I don't experience "chaos of the senses". I experience an intelligible world. This is something Heidegger pointed out. The chaos of the sense which the mind has to make sense of to form an intelligible world is something we infer after the fact. It's not something primary in our experience. — Marchesk

I'm not sure I see the relevance of this. I'm quite happy with the fact that we infer the chaos of the senses. What I'm saying is that the intelligent sense we make of them does not have and objective value. Just because you interpret your senses one way, it does not mean that any other way is less right.

Because they're refusing to acknowledge points made in a straight forward argument. I've seen and done this myself in dumb arguments about sports or movies before, where metaphysics or the "chaos of the senses" isn't a point of contention.

People want to win arguments and confirm their biases. This is well known. — Marchesk

So this goes back to Van Inwagen, whom I've mentioned before, but not in this context I think. If a view contrary to mine is held by one of my epistemic peers (someone of equal intellect and knowledge to me), then one of us must be wrong about the way things are. Yet if one of us is wrong about the way things are, then that proves someone of my intellect and knowledge can be wrong about the way things are despite feeling that one is right. If it is possible for someone of my intellect and knowledge to be wrong about the way things are, how do I know that it is not me?

So the argument is that when two opposing/contradictory metaphysical camps have contradictory criteria for what counts as wrong, when either calls the others' argument "wrong" the calling itself is meaningless as a result of the lack of agreement regarding what counts as "wrong"? — creativesoul

Yes, but it's not just 'when' they have contradictory criteria for what counts as 'wrong', it is virtually inevitable that they will (if only in some small way). These are relatively clever people, they're not gong to present an argument they can see is wrong. It's most likely that they have a different idea of what constitutes wrong. It's the default position rather than an occasion misfortune.

Explanatory power is one way to 'gauge' or measure the power of a metaphysical theory. Coherency(lack of self contradiction) is yet another. Given multiple competing theories with equal coherency and explanatory power there needs to be another means for further discrimination between them. Logical possibility alone does not warrant belief. I'm reminded here of the Scopes Monkey Trials. There are several. We can assess which one works from the fewest number of unprovable assumptions, we can also assess which posits the fewest amount of entities. We can also follow the logical consequences. Then there's always the verifiability/falsifiability aspect. In addition to all this, we can use our best judgment to winnow out clearly unbelievable theories(The Flying Spaghetti Monster kind). — creativesoul

Coherency(lack of self contradiction) is yet another.
— creativesoul

But lack of self-contradiction is easy. Name me an argument in metaphysics that is self-contradictory. Anyone who understands basic grammar can construct one, this leaves virtually all metaphysical theories still in play. — Pseudonym

It wouldn't be an argument that is self-contradictory. It would be the inevitable result of holding a position.

Heraclitus' position is untenable. The God of Abraham and Epicurus' fatal observation of the problem of evil shows inherent self-contradiction.

We can assess which one works from the fewest number of unprovable assumptions
— creativesoul

Can we? How would we go about enumerating the assumptions? Again, do you have an example from metaphysics where a theory has been discarded because it has one more assumption that a competing theory? — Pseudonym

Those arguing for a position enumerate their assumptions.

Do I have an example from metaphysics where a theory has been discarded because it has one more assumption than a competing theory?

Methodological naturalism.

I'm suspicious of your sincerity.

We can also follow the logical consequences.
— creativesoul

And then do what with them? — Pseudonym

Lots of things. I'm wondering if you're just probing at the moment. I'm hoping. It's better than being insincere...

Establish what one must also hold in order to remain coherent, and whether or not one is willing to do so. The skirting around Heraclitus earlier, for example...

Many folk who believe in some form of cosmic justice or another will be forced to conclude that bad/good things happened to someone or another, and so they must have somehow 'deserved' it.

I'm reminded that if one holds to the historically conventional epistemological conception of belief that s/he must deny that non-linguistic animals have thought and belief.

It can also be the case that the logical consequence conflicts with knowledge.

There's a bit of irony here however with Pseudonym, in that the subject of contention is what it takes to be meaningful. As far as I know, meaning is itself a metaphysical matter, at least in part. The case at hand has opposing sides. The one is arguing that if there is no agreed upon sense of the term "meaningful", and each side argues from their own sense, then the debate itself is meaningless.

