Do you agree this means that the souls in heaven do not sin? Don't they have free will, or does God remove our free will when we die? — Relativist

This is a good question -- one that has been resolved by Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae. When we choose, we always choose some good -- something that will satisfy a natural desire. Motivational psychology agrees on this, differing, perhaps, on the number and kinds of motivating factors. So, a sinner does not choose evil per se, but a defective good. (E.g. I want money or a dopamine rush, so I kill someone to get it.) In life, each option before us satisfies some of our desires while leaving others unsatisfied. So, we are free to select one set of partial satisfactions over another -- leaving us open to choosing evil (under the guise of good).

Once we are in the presence of God, we are in the presence of the highest good, fulfilling all our desires. So, there is no reason to choose a partial and incomplete good, and so sin. That need not mean that we have no choices. We could still have many different completely good lines of action open to us.

"Once we are in the presence of God, we are in the presence of the highest good, fulfilling all our desires. So, there is no reason to choose a partial and incomplete good, and so sin. That need not mean that we have no choices. We could still have many different completely good lines of action open to us."
Then you have to agree there is a possible state of affairs in which there exist free-willed creatures who do not sin. Why wouldn't an omnibenevolent God just place us in that environment to begin with?

↪Dfpolis
According to Romans 6:7: " anyone who has died has been set free from sin"

Do you agree this means that the souls in heaven do not sin? Don't they have free will, or does God remove our free will when we die?

My point is that this suggests there can exist free willed beings who do not sin, despite your claims to the contrary. — Relativist

Not sure I have ever seen an argument that depends on a state of affairs in heaven, as a defense for the argument from evil, Seems like a proposition in conflict with the conclusion to me.


To the point I would make the following argument.

There are two states of affairs we can identify as good and evil. In order for free will to exist in beings like us, both states must be an available choice. If beings like us were created with an inability to chose evil, there would be no option and no choice, and no free will.

Then the major question left, is free will, as opposed to no free will, a compensating good for the free choices of evil it allows?

Then you have to agree there is a possible state of affairs in which there exist free-willed creatures who do not sin. Why wouldn't an omnibenevolent God just place us in that environment to begin with? — Relativist

That is a very good question. I can only point to reality, and say that is not how God chose to create.

As I also know, with metaphysical certitude, that God exists, I'll just have to accept that I do not have all the answers.

"Not sure I have ever seen an argument that depends on a state of affairs in heaven, as a defense for the argument from evil, Seems like a proposition in conflict with the conclusion to me."
It shows that Christianity is incoherent.

"There are two states of affairs we can identify as good and evil. In order for free will to exist in beings like us, both states must be an available choice. If beings like us were created with an inability to chose evil, there would be no option and no choice, and no free will."
Are you saying the souls in heaven (i.e. the souls of dead, faithful Christians) are not "like us?"

I realize my argument would not convince a committed theist, but it should sway someone who's tries to objectively weigh God's existence and non-existence without presupposition.

I do not see how any anti theistic argument can be depended on a particular state of affairs in heaven

Look back at the argument. It basically shows that if Christianity is true (premise 4) then God is not omninenevolent (the conclusion). You could reject premise 4, but this is Christian doctrine. That's why I said an omnibenevolent God is not consistent with Christianity.

" an unnecessary adherence to what you perceive as the “conventional” isn’t helpful in philosophy"
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Sure, but unconventional positions must be explained and supported

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Of course. Evidently I should better clarify what I’ve meant.
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You say that abstract facts aren’t real or existent, and I say that I don’t claim that they’re real or existent. You say that abstract facts aren’t causative, and I say “causative of what?? I say that I don’t claim that they’ve caused anything substantial, or that this physical world is substantial, real or existent. ..other than in its own context (…but what in what other context do you believe or want for it to be real and existent?).
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But I’m not asserting that this physical world doesn’t have whatever reality, existence or special ontological status you believe it does. But I merely ask you to specify what you mean when you claim that it does. …and to tell why you think it must.
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I assert only that there are abstract facts, in the sense that we can speak of them. Other than that, I don’t assert the existence or reality of anything describable, including the abstract facts that I refer to.
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Of course nor do I assert about indescribable matters. So really I’m not asserting anything at all (…other than the very modest assertion in the paragraph above).
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To ensure that that’s so, then, instead of asserting that there’s no reason to believe that this physical world is other than the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story, I’ll instead just ask for a reason why it must be.
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You say that I don’t support my assertions, My one and only assertion (as of now, at least) in this discussion is that there are abstract facts, in the sense that we can speak of them. Do you really doubt or deny that?
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As you said, the burden of proof is on the person who is making an ontological claim or assertion. In this discussion, that’s you.
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, whereas conventional positions are generally understood.

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…and too readily uncritically-believed.
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You are presumably criticizing my position

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I’m merely inviting you to tell what you mean when you say that this physical world is real and existent. …what special ontic-status you claim that this physical world has. …what you think that this physical world is, other than the hypothetical setting for the hypothetical life-experience-story that I’ve described.
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In what context or manner, other than its own, do you believe that this physical world is real and existent?
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That isn’t a criticism; it’s just a question.
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, which is perfectly fine, but if your counter depends on some unconventional views, you have the burden of explaining and supporting them

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As explained above, I’m not making any assertions. I’m merely asking questions. As I said, the burden of verification or justification is on the person making an assertion, and that’s you.
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As for explanation, I’ve genuinely been doing my best. If there remains anything unclear, I’ll answer any specific question.
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- and you haven't really done this.

