It occurs to me that most of us are first attracted to philosophy out of genuine curiosity, for truth and beauty as ends in themselves, not means for power as preached by marxist or freudian ideologues. For them there is neither truth, nor beauty, only the power of sophistry or satisfaction of attitudes.

I was first attracted to philosophy, at age 11 initially, via stumbling into philosophy books in a library, and having a dual reaction of (1) realizing that the logical/systematic approach (I mostly found analytic philosophy works at first) was a natural fit for how I thought about things, and (2) running into some claims that struck me as absurd/kinda stupid--that piqued my curiosity re trying to figure out why folks would be claiming such things.

And those are both still largely my attractions to philosophy, and of course when I found works more in a continental vein, (2) was really satisfied, although since (1) wasn't satisfied, that made it more frustrating for me, too.

Anyway, I've never felt that I was "searching" for anything--truth, etc.--via philosophy.

Also re sophistry/the sophists, I never saw that as anything other than Plato badmouthing, and likely mischaracterizing, straw-manning etc. philosophers who disagreed with him, and there was good reason to disagree with him. I love Plato's writing, but he was wrong about far more than he was right in my opinion.

It occurs to me that most of us are first attracted to philosophy out of genuine curiosity, for truth and beauty as ends in themselves, not means for power as preached by marxist or freudian ideologues. For them there is neither truth, nor beauty, only the power of sophistry or satisfaction of attitudes. — jkop

I do find beauty to be an end in itself, perhaps by definition. But why shouldn't there be ideologues of Truth? Scientism is like that, privileging the scientific image against that which makes it possible (the manifest image). Aren't thinkers generally ideologues who give themselves a pass? "They who disagree with me are just confused, misled, afraid. They have opinion. I have truth." The notion that we posses the truth boosts are sense of status, generally. It's the high ground. Now it's not God on our side but Truth on our side. So we tend to think the other guy's reasoning is flawed and not our own. We don't usually doubt the singleness of truth, either. Nor do we doubt (usually) that something like pure reason exists, which is a sort of "Christ" that gives us access to Truth in the first place. I'm not saying this is a whole "truth" about "truth," but I think the masters of suspicion you mentioned have a point (though I like Freud more than Marx.)

Anyway, I've never felt that I was "searching" for anything--truth, etc.--via philosophy.

Also re sophistry/the sophists, I never saw that as anything other than Plato badmouthing, and likely mischaracterizing, straw-manning etc. philosophers who disagreed with him, and there was good reason to disagree with him. I love Plato's writing, but he was wrong about far more than he was right in my opinion. — Terrapin Station

So would say that philosophy was just an amusement, then? I was an angsty little f*cker in my teens and twenties. I wrestled with whether there was a God and/or an objective right and wrong and of course with a consciousness of my own "sin." She's a pretty ridiculous philosopher, but I remember bumping into The Virtue of Selfishness (yes, by her) at about 17. It's not so much that the reasoning was bullet-proof. It was just an example of a thinker going after a primary assumption with daring and verve. Present altruism as a nefarious ideology or at least as one with a dark side contrary to its shining, sentimental face. That's exciting. Or be presented with a plausible argument that God is a fiction, a weapon, a con. That's exciting at first. Then one learns to generalize this. Not only theology, but philosophy too is a fiction, weapon, pose, con, instrument. I know that this last point doubles back on itself, but if someone defends against it philosophically, one might ask why? The notion that philosophy is more than a "weapon" is exactly its cutting edge.

I don't know if I'd say "amusement," exactly. For one, it's just how I think naturally. But re things people have claimed under philosophy's rubric that I find absurd, it's more of a intriguing curio . . . and part of that is simply a spectator's fascination/attraction to weird/bizarre things--I've always liked being in the audience for side shows/carnivals/etc., both figuratively and literally. So I suppose there's some amusement on that end.

Re the "truth" pursuit, I've never felt at all unsure about any "big questions." There are plenty of philosophical issues that aren't of the "big question" variety, things that would not likely if ever occur to someone outside of studying philosophy, things that I encountered once I started studying philosophy more systematically/formally, where it took me some time to figure out what my view was, but regarding topics like the existence of God, what ethics was/how it worked, etc., I never felt at all unsure about that stuff.

With God, though, it was partially because I had very little notion of any relgious beliefs or concepts prior to when I was maybe 14 or 15. My parents never brought it up--my mom's an atheist (and her father was an atheist, too), and my dad is just indifferent towards religion. We never went to church of course, it was never mentioned, and I didn't really have any religious friends when I was a kid. We were focused on other things. When I finally started learning about religious beliefs when I was around 14 or 15, I basically went, "Wait a minute--you believe what???" I literally thought people were putting me on--that it was a big practical joke (exacerbated by coming from a family with quite a few practical jokers in it). So I've never had the slightest inclination to believe anything religious, because the beliefs were so alien to my formation, and they still seem surreally bizarre to me.