That's exactly what's going on here. So, does Pseudo think that s/he is involved in a meaningless discussion/debate?
— creativesoul

As I've said in my responses (possibly mostly to Moliere), there are three factors I think are relevant.

1. I'm not arguing that there is a sharp dividing line between meaningless metaphysical statements and meaningful scientific ones. I'm arguing (from Quine) that there is a gradation, and somewhere along that line statements become so vague that debating them is meaningless. Arguing about arguing, I think, is sufficiently empirical to be (just) on the right side of that line. We have empirical evidence of the way debates actually go and the consequences they have for the direction of philosophical thought. After all, It's a fairly simple empirical matter to point in the direction of a metaphysical debate where one theory was widely determined to be 'better' than another without any intelligent and well-educated detractors.

2. I think that the problem with arguing over matters that cannot be resolved by demonstration is a psychological one, it simply has a cost, that's all. If it's worth that cost, then maybe it's worth doing, if there's something at stake. I think there's something at stake here.

3. Maybe I just like arguing. — Pseudonym

Maybe you're avoiding my initial charge. You are involved in precisely what you've called a meaningless debate. That seems incoherent, at best. I'll let it go though.

One thing to note. An entire generation of well-educated intelligent people can be wrong, and history shows that they have been any number of times. We seem to share an interest in the direction of current and future philosophical discourse. These are typically determined by paradigm shifts. Interestingly enough, those who are responsible for such a shift posited theories that were not necessarily accepted by their well-educated intelligent peers.

I’d said:
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That words don't describe Realiity is easily shown by the fact that no finite dictionary can non-circularly define any of its words.

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You replied:
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You have an argument to support that claim?

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No.
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I sometimes comment on the limitations of words, description, debate, assertion and proof, but I don’t debate it.
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If you believe and argue that words describe all of Reality, then you can win that argument without opposition.
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…even if one might wonder how words, none of which can even be noncircularly defined, can accurately describe Reality.
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I’d said:
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What assumption(s) do you think it [Faraday’s or my metaphysics] depends on?

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You replied:
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I don't know. I have no idea what you are trying to say in your post after the sentence quoted above.

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On the previous occasion when you said that, I invited you to specify a particular claim, conclusion, statement, sentence, phrase, word or term that you didn’t understand the meaning of, and said that, if you did so, I’d be glad to clarify it.
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But, if you don’t, or if you say that you just don’t understand anything that I say, then obviously there’s no point in my saying anything to you, and you’ve concluded this conversation.
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If it is a claim you are trying to make, though, it must rest on some premise in order to count as a claim at all

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…and that’s why, in a recent reply, one or two posts ago, I repeated the two premises of my argument for my metaphysics.
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But I repeat that I don’t assert that this physical world isn’t more than what I’ve described. I merely point out that there’s no reason to believe that it’s more than, or other than, that.
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, and no premises are true by definition.

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Mine were things that we agree on, from our experience.
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It’s good for the premise(s) of an argument to be things that are agreed-on.
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…your definition of events as "if-then propositions"...

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I don’t have time to correct mis-quotes. Usually I won’t copy or mention them.
-----------------------------
I realize that it can be difficult to even consider anything different from what we’ve been taught, starting in primary-school. I just want you to know that I understand about that.
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But Empiricism and Subjective-Idealism have been expressed by a number of highly-respected classic-philosophers.
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In fact, even today, there are Idealists and Non-Substantialists.
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So, let’s not try to claim that such proposals are philosophically beyond-the-pale.
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In particular, physicist Michael Faraday was and is highly-respected, with full credibility.
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Frank Tippler and Max Tegmark, too, are well-established physicists.
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(…but they’re mistaken when they say that this physical universe is or might be someone’s computer-simulation).
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…but, speaking of the “Simulation-Theory”, lots of people here believe it, advocate it, or at least consider it a possibility. It isn’t. But if you believe it or consider it, then you’re closer than you think to Faraday’s metaphysics.
.
Michael Ossipoff

I don't think @Pseudonym has been arguing that the content being argued over in metaphysical debates is meaningless, but that the idea that one or other competing metaphysical system is the "right" one, and hence the "disagreement" itself, is meaningless, because of the general undecidability of metaphysical arguments. I have agreed with what @Pseudonym has been arguing in this thread, and I have been arguing the same point, according to my understanding. Pseudonym will no doubt correct me if I have misunderstood.