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Then I hope that I’ve now better clarified what I assert, what I don’t assert, and what I’m asking.
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It has seemed more of a guessing game

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I don’t recommend or encourage playing guessing-games.
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…where you make some assertion and then I have to guess at what you mean

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I’ve now clarified that there’s only one modest assertion that I’m making in this discussion. …and I hope that I’ve sufficiently clarified what it is. I’ll repeat it here:
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**There are abstract facts, including abstract implications, in the sense that we can speak of them.**
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That’s what I mean. That’s all that I assert here.
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Then I refer to complex systems of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things—and, for each such system, many configurations of mutually-consistent hypothetical truth-values for those propositions.
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…without any claim that any of those propositions are true.
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(I modestly suggest that there’s no reason to believe that any of them are true, but that isn’t an assertion.)
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Then I refer to, among the infinity of such complex hypothetical logical systems, one that models your experience in this physical world.
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And I ask what, specifically, you think this physical world is, other than the hypothetical setting in that hypothetical logical system, which I call your “experience-story”.
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If you claim that this physical world has reality, existence or ontic-status other than that, then I ask you, specifically, what you mean by that.
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If you claim that this physical world is real and existent in a context other than its own context and the context of your life-experience, then I ask you, specifically, what context that would be.
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And I ask what your justification is for any ontological assertion(s) that you make in answer to one or both of the questions asked in the two paragraphs before this one.
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The paragraphs immediately above this one list the questions that I ask.
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The above is an effort to better clarify what I assert, what I don’t assert or claim, and what I ask.
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, then you reply that I got it wrong and hint at some more things for me to guess at.

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I don’t suggest, recommend or encourage guessing about what someone means. If there’s something I said that you don’t know the meaning of, then ask what I meant. ….and specify the particular passage, and what is unclear about its meaning.
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I haven’t even discerned whether or not you are a theist.

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I’m a Theist.
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I emphasize that (I suggest that) the discussion of Theism is outside the area of discussion that is describable, explainable, assertable, arguable, or provable.
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I rarely use the word “God”, other than when answering someone who has done so. It seems anthropomorphic, simplistic, and presumptuous about the applicable range or our descriptions, to imply that we’re discussing a being with a name.
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It’s my (not assertable, arguable or provable) impression and feeling that what-is, is good, and, in fact, that there’s good intent behind what-is.
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I suggest (but don’t claim to prove) that metaphysics implies or suggests that, or gives that impression.
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I suggest that philosophy of mind does too. …and would even for Materialists.
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But I make no claim to list all that could suggest or imply that.
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And I emphasize that I don’t claim that I’m anything I’m saying in this matter is assertable, arguable or provable.
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you have questioned my term "ontological status, so I'll clarify: the ontological status of X entails: does X actually exist? Does it exist hypothetically? What properties does X have, and what relations does it have to other things that exist? Does it exist necessaily or contingently?

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Alright, and, as I clarified above, I’m asking what it means to say that this physical world “actually exists”.
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One accepted meaning for “actual” is: “Of, in, part of, consisting of, or referring to, this physical world”.
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By that definition, it’s trivially, tautologically, true that this physical universe “actually” exists.
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Can you support a claim that this physical world, and the experience-story that is your life, are other than hypothetical?

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"I was referring to your Subjectivism objection."

What subjectivist objection? I didn't know I made one, so this might be a misunderstanding on your part.

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I was referring to your comment that there are abstract facts only because there are humans to discuss them.
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For one thing, that doesn’t matter, because there are humans who discuss them.
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There are abstract facts, in the sense that we can discuss them.
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"Saying that the abstract facts depend on there being someone to discuss them is meaningless, because there are inevitably infinitely-many experience-stories with their complementary protagonists, some of whom discuss abstract facts."
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It is relevant if someone claims the actual world is a consequence of abstractions, which I thought you had implied. Did I misunderstand?

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Yes.
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1. My assertion and questions are only as I stated them earlier in this post.
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2. The concern about the need for beings to discuss the abstract facts is unnecessary, because, there are humans who discuss abstract facts, even in this particular physical world.
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3. In fact, additionally, because the infinity of systems of abstract facts includes infinitely-many experience-stories that imply experiencers who discuss abstract facts, there’s no shortage of discussers of abstract facts.
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Nisargdaatta, Tippler and Tegmark have said or implied similarly, regarding experiencers or observers.
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As I said before, if that sounds bootstrap-circular, that’s okay, because it’s a complete self-contained logical system. It’s a complementarity rather than a fallacious circularity. It isn’t as if I claim that discussers and facts circularly bring each other into existence, because don’t claim existence for either.
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"if you say that you don’t know what ontology I believe in, that might be because I emphasize that I don’t claim or assert one."

I gather that you don't claim or assert a complete ontological system

Agreed.
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…but you DID makethe ontological claim (or claims with ontological implications)

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Yes, I claimed that there’s no reason to believe that this physical world is other than the hypothetical setting in your experience-story which is a complex hypothetical logical system. …but then, in this reply, I replaced that assertion/claim with a question. So I no longer assert it.
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"this life and this world are a blip in timelessness”
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This implies that timelessness exists, that this world exists, and that the latter's existence is within the broader context of tbe former.