With God, though, it was partially because I had very little notion of any relgious beliefs or concepts prior to when I was maybe 14 or 15. My parents never brought it up--my mom's an atheist (and her father was an atheist, too), and my dad is just indifferent towards religion. We never went to church of course, it was never mentioned, and I didn't really have any religious friends when I was a kid. We were focused on other things. When I finally started learning about religious beliefs when I was around 14 or 15, I basically went, "Wait a minute--you believe what???" I literally thought people were putting me on--that it was a big practical joke (exacerbated by coming from a family with quite a few practical jokers in it). So I've never had the slightest inclination to believe anything religious, because the beliefs were so alien to my formation, and they still seem surreally bizarre to me. — Terrapin Station

Thanks for the background. That helps. You didn't have much to be liberated from, it sounds like, since you're parents were intellectually sophisticated. I was taught about God and Heaven and Hell and it was all intoxicating as well as frightening. Of course telling/implying an adolescent boy that sex is bad is a recipe for cognitive dissonance.

But I'm also interested in all of the ways that we tell ourselves stories that put us in a superior subset of humans. I like The Sneeches for generalizing this so economically. We make irrational investments in the truth apart from utility, for instance. Pragmatism has a stink with respect to a piety toward Truth for its own sake, as if the True and the Noble were associated.

I have certainly seen this process in action, but I remark that the final result of the identification-with-truth need not be bleak as the OP seems to imply. Perhaps our Platonic hero may become older, wiser, more cynical, and more willing to compromise and choose his battles. But none of this necessitates a complete abandonment of truth for its own sake.

One gives ground to pragmatism, but only for practical reasons. O:)

For me it's not bleak. I didn't expect it to be perceived that way. I love my radical pragmatism (sophistry). Of course there would be no duty to stop pursuing truth for its own sake. Instead the "for its own sake" looks a little more suspicious.

We should certainly be self-questioning about our motives for doing things. And one can always ask what good it is to be radically pragmatic...

That's what's beautiful to me about pragmatism. The "radically pragmatic" more or less is the good. Ideas that scratch the itch are prioritized. This idea about ideas is pretty clearly going to scratch some itches. This does not at all absolve us from wrestling with the devil in the details. It, pragmatism, doesn't have to assert its own universal purpose-independent truth, but only to suggest its not-necessarily-universal utility. It's one "monkey" offering a (meta-)tool to other "monkeys," as an experiment. Will they assimilate this tool? Find a use for it? Perhaps a new use? The radicalized tool-metaphor re-frames the entire tradition, it seems to me.

If the utility of your pragmatism is not universal, then there is a limit on how radical your pragmatism can be.

I don't see it that way. I remember when I realized how dominated most discourse is by the assumption/projection of universality. It's like unconscious humanism/scientism. We assume that our ethical/epistemological claims should aim for universal validity and be claims in the first place. This is taken for granted and is almost invisible. There's a big shift from "X is the way things are for all of us" to "maybe you guys who are sufficiently similar to me should also try X as a rule for action."

We can also abandon (along these lines) the very notion of "one truth for all." Any belief-habit system that is working for an individual is "true enough"(correspondence is no longer our obsession). Granted, physical science is shrewdly treated as (more or less) true for all, but I think it's only scientism (Truth religion) that tries to project this special case of a normalized discourse to the abnormal discourse (philosophy) that places science among all of our other useful discourses. The non-instrumentalist philosopher (versus the instrumentalist sophist) tends to see himself as a sort of scientist rather than as an inventor or poet. They have a finding-metaphor (the truth is out there) that dominates a making-metaphor (what else might we try?). If this works for Mr. X, then that's fine. "Radical pragmatism" is itself just something someone might try (put in their toolbox).

We can also abandon (along these lines) the very notion of "one truth for all."

..."Radical pragmatism" is itself just something someone might try (put in their toolbox). — Hoo

Well, then I don't see any need to adopt it. Suit yourself.

EDIT: although I have to ask - what's so radical about adding another tool to your toolbox?

The dictionary at the top of the search gives the (first) definition of radical as

(especially of change or action) relating to or affecting the fundamental nature of something; far-reaching or thorough.
"a radical overhaul of the existing regulatory framework"
synonyms: thoroughgoing, thorough, complete, total, comprehensive, exhaustive, sweeping, far-reaching, wide-ranging, extensive, across the board, profound, major, stringent, rigorous
"radical reform" — dictionary

Am I saying that my pragmatism is radical with respect to other strains of pragmatism or that pragmatism is radical with respect to non-pragmatism? Well, my pragmatism isn't apo's in that it abandons the "scientistic" paradigm altogether. It's "post-metaphysical" in terms of its reduced ambitions. So maybe it's a little radical with respect to other strains.

