for we are listening intently to the conversation of our charming neighbor." -
From Your Mind and How to Use It by William Walker Atkinson.

Perception - The interpretation or characterization of the acquired sensation by the mind. This process relies heavily upon memory and, sometimes, a little upon the imagination.

"While perception depends upon the reports of the senses for its raw material, it depends entirely upon the application of the mind for its complete manifestation."
"A sensation is a simple report of the senses, which is received in consciousness. Perception is the thought arising from the feeling of the sensation. Perception usually combines several sensations into one thought or percept. By sensation the mind feels; by perception it knows that it feels, and recognizes the object causing the sensation."
"Sensation merely brings a report from outside objects, while perception identifies the report with the object which caused it. Perception interprets the reports of sensation. Sensation reports a flash of light from above; perception interprets the light as starlight, or moonlight, or sunlight. Sensation reports a sharp, pricking, painful contact; perception interprets it as the prick of a pin. Sensation reports a red spot on a green background; perception interprets it as a berry on a bush."
"Moreover, while we may perceive a simple single sensation, our perceptions are usually of a group of sensations. Perception is usually employed in grouping sensations and identifying them with the object or objects causing them. In its identification it draws upon whatever memory of past experiences the mind may possess. Memory, imagination, feeling, and thought are called into play, to some extent, in every clear perception."
"The infant has but feeble perception, but as it gains experience it begins to manifest perceptions and form percepts. Sensations resemble the letters of the alphabet, and perception the forming of words and sentences from the letters. Thus c, a, and t symbolize sensations, while the word “cat,” formed from them, symbolizes the perception of the object." - From Your Mind and How to Use It by William Walker Atkinson.

Conception - The process by which we create or develop objects/subjects in our minds in relation to the external objects and subjects perceived.

From perception, through processes such as reference to memory, abstraction, comparison, classification, generalization, imagination, etc., we create, build or develop an object/subject in our minds which bear characteristics which are similar or relatable to the external objects/subjects.

Therefore, that relationship between the concept and the external object/subject is what I refer to (not conclusively) as 'knowing'. — BrianW

This is all reasonable. But what I want to know is How does the Brain do all this with the result that I See the color Red or Hear a 440Hz Tone. I'm interested in the end product of all the Processing which is the Conscious Experience. How can Neural Activity of any kind ever result in a Red experience? Think about the Redness of the Red. What is that?

Which is precisely why knowledge is hugely a faith.

We have Neural Activity that seems to produce the Metaphors but we have no Explanation of How we experience the Metaphors. This is the Explanatory Gap of Consciousness — SteveKlinko

Neural activity produces the metaphors... (Metaphor!)

Why is there a need to explain and 'establish' our experience when it is already established, say NOW when I am seeing the screen of my phone, and I am translating my own meaning of words, and I am using as the most absolute reference knowable, my own experience? @SteveKlinko @BrianW@Pattern-chaser

How can Neural Activity of any kind ever result in a Red experience? Think about the Redness of the Red. What is that? — SteveKlinko

The 'red' or 'redness' that we perceive is the difference between the signals induced from the different vibrations impacting our senses. There are always multiple vibrations impacting our senses constantly and perception is the distinction between them. A red dot cannot be distinguished on a red paper (when both reds are of equal 'redness') because the filtration process is not equipped to do that. All products of perception are comparisons. We don't see red, we perceive a particular vibration in contrast to other vibrations. Red light is a vibration which is lacking in the other vibrations other than that which it has. It also explains the combination of colours to form a completely different colour. (When the vibrations are matched, from whatever circumstance is producing that effect, it becomes impossible for the brain to tell that there are different vibrations acting as a unity, e.g., purple -> red + blue; orange - red + yellow; white light -> all the vibrations in the spectrum.)

Why is there a need to explain and 'establish' our experience when it is already established, say NOW when I am seeing the screen of my phone, and I am translating my own meaning of words, and I am using as the most absolute reference knowable, my own experience? — Blue Lux

Because science is always seeking to establish its theories through objectivity. A fact is not significant if it does not have objective applications.

That is idiotic, sorry.

That is idiotic — Blue Lux

It is.