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That statement that you quoted there isn’t part of my ontological questions, and isn’t assertion related to them.
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In the passage that you quoted below, I told why I made the statement that you quoted above.
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"What makes this life (or finite sequence of lives) a blip in timelessness is the temporariness of this life or finite sequence of lives."
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This does not establish the existence of timelessness as a state of affairs, as something that actually exists as a context for the temporal world.
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Yes, that’s why I said you quote next:
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"“But doesn’t there have be timelessness for us in order for you to validly say that?”
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Sure, and I’ve mentioned the timeless sleep at the end-of-lives (or at the end of this life if there’s no reincarnation). …which, by its finality in our experience, and its timeless nature, is the natural, normal, usual state-of-affairs."
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Our short temporal lives exist within the context if the temporal existence of the universe. This therefore does not establish the existence of timelessness.
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1. First, I shouldn’t have even brought up timelessness, because, at the end of lives, the delivery from life’s demands and menaces--and the rest and sleep, quiet and peace, at the end of lives is good enough, without my even mentioning timelessness.
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I brought up the whole matter of the end-of-lives to show that things aren’t as bad as you think when you just look at the state of our societal world that we were born in. The fact that the peaceful, un-demanding, quiet and safe sleep at the end of lives is final, ending, and delivering us from, the things that you rightly object to, is sufficient, without bringing the matter of timelessness into it. So, I apologize for the distraction of bringing up timelessness.
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2. …but the sleep at the end of lives is timeless. How long this universe lasts is entirely irrelevant. Sh*t, not only might the universe experience heat-death a long time from now, but, as observed by your survivors, your life will end soon after you enter your last unconsciousness. So how can I call the end of lives timeless?
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Well, as I said, there’s no such thing as oblivion. In other words, for you, in your experience, there’s no time when you aren’t there. For you, that time never comes.
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And, when the time comes when you’ve such a deep level of unconsciousness that you no longer have any memory or knowledge that there ever was, or even could be, such things as identity, time or events, then it can be said that you’ve reached timelessness. What, as seen by your survivors your life is about to visibly end? In deep unconsciousness and timelessness, you won’t know or care about that.
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And, anyway, how do you expect it to end for you when, for you, there’s never a time when you aren’t there?
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That’s how I justify speaking of timelessness in your life (at your end-of-lives). And that justifies speaking of your temporary life (or finite sequence of them) as a blip in timelessness.
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(Where I’ve say “end-of-lives”, you can substitute “end of this life”, if you assume that there isn’t reincarnation).
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But I re-emphasize that the point that I wanted to make--about your eventual quiet rest, peace, and delivery from all that you don’t like about this regrettable societal world that you were born in—is still perfectly valid without getting into the issue of timelessness.
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Sorry to have brought in that distraction.

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"timeless sleep at the end-of-lives (or at the end of this life if there’s no reincarnation). …which, by its finality in our experience, and its timeless nature, is the natural, normal, usual state-of-affairs."

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Please explain what you mean by your claim that our experience has a " timeless nature". It appears to me that our experiences are entirely temporal. Death seems to me the temporal endpoint of our consciousness, so I see no reason to think this entails "timelessness."

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As I mentioned above, you obviously never reach that “temporal endpoint” of your consciousness. You never experience a time when you aren’t there. What happens is that you gradually sink deeper and deeper into unconsciousness, and you never experience complete unconsciousnesss.
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Deeper and deeper sleep.
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Only your survivors experience a time when you’re gone.
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I answered that question directly above, because that seemed like the time to say it, in reply to that part of your post.
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Anyway, my more complete answer is directly above, in my most recent inline comment-reply-section before this one.
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"I’ve supported those statements by the uncontroversial statement that there’s no such thing as oblivion."
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What is "oblivion"?

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Oblivion is the state of not being-there. Some people think that they’ll reach oblivion at death. Above, in this post, and the previous one, I’ve explained that you’ll never reach a time when you aren’t there.
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"Materialism, with its big brute-fact*, fails the Principle of Parsimony."

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You are confusing my position with materialism. I simply have the uncontroversial belief that the physical world exists.

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Of course the physical world exists in its own context. As I asked above, in what other context or manner would you like or do you believe that it exists?
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So we don’t disagree about that.
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…but I ask what you mean when you say that it has some kind of existence or ontic-status that can’t be explained as I described. That’s one of the questions that I asked above, when I listed my questions.
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I am agnostic regarding the existence of anything immaterial.

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Let me just briefly interrupt here, and say that the matter of whether something immaterial exists depends entirely on how you define existence. Well, that’s true of material things too, where you’re saying that this physical world exists in a stronger way that’s more than as I describe.
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It all depends on what is meant by “exist”.
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That, of course, makes your assertion relevant to me: show that materialism fails the principle of parsimony - this could shift my view.

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Materialism says that this physical universe (including any physically inter-related multiverse that our Big-Bang Universe might be part of) is all of reality, is the ground of all being, is the fundamental, primary, ultimate-reality.
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The problem with that is: Why is there this physical universe (including any physically-inter-related multiverse that our Big-Bang Universe might be part of)?
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The Materialist answers, “Because there just is. It’s the one thing that we can be sure of.”
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Of course we can be sure that this physical world exists in its own context and the context of our lives. But the Materialist can’t tell you why this universe exists, as he believes, in the manner described in the Materialism definition stated above. He says, “It just does.” In other words, he’s giving you a brute-fact.
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When a metaphysics/ontology depends on a big unexplained fact or assumption, that’s a brute-fact.
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The physical world nature and origin that I described involves no brute-facts or assumptions.
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Yes, someone could say, “But why are there abstract-facts?” But I don’t claim any particular existence or reality for them. In particular, if desired, the system of inter-referring abstract implications that I spoke of could be regarded as unreal and nonexistent with respect to every context other than their own inter-referring context.
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If there were no abstract fact, then it would be a fact that there are no facts.
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But couldn’t there be a fact that there are no other facts other than that one fact that there are no other facts?
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Well, for one thing, that would be a distinctly unexplainable brute-fact, calling for, but not having, an explanation.
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For another thing, it implies some sort of continuum relating all facts. … in order for a fact that there are no other facts to have jurisdiction and authority over all other would-be facts. But the systems of inter-referring abstract implications that I speak of are quite completely isolated from and independent of anything outside their own inter-referring context. …and don’t need any medium, outside permission or context, in which to be.
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…like some kind of potting-soil.
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And the argued need for abstract facts to have someone who can discuss them is answered by the complementary nature of the protagonist of an experience-story, with his/her experience story.
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As I said, that doesn’t involve the facts and their discussers circularly bringing eachother into existence, because I don’t claim existence for either.
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Yes, what I’m suggesting is radically, drastically, different from what people are used to.
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But, in philosophy, you’ve got to fairly, objectively consider even the most radically, drastically different explanation, in complete disregard for how radically, drastically different it is!
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Advantage of the ontology that I’d be asserting if I were asserting something: No assumptions, no brute-fact. It passes William of Ockham’s parsimony test.
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No question about “(in the describable realm) why is there something instead of nothing?”
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The describable world that I described, composed on abstract implications, might seem extraordinarily remarkable if that’s how it is. But I point out that what Materialism claim is just as remarkable. Much more so, because of its brute-fact.
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It’s astonishingly remarkable and surprising that you’re in a life. No, I mean really.
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Compared to that, how remarkable or unbelievable is a describable-ontology based on uncontroversially-inevitable abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, and a configuration of mutually-consistent hypothetical truth-values for those hypothetical propositions?
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Its ethereality and insubstantiality, and its parsimony, makes it more believable, not less.
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And what difference would it make for your life or your experiences? How could you tell which way it is (as I’ve described vs what Materialism describes)?
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Michael Ossipoff

My reply to your other post will be along tomorrow morning (July 23rd).