I do think ("radical") pragmatism is indeed radical with respect to non-pragmatism. To re-frame philosophy as creative adjustment via marks and noises is to abandon its pose as purveyor/seeker of universal truth. I'm not at all trying to demonize this traditional pose. I just personally enjoy becoming conscious of it. In retrospect, it's like escaping from tunnel vision.

You seem to be wavering between "abandoning [the traditional philosophical method] as purveyor/seeker of universal truth" and "becoming conscious of it [traditional philosophy]."

Do you want to "abandon" the pursuit of truth, or just "become conscious" of it? You seem to be running a motte-and-bailey argument here.

I agree with the thrust of the OP. I think it's interesting, though, that the two hidden motives you've identified in the quest for absolute truths are purity (disgust for dad) and power (I'm an extra-cave initiate!). Both are rampant, I agree, but I feel like there's an even more fundamental need - security. That there are absolute truths and that one can discover them and be sure of them- how profoundly comforting!

Though all three 'hidden' motives would share, I think, themes of withdrawl and preservation. The apprehension of a truth has a finality; you can find it on your own and once you have it and no one can take it from you.

I use "sophistry" as a symbol for the notion of words as weapons in the war between the individual and other status-seeking personalities. I call it an "obscene father" because one can view the (apparent) invention of non-sophistry ("philosophy") as the work of sophistry. — Hoo

The problem I see with what you are apparently proposing (that the difference between sophistry and philosophy is itself only apparent) is that you must thereby be denying that there could be any other motive for philosophical thought than engaging "in the war between the individual and other status-seeking personalities", which is merely a very questionable psychological thesis, and which as held, would be purporting to itself be universal; which would really be a performative contradiction.

I agree with the thrust of the OP. I think it's interesting, though, that the two hidden motives you've identified in the quest for absolute truths are purity (disgust for dad) and power (I'm an extra-cave initiate!). Both are rampant, I agree, but I feel like there's an even more fundamental need - security. That there are absolute truths and that one can discover them and be sure of them- how profoundly comforting!

Though all three 'hidden' motives would share, I think, themes of withdrawl and preservation. The apprehension of a truth has a finality; you can find it on your own and once you have it and no one can take it from you. — csalisbury

Thanks for the input. I really like "I'm an extra-cave initiate." It's the star on the belly of a Sneetch. We seem to abase ourselves to be exalted. For (Kojeve's) Hegel, we use (in a certain stage of consciousness) a projected supreme master, God, in order to rationalize our bondage to an earthly master, who is also (crucially) God's slave, and therefore partially negated as a master who must otherwise be fought. The absolute truth seems to play a similar "anti-worldly" role. We can become "secret kings of thought." If we are "slaves," that's an illusion on the cave wall.

As far as security goes, I agree completely. I like to contemplate the collisions of personalities.
A person's "sacred" identifications tend to be their weak spots, the "handles" by which they can be humiliated. One end of the spectrum there is identification with absolute truth. Then we stand or fall with this "god." The problem of course is rhetoric that threatens our claim on this truth. Absolute truth is a popular god! Once invested in the notion of single truth, everyone who disagrees with us simultaneously threatens our self-esteem. (Maybe all disagreement is ,well, disagreeable on a gut-level, but in this case the threat is "logical.")

The problem I see with what you are apparently proposing (that the difference between sophistry and philosophy is itself only apparent) is that you must thereby be denying that there could be any other motive for philosophical thought than engaging "in the war between the individual and other status-seeking personalities", which is merely a very questionable psychological thesis, and which as held, would be purporting to itself be universal; which would really be a performative contradiction. — John

I've probably been sloppy here or there. I just intended to focus on the fight for status in the realm of "the sacred" (an archetype of discourse-structuring "master words"). How does the will-to-truth differ from the will-to-utility or the will-to-status? Can we analyze the will-to-truth? Is there piety toward to truth, even when it's useless or even dangerous? If so, what's this piety about? I'm interested in "poses." Is the philosopher a scientist? a poet? an inventor? an arsonist? What's the fundamental metaphor? Obviously it varies from person to person, but the "armchair quasi-scientist" seems dominant.
Maybe I fell into the usual "representational" way of speaking, and I think there is an argument to be made that speech presupposes an imaginary community, but there's a big gap between "a few assholes not unlike myself" and "all of humanity for all of time." Of course I don't pretend that my "meta-tool" dominates my speech like a sentry. It's a maxim or paradigm that one calls to mind, good for abstract jobs. I'm generally a holist. I don't think individual sentences do the job. We form fuzzy images of personalities. My "sophist" or "radical instrumentalist" or what-have-you is something like my sculpture of the anti-priest. It's a poem in a genre.