You not going to pull the old "If all metaphysical arguments are meaningless, then yours is too" card are you? Firstly the argument that metaphysical theories are undecidable is not a metaphysical argument, but a logical and phenomenological one. If you think you can logically demonstrate that metaphysical arguments are decidable then I'd be happy to hear what you have to say. The phenomenological point is that if they were decidable we would all have long since agreed on the one true metaphysics, just as we are all in general agreement over empirical matters.

Mine were things that we agree on, from our experience. — Michael Ossipoff

The only things we generally agree on "from our experience" are empirical matters.

The only things we generally agree on "from our experience" are empirical matters. — Janus

...like the ones that I named as premises.

Michael Ossipoff

Empirical beliefs cannot be premises for metaphysical arguments.

Empirical beliefs cannot be premises for metaphysical speculations. — Janus

Anything that we agree on can be used as a premise.

And no, my metaphysical proposal didn't include speculation. As I said, there's no place for speculation in metaphysics (...but I admit that (as Wayfarer pointed out) my meaning for "metaphysicss" is less broad than the usual one.)

Michael Ossipoff

What's the point of discussing it if you make up your own meaning for the term 'metaphysics"?

What's the point of discussing it if you make up your own meaning for the term 'metaphysics"? — Janus

Now that Wayfarer mentioned it, I did once notice a dictionary definition of metaphysics as the discussion of Ultimate Reality. ...much more ambitious a topic than what I discuss.

You're right, that I shouldn't use a word with a definition different from its standard meaning.

So instead of "metaphysics", maybe i should say "describable, assertable, debatable metaphysics".

(...or replace that with an abbreviation of some kind).

Michael Ossipoff

I can't see how your metaphysics could be both free of speculation, and "debatable". If it were totally unreliant on speculation, then it would self-evident to everyone and simply undebatable.

I can think of "hinge propositions" (to use Wittgenstein's term) or "background understandings", which might qualify, but such things tell us nothing about metaphysics.

I can't see how your metaphysics could be both free of speculation, and "debatable". — Janus

Something can be valid, non-speculative, and still debatable--if someone wants to make a losing debate by taking an incorrect position.

"Debatabe" needn't mean "speculative", "undecidable" or "indeterminate". The square root of 31 is debatable by two students, one of whom is doing the problem wrong.

If it were totally unreliant on speculation, then it would self-evident to everyone and simply undebatable.

Not necessarily. In various areas (but maybe especially in philosophy), people have prejudices and prior positions that they don't easily reconsider. That makes plenty of opportunity for debates. Something can be correct, without being self-evident to people who are (maybe subconsciously) prejudicially attached to their position.

It happens all the time here, doesn't it?

Michael Ossipoff

If it is possible for someone of my intellect and knowledge to be wrong about the way things are, how do I know that it is not me? — Pseudonym

In my view, you're just making a case for sophistry in this thread.

So, if no one else on here agrees with your "one true self-evident metaphysical system" (which is not a metaphysical system at all in any conventional sense since it relies on no speculative premises) they are all wrong? Jesus, man, time for a reality check!

You not going to pull the old "If all metaphysical arguments are meaningless, then yours is too" card are you? — Janus

This is a legitimate criticism of Carnap's position on metaphysics and verificationsim in general.

We need to address another issue in considering verificationism, the persistent criticism that it is self-undercutting. The argument for this claim goes like this: The principle claims that every meaningful sentence is either analytic or verifiable. Well, the principle itself is surely not analytic; we understand the meanings of the words in it perfectly well because we understand our own language. And we still do not think it true, so it cannot be true in virtue of meaning. And it is not verifiable either (whatever we choose ‘verifiable’ to mean).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-empiricism/#EmpVerAntMet — SEP

However, and this ties back to the OP, I do see from that article Carnap came up with the idea of "Tolerance" in response to the criticism the verficationism and metaphysics being meaningless undercuts itself. Under tolerance, verificationism is a practical consideration, because the alternative is endless debates that can't be resolved. So although metaphysicians are capable of proposing grammars and inferences for metaphysical positions that are meaningful, it doesn't resolve the debates.