Michael Ossipoff

1. Logical contradictions do not exist.
2. If x exists then x is not a logical contradiction (converse of 1)
3. Omnipotence entails the ability to directly create any contingent entity whose existence is logically possible.
4. There exist contingent free-willed souls in heaven who do not sin (e.g. the departed souls of faithful Christians). (Christian doctrine).
5. Therefore God's omnipotence entails the ability to directly create free-willed beings that do not sin.
6. Therefore God could have created a world of free-willed beings who do not sin
7. In this world, evil befalls the innocent due to the sinful acts of free-willed individuals
8. God created this world instead of a world of free willed beings that do not sin.
9. Therefore God chose a world with needless pain and suffering.
10. Therefore God is not omnibenevolent. — Relativist

On P4. Your proposition is assuming there is evil in heaven that the free willed beings in heaven would be free to chose if they desired, but don't because of their nature created by God. I do not think it is a valid assumption that there is evil in heaven. Or at least a case need to be made for it.

Without that, the logic of your conclusion (10) fails. It is not contradictory that God could have created 2 separate states of affairs, one we are aware of, and one we are not aware of in heaven. With beings of free will in both. One with an absence of evil. One with evil. And God's benevolence would once again be depended on if there are compensating goods, or morally acceptable reason for the evil that exists in the state of affairs we know.

The best of luck to you.

My reply to your most recent post to me will be along today, but first I just want to make this preliminary comment:

Out of the 100,000,000 who died in the black death, it does seems unlikely that we're judging it wrong each of those times. This is just one natural calamity, which I brought up because it was such a big one — Relativist

The Black Death wasn't a natural calamity.

The superstitious medieval population killed-off all or nearly-all of the cats, fearing that they were evil.

No cats, resulted in lots and lots of rats.

As you know, rats carried the fleas that propagated the Bubonic Plague.

Thereby, the medieval people largely wiped themselves out.

Michael Ossipoff

What is unnatural about killing cats?

I don't think cat killers were the only victims of the black death. My issue is that an omnipotent God could have seen to it that all humans had a natural immunity to it, or miraculously cured those who contracted it. God doesn't seem to intervene in such ways, which suggests indifference or worse.

On P4. Your proposition is assuming there is evil in heaven that the free willed beings in heaven would be free to chose if they desired, but don't because of their nature created by God. I do not think it is a valid assumption that there is evil in heaven. Or at least a case need to be made for it.

My premise makes no assumption like this, but you can suggest this as the environmental condition that results in the absence of sin. But the question becomes: Why would an omnibenevolent God place the creatures that he loves in any OTHER environment? Why did he choose to make us suffer?

Why did he choose to make us suffer? — Relativist

and as above - the theist answer remains, compensating goods or morally justifiable reasons. Which is why this issue always inevitably spirals to this point and has for many many years. And in all likelihood will remain as such for many more - but it is an interesting take on the argument from evil - to allow for God to exist, just not be benevolent.

and as above - the theist answer remains, compensating goods or morally justifiable reasons. Which is why this issue always inevitably spirals to this point and has for many many years

Sure, ...and that's also why some people conclude a 3-omni God doesn't exist. If there is such a God then there are compensating gods, but IF there are no compensating goods, then such a God cannot exist. Contemplate the evil in the world without presumption of God's existence, and seeing no compensating goods, then the conclusion is obvious. (That's not to suggest this need be the end of the epistemic quest)

Sure, ...and that's also why some people conclude a 3-omni God doesn't exist. If there is such a God then there are compensating gods, but IF there are no compensating goods, then such a God cannot exist — Relativist

agree and agree there are reasonable cases for both. I find the theist arguments more compelling, others find the atheistic arguments more compelling - both are reasonable positions.

In the end we will know - it either ends with God or big black hole, all things in the fullness of time.

Thanks for the honest and polite conversation!

If a 3-omni God exists, then objective moral values exist

You're the one insisting that God must be omnipotent.
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Anyway, moral values are another issue, and I’d just say that most people care what happens to other living beings.
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And, as I said in my previous message, it’s my unprovable impression that there’s good intent behind what-is.
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With notable exceptions that we needn’t discuss here, there seems to be some tendency for people to naturally echo, mirror or humanly manifest some of that good intent for other living things.
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…and we have the capacity to discern right and wrong - not infallibly, but our moral judgments should be expected to be generally trustworthy. This provides grounds to judge God's actions and inactions against the objective moral values we are confident are correct.

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You’re assuming that God is responsible for this world and your birth in it.
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In general, just as it’s best to explain by physical-science what can be explained by physical-science, before invoking higher for an explanation—likewise it’s best to explain within describable metaphysics what can be explained within describable metaphysics before invoking higher.
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This world and your birth in it can be explained within describable metaphysics.
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In the unknowable, un-assertable realm, it just isn’t possible to apply logic. It isn’t a topic of logic. And it isn’t possible to reliably say what God can influence, or what He is responsible for.
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So one weak-point in your argument is your assumption about omnipotence.
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…including the power to dictate what the infinity of possibility-worlds and life-experience-stories will consist of? …and to contravene this universe’s physical laws and the implications of logic?
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So you can’t reliably say that this world and your birth in it were intentional on God’s part.
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And how bad is it really? For some in this world, it’s a lot worse than any of us here can imagine, and I don’t deny that.
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But for one thing, as I’ve said, each life is temporary (as is a finite sequence of lives). After it, what follows? Final sleep. Sleep forever. (…for as long as you’re there at all.) …which even a Materialist would agree with.
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As I said, and no one would disagree, everyone is eventually delivered from the brief and temporary life or lives that you’re objecting to, and that deliverance is complete and final.
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When it’s over, how real will it seem, even relatively less far into unconsciousness? Maybe it will seem as Nisargadatta said it, when he said that, from the point of view of the sages, nothing has ever happened.
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Sufficiently far into the sleep at the end-of-lives, you won’t know that any of this happened, or that there ever was or could be worldly life, identity, time or events. …or menace, loss, lack, incompletion…etc.
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Where’s the badness of one’s life then?
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What is the best explanation for all the evil the world has seen and has continues to see? Is the best explanation an omnibenevolent God who chose to create a world with the many evils this one has, despite there being no apparent reason why he couldn't have create a world without these problems?