But, consider the gravitation theory and its many applications in projectile motion. For thousands of years civilizations had been applying those theories (hunting, fighting, etc), and yet until scientists found objective ways to explain them (Newton's theories), they remained in the pages of 'things we do but can't explain how we came about them'. Also, remember when computers were solely for industrial use -> they were like some kind of mythical tools from the gods. Nowadays, we can't imagine how small the capacity of the computer was which monitored the first rocket to space and to the moon.

If the best discovery or invention remained hidden in the scientist's basement, it may as well not exist. There's something to be said about sharing an experience.

But what does all of that really mean? It seems to me that all of that which you are speaking about only has meaning in terms of curiosity or fascination or infatuation.

How can Neural Activity of any kind ever result in a Red experience? Think about the Redness of the Red. — SteveKlinko

Colours are the cultural thing. Colour red is not perceived in some cultures. The sound is much more basic. :)

Unidirectional paradigm [cause → effect] or [input → processing → output] is causing all sorts of problems. The new paradigm is multi-directional [agent ↔ agent] (self-referral). This is explored in AI - Complex Adaptive System theory. (There is a good overview on Wikipedia.) :)

Also. Passive Perception theory is replaced by Active Perception theory. In active perception, there is a communication between eyes/ears and the rest of the brain.

We also tend to think in an egocentric way. An Australian aboriginal child thinks and acts in a geocentric way. The child will learn a new dance facing north, for example, and then will turn south and dance exactly with mirror-like moves... :)

Since [agent ↔ agent] includes self-referral the issue of consciousness is already half done. :)

Hearty, :cool:

It's about what you said about personal experiences:

I am seeing..., and I am translating my own meaning..., and I am using..., my own experience? — Blue Lux

I think we can't really limit experience as being independent of others. A big part of an individual is the interaction with society, therefore, an experience is established only when it relates with others. And I think that's what you meant by 'reference' in,

I am using as the most absolute reference knowable... — Blue Lux

. Meaning that even personal experiences must, at some level, infer a relation with that of others to be established.

I agree with you.

I just read something about this, about Simone De Beauvoir's philosophy.

"Beauvoir rejects the familiar charge against secularism made famous by Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor: “If God is dead everything is permitted”. As she sees it, without God to pardon us for our “sins” we are totally and inexcusably responsible for our actions. Dostoevsky was mistaken. The problem of secularism is not that of license, it is the problem of the “we”. Can separate existing individuals be bound to each other? Can they forge laws binding for all? The Ethics of Ambiguity insists that they can. It does this by arguing that evil resides in the denial of freedom (mine and others), that we are responsible for ensuring the existence of the conditions of freedom (the material conditions of a minimal standard of living and the political conditions of uncensored discourse and association), and that I can neither affirm nor live my freedom without also affirming the freedom of others."

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/beauvoir/#RecBea

The 'red' or 'redness' that we perceive is the difference between the signals induced from the different vibrations impacting our senses. There are always multiple vibrations impacting our senses constantly and perception is the distinction between them. A red dot cannot be distinguished on a red paper (when both reds are of equal 'redness') because the filtration process is not equipped to do that. All products of perception are comparisons. We don't see red, we perceive a particular vibration in contrast to other vibrations. Red light is a vibration which is lacking in the other vibrations other than that which it has. It also explains the combination of colours to form a completely different colour. (When the vibrations are matched, from whatever circumstance is producing that effect, it becomes impossible for the brain to tell that there are different vibrations acting as a unity, e.g., purple -> red + blue; orange - red + yellow; white light -> all the vibrations in the spectrum.) — BrianW

The reason we can't see the Red dot on the Red background is that we don't really see objects themselves. We only see the reflected Light. So if all the reflected Light is Red we won't see the Red dot. If we were able to see objects themselves then we would see the Red dot on the Red background because the reflected Light would be irrelevant. Objects in the World don't have Redness as a property. The Redness is a further processing stage in the Brain.

What we know about Redness is that certain Neural Activity has to happen before we experience it. The question remains as to how Neural Activity can result in an experience of Redness.

↪Tyler
Why is there a need to explain and 'establish' our experience when it is already established, say NOW when I am seeing the screen of my phone, and I am translating my own meaning of words, and I am using as the most absolute reference knowable, my own experience? SteveKlinko @BrianW@Pattern-chaser — Blue Lux

Why is there a need? Well, in absolute terms, there is no need. But we are humans, and we like to know things, and understand them too, if we can :wink:. Mostly, we can't, but we try anyway. So the need is our human aspiration to know and understand. Nothing more than that.