Correspondingly, what Carnap called metaphysics is then treated as though it is, as a matter of brute fact, unintelligible. But what is announced thus dogmatically can be rejected equally dogmatically. Once tolerance is in place, alternative philosophic positions, including metaphysical ones, are construed as alternative proposals for structuring the language of science.

~ a couple paragraphs down — SEP

This is a legitimate criticism of Carnap's position on metaphysics and verificationsim in general. — Marchesk

Maybe, but it's not relevant to what is being argued by those to whom it is directed.

Maybe, but it's not relevant to what is being argued by those to whom it is directed. — Janus

Well, almost the entire thread is a disagreement over whether metaphysical statements can be meaningful which boils down to:

Pro: Example provided.
Anti: Not meaningful.
Pro: Yes it is.
Anti: No it's not
Both: discussion of why it is, or is not meaningful.

So on the anti side, how can this debate be any more meaningful than debates over examples given?

Yes, but the issue is decidability not meaningfulness. I for one, already said the LPs went too far in saying that metaphysical statements are meaningless. Decidability is not all or nothing either; as I said earlier it is on a continuum. Statements have to be decidable enough, that disagreement over them (not the statements themselves, mind) can be meaningful.

So, if no one else on here agrees with your "one true self-evident metaphysical system" they are all wrong? — Janus

1. Strictly speaking, even by the less-broad way I've been using the word "metaphysics", what I've been proposing isn't really a true metaphysics, because I'm not asserting how things are. I'm merely saying that there's no reason to believe that this physical world is more than I've described.

What I've been saying could better be called a metaphysical statement, rather than a metaphysics.

I agree with those here who say that it's impossible to reliably say that things are a certain particular way, that a particular metaphysical description is the correct one. The matter is undecidable.

That's why I don't assert that it isn't true that, superflously, unparsimoniously, unverifable and unfalsifiably, your experience is (in some way) more than the hypothetical experience-story that I've described.

And likewise I don't assert that this physical world isn't more than the hypothetical setting in that hypothetical story.

I merely say that there's no reason to believe that your experience is more than that, or that this physical world is more than that.

2. Instead of calling someone "wrong" if he doesn't agree with my statement in the paragraph directly above this one, I merely invite him to share with us what's wrong with my argument for that statement. ...or why the statement is incorrect.

Isn't that better than assertions about "wrong"?

3, We often hear mutually-contradictory theories here. Can they all be right?

Michael Ossipoff

Yes, but the issue is decidability not meaningfulness. I for one, already said the LPs went too far in saying that metaphysical statements are meaningless. Decidability is not all or nothing either; as I said earlier it is on a continuum. Statements have to be decidable enough, that disagreement over them (not the statements themselves, mind) can be meaningful. — Janus

Yes, you did. I tend to agree with you. But doesn't that make the dispute in this thread undecidable, if meaningful?

IOW, these kinds of disputes have a difficulty escaping the same critique that they put forth.

From listening to the Partially Examined Podcast on Carnap, he seems to have been a rather tolerant and pragmatic fellow, saying that he had no trouble conversing in different metaphysical talk with people holding those views, while remaining unattached to any of them.

It would seem his argument that metaphysics is meaningless was based more for pragmatic (scientific, empirical) reasons than strictly logical ones.

Carnap was at heart a pragmatist.

no one else on here agrees — Janus

But Michael Faraday did.

And Frank Tippler and Max Tegmark partly agree.

And the many people here who believe in, or at least consider possible, the Simulation-Theory, agree with me to a greater degree than you might think.

Michael Ossipoff

There is a considerable difference between acknowledging that something is logically possible, that it might be physically possible, considering it to be plausible, thinking it is likely and actually believing in it.

And I'm thinking here of empirical scenarios. The "simulation theory" is an empirical, not a metaphysical scenario.

Metaphysical pictures involve infinity and the eternity, even if it is only to entertain the possibility that there might be no infinity and eternity.