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Of course not. You can’t be so sure of your assumption and notion of omnipotence.
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Or is the better explanation that there is no such God - and nature simply takes its course?

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You assume that God has full power to contravene logic and physical-law.
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I suggest that The World (as Western philosophers mean that term, as the whole of what is) is overall good, in spite of the unpreventable brief, temporary badnesses that are inevitable due to logical possibility and the workings of physical-law…
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…and individual choices, wants, needs, predisposition and history, if you accepted my ontology of the describable, or the positions of Vedanta or Buddhism.
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As for the issue of Theism vs Atheism, I don’t regard that as a topic for assertion, argument or debate.
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But I’m just trying, here, to answer your problem-of-evil objection. …to explain why the argument using the problem-of-evil isn’t compelling.
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And, before you call me “uncaring”, I’m not saying that I don’t care about what happens to people. But it’s hardly up to me, is it.
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In fact, Theist matters aren’t knowable, or subject to debate, enough to reliably say that God is responsible for our physical world and our birth in it.
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The latter answers all questions about the evil in the world. The former answers none of them.

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…but I haven’t heard anyone invoke God to explain why there’s evil in this societal world, or, in general, why there can be misfortune in physical worlds.
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But you’re making a strong opposite claim when you want to use a fact about our temporary lives, to make an assertion about a non-logical, non-assertable and unprovable matter, based on an assumption about omnipotence, and your own assessment of “balance” between good and bad experience.
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As with my replies to the pessimism of Schopenhaur1, I have to admit that the sentiment that you express has been sometimes felt by me, and probably by all Theists, and that’s why I say that it’s a difficult problem.
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Sure, it's possible there are answers that we are simply not capable of seeing, but why believe this to be the case?

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Then the question is, why would anyone believe that Reality is good or even benevolent in spite of an indication otherwise (this societal world’s badness, &/or the general sometime occurrence of misfortune) No one’s claiming that it’s logical. But I’ve told why the problem-of-evil argument doesn’t have the compellingness that you claim for it.
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There are reasons that suggest and support that impression that Reality is good. For example, there are some in philosophy (as in metaphysics and philosophy-of-mind). There’s the eventual merciful deliverance from this bad societal world, and there’s the temporariness and brevity of this life or finite sequence of lives. …the life whose sometime misfortune (especially in our bad societal-world) is the whole basis for your contention.
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Whether the badness of this societal world, with our brief temporary life in it, is enough to prove that what-is isn’t good overall, or that Reality isn’t good or benevolent is a matter of individual judgment based on feeling (not logic, because this isn’t that kind of a topic), and I don’t claim to have authority over what your judgment or feeling about that should be.
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But Atheists sometimes want to presume to assume the authority to decree how things are, and that other should perceive things as they (Atheists) do.
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Why is it necessary, important or desirable to do that?
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And you don’t know for sure that there aren’t other lives, or whether their world-settings are as bad as this societal world. But I emphasize that the matter of whether or not there’s reincarnation doesn’t affect the validity of the other things that I’ve been saying about the problem-of-evil.
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My argument to the best explanation considers both God's existence and his non-existence, and concludes that his non-existence is more likely given the evidence.

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No one can tell you what your interpretation should be.
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…your interpretation based on your assessment of the amount of badness, and your belief about omnipotence. I’ve told you why that assessment and that belief aren’t warranted.
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Your position seems to assume God exists, and rationalizes the evil he allows based on the mere possibility that there's a billion-billion good reasons that we are simply incapable of discerning.

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I wouldn’t say that there’s the God that you believe in as the omnipotent one-true-God to disbelieve in, by which to evaluate Theism.
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(We can disregard whether “exist” is a good word for other than the things of the describable world.)
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As for the “rationalization”, you’re jumping to conclusions. It’s always questionable when we make assumptions about others’ motivations.
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There are all sorts of different people who are Theists. I certainly don’t claim to speak for all Theists, and so I can’t deny that there could be some who start with a chosen doctrine, and then rationalize to support it.
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But you’re blithely blanket-applying that characterization and motivation to all Theists.
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For some Theists, as for Aristotle, there’s reason for the impression of Reality being benevolent.
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And there are reasons, which I’ve mentioned, why your arguments about blame and omnipotence aren’t so convincing or compelling.
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I’m just answering the question about how anyone could not be convinced by the problem-of-evil argument.
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If God exists, then that surely must be so.

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Certainly not. Only if your God exists. As an Atheist, you’re telling us what God must be like, and concluding that your God doesn’t make sense. No argument there.
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But start with a balanced view..

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It’s popular to start with the premise that one’s view is balanced, while those of others aren’t.
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You’re insisting that God must conform to your definition and belief about how God must be, and then concluding that your God doesn’t make sense.
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You’re assigning all-important weight to a part of a life-experience that is temporary and brief.
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Importance-ratings are subjective, but you’re assuming that your own subjective assessment is valid, and that any other must not be.
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You’re assuming that a perception, impression or feeling that you don’t perceive or feel must not be valid. You want to decisively rule on a matter that isn’t even an issue for assertion or argument….and certainly not for authoritative decree.
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That isn’t “relativist”.
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In these matters, it really is necessary to be willing to question one’s assumptions—including assumptions about others’ motivations.
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, as I did, and that rationalization doesn't make for a good explanation.

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As I said, you’re setting yourself up to have the authority to declare what other peoples’ motivation is.
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I re-emphasize that I’m not trying to convince you in the Theism vs Atheism argument. I don’t regard it as a matter for assertion, argument, logic or proof. I’m merely answering a question about how anyone could not be convinced by the problem-of-evil argument.
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Michael Ossipoff

Relativist: If a 3-omni God exists, then objective moral values exist

Michael: You're the one insisting that God must be omnipotent.

Nope. I never suggested such a thing.

You’re assuming that God is responsible for this world and your birth in it.
Hardly.

In general, just as it’s best to explain by physical-science what can be explained by physical-science, before invoking higher for an explanation—likewise it’s best to explain within describable metaphysics what can be explained within describable metaphysics before invoking higher.
How does one invoke a metaphysics "higher" than that which is describable, which evidently implies that an indescribable metahphysics? This doesn't seem to make any sense.

You can’t be so sure of your assumption and notion of omnipotence.
I'm not sure of anything. What I have argued is that a 3-omni God seems incoherent, given the world we live in. This could mean there is a God who 2-omni.

As an Atheist, you’re telling us what God must be like, and concluding that your God doesn’t make sense. No argument there.
No, I'm telling you what God cannot be like.

But you’re blithely blanket-applying that characterization and motivation to all Theists.
Nope. Consider the argument I stated in my Op: one premise depends on the Christian assumption that the souls in heaven have free will and do not sin. Not all theists are Christian, and even a Christian could simply deny the premise (e.g. maybe the souls in heaven CAN sin). A non-Christian theist could simply deny there's an afterlife. Take the argument for what it is and what it shows, and devise your own logic to get around it - such as, as you alluded above, perhaps God isn't really omnipotent. Lot's of ways around the argument, and I never claimed there wasn't. I address only a very specific set of beliefs, and that's why I tried to structure my argument pretty precisely.

I’m just answering the question about how anyone could not be convinced by the problem-of-evil argument.
Who asked that question? I've said multiple times that I knew this would not convince a committed theist. My purpose in engaging Christians on this topic was to show them how one might reasonably decide God (as usually defined) does not exist. Some Christians already realize this, and for them there's nothing notable here. But others that I've encountered seem unable or unwilling to believe that a belief in God's non-existence can be perfectly rational - and my mission is to help them be a bit more understanding.



It’s popular to start with the premise that one’s view is balanced, while those of others aren’t.
Consider these potential starting points: 1) The premise: God Exists; 2) the premise:God does not exist;

Neither of these seem "balanced," in that they both entail a presumption.


Tomorrow I'll respond to your earlier post (the one that has nothing to do with the purpose of this thread).

Then you have to agree there is a possible state of affairs in which there exist free-willed creatures who do not sin. Why wouldn't an omnibenevolent God just place us in that environment to begin with? — Relativist

On reflection, I decided that my earlier response missed an important point.

The answer is that the only reason that those in heaven do not sin is because they have chosen to love God. To know we must choose to attend to the known object. To attend to God in such a way as to preclude sin we must love God. But, love, to be real must be freely given -- in other words, we can't compel someone to love us. If love can be freely given, it can be freely withheld -- and choosing not to love God (Who is Goodness and Truth) is to sin. So, the final condition we are discussing entails a logically prior condition open to sin. Thus, it is not the counter-example you seek.

An Omni-benevolent God as judged with our limited knowledge? Yes or no?

If Yes, I accept your argument.

If no, are we saying we have unlimited knowledge?

As for me, and many others, when we are deep within the bliss of the Heavenly afterlife, we will agree to anything.

The suffering? All those disasters etc? They would seem like a bad dream, I would not be interested in discussing God's benevolence etc there. It all will seem good to me.

The answer is that the only reason that those in heaven do not sin is because they have chosen to love God.

Christians choose to love God while their on earth, and yet they continue to sin.

An Omni-benevolent God as judged with our limited knowledge? Yes or no?

Our knowledge about everything is limited, and yet we end up believing things anyway. We typically come to a belief based on the information at hand, and that's why the mere possibility of inscrutable reasons doesn't defeat a belief in God's non-existence that is formed based on the information we actually have.

Christians choose to love God while their on earth, and yet they continue to sin. — Relativist

Yes. The difference is that few on earth achieve and maintain union with God. It is only in such a union that conflicting desires are resolved.

“Existence” is metaphysically-undefined. In any case, no one denies that this physical world is real in its own context, and that your life, and this physical world which is its setting, are real in the context of your life.

Existence is a concept referring to the quality of "existing." To exist is to be in the world (world in the generic sense, not necessarily limited the physical world). The world contains beings (=existents, the things that exist). The set of all beings = the totality of reality.

We understand the concept in terms of our innate belief in ourselves and in the external world. We (all animals with any semblance of a mind) intuitively know that we exist (no one has to be convinced of the reality of their being), and we also intuitively know there are things beyond ourselves - we see them and we interact with them. So this non-verbal intuitive foundation entails a world consisting of the self and that which we perceive. From this foundation we conceive (verbally and non-verbally) of additional elements of the world beyond our perceptions.

You refer to being " real in its own context". That seems an attempt at a meta-analysis. It is in our nature to believe the world actually exists independent of ourselves; no one is truly a solipsist. So we naturally believe the world is actually real, without the qualification you suggest. One would need to come up with reasons to think our intuitive beliefs are false or misguided, which you haven't done.

The finality of that sleep at the end of lives, and the absence of any knowledge, memory or perception that there is, was, or could be, such things as identity, time or events, suggests the use of the word “timelessness”.

"Sleep" seems a poor characterization. Death is the cessation of being, if there is no "afterlife." If there is an afterlife, there is no "sleep" - there's just a transition of states of being. In neither case does the term "timelessness" seem applicable. "Timelessness" suggests to me something that does not experience time. "Sleep suggests subtle change in state of living consciousness, not a cessation of consciousness nor a transition of states of being.

So all you’re doing is defining your “objective existence” as more than hypothetical existence....