I don't think Pseudonym has been arguing that the content being argued over in metaphysical debates is meaningless, but that the idea that one or other competing metaphysical system is the "right" one, and hence the "disagreement" itself, is meaningless, because of the general undecidability of metaphysical arguments. I have agreed with what @Pseudonym has been arguing in this thread, and I have been arguing the same point, according to my understanding. Pseudonym will no doubt correct me if I have misunderstood. — Janus

I think I have read Pseudo correctly. Here's where I asked and s/he answered that very question in the affirmative...

So the argument is that when two opposing/contradictory metaphysical camps have contradictory criteria for what counts as wrong, when either calls the others' argument "wrong" the calling itself is meaningless as a result of the lack of agreement regarding what counts as "wrong"?
— creativesoul

Yes, but it's not just 'when' they have contradictory criteria for what counts as 'wrong', it is virtually inevitable that they will (if only in some small way). These are relatively clever people, they're not gong to present an argument they can see is wrong. It's most likely that they have a different idea of what constitutes wrong. It's the default position rather than an occasion misfortune. — Pseudonym

You not going to pull the old "If all metaphysical arguments are meaningless, then yours is too" card are you? — Janus

That's not the argument s/he made, so that sort of reply wouldn't be appropriate for me. However, if s/he had made such an argument, then that response would certainly be warranted. In such a situation, someone like yourself, judging from the sidelines, would be poisoning the well solely by virtue of putting such a question to me. It would succeed only if the reader weren't well-versed in spotting fallacy in the wild, because there's not a thing wrong with the response you're aiming to discredit if it follows the claim that all metaphysical arguments are meaningless.

No, I'm thinking that Psuedo's position is quite a bit more nuanced than that. However, as s/he indicated earlier, I've grasped it well enough to at least begin further parsing. Speaking of which, there are quite a few dubious presuppositions underwriting Psuedo's contributions here. I've yet to have gotten to them, for keeping the discussion in line with or directly about the quality of metaphysical arguments is important. It's difficult to do both at once, but that seems necessary to retain the spirit of the thread while simultaneously pointing out error in his/her contributions.

For example, it is clear that s/he is working from a questionable conception of thought and/or belief. The evidence for that is in the paragraph above when s/he confirmed that I had understood the argument s/he was making. There also seems a bit of ignorance is at work. It's the same bit of ignorance that was at work with Carnap. Ignorance about how meaning emerges onto the world stage. Both, s/he and Carnap, conflate what it takes to be meaningful with what it takes to be verifiable/falsifiable. The current terminological choice is "undecidable". All of that demonstrates an elementary mistake in understanding. I suspect that that is nothing more and nothing less that the logical consequence of a few different utterly inadequate(mis)conceptions.

Firstly the argument that metaphysical theories are undecidable is not a metaphysical argument, but a logical and phenomenological one... — Janus

Well no, I'll have to offer a slight but crucial correction. First, the thread began by asserting that all metaphysical debates were meaningless. Carnap's position was originally put forth in support of that charge as the OP shows. Since then Psuedo has taken the reigns from Carnap and argued that all metaphysical debates were meaningless as a result of being unverifiable/unfalsifiable, and most currently undecidable. Now, secondly, what counts as being meaningful is itself a metaphysical position/argument. The evidence offered in support of this claim consisted of metaphysical debates where the opposing camps were working from seemingly incommensurate terminological frameworks(notions, conceptions, frames of reference, criteria, etc.) Psuedo seems to hold that the purported meaninglessness inherent to metaphysical debates is a direct result from the opposing camps working from different senses of key words.

Now... Zoom out from the focus upon the historical metaphysical positions and zoom in on this discussion.

It is still the case that our discussion here consists of arguing over what counts as being meaningful. My position on that has been neither elucidated nor changed during the course of this thread. It seems that Psuedo's has. It looks like a clear cut case of Psuedo's moving the goalposts. That is, in the beginning s/he worked from a criterion for what counts as being meaningful that required the candidate(a metaphysical debate in this case) to be verifiable/falsifiable. Since then, the criterion for what counts as being meaningful has been expanded to include being decidable.

So the conflation between what counts as being meaningful and what counts as being verifiable/falsifiable continues unabated.

The operative underlying general problem is the conflation of truth and meaning.