I'll clarify. Math and logic use the symbol, "∃" , which is read, "there exists". This is not an ontological claim, it is used to analyze mathematical and logical relations. I label this a "hypothetical existence." It may, or may not, refer to something that is in the world. But (hypothetically) if it exists, we can deduce various things about it.

Regarding "objective existence." This refers to that which exists (not just hypothetically), with the properties it actually has, as opposed to merely what we perceive. I perceive a red ball, you perceive a red balloon. The actual object is a white balloon that we both view through a red filter. The white balloon has objective existence. I suggest that our perceptions provide us a reflection of objective reality, not necessarily identical with objective reality. However, further analysis can lead us in the direction of knowledge about the true nature of reality (a direction to a destination that we may not reach, but it is at least an ideal to work toward).

Relativist:" That there exists an external, physical world is a properly basic belief, an epistemological foundation for all else." — Michael

...for Materialists, of course.[/quote]
Nothing I said is contingent upon materialism being true, and my statement makes no claims about the existence of anything immaterial.

Your experience is the epistemic foundation for all else.

I strongly disagree. Our innate, nonverbal view of the world is our epistemic foundation.

You’ve admitted that you don’t have an answer regarding in what noncircular way you think that this physical world is more than that.

You are imaging things. I did no such thing.

Relativist: "We are not taught that there is an external world "
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There’s undeniably an external world in our experience. That’s what our experience story is about.

No experience required. All us animals that come into the world know intuitively that there is an external world, irrespective of whether this fact is formulated with words.

We’re taught, from an early age, to be little Materialists and Science-Worshippers. Some of us never question that.

Not me. I was raised Catholic. I eventually came to question what I was taught, just as you did.

As animals, we instinctively deal with our surrounding physical world as best we can. Kids, and most people, and (for all we know) all other animals leave it at that, and don’t ask what there really is, or why they’re in a life, or why there’s something instead of nothing.
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…but that doesn’t support Materialism.

Who said it did?

if you say that you don’t know what ontology I believe in, that might be because I emphasize that I don’t claim or assert one.

We have that in common.

"I apply the principle of parsimony."
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It doesn’t support you. Materialism, with its big brute-fact*, fails the Principle of Parsimony.

You've made two errors: 1) you assume I'm a materialist; 2) you don't understand the principle of parsimony.

But no, there’s absolutely no evidence, no physics-experiment, to support a claim that this physical world is other than the hypothetical setting in your hypothetical experience-story, a complex abstract logical system.

I agree that we can't confirm our properly basic beliefs. That does not preclude having rationally justified beliefs. My theory is that we have these properly basic beliefs because we are a product, and component, of this world (and this is true irrespective of whether there is a supernatural creator). This could be wrong, of course, but neither you nor anyone else has given me a reason to doubt it.

None of that supports a claim that this physical world is other than what I said it is.

You repeated this multiple times. You seem to be saying, "nothing you've said has convinced me that my assessment is false." That's great, but I wasn't trying to convince you of anything, I was just sharing what I believe. I hope you realize that such statements don't give me any reason to think I have it wrong either.

I addressed your Subjectivism argument in my previous post.

You are casting my assertions in terms of subjectivism, that is certainly not my claim. Of course, you can believe whatever you like. I hope you aren't trying to convince me of anything, because if you are- you're failing miserably.

To propose an ontology, I’d propose that the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts, and that the describable world consists of nothing other than that.

That is not "an ontology" it is an ontological claim. OK, I hear you and I disagree with you.

You’re the one with an ontology that you aren’t specifying or being clear with us about.

As I said above, I don't believe in an ontology. I do believe certain things exist (e.g. the physical world), and other things possibly exist (such as gods), and I'm just not sure about the nature of the mind (is it really something immaterial?)

At least as discussion-topics, there uncontroversially are abstract facts

I prefer to use the term "fact" to refer to an element of reality as distinct from propositional descriptions of a elements of reality. Abstractions can be the subject of propositions and discussed as such - if this is what you mean, I completely agree.

“Physicalism” (a regrettable two-meaning word for Materialism (or for a philosophy-of-mind position)) is blatantly unparismonious, with its big, blatant brute fact.

I think you may misunderstand the principle of parsimony. It seems to me that whatever is the foundation of reality, it entails a very complex brute fact. An omniscient, immutable God who created material reality is an extremely complex brute fact. But the principle of parsimony is actually an epistemological principle that we should refrain from making any more assumptions than necessary to explain the facts at hand. It does NOT mean that reality is simple.

Relativist:" it seems irrational to believe something just because it is POSSIBLY true"
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And what do you think that I believe in.

You had several similar reactions wherein I tell you something I believe, and then you react in this way (what, inferring that I think you DON'T believe this?). I'm not suggesting what you do, or don't believe, I'm just telling you what I believe.

I emphasize that, in this discussion, I’m not advocating an ontology or metaphysics. I’m merely pointing out that there’s no reason to believe in an ontology that says that this physical world is other than what I’ve said [the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts])"

That's an interesting and bizarre perspective, since you've given no reason to believe "the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts." And of course, I disagree - there are very good reasons to believe the physical world is something other than this. I expect we'll just have to agree to disagree on this.

Relativist:" …, or do you think you can show that your view is more worthy of belief than mine? "
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What belief of mine are you referring to? If I made a controversial claim, what was it?

This one: "the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts"

So you aren’t central to your experience?

Of course I am, but I believe we are also able to contemplate objective reality, that we actually can escape subjectivism. I believe you have things backwards when you claim the physical world is a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts - these abstract "facts" (actually: propositions) are descriptive of what actually IS. Logic is not an existent, it is a rational process, so to claim the physical world is a "logical system" is a category error. Again, we needn't agree - and I doubt we ever will.

“I suggest that this life and the physical world in which it is set, are completely insubstantial”
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Relativist: Why do you believe such a thing?
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I merely claim that there’s no reason to believe otherwise.

I've given you one: we believe it innately, and it is reasonable to think that this is because we are a product of that substantial world. Now you can't make that claim; you have to find a reason to reject what I've said.

let’s be clear which of us is advocating an unverifiable, unfalsifiable proposition.

We both are. But at least mine is grounded in our innate view of the world. I don't have any idea how you came up with your bizarre view.

No need to quibble about how or if the abstract facts exist. I haven’t claimed that they exist other than as subjects of discussion or mention.

If the physical world exists, and it is nothing more than "part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts," then you must believe abstract facts exist. If abstract facts do not exist, then the physical world doesn't exist.

Saying that the abstract facts depend on there being someone to discuss them is meaningless, because there are inevitably infinitely-many experience-stories with their complementary protagonists, some of whom discuss abstract facts.

100 years after the big bang, there was no one around to have an "experience story". At that point in time, did abstract facts exist?

what I’ve been saying doesn’t include any assumptions, brute-facts, beliefs or controversial statements.

This is an assumption: "the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts."

perhaps determining the correct value of "sin" would help solve this equation

I don’t participate in the Theism vs Atheism debates, because I don’t regard as a topic for assertion, argument, proof or debate.
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Besides, I doubt that anyone here would say that someone should believe something that he isn’t aware of a reason to believe.
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…or that philosophical discussion should consist of defending, or uncritically promoting or adhering to, a pre-chosen presumption.
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All I really meant to say in reply to your OP was that, in all of the many repetitions of your argument, that argument is about your “3-omni” God, who, in particular, is omnipotent.
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Without the assumption that God must necessarily have all 3 of the characteristics that you list, you don’t have an argument that would be a helpful argument for Atheists arguing for Atheism. Just saying.
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Your omnipotence assumption is an example of simplistic and anthropomorphic notions and verbalizations about matters that don’t lend themselves to description.
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No one is suggesting that you should believe what you aren’t aware of a reason to believe.
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There’s really nothing more that you can usefully or informedly say on the matter.
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You’re assuming that God is responsible for this world and your birth in it.
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Hardly.

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You’ve been saying that, if there’s a God, then you attribute to Him responsibility for this world and your birth in it. That’s a necessary assumption in the argument from the problem-of-evil.
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In general, just as it’s best to explain by physical-science what can be explained by physical-science, before invoking higher for an explanation—likewise it’s best to explain within describable metaphysics what can be explained within describable metaphysics before invoking higher.
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How does one invoke a metaphysics "higher" than that which is describable

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When I spoke of “invoking higher”, I didn’t say “a higher metaphysics”. When I say “metaphysics”, I’m referring to describable matters of what-is.

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, which evidently implies that an indescribable metaphysics?

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No. See above.
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This doesn't seem to make any sense.

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True, but I didn’t say it.
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You seem to be implying that, if there’s God, then God created or caused this physical world and your birth in it. I suggest that that doesn’t necessarily follow. Just as physics explains things in and with respect to physics’ domain, likewise so does describable metaphysics explain things in and with respect to its domain. I suggest that we should explain as much as possible within the describable realm before invoking outside it. That isn’t irreligious.
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Atheists always talk simplistically and anthromorphically about the Literalists’ God that they so devotedly and loudly believe in disbelieving in.
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Consider the argument I stated in my Op: one premise depends on the Christian assumption that the souls in heaven have free will and do not sin.

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It sounds like you’re still re-living and regurgitating your upbringing. Why? (rhetorical question)
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It’s popular to start with the premise that one’s view is balanced, while those of others aren’t.
Consider these potential starting points: 1) The premise: God Exists; 2) the premise:God does not exist;

Neither of these seem "balanced," in that they both entail a presumption.

Sure, and you genuinely believe that your view is balanced and free of presumptions.
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Well, I’ve here clarified what I meant to say in reply to your thread and your argument. That concludes what I have to say about the topic of the post that I’m now replying to.
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You get the last word on the matters discussed in this post.
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Maybe tomorrow, but anyway not much later than tomorrow, I’ll reply to your other post, the one about ontological issues.
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Michael Ossipoff

There is no "free will" so your argument is wrong in premises 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Maybe 6 is technically true but since it would be detrimental to reality, as I understand it, if God created beings with free will, I don't think that God even weighs the option of creating free will beings.

Under "free will", for the sake of this discussion, I am primarily referring to a capability to choose to do either good or evil depending on personal freedom and desire/want.

Bible doesn't say that beings in Heaven have free will. Satan is rebelling against God but Bible doesn't directly say that he rebelled as his free will choice. In general, we have very limited information about beings in Heaven.

As for humans, apostle Paul writes in Romans, "You have been set free from sin and have become slaves of God."

On Earth, a human is a slave to sin, without possibility to choose whether he will do good or evil, while in Heaven, resurrected humans will be fully established slaves to God, and will only be able to do good. A human who believes that Jesus Christ paid for his sins on the cross and resurrected on the third day still sins in flesh. Apostle Paul says: "I have the desire to do what is right, but not the ability to carry it out. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I keep on doing."

There are serious logical problems and practically blasphemous implications of free will allowed by God, as I see it, but we don't even have to get into that. It is enough that the Bible is not a witness for human free will. Many Christians will object to that, but Bible is also a complex book - "It is the glory of God to conceal a matter, to search out a matter is the glory of kings," Proverbs 25:2 - so human's say on the issue, even if it's from majority of Christians, is not what decides what's true and what's not. (Proverbs are written for believers, not unbelievers, by the way, so God is saying to believers that He hides things and leaves them to be searched out, which means that believers will find some truth of the Bible while here. This sheds some light on why there are many denominations and views on various Biblical issues among Christians.)

Anyway, "free will" is not true explanation for existence of evil.

Evil exists, by the way, for a certain period of time within a certain part of whole reality. Evil is a problem in a sense that it's a sin, but it's not a problem in a sense that God created a problem.

Your claim that "the argument from evil is an inference that a 3-omni God cannot exist, because this is inconsistent with the presence of so much evil in the world" is arbitrary.

Bible gives a lot to answer why evil exists in a reality with God who is love, much more than one would see at a glance, but that's hidden.