If you think you can logically demonstrate that metaphysical arguments are decidable then I'd be happy to hear what you have to say. — Janus

Logically demonstrate that a metaphysical debate is decidable? Surely you are not doubting the ability for any one of us to come up with such a simple syllogism? One could be offered in support of either camp. I suspect by either side. Logical argument presupposes both truth and meaning. Seeing how the debate is about what counts as being meaningful, logical argument alone proves an inadequate method. That's the whole getting 'beneath' language issue...

I'll do one better...

What counts as being meaningful is a metaphysical consideration. That is exactly what is currently in contention between Psuedo, yourself, and myself. When two opposing camps have conflicting criteria for what counts as being meaningful, which one or possibly if both is/are correct, right, and true can most certainly be decided.

The community of speakers will confirm or deny whether or not something is meaningful. Some things have more than one meaning. That's perfectly acceptable and well understood. Some of those things are words. Also nothing wrong with that. Some use this sense of a word, and others use that one. Again, nothing wrong here. Some argue from this sense with others who are arguing from that one. It does not follow that the debate itself is meaningless. Rather, it would be much better said that there were too much meaning...

:wink:

The phenomenological point is that if they were decidable we would all have long since agreed on the one true metaphysics, just as we are all in general agreement over empirical matters. — Janus

This argument doesn't hold either. Being decidable and/or verifiable/falsifiable doesn't guarantee agreement. Have you looked towards the outside world lately?

But doesn't that make the dispute in this thread undecidable, if meaningful? — Marchesk

I don't think it does; because the question as to whether the truth of metaphysical conjectures of statements is undecidable is itself decidable on both logical and empirical grounds. It can be demonstrated by logical analysis that the premises of metaphysical argument cannot be confirmed or dis-confirmed in any way analogous to the way empirical propositions can. It can also be empirically established that there has been no consensus about metaphysical "theories"; whereas there has been plenty of consensus about empirical propositions. For example no one disagrees with you when you say it is raining, if it is raining, or if you say the Sun rises in the East, Paris is the capital of France, and so on and on for countless other examples.

Since then Psuedo has taken the reigns from Carnap and argued that all metaphysical debates were meaningless as a result of being unverifiable/unfalsifiable, and most currently undecidable. — creativesoul

You are involved in precisely what you've called a meaningless debate. — creativesoul

Firstly it was I who first introduced the idea of "undecidability" into this thread, unless I am mistaken on account of not having read through the thread carefully enough. I don't want to answer for @Pseudonym, but only for my interpretation of what Pseudonym appears to be arguing.

I think Pseudonym is arguing that because the truth of metaphysical conjectures is undecidable, the notion that one position is the correct one and the other is the mistaken one is without sense, in other words incoherent and meaningless, and not arguing that the exchange of metaphysical ideas is meaningless per se. In any case this is what I have been arguing.

The question of meaning is a semantic, not a metaphysical matter. So your invocation of the usual argument against LP is inapt.

...the truth of metaphysical conjectures is undecidable, the notion that one position is the correct one and the other is the mistaken one is without sense, in other words incoherent and meaningless... In any case this is what I have been arguing. — Janus

We cannot check to see if a metaphysical position is true, therefore they are without meaning?

:worry:

C'mon Janus. You know better.

Furthermore, how can something be both incoherent and meaningless? Being incoherent means containing self-contradiction. Self contradiction requires meaning.

The question of meaning is a semantic, not a metaphysical matter. So your invocation of the usual argument against LP is inapt. — Janus

This is the kind of response that leaves me unimpressed.

The question at hand is what counts as being meaningful. That is, what is the criterion - which when met by a candidate - counts as that candidate being meaningful?

We have to know what a position is claiming in order to know whether or not we can check to see if it's true. That is, we have to know what a statement means in order to know whether or not it is verifiable/falsifiable.

This shows the inherent untenability and covert self-contradiction(incoherence) of the position that being unverifiable/unfalsifiable equates to being meaningless. This is a very generous reading.

Your first response is again inapt because I haven't denied the meaningfulness of metaphysical statements. How many times are you going to need this pointed out to you?

Your second response is irrelevant too. I have nowhere equated meaning or meaningfulness with decidablilty. Of course you have to know what something means in order to know whether it is decidable (let's stick to the terms already in use otherwise you will become even more confused). Do you know what the usual metaphysical positions are claiming?

When you say something cogent that actually relates to anything I've said, I'll respond.